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Post by admiralhood on Dec 6, 2018 16:02:18 GMT -6
Hi my fellow admirals, I just came up with some new ideas with some time and readiness related features for the aerial warfare: 1. Launching an airstrike could not be finished within a blink of an eye(I mean taking off and grouping). On land it should be decided by number of runways in airbase and on a carrier it should be related to the number of the elevators and catapults(which is decided by ship design). Also on a carrier, the quality of airman and ship crew could be taken into consideration. A good example would be in the Battle of Midway, the 4 IJN carriers(I believe their crew quality should be categorized as "Elite") launched 108 aircraft with 15 minutes and USS Hornet(CV-8), which entered into service only 8 months ago(the crew quality seems to be "Poor"), took nearly an hour to launch 44 planes. 2. Forming a new air group could not be finished within a month. A "WU" phase of 3 to 5 months would really be nice. In the "WU" phase the airman quality would be "Poor". Also, if the same air group, even a veteran, is switching to a new type of plane, there should be a crew quality and readiness(Which I will mention later) penalty. 3. Just like in the RTW where ships could have mechanical failures from time to time, the mission capability rates of the air forces could not be 100%. It could suffer from several factors. e.g. 3.1. If all the other conditions are same, an air group on a carrier should have a lower readiness rate, especially if your planes are using liquid-cooled engine. 3.2. In area where it is too hot, too humid or too cold, the readiness rate of an AG should suffer(like during the summer in the South Pacific area, actually I believe that the airman quality should suffer as well LOL). 3.3. In a air station where the base capability is lower(e.g. an small airfield on Guam vs an well-developed air field on Oahu, Hawii) or during wartime when a air station is blocked from supplies(like Rabaul after 1943), the readiness rate should be lower. 3.4. On a carrier where the crew quality is lower, the readiness rate of its AG should suffer. 3.5. The first several months of a new aircraft or after several years(e.g. into service for 5 years), the readiness rate should suffer(you know, the bathtub curve). 3.6. The readiness rate of an AG in a fraction with less developed aerial industry(like Japan, Italy or Russia) should suffer.
These are some of the ideas that just came into my mind this afternoon. I believe that they could make this game more lively and playable once implemented(e.g. A Japanese admiral could be more confident in putting in his surfaces forces during the time when the air superiority of its American opponent are reduced by the hostile climate). I would be more than happy to discuss with you admirals and sailors if you have similar ideas. 
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saden
New Member
Posts: 42 
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Post by saden on Dec 6, 2018 17:11:44 GMT -6
This sounds like an excellent idea, and putting sortie time dependent on crew quality doesn't seem like something that would be difficult to implement. Climate is a little iffy though, unsure how you could set that sort of thing up.
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Post by admiralhood on Dec 6, 2018 23:54:32 GMT -6
This sounds like an excellent idea, and putting sortie time dependent on crew quality doesn't seem like something that would be difficult to implement. Climate is a little iffy though, unsure how you could set that sort of thing up. It could be implemented like a penalty factor, e.g. starting from November to March, as for an air group located in Finland, the crew quality and the mission capable rate should decrease by 20% because of the winter attrition, which could inspire admirals to fight a surface battle instead during this time of the year instead of trying to get everything solved with immense fleet of B-17s/B-24s all the time. |
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Post by MateDow on Dec 7, 2018 0:12:27 GMT -6
It could be implemented like a penalty factor, e.g. starting from November to March, as for an air group located in Finland, the crew quality and the mission capable rate should decrease by 20% because of the winter attrition, which could inspire admirals to fight a surface battle instead during this time of the year instead of trying to get everything solved with immense fleet of B-17s/B-24s all the time. This could probably be implemented in the map file with a setting for each port and sea zone. A simple numerical value referencing a table for the effects. If you chose a 1-5 scale it could look like this... 1 - High latitudes, Northern Hemisphere 2 - Low latitudes, Northern Hemisphere 3 - Equatorial latitudes 4 - Low latitudes, Southern Hemisphere 5 - High latitudes, Southern Hemisphere This would allow a rough but simple system of "customizing" ports and sea zones for weather probabilities. Of course you could make the system more granular. |
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Post by alexbrunius on Dec 7, 2018 5:14:35 GMT -6
Hi my fellow admirals, I just came up with some new ideas with some time and readiness related features for the aerial warfare: 1. Launching an airstrike could not be finished within a blink of an eye(I mean taking off and grouping). On land it should be decided by number of runways in airbase and on a carrier it should be related to the number of the elevators and catapults(which is decided by ship design). Also on a carrier, the quality of airman and ship crew could be taken into consideration. A good example would be in the Battle of Midway, the 4 IJN carriers(I believe their crew quality should be categorized as "Elite") launched 108 aircraft with 15 minutes and USS Hornet(CV-8), which entered into service only 8 months ago(the crew quality seems to be "Poor"), took nearly an hour to launch 44 planes. There are two different things here that I think could be useful to separate. 1.) Experience of deck & maintenance crew, this determines mainly how quickly the airplanes can be turned around ( ready again to take off after landing having expended all their fuel and ammo ), but also to a smaller degree risk of accidents or issues in combat due to in-proper maintenance of engines/planes/guns. 2.) Experience of the aircrew and air commanders, this determines cohesion of strike, chance to locate the target and the chance to land bombs or torpedoes on target when making attacks, as well as how they do in air-combat vs enemy airplanes. |
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Post by corsair on Dec 7, 2018 19:23:52 GMT -6
A good example would be in the Battle of Midway, the 4 IJN carriers(I believe their crew quality should be categorized as "Elite") launched 108 aircraft with 15 minutes and USS Hornet(CV-8), which entered into service only 8 months ago(the crew quality seems to be "Poor"), took nearly an hour to launch 44 planes.
That had less to do with crew quality and much more to do with doctrinal differences.
The IJN operated their carriers as a group and organized strikes accordingly. For the Midway raid, only half the air strength of the carrier force was committed, with the remainder held in reserve onboard. The four carriers contributed equally to the strike, but the attack components were split up. Each carrier launched 9 fighters for the mission. Then, two carriers launched 18 dive bombers apiece while the other two carriers were each launching 18 torpedo bombers (armed with bombs). That added up to the 108 aircraft, comprising 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers, and 36 torpedo bombers armed with bombs.
By dividing up the strike package in this manner between ships, and by spreading the strike out evenly between the carriers (27 aircraft from each) and committing only half the total force available, that is how they were able to launch a large, combined strike in that short amount of time.
The USN at Midway, in contrast, had each carrier independently organizing its own strike group, even when operating in conjunction with other carriers. The Hornet and Enterprise also opted to launch full strikes, with the Hornet sending up 60 aircraft (10 fighters, 35 dive bombers, 15 torpedo bombers) while the Enterprise launched 57 (10 fighters, 33 dive bombers, 14 torpedo bombers), for a total of 117 aircraft being dispatched to attack the IJN carriers. So while each Japanese carrier only launched 27 aircraft, the Hornet and Enterprise each sent up more than double that number. So their strike taking longer should be expected, particularly since a full strike could not be spotted on the flight deck at once, meaning part would be launched and be in the air while the next portion would be brought up and spotted for launch. (This was complicated by the fact that weaker-than-expected winds on the day meant the dive and torpedo bombers had be be spotted further back on the flight deck than planned, which caused the portion being launched to be smaller necessitating additional cycles of bringing up aircraft from the hanger deck and spotting them for launch.)
If the Hornet and Enterprise had been using IJN-style doctrine, then each could have launched 5 fighters as escorts, then the Hornet could have launched its 15 torpedo bombers while the Enterprise was dispatching its 33 dive bombers, resulting in a strike of 58 aircraft. This probably would have sped up the mission launch time considerably and resulted in a more concentrated strike but at the cost of it consisting of only half the amount of aircraft actually sent.
All of which, I think, points to the idea of a technology called something like "Combined Strike Doctrine"in Fleet Tactics research in Rule the Waves 2 to allow the player the ability to operate their carrier groups along IJN doctrine if they so choose (with the proviso that the tactic only works with multiple-carrier forces, e.g. two CVs, four CVs, etc.).
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Post by bcoopactual on Dec 7, 2018 19:47:25 GMT -6
Welcome to the forum corsair , excellent post. Crew quality definitely paid a part as well as doctrine (not saying you are claiming otherwise, I'm just emphasizing both points). Not only was Hornet a relatively newly commissioned ship but as soon as they transferred to the Pacific they took on the Doolittle raiders which precluded flight ops on their deck until they were launched. Hornet's airgroup and plane handlers also didn't get the chance to benefit from the raids the other American carriers performed in the months between Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea. And you can compare the Yorktown's airgroup compared to Enterprise and Hornet. The most experienced of the three and veterans of Coral Sea, Yorktown's airgroup operated using the same doctrine as the other two but was the only one that managed to stay together and make a coordinated strike against the Japanese fleet. Not that it did their torpedo bombers much good. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 7, 2018 22:09:10 GMT -6
I just wanted present some facts about Yorktown and her air wing. After Coral Sea, she received three replacements for her squadrons. Saratoga’s VB-3 replace Yorktown’s VS-5, VF-3 replaced VF-42, her fighter squadron, and VT-3 replaced VT-5 her torpedo bomber squadron. Saratoga’s air wing had no experience since she had been torpedoed on January 11,1942 and had to return to the yard for repairs and upgrades. Her airwing stayed on Ewa Field. In point of fact, none of the three carriers at Midway; Hornet, Enterprise and Yorktown had experienced air wings. They had some leaders that had survived on Yorktown, but not the body of the air wings. Hornet’s were the newest and least experienced, Enterprise’s were the most experienced and had flown together since the start of the war.
On paper, it appeared that Yorktown's was the most experienced, in fact they were not. Enterprise actually was the most experienced. At Midway, Enterprise sank both Kaga and Akagi, while Yorktown only sank Soryu. Hiryu was sunk by 24 dive bombers from VS-6, 4 from VB-6 and 14 from VB-3 on Yorktown. On the whole, Enterprise actually sank or participated in sinking more ships if that is the criteria.
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Post by corsair on Dec 8, 2018 0:49:50 GMT -6
Welcome to the forum corsair , excellent post. Crew quality definitely paid a part as well as doctrine (not saying you are claiming otherwise, I'm just emphasizing both points). Not only was Hornet a relatively newly commissioned ship but as soon as they transferred to the Pacific they took on the Doolittle raiders which precluded flight ops on their deck until they were launched. Hornet's airgroup and plane handlers also didn't get the chance to benefit from the raids the other American carriers performed in the months between Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea. And you can compare the Yorktown's airgroup compared to Enterprise and Hornet. The most experienced of the three and veterans of Coral Sea, Yorktown's airgroup operated using the same doctrine as the other two but was the only one that managed to stay together and make a coordinated strike against the Japanese fleet. Not that it did their torpedo bombers much good.
Thanks for the welcome. I've been following the forthcoming game for a few months now, and decided to finally join the forum instead of just reading it.  In terms of crew quality, my initial thought is that it could be broken down into three areas: (1) Ship operations: these are the guys running the non-aviation aspects of the ship, i.e. the engines, guns, damage control, etc. (2) Aviation operations: these are the crew members responsible for maintenance, arming, fueling, deck handling, etc., of the aircraft onboard. (3) Aircrew: the fellows actually flying the aircraft. One could arguably combine #1 and #2 together, though keeping them separate makes sense as well.
In regards to aircrew quality, something specifically related to the training of aircrew ought to be on the training allocation screen. Training for aircrews matters a lot to how well they'll perform. The iJN had perhaps the best-trained aircrews in the world at the onset of war; by 1944, however, training had fallen off enormously and the result was things like the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. Skimping on pilot training means your aircrews won't last long.
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Post by hotellobby on Dec 8, 2018 19:42:14 GMT -6
Hornet’s were the newest and least experienced, Enterprise’s were the most experienced and had flown together since the start of the war. On paper, it appeared that Yorktown's was the most experienced, in fact they were not. Enterprise actually was the most experienced. At Midway, Enterprise sank both Kaga and Akagi, while Yorktown only sank Soryu. Hiryu was sunk by 24 dive bombers from VS-6, 4 from VB-6 and 14 from VB-3 on Yorktown. On the whole, Enterprise actually sank or participated in sinking more ships if that is the criteria. Just a further note about this, Enterprise's air group were also relatively incompetent. Standard practice was for the 2 dive bomber groups, when given 2 targets, to split up with the lead group taking the farther target. Because one of the air group leaders was inexperienced, all dive bombers actually attacked the near carrier (Kaga). Only the commander of the 2nd group and his 2 wingmen realized the error. If they hadn't been as good aims, then Enterprise would have missed Akagi altogether. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 8, 2018 20:09:47 GMT -6
Hornet’s were the newest and least experienced, Enterprise’s were the most experienced and had flown together since the start of the war. On paper, it appeared that Yorktown's was the most experienced, in fact they were not. Enterprise actually was the most experienced. At Midway, Enterprise sank both Kaga and Akagi, while Yorktown only sank Soryu. Hiryu was sunk by 24 dive bombers from VS-6, 4 from VB-6 and 14 from VB-3 on Yorktown. On the whole, Enterprise actually sank or participated in sinking more ships if that is the criteria. Just a further note about this, Enterprise's air group were also relatively incompetent. Standard practice was for the 2 dive bomber groups, when given 2 targets, to split up with the lead group taking the farther target. Because one of the air group leaders was inexperienced, all dive bombers actually attacked the near carrier (Kaga). Only the commander of the 2nd group and his 2 wingmen realized the error. If they hadn't been as good aims, then Enterprise would have missed Akagi altogether. I do agree that none of the carrier air groups were experienced and made mistakes. In war, the side that makes the fewest mistakes, generally wins. This is exactly what happened at Midway. I will tell you that flying at 20,000 FT. when you are reaching the end of your available petrol, can make you go after the first ship you can find. The Air Group commander designated by voice radio one CV target for himself and VS-6 and another for VB-6. Commander VB-6 thought his target was the "left Hand" CV. He gave the attack signal and releasing his other two division leaders for individual division maneuvering which was SOP at this time in the Navy. He began to attack the "left Hand" CV and the first division commander (Best) decided to go after the "right hand" CV which was Akagi. When you read the actual details, it wasn't that anyone made a mistake, it was simply that the two division commanders were now given freedom to act, and Richard Best did just that. I don't really see any real problems. In this kind of combat, things will get confusing. McCluskey's group had been flying and had seen nothing, the IJN was not at the designated spot, so he followed a destroyer and this led him to Kaga. Low on fuel I suspect, he made the assignments and went after Kaga and the rest is history. I still don't see much in the way of mistakes, they took the initiative, found the enemy ships and went after them. Personally, I think Enterprise's air group action was rather brilliant. They could not find the enemy fleet, used good judgement, found them and then went after them. |
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Post by corsair on Dec 9, 2018 1:30:03 GMT -6
Hornet’s were the newest and least experienced, Enterprise’s were the most experienced and had flown together since the start of the war. On paper, it appeared that Yorktown's was the most experienced, in fact they were not. Enterprise actually was the most experienced. At Midway, Enterprise sank both Kaga and Akagi, while Yorktown only sank Soryu. Hiryu was sunk by 24 dive bombers from VS-6, 4 from VB-6 and 14 from VB-3 on Yorktown. On the whole, Enterprise actually sank or participated in sinking more ships if that is the criteria. Just a further note about this, Enterprise's air group were also relatively incompetent. Standard practice was for the 2 dive bomber groups, when given 2 targets, to split up with the lead group taking the farther target. Because one of the air group leaders was inexperienced, all dive bombers actually attacked the near carrier (Kaga). Only the commander of the 2nd group and his 2 wingmen realized the error. If they hadn't been as good aims, then Enterprise would have missed Akagi altogether. Then, of course, there's the matter of Hornet's dive bomber group, which completely failed to find the Japanese carriers. Had those 35 SBDs arrived on the scene at about the same time as the Enterprise and Yorktown groups, things would have gone a lot worse for the IJN. |
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 9, 2018 10:18:16 GMT -6
From the AAR, USS Hornet:
This should make it clear that it was simply that they had been given a bearing to search, the enemy was not in that area, but had moved. It was, IMHO, a fault of the CIC for not having radioed to the air wing the change in the enemy’s course, not the pilots.
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Post by axe99 on Dec 9, 2018 15:45:39 GMT -6
Agreed Oldpop - my understanding is far more limited, but it's not that the Hornet pilots did anything wrong, but that the location of the IJN forces were uncertain. Indeed, a great many strike sorties during WW2 never found their target, due to issues like this (as well as things like weather and bad navigation), and I'm hoping this will make the game (I'd bet good money it would, given the wonderful details on carrier warfare we're seeing at the moment  . |
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Post by corsair on Dec 9, 2018 16:23:32 GMT -6
From the AAR, USS Hornet: This should make it clear that it was simply that they had been given a bearing to search, the enemy was not in that area, but had moved. It was, IMHO, a fault of the CIC for not having radioed to the air wing the change in the enemy’s course, not the pilots. And yet Hornet's torpedo bombers did find the Japanese carriers.
As I understand it, only one report from Hornet was filed after the battle. This contrasts to the numerous action reports filed by Enterprise regarding its operations during the battle. Indeed, the Enterprise commander even states in his report that Enterprise's records are to be considered more accurate than Hornet's. I came across one historian/researcher who has been digging into the matter who makes the case that Mitscher may well have falsified parts of Hornet's action report to cover up some rather shoddy operations.
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