Alt-History Santa Cruz Question

[enterprisefan]

Wikipedia Article On Wasp Below for context

"On Tuesday, 15 September 1942, the carriers Wasp and Hornet and battleship North Carolina with 10 other warships were escorting the transports carrying the 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal as reinforcements. Wasp was operating some 150 nautical miles (170 mi; 280 km) southeast of San Cristobal Island. Her aircraft were being refueled and rearmed for antisubmarine patrol missions and Wasp had been at general quarters from an hour before sunrise until the time when the morning search returned to the ship at 10:00. Thereafter, the ship was in condition 2, with the air department at flight quarters. The only contact with the Japanese that day had been a Japanese four-engined flying boat that was downed by one of Wasp's F4F Wildcats at 12:15.

About 14:20, the carrier turned into the wind to launch eight F4F Wildcats and 18 SBD Dauntlesses and to recover eight F4F Wildcats and three SBD Dauntlesses that had been airborne since before noon. Lt. (jg) Roland H. Kenton, USNR, flying a F4F-3 Wildcat of VF-71 was the last aircraft off the deck of Wasp. The ship rapidly completed the recovery of the 11 aircraft before turning to starboard, heeling slightly as she did so. At 14:44 a lookout reported "three torpedoes ... three points forward of the starboard beam".

A spread of six Type 95 torpedoes was fired at Wasp at about 14:44 from the tubes of the B1 Type submarine I-19. Wasp put over her rudder hard to starboard to avoid the salvo, but it was too late. Three torpedoes struck in quick succession about 14:45; one actually breached, left the water, and struck the ship slightly above the waterline. All hit in the vicinity of the ship's gasoline tanks and magazines. Two of the spread of torpedoes passed ahead of Wasp and were observed passing astern of Helena before O'Brien was hit by one at 14:51 while maneuvering to avoid the other. The sixth torpedo passed either astern or under Wasp, narrowly missed Lansdowne in Wasp's screen about 14:48, was seen by Mustin in North Carolina's screen about 14:50, and struck North Carolina about 14:52.

After consulting with Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Captain Sherman ordered "abandon ship" at 15:20. All badly injured men were lowered into rafts or rubber boats. Many unwounded men had to abandon ship from aft because the forward fires were burning with such intensity. The departure, as Sherman observed it, looked "orderly", and there was no panic. The only delays occurred when many men showed reluctance to leave until all the wounded had been taken off. The abandonment took nearly 40 minutes, and at 16:00 Sherman abandoned the ship once he was satisfied that no survivors were left on board.

Although the submarine hazard caused the accompanying destroyers to lie well clear or to shift position, they carried out rescue operations until Laffey, Lansdowne, Helena, and Salt Lake City had 1,946 men embarked. The fires on Wasp, drifting, traveled aft and there were four violent explosions at nightfall. Lansdowne was ordered to torpedo the carrier and stand by until she was sunk. Lansdowne's Mark 15 torpedoes had the same unrecognized flaws reported for the Mark 14 torpedo. The first two torpedoes were fired perfectly, but did not explode, leaving Lansdowne with only three more. The magnetic influence exploders on these were disabled and the depth set at 10 feet (3.0 m). All three detonated, but Wasp remained afloat for some time, sinking at 21:00. 193 men had died and, 366 were wounded during the attack. All but one of her 26 airborne aircraft made a safe trip to carrier Hornet nearby before Wasp sank, but 45 aircraft went down with the ship."



With the Saratoga out of action, this left Hornet and Enterprise as the two remaining operational fleet carriers in the Pacific. Enterprise was currently also not immediately available undergoing repairs from the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Though, she would return in time for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Now my alternative path begins, let us assume that for some reason TF-18 was not sighted or the attack was foiled and drove off before the Submarine had managed to make its attack.. Let's also assume that the USS Chester also avoided her own torpedoing several weeks later. In this alternative time line: Wasp CV-7, North Carolina BB-55, USS Chester CA-27, destroyer O'Brien (DD-415), USS Aaron Ward (DD-483), USS Lardner (DD-487), USS Lansdowne (DD-486) are all still fit for duty in late October, and are grouped. Let us also make the assumption that the Enterprise and her Task Group arrive in the same state as they did historically.

Now as Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands unfolds how if at all would the outcome change. Wasp was by no means a great carrier being a compromise design several knots slower then the Yorktowns, but she still contained a large air group and given the speed of North Carolina she would not have slowed the task group.  Therefore, would the battle be more of a draw or tactical victory?

Note: I make no allusions of being an expert, I am novice at this entire realm driven only be an urge to learn more about my families own history and a general love of anything nautical. While, I feel I have a good understanding of the Pacific Naval warfare after many an evening consumed by reading I know there are those far more knowledgeable than myself. So If I made any mistakes in any of my logic; I would like to apologize in advance. 

[oldpop2000]

Nov 6, 2018 20:50:37 GMT -6 enterprisefan said:

Wikipedia Article On Wasp Below for context

"On Tuesday, 15 September 1942, the carriers Wasp and Hornet and battleship North Carolina with 10 other warships were escorting the transports carrying the 7th Marine Regiment to Guadalcanal as reinforcements. Wasp was operating some 150 nautical miles (170 mi; 280 km) southeast of San Cristobal Island. Her aircraft were being refueled and rearmed for antisubmarine patrol missions and Wasp had been at general quarters from an hour before sunrise until the time when the morning search returned to the ship at 10:00. Thereafter, the ship was in condition 2, with the air department at flight quarters. The only contact with the Japanese that day had been a Japanese four-engined flying boat that was downed by one of Wasp's F4F Wildcats at 12:15.

About 14:20, the carrier turned into the wind to launch eight F4F Wildcats and 18 SBD Dauntlesses and to recover eight F4F Wildcats and three SBD Dauntlesses that had been airborne since before noon. Lt. (jg) Roland H. Kenton, USNR, flying a F4F-3 Wildcat of VF-71 was the last aircraft off the deck of Wasp. The ship rapidly completed the recovery of the 11 aircraft before turning to starboard, heeling slightly as she did so. At 14:44 a lookout reported "three torpedoes ... three points forward of the starboard beam".

A spread of six Type 95 torpedoes was fired at Wasp at about 14:44 from the tubes of the B1 Type submarine I-19. Wasp put over her rudder hard to starboard to avoid the salvo, but it was too late. Three torpedoes struck in quick succession about 14:45; one actually breached, left the water, and struck the ship slightly above the waterline. All hit in the vicinity of the ship's gasoline tanks and magazines. Two of the spread of torpedoes passed ahead of Wasp and were observed passing astern of Helena before O'Brien was hit by one at 14:51 while maneuvering to avoid the other. The sixth torpedo passed either astern or under Wasp, narrowly missed Lansdowne in Wasp's screen about 14:48, was seen by Mustin in North Carolina's screen about 14:50, and struck North Carolina about 14:52.

After consulting with Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, Captain Sherman ordered "abandon ship" at 15:20. All badly injured men were lowered into rafts or rubber boats. Many unwounded men had to abandon ship from aft because the forward fires were burning with such intensity. The departure, as Sherman observed it, looked "orderly", and there was no panic. The only delays occurred when many men showed reluctance to leave until all the wounded had been taken off. The abandonment took nearly 40 minutes, and at 16:00 Sherman abandoned the ship once he was satisfied that no survivors were left on board.

Although the submarine hazard caused the accompanying destroyers to lie well clear or to shift position, they carried out rescue operations until Laffey, Lansdowne, Helena, and Salt Lake City had 1,946 men embarked. The fires on Wasp, drifting, traveled aft and there were four violent explosions at nightfall. Lansdowne was ordered to torpedo the carrier and stand by until she was sunk. Lansdowne's Mark 15 torpedoes had the same unrecognized flaws reported for the Mark 14 torpedo. The first two torpedoes were fired perfectly, but did not explode, leaving Lansdowne with only three more. The magnetic influence exploders on these were disabled and the depth set at 10 feet (3.0 m). All three detonated, but Wasp remained afloat for some time, sinking at 21:00. 193 men had died and, 366 were wounded during the attack. All but one of her 26 airborne aircraft made a safe trip to carrier Hornet nearby before Wasp sank, but 45 aircraft went down with the ship."



With the Saratoga out of action, this left Hornet and Enterprise as the two remaining operational fleet carriers in the Pacific. Enterprise was currently also not immediately available undergoing repairs from the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Though, she would return in time for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Now my alternative path begins, let us assume that for some reason TF-18 was not sighted or the attack was foiled and drove off before the Submarine had managed to make its attack.. Let's also assume that the USS Chester also avoided her own torpedoing several weeks later. In this alternative time line: Wasp CV-7, North Carolina BB-55, USS Chester CA-27, destroyer O'Brien (DD-415), USS Aaron Ward (DD-483), USS Lardner (DD-487), USS Lansdowne (DD-486) are all still fit for duty in late October, and are grouped. Let us also make the assumption that the Enterprise and her Task Group arrive in the same state as they did historically.

Now as Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands unfolds how if at all would the outcome change. Wasp was by no means a great carrier being a compromise design several knots slower then the Yorktowns, but she still contained a large air group and given the speed of North Carolina she would not have slowed the task group.  Therefore, would the battle be more of a draw or tactical victory?

Note: I make no allusions of being an expert, I am novice at this entire realm driven only be an urge to learn more about my families own history and a general love of anything nautical. While, I feel I have a good understanding of the Pacific Naval warfare after many an evening consumed by reading I know there are those far more knowledgeable than myself. So If I made any mistakes in any of my logic; I would like to apologize in advance. 

My first question is why did the Battle of Santa Cruz even occur? The Japanese were making a strenuous effort to cut the communications and put Henderson Field out of commission to precede a full-scale amphibious landing. They were trying to eliminate land-based air opposition. They fully expected their land forces to capture Henderson. The drive failed terribly. Now the Japanese had to look to its naval forces. We detected a large force of merchants and combat forces in the Upper Solomon’s earmarked for the amphibious operation. A portion of the invasion had occurred landing over 10,000 men after a nighttime Battleship bombardment.


Now the Japanese were going to use their available battleships and carriers to stop any naval surface forces that we might send to stop this invasion. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the breach that the Japanese force made, did not last and they never reached Henderson Field. The field was still operational with aircraft.


Our naval forces primary mission was to stop the Japanese naval force. It would have made no difference to events, even if the battle had never occurred. Their land attack had failed, and the naval forces therefore would retreat, as they had done before. The Battle of Santa Cruz was a wasted effort. The key to the whole operation was the capture of Henderson Field. This failed and without Henderson’s capture, the whole offensive was wasted. The IJN was supposed to support the invasion and prevent us from intervening and when the offensive failed, the IJN was forced to retreat. Here is good article to read - www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2011-10/solving-mysteries-santa-cruz

Personally, I agree with this articles conclusions that we got the short end of the stick but the Japanese failed to take advantage of it. But even with a victory, I don't see the post-battle events really changing much. This battle was not lost due to numbers but timing. In the previous three carrier battles, we had detected the enemy force and launched faster. This gave us the victory in all of the three previous battles. In this battle, although we did detect the enemy force, we delayed our launch, and the Japanese won the battle. This was trend in the naval battles in the Pacific, find your opponent first and launch first and you will win the battle. 

[oaktree]

Adding the USS Wasp and several other USN ships to the roster for the Battle of Santa Cruz probably, as Oldpop2000 said, doesn't change things too much. The Japanese offensive fails. For the naval battle itself, whether these ships themselves do something to alleviate the USN losses (primarily USS Hornet) or increase the IJN losses significantly enough to affect future operations is unclear.

Chance plays a large part in these operations and there are multiple cases during this phase of the war of carrier strikes simply failing to find their targets - so Wasp's aircraft could possibly mean nothing to the battle. The additional ships of an additional task force being there might make the USN easier to find. And Japanese strikes might be diluted somewhat, or take greater losses to AAA and CAP, but they might also get greater success with more targets to go after as well.

[oldpop2000]

I want to remind all about what Henderson Field had at the time of the battle. She had 74 aircraft of which 32 were fighters, 27 were SBD’s, 8 TBF’s, 9 P-400’s, and 0 P-39’s. Essentially, she had an air wing. Just like the Midway operation, we would have two carrier air groups, but we also had an unsinkable carrier with a reasonable size air wing at Henderson Field. The four carriers fielded by the Japanese were not all fleet carriers, two; Junyo and Zuiho, were light carriers. Zuiho had an air wing of about 30 aircraft. Junyo had an air wing of about 53 aircraft but she had launched an airstrike on Henderson and probably did not have a full air wing any longer. Junyo had a top speed of 25 knots, Zuiho had a top speed of 28 knots.

To the question of having Wasp available. She could have provided A. fighter escorts and combat air patrols to protect the Task Force. B. Provided more attack aircraft, possibly having one complete strike package in reserve. C. Extra scouting and low-level torpedo bomber protection. However, without a timely launch, all this means nothing. You must find the enemy and launch immediately. That is how carrier battles were won. Carriers don’t fire salvos, they fire pulses of power.

After Santa Cruz, the situation in the SW Pacific was the following:

Japan started with three carriers and 212 aircraft, however only 1.5 carriers actually survived as Zuiho and Shokaku were both heavily damage. The lost over 100 aircraft.

US started with two carriers and 171 aircraft but only one carrier survived along with 97 aircraft.

There was no more carriers battles until 1944. We built fifteen carriers by that time, the japanese only manage to get to nine.

[dorn]

"US started with two carriers and 171 aircraft but only one carrier survived along with 97 aircraft."

Do not forget Robin in 1943 which increase USN carrier force strenght. ;-)

[oldpop2000]

Nov 7, 2018 13:45:25 GMT -6 dorn said:

"US started with two carriers and 171 aircraft but only one carrier survived along with 97 aircraft."

Do not forget Robin in 1943 which increase USN carrier force strenght. ;-)

Ha Ha! Yes, I will not forget the HMS Victorious. My dad's ship sailed with her.

[oldpop2000]

Now, as to counterfactual historical analysis of the Japanese operation and our response.

1. The Japanese land attack succeeds and they capture Henderson Field. The Marine either have to retreat or the Navy has to remove them. This would be difficult in Florida Straits so the carrier fleet would have to move closer and provide air cover. This would essentially anchor us near the island and might cause us to loose carriers and other ships. On the other hand, we might just send in a cruiser-destroyer squadron to escort the transports out. It's hard to really determine the outcome.

2. The land attack fails, and the Japanese Navy abandon's any attempt to support the island and decides to pull all of its remaining troops off the island as they eventually did in January 1943. This would have been the best path to take.

3. The land attack fails, the IJN tries to support a further landing, but we have Wasp and strike quickly upon location of their fleet. They lose at least one fleet carrier and one light carrier along many transports.

4. The land attack fails, the IJN tries to support a further landing of troops and we lose Enterprise and Hornet with no Wasp available. This was entirely possible.

Lots of ideas, just some of mine.

[oaktree]

On a longer counterfactual look, does the loss of Guadalcanal via the loss of Henderson Field, or a longer and bloodier campaign to hold it lead to a longer campaign to advance up the Solomons. And does it possibly lead to Operation Cartwheel being delayed or even canceled in favor of the drive towards Japan being centered on the Central Pacific island hopping?

[oldpop2000]

Nov 8, 2018 20:12:24 GMT -6 oaktree said:

On a longer counterfactual look, does the loss of Guadalcanal via the loss of Henderson Field, or a longer and bloodier campaign to hold it lead to a longer campaign to advance up the Solomons. And does it possibly lead to Operation Cartwheel being delayed or even canceled in favor of the drive towards Japan being centered on the Central Pacific island hopping?

The capture of Henderson Field and/or the destruction of the First Marine division will extend the campaign but the Allies had better logistics than the Japanese who just did not have any more divisions to place on the island. We could have just sealed it off and left it to die on the vine. We could then have deployed more Marine divisions and gone around Guadalcanal. Remember that we also had Florida island, they would have had to take that also.

The events on Guadalcanal, probably would have delayed cartwheel for a while, but not long. The Allies had learned a lesson; to bypass certain islands and leave them to wither on the vine, this is a lesson from cartwheel. The loss of Guadalcanal probably would have quickened our learning of that lesson. I know MacArthur would have learned the lesson quickly and just left small islands to die on the vine. Nimitz did not have to learn that lesson, our initial move through the Central Pacific would start over one year later, November 1943 in the Gilberts. After Tarawa, we would still have advanced to the Marshall Islands and taken Kwajalein. What happened at Guadalcanal and Santa Cruz would have had no real effect. We would have had at a minimum, five or six Essex class carriers available for that operation. The Japanese would only have had available possibly three fleet carriers but badly depleted air groups with no real experienced pilots. 

In any counterfactual historical analysis of the War in the Pacific, the two most important factors in order of importance was: A. Air superiority over the island and area B. Logistical support. Without those two factors, you cannot invade and maintain control over any island. The history in the Pacific verifies this.

[oldpop2000]

Let’s prepare a “back Story” for our possible counterfactual history. I am starting from the turning point in the Pacific, the Battle of Midway.

June 4th, 1942 – Japanese lose four fleet carriers and one heavy cruiser – Historians and strategist alike consider this the end of Japanese offensive operations.

June 21st, 1942- Japanese land troops on Gona on New Guinea. This is the start of a attrition campaign to take Port Moresby. It will fail eventually.

August 7th, 1942 – The First Marine Division is landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi and following day, they take Henderson Field.

August 8/9th Battle of Savo Island, Japanese failed to follow up this victory.

August 29th, 1942 Battle of the Eastern Solomon’s – Japanese lose Ryujo. One day later Saratoga is torpedo and heads to Hawaii for repairs.

September 15, 1942 Japanese submarine torpedoes Wasp and damages North Carolina.

This simple but it is accurate. Now, we can move down our alternate paths. If we assume the last event occurs, then the US has just Enterprise and Hornet. The Japanese have two fleet carriers and two light carriers but we have Henderson Field.

[oaktree]

OK. I will propose a start for one branch - On Oct 16, 1942 when traveling to Noumea to interview Admiral Ghormley's staff an accident happens and Admiral Halsey and immediate aides are lost at sea and presumed dead after an extensive search.

I think one immediate result is that Admiral Ghormley is not replaced on Oct 18, 1942 and thus remains as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific) for at least a while longer with corresponding issues regarding communications and squabbling subordinates. With Halsey lost there is a good chance that Adm Fletcher is retained to command the carriers instead of being given leave and essentially sidelined for the rest of the war. So the alt-Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands will be fought with a different American commander. There should be negative effects on the Solomon's Campaign, and possibly carrier operations throughout the rest of the war with Halsey not available to alternate command with Spruance.
a. Whoever eventually replaces Ghormley will have to deal with MacArthur during the Solomon's Campaign and Operation Cartwheel. (Halsey got along with MacArthur fairly well.)

c. A "brown shoe" Admiral will need to be found to be the 3rd Fleet leader since I have doubts Spruance will be left with the carrier fleet command full-time for 1944-45. If events run similar than this admiral will be commanding for the Battle of Leyte Gulf and need to make decisions regarding how the IJN is handled in the last large naval battle of the war. (I think the most likely candidates for this role would be Fletcher or Fitch. In fact Fitch could well be the admiral to replace Ghormley as well.)

[oldpop2000]

Nov 12, 2018 0:55:44 GMT -6 oaktree said:

OK. I will propose a start for one branch - On Oct 16, 1942 when traveling to Noumea to interview Admiral Ghormley's staff an accident happens and Admiral Halsey and immediate aides are lost at sea and presumed dead after an extensive search.

I think one immediate result is that Admiral Ghormley is not replaced on Oct 18, 1942 and thus remains as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific) for at least a while longer with corresponding issues regarding communications and squabbling subordinates. With Halsey lost there is a good chance that Adm Fletcher is retained to command the carriers instead of being given leave and essentially sidelined for the rest of the war. So the alt-Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands will be fought with a different American commander. There should be negative effects on the Solomon's Campaign, and possibly carrier operations throughout the rest of the war with Halsey not available to alternate command with Spruance.
a. Whoever eventually replaces Ghormley will have to deal with MacArthur during the Solomon's Campaign and Operation Cartwheel. (Halsey got along with MacArthur fairly well.)

c. A "brown shoe" Admiral will need to be found to be the 3rd Fleet leader since I have doubts Spruance will be left with the carrier fleet command full-time for 1944-45. If events run similar than this admiral will be commanding for the Battle of Leyte Gulf and need to make decisions regarding how the IJN is handled in the last large naval battle of the war. (I think the most likely candidates for this role would be Fletcher or Fitch. In fact Fitch could well be the admiral to replace Ghormley as well.)

First, I would replace Admiral Ghormley with an experienced admiral from the Pacific Fleet. Some officers of rank, are good administrators and organizers but not good at leading in combat. This was Admiral Ghormley. I believe that Wilson Brown, Soc McMorris, possibly Miles Browning with his aviation experience might be good choices. I think Ray Spruance could stay as commander of the 5th Fleet with Admiral Marc A. Mitscher taking over the 3rd fleet from Halsey. Admiral Fletcher could move to the Aleutians and do fine job up there. Willis Lee, Richard Kelly Turner and few others could move up and take command, they were experienced combat leaders and that is what was needed for the Solomon's campaign.

[oldpop2000]

FYI

This is the exact messages that relieved Admiral Ghormley from the Nimitz Graybook. I thought you might find it interesting.