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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 14, 2018 11:10:34 GMT -6
Four dimensions? Yes four. As we proceed in the game into the late 1920’s, 30’s, 40’s and early 50’s we are now in four-dimensional warfare.
1. Surface Warfare
2. Undersea Warfare
3. Air Warfare
4. Electronic Warfare
I have added the fourth dimension and now we should put all four together and discuss how we can research and utilize all four dimensions together, because we have now reached that interwar period where all of them were tested together. They all had an effect in WW2 and will in this game. The German’s lost the BOB because they did not pay attention to the British Radar Network and try to eliminate it. They started out trying to, but after a while, they went after cities. The Radars were the key.
We won the Battle of Midway primarily due to radio intercepts and good cryptography. The Japanese did not pay attention to the details and this was a major contributing factor.
All four of these dimensions, during the war played major role in victories and defeats. Now, let’s discuss all four together.
For the fourth dimension, we have radar, HF and UHF Radios, radio direction finders, radio homing devices, radio bombing systems, IFF, SONAR and many other innovations that contributed to the success or failures of navy's throughout the war and the period.
Note: In the 1960's, we added a fifth dimension.... space
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Post by axe99 on Sept 14, 2018 17:40:40 GMT -6
Nice one Oldpop. As I understand it, an important element of the fourth dimension is the dissemination of gathered intelligence - so the information systems that allow tracks of enemy aircraft and planes to be displayed in a vessel from its own sensors, as well as integrate the information from the vessels' own sensors into other information from other sources, from underwater sonar arrays to satellites (no satellites in RtW2 though I expect!) Things like the British target indication radar that was around late war, and the benefits of the circular PPI radar display over the previous 'oscilloscope-style' (sorry, I don't know the name of the earlier radar displays - suspect you might be able to cover that one off) are both things that are relevant to the time period, as are jamming (the Allies developed signal jammers against radio-guided munitions, for example).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 14, 2018 17:49:55 GMT -6
Nice one Oldpop. As I understand it, an important element of the fourth dimension is the dissemination of gathered intelligence - so the information systems that allow tracks of enemy aircraft and planes to be displayed in a vessel from its own sensors, as well as integrate the information from the vessels' own sensors into other information from other sources, from underwater sonar arrays to satellites (no satellites in RtW2 though I expect!) Things like the British target indication radar that was around late war, and the benefits of the circular PPI radar display over the previous 'oscilloscope-style' (sorry, I don't know the name of the earlier radar displays - suspect you might be able to cover that one off) are both things that are relevant to the time period, as are jamming (the Allies developed signal jammers against radio-guided munitions, for example). The scopes that were used by the Chain Home system were A-scan or A-scopes. They were sometimes given the name range scopes. The X-axis was the sweep calibrated in Range and the Y-axis was the signal amplitude. Airborne intercept radars used B-scan but then when the target is acquired, switch to C-scan. The key is threat assessment and dissemination of information as you indicated. All four elements are vital. As WW2 progressed, CIC's were either jerry-rigged or built into ships to gather, assess all raw data from all the sensors, then display and make decisions as to the combat tactics and actions. This is why four dimensional warfare and discussion of it, is vital. You cannot leave one out. Gamers who don't want to use submarines are leaving out an important element and the opponent then has an advantage. Simply put, we are moving away from the standard line astern, close with the enemy and let him have it. Now, we have to assess other threats like aircraft from carriers and land bases, submarines and the threat that the enemy is reading our mail. Now naval warfare should get interesting. Damn the Torpedoes, full speed ahead.
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Post by axe99 on Sept 15, 2018 15:39:56 GMT -6
The scopes that were used by the Chain Home system were A-scan or A-scopes. They were sometimes given the name range scopes. The X-axis was the sweep calibrated in Range and the Y-axis was the signal amplitude. Airborne intercept radars used B-scan but then when the target is acquired, switch to C-scan. The key is threat assessment and dissemination of information as you indicated. All four elements are vital. As WW2 progressed, CIC's were either jerry-rigged or built into ships to gather, assess all raw data from all the sensors, then display and make decisions as to the combat tactics and actions. This is why four dimensional warfare and discussion of it, is vital. You cannot leave one out. Gamers who don't want to use submarines are leaving out an important element and the opponent then has an advantage. Simply put, we are moving away from the standard line astern, close with the enemy and let him have it. Now, we have to assess other threats like aircraft from carriers and land bases, submarines and the threat that the enemy is reading our mail. Now naval warfare should get interesting. Damn the Torpedoes, full speed ahead. Cheers, had a feeling you'd know Agree that information management and use was key to 1940s naval warfare at the fleet level.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 15, 2018 16:00:47 GMT -6
The scopes that were used by the Chain Home system were A-scan or A-scopes. They were sometimes given the name range scopes. The X-axis was the sweep calibrated in Range and the Y-axis was the signal amplitude. Airborne intercept radars used B-scan but then when the target is acquired, switch to C-scan. The key is threat assessment and dissemination of information as you indicated. All four elements are vital. As WW2 progressed, CIC's were either jerry-rigged or built into ships to gather, assess all raw data from all the sensors, then display and make decisions as to the combat tactics and actions. This is why four dimensional warfare and discussion of it, is vital. You cannot leave one out. Gamers who don't want to use submarines are leaving out an important element and the opponent then has an advantage. Simply put, we are moving away from the standard line astern, close with the enemy and let him have it. Now, we have to assess other threats like aircraft from carriers and land bases, submarines and the threat that the enemy is reading our mail. Now naval warfare should get interesting. Damn the Torpedoes, full speed ahead. Cheers, had a feeling you'd know Agree that information management and use was key to 1940s naval warfare at the fleet level. By the start of WW2, we are now seeing the beginnings of information management and overload. Some of the AAR from early naval battles show that the rudimentary CIC teams were having difficulty managing all the data. It got better though. Here is a link to the CIC manual from the US Navy during WW2. You can pick what you want to read but you can get a good idea of what we are talking about. I can't tell you whether the game will allow this creation but it would be good.
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Post by ccip on Sept 17, 2018 12:57:15 GMT -6
The 4th dimension is super important! But I think much of it can be rolled into doctrine research and various battle modifiers, which I'm assuming it already is (in the same way doctrine research already affects probabilities of battle types, force setups, etc. in RTW 1). In the strategic game, it might be useful to distinguish between active emissions doctrine (i.e. EMCON) and passive emissions capabilities (i.e. ELINT), with both factoring into things like the likelihood of raider intercepts and battle setups, with the "noisier" nations at a disadvantage, and nations that are better at listening both more likely to pick up "quieter" units and avoid unwanted contract (plus perhaps a boost to espionage info).
In battle, it sounds like there's already electronic contacts with the accompanying uncertainty. I'm assuming there's some rudimentary EMCON commands, and honestly, I'd be perfectly happy if player control was kept to a minimum. It's definitely useful to have at least some command for ordering your force to go "stealthy" vs. maximize detection chances - but I don't think it's of any use to try specifying which ships should transmit, or specifically ordering FCR not to be used for gunnery. Those are not even captain-level decisions - that's more of a doctrine thing and there's no reason to mess with them since one assumes it'll have been worked out on exercises, they'll be doing as well as they can be expected with managing it, and mid-battle is not the time to experiment!
The key thing, which RTW has always excelled at, is to keep the player's role clearly defined - and the player has always been in the "Grand Admiral" role. Things that are outside of the scope of that role, like actual fire control or sensor usage, should stay subordinate to the AI, doctrine, battle generation logic, etc.
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Post by aeson on Sept 17, 2018 14:35:24 GMT -6
In battle, it sounds like there's already electronic contacts with the accompanying uncertainty. I'm assuming there's some rudimentary EMCON commands, and honestly, I'd be perfectly happy if player control was kept to a minimum. It's definitely useful to have at least some command for ordering your force to go "stealthy" vs. maximize detection chances - but I don't think it's of any use to try specifying which ships should transmit, or specifically ordering FCR not to be used for gunnery. Those are not even captain-level decisions - that's more of a doctrine thing and there's no reason to mess with them since one assumes it'll have been worked out on exercises, they'll be doing as well as they can be expected with managing it, and mid-battle is not the time to experiment! I think there's already RDF contacts in Rule the Waves - I had a battle recently where I received a report from E-DIENST (I think; don't recall exactly what the first letter was) indicating that Russian ships were operating somewhere to my southeast. I didn't have any ships named E-DIENST, I was playing as Germany, and the various *-Diensts were German intelligence sections historically, so I'm pretty sure it represented a radio intelligence report.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 17, 2018 16:58:37 GMT -6
When the two other elements are added to naval warfare, strategy and tactics do get much more complex. This was the reason for the CIC's being developed and installed. In any game, it can get a bit overwhelming for you, as War in the Pacific, Admiral's edition illustrates for anyone who plays it. I have great respect for the commanders after playing these games. However, identifying these elements and how they interact is still a valuable lesson in military strategy, in my opinion.
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Post by ccip on Sept 17, 2018 19:13:02 GMT -6
Yes indeed, there are already a whole bunch of passive long-distance detection mechanics - they're more used in the SAI campaigns but they all work roughly the same way, from what I understand - a probability per minute with a margin of error for ID and location, with things like proximity to units, bases, weather, doctrine etc. as modifiers. I don't see any problem continuing to use that for basically anything over-the-horizon. And it sounds like there's already a new mechanic for tracking and fire control radars. It'll be interesting to see how it all mixes with aircraft!
Actually one thing that I'm more curious about than sensors, in terms of the electronic dimensions, is comms/signals. It's a very abstracted dimension in RTW right now, and partly rolled into the tactics doctrines - which make a huge difference in how effective the fleets are by late game. I don't have any issue with that, but it'll be interesting to see how the post-1925 technology will factor into that. I imagine the problems of communicating with air units by themselves are gonna throw some wrenches into things!
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Post by director on Sept 20, 2018 18:37:00 GMT -6
This may or may not be related - I think it is - but I would rank the ability to assess and use intelligence at or above the actual technical ability required for radar, RDF et cetera.
The UK and US built impressive bureaucracies that - on paper - could process intelligence for a theater commander, but in practice there were notable failures: mishandling information to Jellicoe before Jutland, RK Turner refusing to forward a war warning to Kimmel before Pearl Harbor and the slow improvement in the quality of aerial recon information (for exactness and reliability) in the Guadalcanal campaign for three. I'm not as familiar with the staff services of other nations, but these examples highlight the importance of discerning what is true, what is important, and who needs it.
The old SSG 'Carriers At War' did a great job of showing the player what it was like to receive dozens of sighting reports with (sometimes) wildly improbable force estimates - or all-too-believable estimates - while all the time the clock is ticking: do you launch now at what could be a phantom or four actual carriers, or do you wait for better intel and likely get jumped? And if you must launch, which target is the best bet?
And let us not forget that, despite what radar promised and delivered, US admirals throughout the Guadalcanal campaign continued to command from non-radar-equipped heavy cruisers while US shipyards kept putting radar on light cruisers... The best information is worse than useless if you can't or won't use it.
Another innovation worthy of note was the gradual development of a combat information center, separate from the bridge and usually deep in the ship, where all available information could be concentrated, evaluated and used to direct the ship's systems in combat. This is (pardon the pun) a sea-change in the way ships were fought and it was so effective it is still used today.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 20, 2018 21:34:41 GMT -6
This may or may not be related - I think it is - but I would rank the ability to assess and use intelligence at or above the actual technical ability required for radar, RDF et cetera. The UK and US built impressive bureaucracies that - on paper - could process intelligence for a theater commander, but in practice there were notable failures: mishandling information to Jellicoe before Jutland, RK Turner refusing to forward a war warning to Kimmel before Pearl Harbor and the slow improvement in the quality of aerial recon information (for exactness and reliability) in the Guadalcanal campaign for three. I'm not as familiar with the staff services of other nations, but these examples highlight the importance of discerning what is true, what is important, and who needs it. The old SSG 'Carriers At War' did a great job of showing the player what it was like to receive dozens of sighting reports with (sometimes) wildly improbable force estimates - or all-too-believable estimates - while all the time the clock is ticking: do you launch now at what could be a phantom or four actual carriers, or do you wait for better intel and likely get jumped? And if you must launch, which target is the best bet? And let us not forget that, despite what radar promised and delivered, US admirals throughout the Guadalcanal campaign continued to command from non-radar-equipped heavy cruisers while US shipyards kept putting radar on light cruisers... The best information is worse than useless if you can't or won't use it. Another innovation worthy of note was the gradual development of a combat information center, separate from the bridge and usually deep in the ship, where all available information could be concentrated, evaluated and used to direct the ship's systems in combat. This is (pardon the pun) a sea-change in the way ships were fought and it was so effective it is still used today. I cannot agree more that the ability to examine, assess and use the intelligence information is critical. Our code breakers during WW2 excelled in their work. The decision to send the carriers north to defend Midway was made on a scant amount of information. This happened a lot in WW2 that battles were lost and won by valuable information being poorly handled.
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Post by alexbrunius on Sept 21, 2018 9:20:54 GMT -6
The forth dimension in Naval warfare relevant to the time period is IMO not electronic warfare but Information & Intelligence management (C3I). Jamming and Chaff ( Electronic warfare ) had a very marginal impact on naval warfare compared to C3I supporting systems like Radar, sonar or decryption. Definition of Electronic warfare: en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_warfare
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 21, 2018 10:59:03 GMT -6
The forth dimension in Naval warfare relevant to the time period is IMO not electronic warfare but Information & Intelligence management (C3I). Jamming and Chaff ( Electronic warfare ) had a very marginal impact on naval warfare compared to C3I supporting systems like Radar, sonar or decryption. Definition of Electronic warfare: en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electronic_warfareElectronic warfare was in its early stages at the beginning of the war, but by the end, it was a decisive area of military operations on both sides of the world. With the invention of wireless radios and especially radar, there began the struggle between RCM or radar countermeasure during the war. The name has since been modified to ECM. The AAF and the British both had a real array of electronic weapons to use against both the Germans and the Japanese. I don’t believe most people understand how important ECM and ECCM was and still is the military circles. This is due to its top-secret nature. Some of the equipment I used and worked on was based on late WW2 technology. Electronic Warfare is defined as “detect, deny, analyze and hinder the use of the EM spectrum. There is ESM or Electronic Support Measures used during ELINT periods, ECM and ECCM. Chaff and Jamming had more of an effect than is publicized for the reason I stated above, security. Jamming is not designed to completely eliminate an opponents radar, just provide a corridor for the aircraft to fly through and then the jamming shuts off. That's all it is designed to do, just provide a temporary path. However, information and intelligence management was vital and spurred by the need to coordinate signal intelligence with electronic radar and radio intelligence. The two are different. I wish I could be more specific, but I am not allowed.
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Post by alexbrunius on Sept 21, 2018 16:03:12 GMT -6
I am sure that it's not classified to provide examples of the impact of chaff, Jamming or EW from WW2 for the naval war.
At a time when many of the opposing powers ships or airplanes didn't have radar at all the ability to throw raspberry Jam on it cannot have been of any major importance.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 21, 2018 17:12:53 GMT -6
I am sure that it's not classified to provide examples of the impact of chaff, Jamming or EW from WW2 for the naval war. At a time when many of the opposing powers ships or airplanes didn't have radar at all the ability to throw raspberry Jam on it cannot have been of any major importance. Well, I don't know. Here is a quote from the Naval Mission to Japan in 1946. Seems the Japanese used it, I know the German's used it and I am absolutely certain that US and Great Britain used in the Strategic Bombing of Germany.
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