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Post by dorn on Mar 20, 2019 1:35:15 GMT -6
I think most important point of view was that RN cannot allow losses so they need carriers to be sturdy and difficult to sink. So they design Illustrious class and succeeded. USN can replenish losses quite easily so they can focus on maximalize strike power.
And if you look at environment their carriers operated it emphasis design philosophy even moore.
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Post by dorn on Mar 20, 2019 1:49:09 GMT -6
Except that it turned out those kamikaze hits had warped the hulls of those RN carriers, so much so they were deemed unsuitable for post-war rebuilds. The Essex class carriers, on the other hand, continued in service for several more decades, under going substantial rebuilds and refits allowing them to operate jet-powered air wings.
The main reason were not that they cannot be rebuild (HMS Victorious was) but that after the war UK has so high debt, they cannot afford that.
On opposite damage of USS Franklin was enourmous however she was repaired as USA can do it. But after was the ship was still decommisioned.
And there is another attribute which has quite effect. Most Essex class carriers operated only about 1-2 years in war when USN has complete superiority. On opposite most Illustrious class carriers operated about 3-4 years at time when they were overhelmed. If you take this view you should compare Illustrious class with USS Enterprise and USS Saratoga as both USN carriers operated in war condition approximetly for same time.
RN carriers had problems (mainly HMS Illustrious) with warped hulls but it was not due to kamikaze attacks as their bombs was much smaller to bombs they faced in Mediterranean. However these small bombs opened wounds from early war. It is quite difference being hit by 1000 kg (explosives about 500-600 kg) and 557 lb bomb (explosives 228 lb).
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Post by archelaos on Mar 20, 2019 2:33:55 GMT -6
I'm English, and proud of the fact. Armoured flight decks saw us through the Second World War, and our carriers survived kamikaze attacks with barely a scratch while American carriers needed months in drydock after a hit. Except that it turned out those kamikaze hits had warped the hulls of those RN carriers, so much so they were deemed unsuitable for post-war rebuilds. The Essex class carriers, on the other hand, continued in service for several more decades, under going substantial rebuilds and refits allowing them to operate jet-powered air wings. Hmm, I do not remember this to be the case. Yes, hulls (esp Illustrious) were warped... But from heavy bomb hits/near misses, not kamikaze strikes. This was the strongest point of armoured deck carrier concept - ability to survive, and often shrug off HE hits including light "land" bombs, kamikaze his and probably (though never tested) light shells from cruiser guns. Illustrious, we all know. Formidable was demolished by fire resulting from own plane firing guns in hangar. Indomitable was destroyed by post-war gasoline explosion in hangar deck. Victorious went through criminally bad refit (made, then undone to refit engines, then remade again...). We also have to remember that UK post war government was very willing to scrap ships due to economic near collapse of UK.
It is safe, I think, to say that UK carriers were harder to damage, but when the damage happened it was more severe due to more difficult repairs. And some kinds of damage (various explosions in hangar) resulted in devastating damage due to happening both in enclosed space and within hull construction.
EDIT: dorn beat me to answer this. I agree with him that US could accept much higher losses even in capital ships. By 1944 US could safely ignore losing fleet carrier as it can be easily replaced, while UK has no ability to replace lost ships, having docks either occupied with repairs, construction of escorts or disrupted by attacks.
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 20, 2019 4:02:07 GMT -6
The question of just how tough the RN armoured carriers were is a complicated one.
The armoured hanger did not provide any protection to the forward and aft end of the flight deck which are the critical areas for flight operations, so it was just as easy to mission kill an armoured carrier as it was an unarmoured one. There is an argument that it was quicker and easier to repair damage to an unarmoured deck so in theory it could be put back into service quicker, but the RN were very good at patching their armoured decks so that is probably debatable.
The US unarmoured carriers did suffer terrible damage from kamikaze attacks, however the worst damage seems to be related to instances when the kamikaze hit large deck parks of fueled and bombed up aircraft - a kamikaze hit on a clear deck would often fail to penetrate to the hanger and just cause a local fire that was easily controlled.
RN armoured carriers were subject to far more intense and repeated attack by shore based aircraft using heavier ordnance than the US carriers were, making any like for like comparison impossible. In particular the large number of hits and near misses and the intense nature of any hanger fires is claimed to have warped the hulls. This is explained as a weakness inherent in the design and an inevitable consequence of placing the hanger inside the strength girder of the ship. I am less sure about this - I believe the explanation about how the warping occurred, but am not sure it is peculiar to this design. No US carriers were subject to this type of attack so we just don't know how they would have stood up to it.
The fact that most of the RN carriers were scrapped soon after the war is unavoidable, however the reason given, that they were "beyond economic repair" is political double speak. Britain's economy was tanked, it is true, but the limitations imposed by that original design decision to incorporate the hanger into the ships strength girder made it impossible to give them enough hanger space to operate a big enough airgroup of the newer larger aircraft that were coming into service.
One thing is clear to me. Even with radar controlled fighter direction no WW2 era carrier can survive long against a concerted attack by shore based aircraft. The CAP will get whittled away over the course of dozens of attacks and eventually the bombers will get through. The only solution that really works is to have so many carriers that the airwings outnumber the shore based aircraft, and only the US had the economic power to do this. The RN carriers were built to fulfill an outdated doctrine formulated under restrictions that no longer applied, but they were good enough to do the job they needed to do.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 20, 2019 8:50:35 GMT -6
I hope that everyone knows that the carriers built before the IJN Taiho was launched on April 7, 1943, did not have armored flight decks. They were wooden planks like ours. They did have enclosed hangars. So, when the 1000 lbs. bombs from the SBD's during the Midway action hit those carriers, there was essentially nothing to really stop them. This is why we used the 1000 lbs. GP bombs. The Japanese damage control and preparation was not very good and they paid the price. You might find this interesting - www.armouredcarriers.com/japanese-aircraft-carrier-taiho-armoured-flight-decks/
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Post by corsair on Mar 20, 2019 17:12:09 GMT -6
RN carriers had problems (mainly HMS Illustrious) with warped hulls but it was not due to kamikaze attacks as their bombs was much smaller to bombs they faced in Mediterranean. However these small bombs opened wounds from early war. It is quite difference being hit by 1000 kg (explosives about 500-600 kg) and 557 lb bomb (explosives 228 lb).
The dangers of relying solely on memory. Battle damage in general rather than kamikaze strikes specifically. Nevertheless, the point remaining is that armoured flight decks had an unintended consequence.
The last time the armoured vs. unarmoured flight deck debate came up, the 36-minute video on YouTube by Drachinifel which explores the topic was mentioned. It's worth a repeat, since it was a good examination of the topic; video can be watched here.
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Post by requiem762 on Mar 20, 2019 22:13:46 GMT -6
RN carriers had problems (mainly HMS Illustrious) with warped hulls but it was not due to kamikaze attacks as their bombs was much smaller to bombs they faced in Mediterranean. However these small bombs opened wounds from early war. It is quite difference being hit by 1000 kg (explosives about 500-600 kg) and 557 lb bomb (explosives 228 lb).
The dangers of relying solely on memory. Battle damage in general rather than kamikaze strikes specifically. Nevertheless, the point remaining is that armoured flight decks had an unintended consequence.
The last time the armoured vs. unarmoured flight deck debate came up, the 36-minute video on YouTube by Drachinifel which explores the topic was mentioned. It's worth a repeat, since it was a good examination of the topic; video can be watched here. Drachifel's conclusion, which has been echoed by many here is essentially that both the RN and USN both built carriers that best fit their geographic, political, and industrial situations in addition to considering their relative strengths and weaknesses. The debate as to whuch is "better" seems driven by patriotic zeal and its associated desire to re-interpereate history in a light best suited to an individuals proclivities. Personally, while I find it interesting to compare and contrast the merits of each side and discusss them, I find the need to settle the debate, something that has been debated ad infinitum and never settled, utterly pointless. The cases presented by both sides show marginal advantages over the other side at best. If we continue discuss the merits and detrimates of each design choices and how they will work in RTW2 then that's great! However if we are going to sit here and try and win history for our respective navies I see little point in continued discussion of the topic here.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 20, 2019 23:11:36 GMT -6
The dangers of relying solely on memory. Battle damage in general rather than kamikaze strikes specifically. Nevertheless, the point remaining is that armoured flight decks had an unintended consequence.
The last time the armoured vs. unarmoured flight deck debate came up, the 36-minute video on YouTube by Drachinifel which explores the topic was mentioned. It's worth a repeat, since it was a good examination of the topic; video can be watched here. Drachifel's conclusion, which has been echoed by many here is essentially that both the RN and USN both built carriers that best fit their geographic, political, and industrial situations in addition to considering their relative strengths and weaknesses. The debate as to whuch is "better" seems driven by patriotic zeal and its associated desire to re-interpereate history in a light best suited to an individuals proclivities. Personally, while I find it interesting to compare and contrast the merits of each side and discusss them, I find the need to settle the debate, something that has been debated ad infinitum and never settled, utterly pointless. The cases presented by both sides show marginal advantages over the other side at best. If we continue discuss the merits and detrimates of each design choices and how they will work in RTW2 then that's great! However if we are going to sit here and try and win history for our respective navies I see little point in continued discussion of the topic here. I believe that if you read my posts and others, you will find our assessment is that each navy's building philosophy was based on geography. The North Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea were both enclosed seas. This makes them a dangerous place for warships when land based aircraft have good access to the area. The Solomon's and the Coral Sea were also narrow straits and enclosed seas. Carriers are by their nature, fragile instruments of war. All three nations that built carriers understood this and built according to where their primary areas of conflict were located . Doctrine also plays a big part, and each nations doctrine of naval warfare was different. Again, based on their geostrategy. Nationalism also plays a part; people will defend their nations history, and they should, with pride. I will point out that even the most knowledgeable and experienced naval historians cannot agree on many points about history especially World War II. It is the nature of the humanity. A good discussion, with each side presenting facts and sources, is valuable for all of us. I do agree that arguing about whose ship was better is not necessarily the best way to discuss intelligently but we do try on this forum. But keep in mind, that hindsight is notably cleverer than foresight. So says Chester M. Nimitz.
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 21, 2019 5:55:00 GMT -6
The dangers of relying solely on memory. Battle damage in general rather than kamikaze strikes specifically. Nevertheless, the point remaining is that armoured flight decks had an unintended consequence.
The last time the armoured vs. unarmoured flight deck debate came up, the 36-minute video on YouTube by Drachinifel which explores the topic was mentioned. It's worth a repeat, since it was a good examination of the topic; video can be watched here. Drachifel's conclusion, which has been echoed by many here is essentially that both the RN and USN both built carriers that best fit their geographic, political, and industrial situations in addition to considering their relative strengths and weaknesses. The debate as to whuch is "better" seems driven by patriotic zeal and its associated desire to re-interpereate history in a light best suited to an individuals proclivities. Personally, while I find it interesting to compare and contrast the merits of each side and discusss them, I find the need to settle the debate, something that has been debated ad infinitum and never settled, utterly pointless. The cases presented by both sides show marginal advantages over the other side at best. If we continue discuss the merits and detrimates of each design choices and how they will work in RTW2 then that's great! However if we are going to sit here and try and win history for our respective navies I see little point in continued discussion of the topic here. Just for the record I am a Brit so I think I can lay some claim to impartiality here given the arguments I have presented. I have nothing against the RN or its carriers as such, but I can see that they had both strengths and weaknesses and I do get annoyed when people try to claim any sort of absolute "best" or "worst" title for them. Historically it is completely clear that the RN recognised the different requirements that the Pacific and European theaters of operations posed. HMS Ark Royal was designed and built for service in the Pacific and compares quite well to the Yorktown class of US carrier. She was larger than the US ship but carried a smaller airgroup which reflects RN thinking at the time - the RN had no control over the FAA at that time and had to rely on the RAF to fund and develop naval aviation; something that the RAF had no interest in doing. This lack of interest had the knock on effect of causing British aircraft manufacturers to not invest in developing aircraft for naval use and resulted in the FAA being equipped with small numbers of aircraft that were poor performance and outdated. The RN in the mid 30's had no way to know that this situation would change and therefore had to design their doctrine and ships accordingly. About the time Ark Royal was built Britain's threat focus shifted from Japan to the European powers, and doctrine and ship design shifted to accommodate that new threat. The RN was still thinking in terms of having small and outdated airgroups, and the threat of shore based aircraft was far greater in the European theater; fighter direction was crude and the RN had no confidence that their few, obsolete fighters could protect their carriers so the armoured carrier concept was born. The RN had pioneered carriers in the 20's and this meant that under treaty limits they were able to replace their oldest carriers with new armoured carriers. The Illustrious class was in many ways a masterpiece of naval architecture, however its most innovative feature, the armoured hanger incorporated into the strength girder of the ship (which allowed such great economy of weight) also proved to be its Achilles heel. The US was in a very different situation. Their threat focus never shifted from the Pacific and the USN had full control of its aviation. US doctrine, as it evolved, always called for a large number of carriers and the US aircraft builders saw a very large future market for naval aircraft which meant that a lot of money was invested in aircraft designed purely for naval use. Finally, the treaty limits did not allow the US to replace any of its older carriers before the war broke out, so when they finally started building new ones they were thoroughly up to date. By the time the war broke out in Europe the Illustrious class was already out of date. With the rapid changes that were taking place in aircraft performance, fighter direction, radar etc, doctrine was shifting in favour of larger airgroups and fighter protection of carriers, however the Illustrious class was poorly suited to the new paradigm (mainly due to their hanger arrangements) and despite the RN's best efforts to adapt them they were fundamentally limited. The RN regained control of the FAA however there was no time to make any changes or improvements, so the FAA that the RAF had mismanaged so badly was the FAA that went to war. The British aircraft industry was capped out building aircraft for the RAF and had no resources to devote to naval aviation - eventually navalised versions of land based fighters would be provided, but they were very poorly suited to carrier operations. The RN turned to the US to provide aircraft. The US aircraft industry had developed many aircraft specifically for naval use, however they were designed for use on USN carriers which were built to a different design philosophy and the limitations of the RN armoured hanger again created problems. Throughout the war the RN tried to increase the airgroups on the Illustrious class but the limits imposed by the armoured hanger (in particular the limited headroom) were never overcome. The final two armoured carriers were laid down in 1939 but not completed until 1944. The ships were delayed for political reasons, however to me these two ships represent the RN's only real failure in the events I have described. Given the opportunity to build two new carriers the RN ordered two repeats of the Illustrious class, and when construction was halted they took the opportunity to carry out a redesign. That redesign still had the same hanger design with the same limited headroom, and to me that is a terrible waste of an opportunity. By the time Implacable and Indefatigable commissioned they were thoroughly outdated despite their redesign, and the RN would have been much better served by an interim class to bridge the gap between the Illustrious class and the proposed Malta class - to be honest a simple knock off of the Essex class would have been better. The one thing that they should have redesigned was the hanger headroom, over everything else, and they didn't do it. Worse, they added a second lower hanger with more headroom and then in an inexplicable fit of lunacy reduced the height. The reason stated was that future British aircraft designs would incorporate rearward folding wings. This was sheer madness, at a time when most of the aircraft the FAA were operating were US made and the RN had exactly zero say in their design. For me it all boils down to timing and circumstance. IF the RN had not been able to build new carriers in 1937, IF the RN had controlled the FAA in the interwar years (or even just regained control a few years earlier). An RN carrier designed in 1939 would have been very different to Illustrious; The need for large airgroups was accepted by then and the use of carrier based fighters for CAP was accepted as the first line of defense. An RN that was able to drive the development of the FAA could have ensured that British aircraft manufacturers devoted some resources to developing aircraft specifically for naval use. Under those circumstances that 1939 carrier would have looked very different; a ship built outside treaty restrictions with the hanger outside the strength girder (like Essex) but partially enclosed for weather protection (like Malta) and an armoured flight deck, carrying an airgroup of British aircraft designed to fit in the hangers and on the lifts. I would have liked to see that ship.
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Post by dorn on Mar 21, 2019 7:16:11 GMT -6
I will comment something and put question to think about. I will not answer them intentionally that you can think about them as the answer is not black and white.
"The Illustrious class was in many ways a masterpiece of naval architecture, however its most innovative feature, the armoured hanger incorporated into the strength girder of the ship (which allowed such great economy of weight) also proved to be its Achilles heel."
Just think about some equipment from start of the war that was quite useful at the end. The technology progress during war is so fast that any equipment designed before war would be absolute at the end of war. So we can ask ourselves it was the issue during the war? Is exist any equipment from designed/produced before war that was first line usage after war?
"By the time the war broke out in Europe the Illustrious class was already out of date. With the rapid changes that were taking place in aircraft performance, fighter direction, radar etc, doctrine was shifting in favour of larger airgroups and fighter protection of carriers, however the Illustrious class was poorly suited to the new paradigm (mainly due to their hanger arrangements) and despite the RN's best efforts to adapt them they were fundamentally limited."
I do not think that they were already out of date if you do not describe "out of day" if you do not consider Spitfire Mk1 out of day when first Spitfire Mk2 are tested.
But was is important how the equipment can adapt to changing situation as aicraft performance, fighter direction, radar etc. All of that Illustrious class adapted well and some of the better than other pre-war designs (e.g. Yorktown class was much more top heavy as I know and have more difficulties do adapt). The smaller aigroup was the issue however it was design decision and in Europe theatre (ETO) it worked well.
And considerably smaller airgroup was not issue of hangar but on RN how they want to fight with carriers in ETO. Available space of Illustrious class hangar was about same as Yorktown class. The main difference comes from deck parks. The USN carriers were designed for that, RN carriers not. So even after they use deck parks they cannot fit so many airplanes as their deck was smaller.
"The RN turned to the US to provide aircraft. The US aircraft industry had developed many aircraft specifically for naval use, however they were designed for use on USN carriers which were built to a different design philosophy and the limitations of the RN armoured hanger again created problems." If your are writing about Corsair it is quite strange as RN approved them for carrier usage even before USN. However it is true that they cannot be operated from Indomitable and Implacables. But at that time it was not cruicial to war effort.
"Throughout the war the RN tried to increase the airgroups on the Illustrious class but the limits imposed by the armoured hanger (in particular the limited headroom) were never overcome. The final two armoured carriers were laid down in 1939 but not completed until 1944. The ships were delayed for political reasons, however to me these two ships represent the RN's only real failure in the events I have described. Given the opportunity to build two new carriers the RN ordered two repeats of the Illustrious class, and when construction was halted they took the opportunity to carry out a redesign. That redesign still had the same hanger design with the same limited headroom, and to me that is a terrible waste of an opportunity. By the time Implacable and Indefatigable commissioned they were thoroughly outdated despite their redesign, and the RN would have been much better served by an interim class to bridge the gap between the Illustrious class and the proposed Malta class - to be honest a simple knock off of the Essex class would have been better. The one thing that they should have redesigned was the hanger headroom, over everything else, and they didn't do it. Worse, they added a second lower hanger with more headroom and then in an inexplicable fit of lunacy reduced the height. The reason stated was that future British aircraft designs would incorporate rearward folding wings. This was sheer madness, at a time when most of the aircraft the FAA were operating were US made and the RN had exactly zero say in their design."
How do you want them redisign? Their hull was laid down which limit their overall size and a lot of things. For RN they were not priority and comlete redisign was probably waste of resources and time. On other hand at this time several British designs were prepared, nobody knows that they will be operational later and that their performance will suffer at climate where BPF would operate. There are just too many things that could not be seen at that time and it is easy to tell today it was wrong. But if you look at job they done they did as they were designed for. You need to think that design was finished in early 1939, they were launched in 1942 so any important change is "out of question".
"For me it all boils down to timing and circumstance. IF the RN had not been able to build new carriers in 1937, IF the RN had controlled the FAA in the interwar years (or even just regained control a few years earlier). An RN carrier designed in 1939 would have been very different to Illustrious; The need for large airgroups was accepted by then and the use of carrier based fighters for CAP was accepted as the first line of defense. An RN that was able to drive the development of the FAA could have ensured that British aircraft manufacturers devoted some resources to developing aircraft specifically for naval use. Under those circumstances that 1939 carrier would have looked very different; a ship built outside treaty restrictions with the hanger outside the strength girder (like Essex) but partially enclosed for weather protection (like Malta) and an armoured flight deck, carrying an airgroup of British aircraft designed to fit in the hangers and on the lifts."
You should ask yourself. You know war is probably starting any moment. You know that your fleet is outdated, you do not have enough ships so you need any ship available now. Would you start designing ship based on previous class (designed just 2 years ago) or start new design from scratch knowing it would take more resources and more time. And you know that you need to take that resources and time from other project as e.g. design of CLAA?
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 21, 2019 7:28:27 GMT -6
RN carriers had problems (mainly HMS Illustrious) with warped hulls but it was not due to kamikaze attacks as their bombs was much smaller to bombs they faced in Mediterranean. However these small bombs opened wounds from early war. It is quite difference being hit by 1000 kg (explosives about 500-600 kg) and 557 lb bomb (explosives 228 lb).
The dangers of relying solely on memory. Battle damage in general rather than kamikaze strikes specifically. Nevertheless, the point remaining is that armoured flight decks had an unintended consequence.
The last time the armoured vs. unarmoured flight deck debate came up, the 36-minute video on YouTube by Drachinifel which explores the topic was mentioned. It's worth a repeat, since it was a good examination of the topic; video can be watched here. I am sorry, but the way you present the question "armoured vs unarmoured flight deck" shows that you have no understanding of the situation. The RN armoured carriers in WW2 did not have armoured flight decks. The presence (or absence) of armour anywhere on the RN carriers had little bearing on the warping they suffered due to battle damage. The RN armoured carriers were designed with the hanger incorporated into the strength girder of the ship. In effect this made the hanger part of the hull and not, as was the case with (i believe) all other contemporary carriers, a superstructure built on top of the hull. Having such a large open space in the hull, that was impossible to adequately cross brace or compartmentalise, meant that when the ship was hit either on top or on the side (near misses landing close alongside) the hull was twisted and warped. If the hanger is not part of the hull (i.e. built as superstructure on top of the hull) the weakness of having the large open space in the hull is eliminated and the hull is no more subject to twisting and warping than any other warship. Putting an armoured flight deck on top of a hanger, whether part of the hull or built as superstructure would have no effect either way. In the short term the warping had little effect - I think one ship had its speed limited by vibration on the center shaft caused by hull warping - but apart from that it didn't really effect their ability to prosecute the war. In the long term, the worst affected really were beyond economic repair after the war. Others that had suffered less battle damage probably could have been repaired if the money was available but after Victorious rebuild was botched so spectacularly the will and the money just wasn't there.
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 21, 2019 7:56:54 GMT -6
I will comment something and put question to think about. I will not answer them intentionally that you can think about them as the answer is not black and white.
...
"For me it all boils down to timing and circumstance. IF the RN had not been able to build new carriers in 1937, IF the RN had controlled the FAA in the interwar years (or even just regained control a few years earlier). An RN carrier designed in 1939 would have been very different to Illustrious; The need for large airgroups was accepted by then and the use of carrier based fighters for CAP was accepted as the first line of defense. An RN that was able to drive the development of the FAA could have ensured that British aircraft manufacturers devoted some resources to developing aircraft specifically for naval use. Under those circumstances that 1939 carrier would have looked very different; a ship built outside treaty restrictions with the hanger outside the strength girder (like Essex) but partially enclosed for weather protection (like Malta) and an armoured flight deck, carrying an airgroup of British aircraft designed to fit in the hangers and on the lifts."
You should ask yourself. You know war is probably starting any moment. You know that your fleet is outdated, you do not have enough ships so you need any ship available now. Would you start designing ship based on previous class (designed just 2 years ago) or start new design from scratch knowing it would take more resources and more time. And you know that you need to take that resources and time from other project as e.g. design of CLAA?
I am going to let most of your comments stand because I know by now that you and I are never going to agree on them, but I will answer your last one. I would start from a previous class, as you said, but that is missing my point completely. My point was that if the RN cannot replace 4 carriers in 1937 there would be no previous class. The Illustrious class would never have been designed. Or better to say that the Illustrious class would have been designed in 1939 and not in 1937. In those two years there were huge strides in so many areas of naval aviation, and if the RN had been able to drive the development of the FAA as well I am certain that the 1939 Illustrious class would have been totally different to the 1937 Illustrious class. The need for large airgroups would have dictated more hanger space, The absence of treaty limits would have removed the need to save every last ton of weight which would have made the internal hanger unnecessary, the threat of shore based aircraft in the ETO would mean that an armoured flight deck would be desirable, and possibly even an armoured hanger, but it could be built as a superstructure on top of the hull rather than part of the hull. The features that proved to be the limiting factors on the historical Illustrious class could very well have been avoided if the RN had been able to allow doctrine and technology to mature for another year or two before designing it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 21, 2019 10:39:12 GMT -6
I just wanted to add some comments to this discussion. They are not directed at one nations carrier design but at the process of assessment that all historians, amateur historians, and gamers use to discuss the qualities of a carrier or any weapons system. The only tools that we have available for assessment are drawings, comments by designers, officers who served aboard these ships, after action reports and descriptions of operations and their results. In my opinion, this is all we have. The best, if you want to categorize it as such, method is by the results of the ships use in combat. Unfortunately, those results are not always complete and factual. There are so many factors that can lead to bad results in the use of a carrier battle that it taints the results. After the carrier specifications have been submitted and awarded, the designer now has to fit three pounds of junk in a one-pound box. Literally that is what he has to do. He does not have the choice of the aircraft that will serve on the ship nor does he have the choice of the anti-aircraft weaponry and fire control that will be placed. This equipment will be on the list of specifications so that he can provide the locations for the weapons and control compartments along with wiring and other infrastructure needed to support the system. These ARE just some of the items that will affect the carrier’s performance that he has no control over. The other items are carrier doctrine, damage control, combat air patrol doctrine, operational doctrine as to how the carriers will be coordinated in formations and how they will be deployed in a combat operation. Once the ship leaves the yard, it is now in the hands of the navy and the training and coordination is its responsibility. After deployment, the carrier is in the hands of an admiral, who may or may not have naval air experience. Once the carrier enters combat, there are so many factors that the ship designer nor the admiral have control over. Damage control training is one of them. Once in combat it is too late to change how you perform that important work. Once in combat it is too late to change your CAP doctrine, or the number of fighters deployed. Once in combat, poor command and control cannot be changed, you live with your mistakes. You also don’t have control over what your escorts might do in combat nor what the scouts you deploy might do. At Midway, Nagumo had no idea what was going on with his scouts, many were late, many were flying the wrong path, some even failed to provide the exact number of ships and types, again this was training and he had no control over that aspect. In many cases, Midway was one, your operational orders are just silly and do not reflect the actual situation that might occur. If the fleet commander decides not to follow them, he might be successful, if he does, he might fail. This is the case with Nagumo, but he has to take the responsibility. All these factors affect how the carrier performs in combat and whether it survives. After the battle or operation, we have to collect radio reports, after action reports, eyewitness accounts and maps of the action along with deck logs if they survive. In the case of the IJN, they did not. So, the Japanese account of World War 2, Sensi Sosho, was written 20 years after the battle by scribes who had to remember what they had written. We might be able to interrogate surviving personnel from the opponent to gather data on how they conducted their operations. All this and more, is the basis for a narrative on the battle. From this we all base our assessment of the ships design, all this incomplete and possibly a slanted view of how the battle or operation was conducted. So, this is just little tiny bit of the process and what we have to use. From all this, we try to assess the value of the ship. But the true value is how well did it perform its mission, not how long it survived. As I have stated in a previous post, carriers are fragile instruments of war, and their use was still being tested when the war started. What I have presented is just a pinprick of the complexity of our subject. The information we have deteriorates over time. We are now reaching a period where all we have is the information already documented, because the men who served and compiled the information are long gone. In my opinion, this subject is not a controversy, just a simple discussion of differing points of view as to how carriers should be designed and built. We all have the same incomplete information to use. Thanks, and apologies for the length. I got long winded today.
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Post by yemo on Mar 21, 2019 15:08:52 GMT -6
You cannot mix standard displacement with full displacement. Illustrious class had 23000 standard displacement, Implacables were designed about that, finally making about 24000 tons. 32000 tons was full displacement, comparateble was around 36-37000 of Essex class (27.000 standard displacement).
The did not redisign class, they design it in 1938 and the were no major changes after that. The design was taken from Illustrious class with condition to have more aicraft so they take some weight (as heigh of hangar, belt armour of hangar) to be able have 2 full hangars. The reason why ships were commissioned in 1944 was priorities of Royal Navy switched to U-boat threat and the fact Churchill push ahead KGV class over Implacable class.
It is completely true that comparison has no sense. You can compare armoured deck philosophy with armour at hangar deck philospohy in Midway design (probably Malta too). I think USN has several variants of designs including armoured deck and exluding it. To compare them is I think best comparison as it used same principles otherwise. I have not them, but I think it could be written about them in Friedman U.S Aicraft Carriers. If you do not have book as me we can ask somebody if there is some comparison with variants. I found something on internet but the variants were only about speed, dimension, armour but not about number of aircrafts.
Please can you tell me where you got the figure of 24,000 tons standard displacement for the Implacable class. As I said, wikipedia lists the Implacable class as 32,110 standard / 32,630 full load. I have found an additional reference on navypedia.org that lists it as 23,450 standard / 32,110 full load, but I find it very unlikely that the difference between those two figures could be so large - 8,660 tons of stores etc represents 37% of the ships standard tonnage. Compare it to Essex (5,580 tons) which carried a larger airgroup, much more avgas, had a longer range (so more fuel oil and food) etc. And you are still quibbling because even comparing full load displacements it is obvious that comparing a 32,110 (or 32,630) ton ship to a 25,500 ton ship (Yorktown, full load) makes less sense than comparing it to a 36,380 ton ship (Essex, full load). Regardless of what GB actually did in Implacable's redesign the fact remains that they had 5 years to build the carrier they wanted and the result of that effort should rightly be compared to a ship built at the same time. If the RN used that time to built a minor tweak to a 1937 design then history (and us) should heap all the scorn in the world on them.
Just answering the call for a source for displacements.
From Conways All the Worlds Fighting Ships 1922-1946: Ark Royal: 22,000t standard; 27,720t deep load
Illustrious class: 23,000t standard; 28,620t deep load designed; 29,110 - 29,240t service Indomitable: 23,000t standard; 29,730t deep load Implacable class: 23,450t standard; 32,110t deep load Yorktown class: (Enterprise) 19,875t standard; 25,484t full load Essex class: (Essex) 27,208t standard; 34,881t full load
However, especially the values for Essex are a "starting point" for the class (Essex did not even have flight deck catapults when completed). Unfortunately none of the displacement values offer easy comparisons. The treaty "standard" displacements were a matter of trickery and deceit anyway and the deep/full load numbers are not directly comparable either.
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Post by director on Mar 21, 2019 17:06:11 GMT -6
Just an opinion here...
What separates British carrier development from Japanese and American carrier development? Two things seem to me to be key: 1) the Royal Navy lost control of its air arm to an unfriendly rival service with its own priorities and little interest in providing naval pilots 2) the US and Japan were able to retool two fast, very large hulls into fast, big carriers. This gave them the ability to, and the experience of, operating large air groups
Although the air arm was eventually sort-of returned to Navy control, the damage was done. Warships have long lead times and the trust of top navy brass is not easily regained.
I do agree that geography played a part. But let me posit this question: what if we reverse the designs of the British and American navies? Can Britain wage a successful naval war with Enterprise and Essex types? And can the US wage Coral Sea, Midway, the Guadalcanal battles and the Marianas with Illustrious and Indomitable class-types?
An armored deck might have been useful in the last year of the war, when the kamikazes were swarming, but I think the reduced aircraft capacity would have been a liability up to that point.
It deserves to be mentioned that the two design-theories grew together at war's end; Britain was planning new carriers without a thick and extensive armored deck, and with the Midway class the US abandoned the unarmored flight deck and moved toward the British model.
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