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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 27, 2018 10:17:28 GMT -6
We can't really know why Beatty did not talk to Evan-Thomas, there might have been some past animosities. I don't think this entered into the Jutland battle. Beatty despite his attitude was a professional and not everything that occurred in that battle was his fault. Jellicoe in his book admits that he allowed Beatty to get to far ahead of him. The distance was 69 miles, it should have been much closer. I will say the Grand Fleet was not aided by the Admiralty Operations section which performed poorly. I suspect that this was the reason that Jellicoe was relieved of the command and brought into the Admiralty to clean up the mess and make it more professional. Good stuff to research.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 27, 2018 15:12:47 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 28, 2018 11:49:35 GMT -6
I wanted to present an idea about the Interwar period and WW2 British naval development and operations. We know that in the Interwar period the British suffered, like all nations did, a depression. However, the depression and economic downturn they experienced was also fed by anger at the war losses and the debt that had been accumulated to build the fleet. A fleet that to many British subjects, was useless. They had a lot of pride in Nelson's navy but the modern 20th century British fleet never lived up to that ideal. This was a new century, new opponent and a now globalization was taking hold of the world. These factors and many others manifested themselves after the war in a nation that was really tired of spending so much money on expensive warships just to see them sit in Scapa Flow. I am not making this up, there are many writers and historians that agree with this line of thinking.
After the war, with the rise of Hitler, there was still no real naval threat as there had been in the early part of the century. The threat now was medium and long range bombers, dive bombers and fighters. This threat took time to unfold but it was there. Keep in mind, that grand strategy changes over time and it did for the British. They were heavily in debt, their new threat, because threat assessment is vital to guide the direction of military spending, was now a continental, land-based air force. In the Mediterranean, the British now had the Italian threat, as they did have a navy and an air force, along with an agreement with Germany. So the threat in the Mediterranean was now land-based, continental aircraft like bombers, dive bombers and fighters. There was also the threat of the improved submarines built by the German's and Italians. This changed geostrategy for the British and did force them to begin to investigate and prepare for home based air defenses. This is where the two fighters came from and of course, Chain Home High and low, their long range radar detection system. During this assessment, carrier aviation and carriers themselves suffered.
The RAF, being land-based and whose primary mission was air defense and close air support, built the kinds of planes that were more aligned with their needs... not the Royal Navy's. So, the Royal Navy suffered in the area of carriers and carrier aircraft. The Far East was not a mission that the British could really provide any Naval support, they were frankly more focused on the home islands and the Mediterranean, rightly so. They had basically turned over protection of their colonial assets in the Far East to the US with help from the Australians. However, they were realists, and knew that if the Japanese wanted Hong Kong and Singapore, they could take them before the British could really do anything about it. The ABDA force was a farce, all the nations involved knew that.
My point is that as with the early 20th century, the situation had changed from the past. For the Royal Navy in the early 20th century, naval strategy had changed from Nelson's day. The same held true for the RN of the late 1930's and 1940's. The ships we see them deploy and the aircraft, were not the best, but they could not focus on naval strategy in my opinion. They were hoping for French naval support in the Mediterranean but were very surprised by the Fall of France. This event also change the Far East since the Vichy Government essentially gave the Japanese Indochina. Now with the air bases at Saigon, they could easily strike any force moving out of Singapore to aid any invasion. The game in the Far East was essentially over.
I hope we can put all these changes into the discussion and realize why things occurred the way they did during the interwar period. I am hoping that Friedman identifies this British change of strategy in the book. It occurred possibly a year or two after Hitler's ascent to power. The Luftwaffe was not officially established until 26 February 1935 but I am certain that the British Intelligence was far ahead of that date in its assessment.
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Post by marcorossolini on Oct 12, 2018 8:54:16 GMT -6
Largely agree with what you'd say, but I'd suggest that the nature of the RN's strategic tasks hadn't actually changed in the last... however long, since Britain had first owned colonies. Those two tasks were to prevent enemies (who almost always had superior armies) from reaching the British isles and secondly to maintain communications with Britain's colonies, trading partners and the sources of all her wealth and ability to sustain the ability to fight. That was the aim in Nelson's time (or, alternatively, to hoover up all the enemy's colonies ) and so it would be in WW1 and in WW2 (see the battles for the Atlantic and of course the panic over the Scarborough raid - if they can get ships to us then they can get troops to us). To my mind, the basics were still the same regardless of period (and I haven't even read Mahan!) What had changed however to my mind was the nature of Britain's opponents. Britain had become poorer (and much poorer after WW1 - where the centre of world banking went from London to New York) and that only got worse through the depression. The decline of course had been taking place before hand too, see their move from splendid isolation to entente and the rise of German industry - which was able to maintain a decent fleet and the finest European land army at the same time. WW1 of course only accelerates the decline. At the same time, Britain is losing her colonies as well, and is watching new challengers approach, notably the US, but also Japan, which whilst certainly no match for all the Grand Fleet, would of course be a major problem for Britain in the pacific when it has to cover Britain as well. True, the fine points had changed, but I consider the broad scope to have been unaltered since about 1600 and the situation has only returned to a single aim (protect British homeland from attack) with maybe the Suez crisis or thereabouts when Great Power diplomacy ended well and truly (or at least until a certain little dustup in the Falklands).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 12, 2018 13:17:46 GMT -6
Largely agree with what you'd say, but I'd suggest that the nature of the RN's strategic tasks hadn't actually changed in the last... however long, since Britain had first owned colonies. Those two tasks were to prevent enemies (who almost always had superior armies) from reaching the British isles and secondly to maintain communications with Britain's colonies, trading partners and the sources of all her wealth and ability to sustain the ability to fight. That was the aim in Nelson's time (or, alternatively, to hoover up all the enemy's colonies ) and so it would be in WW1 and in WW2 (see the battles for the Atlantic and of course the panic over the Scarborough raid - if they can get ships to us then they can get troops to us). To my mind, the basics were still the same regardless of period (and I haven't even read Mahan!) What had changed however to my mind was the nature of Britain's opponents. Britain had become poorer (and much poorer after WW1 - where the centre of world banking went from London to New York) and that only got worse through the depression. The decline of course had been taking place before hand too, see their move from splendid isolation to entente and the rise of German industry - which was able to maintain a decent fleet and the finest European land army at the same time. WW1 of course only accelerates the decline. At the same time, Britain is losing her colonies as well, and is watching new challengers approach, notably the US, but also Japan, which whilst certainly no match for all the Grand Fleet, would of course be a major problem for Britain in the pacific when it has to cover Britain as well. True, the fine points had changed, but I consider the broad scope to have been unaltered since about 1600 and the situation has only returned to a single aim (protect British homeland from attack) with maybe the Suez crisis or thereabouts when Great Power diplomacy ended well and truly (or at least until a certain little dustup in the Falklands). Well, as I have stated, the British nation was still a maritime, island nation. That geographic situation had not changed. However, the financial and industrial revolutions during the late 19th century changed the picture. The British Navy was, in fact, obsolete both in ships and training. Fisher knew that, and that is why he brought home all those obsolete ships, scrapped them and developed newer ships to deal with trade warfare. It was why the British developed the treaty with the Japanese so that they could patrol the Far East for the British. These changes were radical for the British Navy. It is hard for us, one hundred odd years later to comprehend this. It doesn’t appear any thing changed, but in fact it actually did. Nothing would be the same. After this, the British would go downhill until the start of the World War and then the Interwar period would be the coup de gras for the British Empire. It was not just the fine points that changed, but the entire picture in the world with globalization, improvement in world finances etc. More than just opponents changed, everything changed. Business, finances, social and warfare all changed.
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Post by oaktree on Oct 15, 2018 15:50:25 GMT -6
Largely agree with what you'd say, but I'd suggest that the nature of the RN's strategic tasks hadn't actually changed in the last... however long, since Britain had first owned colonies. Those two tasks were to prevent enemies (who almost always had superior armies) from reaching the British isles and secondly to maintain communications with Britain's colonies, trading partners and the sources of all her wealth and ability to sustain the ability to fight. That was the aim in Nelson's time (or, alternatively, to hoover up all the enemy's colonies ) and so it would be in WW1 and in WW2 (see the battles for the Atlantic and of course the panic over the Scarborough raid - if they can get ships to us then they can get troops to us). To my mind, the basics were still the same regardless of period (and I haven't even read Mahan!) What had changed however to my mind was the nature of Britain's opponents. Britain had become poorer (and much poorer after WW1 - where the centre of world banking went from London to New York) and that only got worse through the depression. The decline of course had been taking place before hand too, see their move from splendid isolation to entente and the rise of German industry - which was able to maintain a decent fleet and the finest European land army at the same time. WW1 of course only accelerates the decline. At the same time, Britain is losing her colonies as well, and is watching new challengers approach, notably the US, but also Japan, which whilst certainly no match for all the Grand Fleet, would of course be a major problem for Britain in the pacific when it has to cover Britain as well. True, the fine points had changed, but I consider the broad scope to have been unaltered since about 1600 and the situation has only returned to a single aim (protect British homeland from attack) with maybe the Suez crisis or thereabouts when Great Power diplomacy ended well and truly (or at least until a certain little dustup in the Falklands). Well, as I have stated, the British nation was still a maritime, island nation. That geographic situation had not changed. However, the financial and industrial revolutions during the late 19th century changed the picture. The British Navy was, in fact, obsolete both in ships and training. Fisher knew that, and that is why he brought home all those obsolete ships, scrapped them and developed newer ships to deal with trade warfare. It was why the British developed the treaty with the Japanese so that they could patrol the Far East for the British. These changes were radical for the British Navy. It is hard for us, one hundred odd years later to comprehend this. It doesn’t appear any thing changed, but in fact it actually did. Nothing would be the same. After this, the British would go downhill until the start of the World War and then the Interwar period would be the coup de gras for the British Empire. It was not just the fine points that changed, but the entire picture in the world with globalization, improvement in world finances etc. More than just opponents changed, everything changed. Business, finances, social and warfare all changed. UK cruiser design in the 1920-30s went sort of ga-ga. They'd "introduced" the heavy cruiser with the Hawkins-class in 1915 armed with 7.5" guns. And, in reality, they might have preferred not to since their preference was for large numbers of small cruisers in order to protect trade routes. But they also needed to have a cruiser that could stand up to the cruisers of other navies. So they had a quandary of needing numbers and size, plus sufficient endurance (which is trading off armor or weapons for larger fuel tanks).
And as aircraft developed they wanted their cruisers to carry a seaplane to extend search range, and AAA guns to defend against aircraft, and still carry a decent torpedo armament. And not be budget breaking as well. Thus their treaty interest in limiting cruiser size (if possible). And overall they never quite hit on the right design it seems since all the ones they built had issues in one way or another. And as the radar and more AAA were needed their designs eventually gave up aircraft and some gave up a main gun turret in order to get space for all the extras.
The last was an issue all the navies had to deal with. The USN Cleveland-class were getting pretty top heavy by 1945. And the IJN designs were pushing the envelope from the get-go.
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Post by dorn on Oct 17, 2018 7:23:59 GMT -6
I have done some reading and I corrected my wrong view of Fisher in designing battlecruisers.
As it was something which was built but Fisher proposed much earlier (1905) the design of battleship with dreadnought firepower and armor but with speed of 25 knots, X4 design.
So British battlecruisers with her weak armor was effect by dismissing Fishers proposal for larger ship that have speed of battlecruiser but armor of battleship earlier as Fisher was not willing to sacrifice speed.
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Post by dorn on Oct 24, 2018 4:51:18 GMT -6
I have one question which I do not have answer for. May be I do not have the right information.
It is about supplying of Malta during WW2. The convoys went from Gibraltar through Strait of Sicily. Sometimes the most important was fuel which Malta lacks. Why did convoy sail from Gibraltar? Why did not sail from Alexandria? Strait of Sicily was the most dangerous space as Sicily airports were close enough.
As I am aware there were some convoys directly through Mediterranean to supply North Africa and empty convoys on way back. Why RN did not take one tanker into empty convoy with task to supply Malta? Why they did not use western way for some of supplies, especially ones as fuel which comes from east.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 24, 2018 18:17:58 GMT -6
I have one question which I do not have answer for. May be I do not have the right information. It is about supplying of Malta during WW2. The convoys went from Gibraltar through Strait of Sicily. Sometimes the most important was fuel which Malta lacks. Why did convoy sail from Gibraltar? Why did not sail from Alexandria? Strait of Sicily was the most dangerous space as Sicily airports were close enough. As I am aware there were some convoys directly through Mediterranean to supply North Africa and empty convoys on way back. Why RN did not take one tanker into empty convoy with task to supply Malta? Why they did not use western way for some of supplies, especially ones as fuel which comes from east. Well, take a look at this list.... it might answer your question. The real answer is simple.... look at a map. The distance from the Clyde to Suez is 12,860 miles. If a convoy makes a round trip, that is about 20,000 miles longer than through the Mediterranean. Merchant ships can barely make about 10-15 knots. Crunching the numbers, means that a convoy, on a good day would need 35 days to reach Cairo. Now, another issue is the Red Sea. When the convoy get to the Red Sea, at least early in the war, it has to deal with the Italian forces in Ethiopia. It wasn't until about May 1941 that Haile Selassie regained Addis Ababa and the Italian occupation was over. At the same time the Italians were in North Africa, Bizerte etc. See the issue.
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Post by dorn on Oct 24, 2018 23:41:33 GMT -6
I have one question which I do not have answer for. May be I do not have the right information. It is about supplying of Malta during WW2. The convoys went from Gibraltar through Strait of Sicily. Sometimes the most important was fuel which Malta lacks. Why did convoy sail from Gibraltar? Why did not sail from Alexandria? Strait of Sicily was the most dangerous space as Sicily airports were close enough. As I am aware there were some convoys directly through Mediterranean to supply North Africa and empty convoys on way back. Why RN did not take one tanker into empty convoy with task to supply Malta? Why they did not use western way for some of supplies, especially ones as fuel which comes from east. Well, take a look at this list.... it might answer your question. The real answer is simple.... look at a map. The distance from the Clyde to Suez is 12,860 miles. If a convoy makes a round trip, that is about 20,000 miles longer than through the Mediterranean. Merchant ships can barely make about 10-15 knots. Crunching the numbers, means that a convoy, on a good day would need 35 days to reach Cairo. Now, another issue is the Red Sea. When the convoy get to the Red Sea, at least early in the war, it has to deal with the Italian forces in Ethiopia. It wasn't until about May 1941 that Haile Selassie regained Addis Ababa and the Italian occupation was over. At the same time the Italians were in North Africa, Bizerte etc. See the issue. Thanks oldpop2000 for the nice table. For standard supplies I understand that convoy is created in west so going around Africa is really long and use a merchants whole time and block the tonnage for something else. But what about fuel, there were no oil refineries in Iran or Iraq?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2018 8:00:17 GMT -6
Well, take a look at this list.... it might answer your question. The real answer is simple.... look at a map. The distance from the Clyde to Suez is 12,860 miles. If a convoy makes a round trip, that is about 20,000 miles longer than through the Mediterranean. Merchant ships can barely make about 10-15 knots. Crunching the numbers, means that a convoy, on a good day would need 35 days to reach Cairo. Now, another issue is the Red Sea. When the convoy get to the Red Sea, at least early in the war, it has to deal with the Italian forces in Ethiopia. It wasn't until about May 1941 that Haile Selassie regained Addis Ababa and the Italian occupation was over. At the same time the Italians were in North Africa, Bizerte etc. See the issue. Thanks oldpop2000 for the nice table. For standard supplies I understand that convoy is created in west so going around Africa is really long and use a merchants whole time and block the tonnage for something else. But what about fuel, there were no oil refineries in Iran or Iraq? To aid in your understanding of the sea routes, I am providing another snippet from my friends book on the Med Convoys. Notice that there were sea routes from the US because that is where the oil came from, to be exact, Texas and Oklahoma. Here is a link to a site that has the Malta Convoy Code names to understand the list I provided in the previous post. Convoy's for Malta as you can see, began with an M. www.eurekaencyclopedia.com/index.php/Category:Siege_Of_Malta_and_The_Mediterranean_ConvoysOne more link that has the convoy's listed - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Allied_convoys_during_World_War_II_by_region
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Post by Airy W on Oct 26, 2018 12:50:43 GMT -6
I'm confused by that map. What is it showing? I dont think ships would have taken routes within the bands shown and the bands are so thick it's difficult to understand what they are connecting in more then a vague sense.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 26, 2018 13:00:50 GMT -6
I'm confused by that map. What is it showing? I dont think ships would have taken routes within the bands shown and the bands are so thick it's difficult to understand what they are connecting in more then a vague sense. The maps were designed to show the basic British sea routes at the beginning of the war around the world. By showing those routes one year after the war started the intent was to show how the sea routes increased in importance. As you can see by comparing the two maps, the routes around Africa increased dramatically and the new route was added to Australia. Also, the route through the Med was gone. I got this from Vince O'Hara's In Passage Perilous: Malta and the Convoy Battles of 1942. I hope that gives you a better explanation. I just did not have time to find and copy better more exacting maps but I am certain they exist.
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Post by Airy W on Oct 26, 2018 13:49:07 GMT -6
As a data science instructor it breaks my heart that someone painstakingly went to the trouble of making that when a bar chart would be more effective and take a fraction of the effort.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 26, 2018 14:21:40 GMT -6
As a data science instructor it breaks my heart that someone painstakingly went to the trouble of making that when a bar chart would be more effective and take a fraction of the effort. I majored in geography and minored in geology in college so I understand the reasoning behind presenting maps. A picture is worth a thousand words. Now, having said that, a bar chart along with the list of convoy's that I presented would add to the understanding of the situation during the war. The problem is that most readers probably would not necessarily have needed or cared about all that information. I read this book in its pre-published version in fact, my name is in the acknowledgements. He was aiming this book at a certain level of reader, not necessarily a reader with our education and experience in these matters. Here is a link to a very good document produced by the government about this subject. www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/h/history-convoy-routing-1945.html#appkb
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