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Post by generalvikus on Dec 17, 2018 3:24:49 GMT -6
Excellent point. While the risk of unrest would certainly make sense for democracies, it would not make sense in autocratic ones. Hmm, maybe for autocratic countries the effect of the Great Depression is that their naval budgets won't get slashed, but their chance of getting new funding is severely curtailed. E.g. events that would give additional funding are not issued. Instead, only being at war would give said increase in budget. This way it could somewhat reflect the reality that the autocratic government were able to keep their military budget but at the expense of their economy. Thoughts on this idea? I thought a little about this while writing my response, but couldn't make up my mind about it and still can't. From the perspective of the chief of a military service, living under a totalitarian system is objectively better; you're going to get more funding, no strikes, and if the depression is effecting you at all, re-armament is, if anything, going to be a solution rather than a problem. There's just one real downside, of course, and that is the risk of being shot. There are some related complications, though; even if you're not going to be shot, you're still more likely to suffer from the whims of the leadership than you would be in a liberal democracy. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that the intense inter-service struggle that took place in Japan could have occurred in any country in which the influence of the military establishment over society was not so great as it was there. The military was steering the government, and not the other way around, and this could be translated into a higher-risk event system for that type of government. Furthermore, consider some of the event choices that we already have. If you're at the risk of having your budget cut, normally you can choose to avoid it by taking a hit to prestige, tensions or unrest. If you're ordered to build a certain number of ships, you can normally choose not to do that as well - but are you really going to say 'no' to the Navy Comissar with a bad temper and an itchy trigger finger? Perhaps submarines really are your best bet, but if the Fuhrer wants big, shiny battleships, who are you to refuse him? Beyond that, if in a normal system you're concerned about unrest, but all of a sudden you find yourself suddenly not having to worry about the unions any more, this perhaps ought to be balanced by the fact that you have to take extra special care to keep your prestige moving onwards and upwards. In the aforementioned climate of intense inter-service competition, any drop in prestige should risk earning the displeasure or disinterest of the dictator - and the army and air force will be only too eager to exploit that. Fail to keep impressing the glory - hungry bosses, and severe budget cuts should be just around the corner - and perhaps one of your new battleships is going to get its guns commandeered for the army's extremely necessary and oh-so-practical siege guns... My point is that, in reality, being a dictatorship means more money for armaments no matter how you look at it, so I think this ought to be represented in game by a greater base allotment of the national resources. However, it can be balanced out by allowing the player to lose control of how this money is spent in a variety of ways, without unduly infringing on his ability to play the game.
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Post by firefox178 on Dec 17, 2018 10:07:29 GMT -6
Excellent point. While the risk of unrest would certainly make sense for democracies, it would not make sense in autocratic ones. Hmm, maybe for autocratic countries the effect of the Great Depression is that their naval budgets won't get slashed, but their chance of getting new funding is severely curtailed. E.g. events that would give additional funding are not issued. Instead, only being at war would give said increase in budget. This way it could somewhat reflect the reality that the autocratic government were able to keep their military budget but at the expense of their economy. Thoughts on this idea? I thought a little about this while writing my response, but couldn't make up my mind about it and still can't. From the perspective of the chief of a military service, living under a totalitarian system is objectively better; you're going to get more funding, no strikes, and if the depression is effecting you at all, re-armament is, if anything, going to be a solution rather than a problem. There's just one real downside, of course, and that is the risk of being shot. There are some related complications, though; even if you're not going to be shot, you're still more likely to suffer from the whims of the leadership than you would be in a liberal democracy. It is difficult to imagine, for example, that the intense inter-service struggle that took place in Japan could have occurred in any country in which the influence of the military establishment over society was not so great as it was there. The military was steering the government, and not the other way around, and this could be translated into a higher-risk event system for that type of government. Furthermore, consider some of the event choices that we already have. If you're at the risk of having your budget cut, normally you can choose to avoid it by taking a hit to prestige, tensions or unrest. If you're ordered to build a certain number of ships, you can normally choose not to do that as well - but are you really going to say 'no' to the Navy Comissar with a bad temper and an itchy trigger finger? Perhaps submarines really are your best bet, but if the Fuhrer wants big, shiny battleships, who are you to refuse him? Beyond that, if in a normal system you're concerned about unrest, but all of a sudden you find yourself suddenly not having to worry about the unions any more, this perhaps ought to be balanced by the fact that you have to take extra special care to keep your prestige moving onwards and upwards. In the aforementioned climate of intense inter-service competition, any drop in prestige should risk earning the displeasure or disinterest of the dictator - and the army and air force will be only too eager to exploit that. Fail to keep impressing the glory - hungry bosses, and severe budget cuts should be just around the corner - and perhaps one of your new battleships is going to get its guns commandeered for the army's extremely necessary and oh-so-practical siege guns... My point is that, in reality, being a dictatorship means more money for armaments no matter how you look at it, so I think this ought to be represented in game by a greater base allotment of the national resources. However, it can be balanced out by allowing the player to lose control of how this money is spent in a variety of ways, without unduly infringing on his ability to play the game. Excellent points. The main problem is how to simulate both the advantages and disadvantages of being under and autocratic regime. On one hand a secure source of funding, on the other a very cut throat politics and back room dealings. As such, my new suggestion is that, during the Great Depression the players in an autocratic regime, their prestige score is used as the basis of the events. If it is high enough the player is given the option to deny "suggestions" made by the Head of State, with the price being ones prestige. Or that said "suggestions" won't appear at all. Or maybe the player is even given the chance to use their prestige in exchange of additional funds. This is to reflect that the player is highly valued by the Head of State and that their personal input has great weight. If the players prestige score is in the middle then the "suggestions" made by the Head of State have a large prestige hit if the suggestion is denied. However, agreeing to do the orders only nets a slight increase in prestige. This set-up is meant to reflect that while you are not in high-esteem with the Head of State you are still secure in your position that only they can order you around and not the other military branches or other government organizations. If however the player has low prestige, then those "suggestions" have the possibility of the player losing their job if they say no. While agreeing to it only yields a slight increase in prestige. As such to give more options other potential source of prestige is necessary. And those are the other military branches or government departments in the regime. For example, a group approaches the player with the offer of additional prestige but at the cost of considerable funding. This is to represent the player making compromises in order to secure their position. Or that they were out-maneuvered and lost their funding to their rivals but kept their position. This is done so that the player has the option of being able to increase their prestige but at the price of being curtailed in what they could do later. E.g. lack of funding and sub-optimal choices could lay the seeds of the players downfall. The main idea is to reflect the high-risk high-reward dynamic in an autocratic regime. If your on the top you can feel invincible, but if you are struggling you can easily slip into a downward spiral ending in a lost play through. But it should be noted that these events should only fire if their is a Great Depression. That way, the player can feel the economic squeeze of the Depression. As for democratic governments, the choice between slashing the budget or increase unrest is enough. The only thing I would add is that the choice were the player is suggested to build a certain ship, is not added. I mean it would be weird for a government official to order the navy to build ships when their is a economic crises. This would reflect the fact that the democratic government is less likely to meddle in the affairs of the navy, while the navy also cannot dictate to the government. A less-risk but also less-reward option. And again this scenario should only apply during the Great Depression. As a final note, I think the Great Depression should be an optional choice and that it should affect the other A.I. nations as well. For example the A.I. would also experience some effects similar to the choices given to the players. E.g. a democratic nation either slashes their budget or experiences unrest. While an autocratic government either slashes their naval budgets to give to other branches or increases their navy budget. Or that they are building ships. Said events must be decided in random in how they happen but within the parameters set for either democratic or autocratic governments. That way players have the choice of whether they want to deal with these scenarios or not. And that if they do chose, they won't feel that only they are hampered by the Great Depression. Thoughts?
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Post by Fredrik W on Dec 17, 2018 12:51:30 GMT -6
Good discussion, thanks for some constructive ideas and input for RTW2.
There are depressions in RTW, as you can see in the events occasionally, though they are admittedly not as severe or long lasting as the "real" great depression. OTOH when I studied the effect of the depression on actual defense budgets for RTW I got the impression that it was not as dramatic as is commonly assumed. That is one reason that its effects in RTW are relatively mild compared to what one might expect.
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Post by firefox178 on Dec 18, 2018 0:00:08 GMT -6
Good discussion, thanks for some constructive ideas and input for RTW2. There are depressions in RTW, as you can see in the events occasionally, though they are admittedly not as severe or long lasting as the "real" great depression. OTOH when I studied the effect of the depression on actual defense budgets for RTW I got the impression that it was not as dramatic as is commonly assumed. That is one reason that its effects in RTW are relatively mild compared to what one might expect. Huh, did not know that. I actually presumed that with such poor economic prospect, the government would try to scale down their military budgets, at least for the democratic ones. Then again, the Washington Naval Treaty practically put a cap on naval spending for the majority of the Great Depression. There is not much budget to slash in the first place. And none of the major powers would risk to look weak, especially with World War 1 and it's effects still being felt. Also reading about the Washington Treaty showed that it was made in due part to the economic recessions being felt by the major powers just a few years after World War 1. Even if the Naval Treaty was rejected, their faltering economy would have seriously constricted them from doing so. Not to mention the Great Depression just a few years down the line would have throttled any naval expansion. As such, the only option is to find the balance between a large force to deter threats, while keeping it small enough to be fiscally sustainable. The Naval Treaty just formalized such balance. And history does support this. Once the Great Depression was going away, the governments went back to building new ships, regardless of the treaty signed. Economic constraints did more to enforce the Naval Treaty than any form of policing and enforcement ever could.
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Post by jeb94 on Dec 18, 2018 9:53:42 GMT -6
The reality is actually reversed at least for the British and Americans. Both nations used things like building warships, cruisers and destroyers, to help put people to work. Why cruisers? More liberal treaty limitations on the number of cruisers that could be built and they took a little time to build. Why destroyers? Not much in the way of limits but they didn’t take long to build.
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Post by Fredrik W on Dec 18, 2018 11:49:32 GMT -6
US navy budget 1900-1940. Note that spending in the 20s and 30s may seem low compared to WW1, but is actually considerably higher than before WW1. The effect of the WNT is apparent, the effect of the depression less so. Not adjusted for inflation though.
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Post by rob06waves2018 on Dec 18, 2018 11:49:59 GMT -6
The reality is actually reversed at least for the British and Americans. Both nations used things like building warships, cruisers and destroyers, to help put people to work. Why cruisers? More liberal treaty limitations on the number of cruisers that could be built and they took a little time to build. Why destroyers? Not much in the way of limits but they didn’t take long to build. That's right. In Britain, we could see that we'd be fighting a war sometime (against Germany or the US) so the ordered large numbers of lesser escorts, not because we needed them per se, but because it meant we could retain a skilled workforce for new capital ships when war broke out.
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Post by dorn on Dec 18, 2018 12:31:10 GMT -6
The reality is actually reversed at least for the British and Americans. Both nations used things like building warships, cruisers and destroyers, to help put people to work. Why cruisers? More liberal treaty limitations on the number of cruisers that could be built and they took a little time to build. Why destroyers? Not much in the way of limits but they didn’t take long to build. That's right. In Britain, we could see that we'd be fighting a war sometime (against Germany or the US) so the ordered large numbers of lesser escorts, not because we needed them per se, but because it meant we could retain a skilled workforce for new capital ships when war broke out. Interesting especially with knowledge that capital ship construction was limited mainly by armour production (some of armour for Illustrious class was from Vítkovice in Czechoslovakia) not shipyards capacity. Ship production capacity is usually (USA is exception) limited by money in peace and by industry capacity or resources (labour, raw material...) in war. Industry capacity is in RTW modelled quite well, It seems to me that more construction in progress higher pro agility of event that slow down construction and opposite event for new ship with 10 % discount. The costs of ships in history vary significantly, I remember somebody give costs of RN WW1 capital ships here somewhere. Another thing are budgets in peace time. In late 19th and beginning of 20th century national budgets were changing rapidly. The amount of "social" expenditures grew so cutting rapidly military expenditures could not solve the issue with national budget alone. So It was more about political will. Could be increase of military expenditures justified? If yes, money were raised, If not It would be political suicide. After WW1 the great powers except Russia were moreless democratic countries. This is in RTW simulated quite well. What is not simulated is nondemocratic countries. Their military budget is limited by economy and distributed between different branches of military. Germany was close to bancrupcy before occupying Austria, later Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia. Their military expenditures were raising rapidly even in peace at level which was not possible in democratic countries. Just by mind at start of Pacific war military spending of USA and Japan were close to max. possible however Japanese ratio between military expenditures and economic capability were ten times higher than in the USA. It could be interesting to see if during peace nondemocratic countries were able to increase their actual military budget comparable to ecoconic power much more without discontent with higher risk of buncrupcy or collapse during war. And in this case they would be warmongering against onother one choosen country to simulate history and needed conquer to help finance military.
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Post by corsair on Dec 18, 2018 17:20:32 GMT -6
The reality is actually reversed at least for the British and Americans. Both nations used things like building warships, cruisers and destroyers, to help put people to work. Why cruisers? More liberal treaty limitations on the number of cruisers that could be built and they took a little time to build. Why destroyers? Not much in the way of limits but they didn’t take long to build. I must disagree with the statement that it took little time to build cruisers and destroyers. This was not the case in the U.S. during peacetime.
The U.S. laid down 19 cruisers from 1931 to 1936. The average time from laying down to commissioning: 35½ months. Nearly three years. (The quickest took just under 28 months; the longest, almost 44 months.)
A total of 55 cruisers were laid down from 1940 through 1944; the average time from laying down to commissioning was a little under 24 months. (The quickest took slightly over 16 months; the longest, just under 31 months.)
This difference between peacetime and wartime, or nearly wartime, construction rates in USN ships was true for other ship classes. The five CVs built between 1931-39 averaged 38½ months from laying down to commissioning; the Essex-class carriers averaged 19 months. A total of 92 destroyers were laid down from 1932-39; the average time laying down to commissioning was 25 months. About 373 destroyers were laid down from 1940-44; average time, 11½ months. There were 38 submarines laid down from 1931-39; average time, 19½ months. About 222 submarines were laid down from 1940-44; average time, a little under 13 months.
The question of construction times is one I've wanted to raise. I don't think RTW at present captures the inherent variability in construction times between ships of the same class. Yes, it allows for the user to halt construction, and there are random events which can cause delays, but this is not the same thing. Even absent major factors, there will be some variance in completion time (approximately +/- three months is the standard deviation from the average time). There is also the matter of significantly increased production rates during wartime. In the U.S. historically, the average construction time for carriers and destroyers was halved, while cruisers and submarines saw times reduced by one-third. (It's hard to tell with battleships, given the low numbers of and timing of the builds involved.)
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Post by generalvikus on Dec 18, 2018 17:29:55 GMT -6
US navy budget 1900-1940. Note that spending in the 20s and 30s may seem low compared to WW1, but is actually considerably higher than before WW1. The effect of the WNT is apparent, the effect of the depression less so. Not adjusted for inflation though.
Great data and a very good point, @frederik W. Some inflation data for reference: Year | Inflation (%) Relative to 1913 | 1913 | 0% | 1920 | 102% | 1925 | 76.8% | 1930 | 68.7% | 1935 | 38.4% | 1940 | 41.4% |
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What is particularly notable is that the World War I spike on this graph was offset in real value by about half due to a concurrent doubling of prices, meaning that the spending of the re-armament period comes much closer than it seems to World War I levels, while the spending of the early interwar years appears over-valued compared with the pre-war era; real spending seems actually to have been quite similar before and after the First World War when inflation is accounted for. Furthermore, while spending remained more or less constant in the interwar years, the steady deflation of that period means that the real value of the spending was actually increasing. jeb94 I would be very wary of the assertion that naval re-armament was used deliberately to aid in Britain and America's recovery from the depression; I think you risk confusing what those nations ought to have done with what they were actually doing at the time. This was certainly the case in Germany, but in the western democracies the depression created an intense downward pressure on re-armament efforts due to austerity on the one hand and increased demands for social spending on the other. It would certainly be fair to say that in both cases the navy got off easier than both the army and the air force, as it was the primary instrument of defense for both nations and was, importantly, perceived to be defensive in nature. However, whereas today defense spending can come to be seen as something of an industrial subsidy and a 'job creator', the perceptions of the 1930s were very different; popular opinion favored disarmament and, as long as this would not materialize, the strict limitation of any new spending. Armaments spending was widely to be a cause of economic troubles and not a solution to them; the suggestion that it could be used to fix the depression would have seemed perverse, and this argument was not made by proponents of re-armament.
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Post by jeb94 on Dec 18, 2018 17:42:43 GMT -6
The reality is actually reversed at least for the British and Americans. Both nations used things like building warships, cruisers and destroyers, to help put people to work. Why cruisers? More liberal treaty limitations on the number of cruisers that could be built and they took a little time to build. Why destroyers? Not much in the way of limits but they didn’t take long to build. I must disagree with the statement that it took little time to build cruisers and destroyers. This was not the case in the U.S. during peacetime.
The U.S. laid down 19 cruisers from 1931 to 1936. The average time from laying down to commissioning: 35½ months. Nearly three years. (The quickest took just under 28 months; the longest, almost 44 months.)
A total of 55 cruisers were laid down from 1940 through 1944; the average time from laying down to commissioning was a little under 24 months. (The quickest took slightly over 16 months; the longest, just under 31 months.)
This difference between peacetime and wartime, or nearly wartime, construction rates in USN ships was true for other ship classes. The five CVs built between 1931-39 averaged 38½ months from laying down to commissioning; the Essex-class carriers averaged 19 months. A total of 92 destroyers were laid down from 1932-39; the average time laying down to commissioning was 25 months. About 373 destroyers were laid down from 1940-44; average time, 11½ months. There were 38 submarines laid down from 1931-39; average time, 19½ months. About 222 submarines were laid down from 1940-44; average time, a little under 13 months.
The question of construction times is one I've wanted to raise. I don't think RTW at present captures the inherent variability in construction times between ships of the same class. Yes, it allows for the user to halt construction, and there are random events which can cause delays, but this is not the same thing. Even absent major factors, there will be some variance in completion time (approximately +/- three months is the standard deviation from the average time). There is also the matter of significantly increased production rates during wartime. In the U.S. historically, the average construction time for carriers and destroyers was halved, while cruisers and submarines saw times reduced by one-third. (It's hard to tell with battleships, given the low numbers of and timing of the builds involved.)
You've misread what I said. I was saying because it took a little bit of time for cruisers that they were ideal to keep shipyards in business. Destroyers were built a little too quickly but weren't so limited numbers wise by treaties.
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Post by jeb94 on Dec 18, 2018 17:49:55 GMT -6
US navy budget 1900-1940. Note that spending in the 20s and 30s may seem low compared to WW1, but is actually considerably higher than before WW1. The effect of the WNT is apparent, the effect of the depression less so. Not adjusted for inflation though.
Great data and a very good point, @frederik W. Some inflation data for reference: Year | Inflation (%) Relative to 1913 | 1913 | 0% | 1920 | 102% | 1925 | 76.8% | 1930 | 68.7% | 1935 | 38.4% | 1940 | 41.4% |
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What is particularly notable is that the World War I spike on this graph was offset in real value by about half due to a concurrent doubling of prices, meaning that the spending of the re-armament period comes much closer than it seems to World War I levels, while the spending of the early interwar years appears over-valued compared with the pre-war era; real spending seems actually to have been quite similar before and after the First World War when inflation is accounted for. Furthermore, while spending remained more or less constant in the interwar years, the steady deflation of that period means that the real value of the spending was actually increasing. jeb94 I would be very wary of the assertion that naval re-armament was used deliberately to aid in Britain and America's recovery from the depression; I think you risk confusing what those nations ought to have done with what they were actually doing at the time. This was certainly the case in Germany, but in the western democracies the depression created an intense downward pressure on re-armament efforts due to austerity on the one hand and increased demands for social spending on the other. It would certainly be fair to say that in both cases the navy got off easier than both the army and the air force, as it was the primary instrument of defense for both nations and was, importantly, perceived to be defensive in nature. However, whereas today defense spending can come to be seen as something of an industrial subsidy and a 'job creator', the perceptions of the 1930s were very different; popular opinion favored disarmament and, as long as this would not materialize, the strict limitation of any new spending. Armaments spending was widely to be a cause of economic troubles and not a solution to them; the suggestion that it could be used to fix the depression would have seemed perverse, and this argument was not made by proponents of re-armament. Regardless if its what they should've done or not it was something that was done to keep shipyards open and people employed. I personally don't think the spending spree these nations, particularly the US, went on actually helped the situation but its what they did. For what its worth I think the naval building program brought the most value of these programs. It helps that there was a bit of a need for such ships but that's basically saying that the nations were rearming and modernizing for the next great war, which it turns out they were.
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Post by corsair on Dec 19, 2018 20:14:09 GMT -6
You've misread what I said. I was saying because it took a little bit of time for cruisers that they were ideal to keep shipyards in business. Destroyers were built a little too quickly but weren't so limited numbers wise by treaties. Ah, yes, I missed the "a" in the original sentence. I had to reread it a couple of times before I saw that little letter! It does change the meaning of the sentence.
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AiryW
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Post by AiryW on Dec 19, 2018 23:13:13 GMT -6
Re-armament is what got Germany out of the depression I am wary of that statement. There is a tendency to overlook just how downright outlandish the Nazi economy was, not just evil but also fundamentally alien to the tradeoffs we usually think about. Because their military was so dependent on imports and their creditworthiness was so poor that military buildup required shutting down civilian industries. Imports were made effectively impossible, small light industries were shut down for Jewish associations and the workers drafted into strategic industries. Import substitution was done through farcical measures, look at the Volkswagen company for instance which employed tens of thousands but never delivered a car but was kept going because the government appropriated personal savings to fund that corporation. Keynes said that government surpluses or deficits could influence investor behavior, provide liquidity to markets and smooth out spending patterns. These are all excellent examples of things the Nazis made impossible. They just straight up replaced the investors with nationalizations and rationing. That destroyed all liquidity so they needed to make up for it with ever increasing subsidies. And rather then smooth out the business cycle they just destroyed all equilibrium but started conquering other countries so they would finally have the resources to pay off all the internal debts they racked up in not even half a decade of this madcap scheme. It's warlord economics essentially, buy people's loyalty then go looting to pay off your investment.
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Post by corsair on Dec 20, 2018 2:53:21 GMT -6
Re-armament is what got Germany out of the depression I am wary of that statement. There is a tendency to overlook just how downright outlandish the Nazi economy was, not just evil but also fundamentally alien to the tradeoffs we usually think about. Because their military was so dependent on imports and their creditworthiness was so poor that military buildup required shutting down civilian industries. Imports were made effectively impossible, small light industries were shut down for Jewish associations and the workers drafted into strategic industries. Import substitution was done through farcical measures, look at the Volkswagen company for instance which employed tens of thousands but never delivered a car but was kept going because the government appropriated personal savings to fund that corporation. Keynes said that government surpluses or deficits could influence investor behavior, provide liquidity to markets and smooth out spending patterns. These are all excellent examples of things the Nazis made impossible. They just straight up replaced the investors with nationalizations and rationing. That destroyed all liquidity so they needed to make up for it with ever increasing subsidies. And rather then smooth out the business cycle they just destroyed all equilibrium but started conquering other countries so they would finally have the resources to pay off all the internal debts they racked up in not even half a decade of this madcap scheme. It's warlord economics essentially, buy people's loyalty then go looting to pay off your investment. As I recall, in Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction, he stated that Germany pretty much had to go to war in September 1939 or face its overheated economy burning out and collapsing.
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