German Naval Strategy in the 20th Century

[oldpop2000]

I think the idea of separating the naval strategies of the German's is a good idea but we can still compare with the British

[ramjb]

Ok, I'll break off with the first salvo then.


German naval strategy in both wars was a dismal disaster, at so many levels is hard to grasp. The pre-WW1 german bid to create a fleet to somehow counter the british without challenging it (it already sounds bad, doesn't it) was not only based on a flaw proposition, but it costed Germany an ally, and probably was one of the main reasons why WW1 happened alltogether.

First one has to remember that before the naval madness began in Germany, the UK and Germany had been close friends (Wilhem II's mother was english no less), and before that there had been a very long-lasting friendship and alliance between the UK and Prussia that had lasted since the days of Frederick the Great and had seen continuation through the Napoleonic wars and until the day the German Empire was declared, and beyond.

Tirpitz's madness (and Wilhem II's mixed love/hate relations towards the UK) didn't just break that long lasting alliance and friendship. It didn't just cost Germany an invaluable friend. It threw it away directly into the arms of the French-Russian alliance, turning it into a reluctant enemy, but an enemy nonetheless. Antagonizing the british in a naval race was the most stupid thing Germany could ever do, aswell, because Germany wasn't a naval nation - had never been a naval nation and didn't really have any reason to be a strong naval nation anyway (beyond the bare minimum needed to protect trade and colonial interests, but you didn't need a fleet the size of the one Tirpitz was constantly pushing for to achieve that).

Incredible ammounts of money and resources were thrown away at the creation of that fleet. To dredge channels and ports, to widen the Kiel canal, infrastructures, logistics, and then the ships themselves. Germany literally paid astronomical ammounts of money and dedicated an incredible ammount of resources and manpower to, literally, guarantee that the next time Germany went to war with France (which the French were only waiting for an opportunity to jump on to see it through) the UK would be an enemy aswell.

one can't get more stupid than that.


From the technical standpoint however, the germans, again a nation without any previous oceangoing tradition, were able to build a highly capable, powerful and efficient fleet starting out from almost 0 in a (relatively) few years. That was quite the feat. It actually was quite impressive because they didn't just need to build ships and infrastructure, that was only a matter of throwing enough money and resources to the problem: but it was much more far-reaching than that. In order to create the fleet they sought they had to design it first, and build it well later; to do that they needed knowledge they started without, know-how they started without at all levels (industrial, shipyards, etc), they had design ships of incredible (for the day) size without having done so ever before. Each of those was a huge challenge on their own. They achieved all those goals.

The creation of the HSF from bassically nothing into the 2nd biggest (by far compared with the 3rd) world navar power of the 1910s in just a few decades was one of the biggest military technological feats of modern history in my opinion and usually one that goes unnoticed.

They also raised an excellent navy from the human resource standpoint - german ships were manned with well trained crews and excellent officers through and through. The HSF was an amazing achievement from both the tecnhological and human resource standpoint - but also a cursed one for the reasons already stated avobe. A fleet big enough to antagonize your oldest ally turning it into your foe, still far from powerful enough to really challenge it's navy (something it was really never intended to do, and something that could've never done anyway given british shipbuilding capacity Germany would never win that race. Yet another proof that points out how foolish the whole enterprise was for the germans).

Summing up: no matter how impressive the technological feats involved in the construction of that fleet were, no matter how excellent their crews and officers were, the fact remains: building that ship was one of the worst blunders of modern history politics, and one of the most stupid decisions ever taken by any big power in the last 300 years.


I won't enter about the absolute disaster the german fleet was for the III Reich until we reach that point. Because that was something else XD.

[oldpop2000]

Germany as a nation and not a collection of Germanics states did not arrive on the Eurasian scene until 1870 or thereabouts. This makes a difference. Germany is a continental power, not a maritime power. The famous German General Staff and the old Prussian Junkers, due to their continental position never really understood the purpose of a strong navy. But as the industrialization began to occur, and a new commercial class, wealthy and prosperous, began to develop. They were forcing the adoption of protection for German commerce and for German overseas possessions. Remember also that the Emperor was of English descent, since his grandmother was England’s Queen Victoria and he want to be like the British and have large navy.

The Navy got its own independent chief of the navy in 1889 and it was independent of the Imperial Navy Office. The emperor also created his own Naval Cabinet. It was at this time, that the Emperor became over zealous about the Navy. This is the beginnings of the Imperial German Navy.

The first German Navy Act was enacted in 1898. It authorized 19 battleships, 8 armored coastal defense ships, 6 Large cruisers and 16 small cruisers. It also authorized 2 ships for East Africa, 1 for Central America and 3 for reserve. There was a total of 14 ships built for overseas service.

Germany is a continental nation by geography. She had naval bases, one at Kiel on the Baltic, one at Heligoland, One at Borkum, Emden, and Wilhelmshaven. There were others at Cuxhaven, Brunsbuttel with Kiel connected to Wilhelmshaven by the Kiel Canal. The German fleet either had to sail out of Kiel through the Kattegat or sail out into the North Sea. Both exits put them in the North Sea which is an enclosed sea protected by the British Royal Navy.

Now, was their decision to challenge the British Royal Navy with its three to four centuries of naval experience, not the best decision?  Reinhardt Scheer in his book about the High Seas Fleet states that a coastal navy would not have protected German trade routes and that that was why they built a battle fleet. Is this a valid reason? Well, he is correct, a coastal fleet cannot protect your commercial trade routes overseas. The real problem for the Germans was their diplomacy. First, they had the French still seething over the Franco-Prussian War loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Possibly they could have ameliorated that anger by giving it back and agreeing to some sort of non-aggression pact that would have protected the sovereignty of the Benelux countries which were high their list and the British. This would have possibly eliminated to certain degree any hostility by the British to the German building a battle fleet and maybe provided a reason for a non-aggression pact with both France and England. The second issue is the pact with Austria-Hungary, a nation that was already having internal difficulties which, had the heir to the throne not been assassinated, would have possibly corrected the social problems in the empire. This pact drew the German's into a conflict with Russia, giving France and England a good reason to come into the war especially to protect the Benelux countries. So, was the building of a battle fleet the reason for the German problems? I don't really think so. It just added to the mix. The Naval Race in the pre-WW1 era did not send the nations to war and the German desire for a battle fleet were justified, but their diplomacy was poor.  

[oaktree]

A superior battle fleet was *key* to Britain's security. Up through World War I they were following a "two-power" doctrine where the British fleet was as big as the next two navies combined. (Though German, American, and other industrializing was essentially making that impossible anyways.) Another European nation building any sort of battle fleet beyond coastal defense was going to make them concerned.

If trade protection was an issue, then to Britain the solution is to ask Britain to help you since their navy is at least partially geared towards doing that. If that means your colonies are at risk if you get into a fight with Britain... well Britain taking your colonies away during a European war was essentially what they had been doing since the 1700s. It was how they got things to trade back during the peace negotiations. And it seems that British policy towards Europe was generally to leave it alone as long as one power did not dominate most of Europe and interfere with their trade and profit making. (I think keeping the Low Countries independent was also a secondary concern since it helped keep an enemy out of the Channel ports that would be needed for an invasion.)

I think if Germany had built up a force of cruisers for overseas work the British would not have been as concerned. Yes, it would be a threat to their trade protection in having to counter raiders, but it would not have been a threat to Britain in control of the North Sea or influence in the Med with their main battle fleet being able to support a blockade.

(Going mainly from _Dreadnought_ here_)
It seems that Bismarck's overall policy for Germany was keeping France and Russia apart. Relations with Britain were friendly since, for the most part, Germany and Britain did not have any major reasons to be at odds, especially compared to British-French colonial frictions. Different spheres of interest. Wilhelm II came to power, dumped Bismarck, and then pretty much wrecked everything else - France and Russia allied, Britain and France patched up a bunch of issues, and construction started on a battle fleet that due to design could only have one purpose - challenge the Royal Navy for control of the North Sea.

[oldpop2000]

The first comment I have is that of the officers in the British and German fleets, only Beatty had any real combat experience. For Beatty it was Helgoland Bight and Dogger Bank, for Hipper it was the same. Interesting then, that the main losses to the British fleet occurred under the only officer with actual combat experience. This was true of both sides.

Now, German dockyards were newer and could build beamier ships than the British dockyards which due to their age, could not build ships over about 90 feet. For the Germans, this mean they could build beamier ships, which allows them to increase the armor protection. Due to their lack of range requirements since their fleet was designed to fight in the North Sea and the Baltic, they did not have to carry as much fuel. All this led them to design ships that were much more compartmentalized and consequently harder to sink. The German doctrine was to close with the enemy, since their ships could handle the sizes of shells. The British on the hand, could not. Design issue between the ships was important and must be considered.

Other issues about Jutland are: Scheer’s plan, and I will check this in his diary, was to send his subs out to monitor the British naval ports and be waiting for Beatty when he left port. Unfortunately for him, he did not realize that Room 40 had his codes from the Magdeburg. This allowed both British fleets to sail and be through the area of the submarines. He had lost the element of surprise and not the British had the advantage.

The British had lost one naval engagement at Coronel at the beginning of the war, but had won three others at Falkland Islands, Helgoland Bight and Dogger Bank, so the British had done well so far. I can’t say that for the German Navy.

Another issue that does not relate directly to Jutland but does figure into this whole issue is that of economics. In most of the 19th century, the British had a commanding economic lead. Its output of coal, pig iron and crude steel was more than twice that of any of the continental powers and the manufacturing of cotton textiles at Manchester was even larger. Much of this production was exported. Her share of world trade was 23 percent. However, after 1880’s the lead decreased substantially due to productions by the US, Japan and other world nations. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, the German Empire had overtaken Britain, in the output of pig iron and crude steel. England’s share of trade was now down to 14%. She still had the advantage in banking and shipping. Germany gained the ability to build capital ships in greater numbers and at a faster rate. Her advances in chemistry far exceeded the British along with electrical components. All this fits into the mix of the Naval Arms Race.

I believe that both sides made mistake leading to the battle, and during the battle. As with most battles, it is the side that makes the fewest mistakes, that generally wins. Weather played big part also, conditions in the North Sea are never good and with nothing but binoculars and range finders to sight with, along with smoke from the ships and gunfire, mistakes are easy to make. Signals using flags were not that helpful either neither were the crude wireless equipment. 

[oaktree]

Came across the following book in Powell's in Portland, OR. Did not pick it up since I don't have spare luggage space for the trip home. But it sounds like something that could be applied to this discussion.

Holger H Herwig - _Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941_

[oldpop2000]

Oct 15, 2018 21:27:46 GMT -6 oaktree said:

Came across the following book in Powell's in Portland, OR. Did not pick it up since I don't have spare luggage space for the trip home. But it sounds like something that could be applied to this discussion.

Holger H Herwig - _Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-1941_

The book is available in electronic format at Internet Archive, if you get a login. It is free. archive.org/details/politicsoffrustr00herw?q=Holger+H.+Herwig

[oaktree]

I'll take a look at that and potentially add it to the to-read list. Got a few books ahead of it in the reading order, including finishing the Friedman book that was not brought on the vacation.