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Post by rockmedic109 on Apr 14, 2019 14:06:07 GMT -6
I never read "Bankrupting the Enemy". Thanks for the referral.
The Oil embargo was certainly not the only thing that led to war, but I think it was the trigger or lighting of the fuse. The ambitions, philosophies and megalomania of world leaders come into play. I sometimes wonder if WWII could have been avoided. I come away with the feeling that events and personalities made it inevitable.
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Post by akosjaccik on Apr 14, 2019 14:39:28 GMT -6
Just a thought: I'd not go into this without taking a look at the Great War, as I believe the world that crystalized on the peace summits - to take my example from the side of material science - left too much frozen-in tension. However, even if states wouldn't been left in a mutilated and humiliated state, the starving, traumatized, disease-ridden populace is still a factor. Maybe - to oversimplify it - without a first, there would not have been a second war, but maybe internal social change alone can pull out the gun, from the french to the russian revolutions alike. But of course, the answer is surely made of an infinite amount of layers.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 14, 2019 15:05:56 GMT -6
I never read "Bankrupting the Enemy". Thanks for the referral. The Oil embargo was certainly not the only thing that led to war, but I think it was the trigger or lighting of the fuse. The ambitions, philosophies and megalomania of world leaders come into play. I sometimes wonder if WWII could have been avoided. I come away with the feeling that events and personalities made it inevitable. I would not characterize the oil embargo as the trigger, but you could stretch the point. It was just a last ditch, economic action to try to get the Japanese to leave Asia alone. I feel the administration probably knew it wasn't going to work. I say that because of the Two Ocean Navy act. That is a good indicator that we were preparing for war. Another excellent book, if you haven't read it is "War Plan Orange" by the same author. I would read that one first, then the other.
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Post by rockmedic109 on Apr 14, 2019 15:51:35 GMT -6
Trigger or fuse in that I think that once the embargo was in place, war was inevitable. It was probably inevitable before this, but there was no turning back after the embargo. The US had to back off their demands or Japan had to quit China. I do not think either was going to happen. I agree that the administration probably knew it was doomed to fail. FDR was not an idiot.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 14, 2019 17:07:59 GMT -6
Just a thought: I'd not go into this without taking a look at the Great War, as I believe the world that crystalized on the peace summits - to take my example from the side of material science - left too much frozen-in tension. However, even if states wouldn't been left in a mutilated and humiliated state, the starving, traumatized, disease-ridden populace is still a factor. Maybe - to oversimplify it - without a first, there would not have been a second war, but maybe internal social change alone can pull out the gun, from the french to the russian revolutions alike. But of course, the answer is surely made of an infinite amount of layers. You are entirely correct that the key to WW2 sits on the results of the Versailles Treaty. The economic problems in the 1920's and 30's led to the Nazi's, Fascists and eventually to a military government in Japan. However, if I am asked for starting point. I would say "start in the 1870's or thereabouts". Start with the Age of Iron and Steam, creation of Germany and Italy, and the Meji Restoration in Japan. This new age forced countries to look for natural resources around the world, that they did not have available in their countries. This search is what created the problems in the early 20th century. If you connect the dots carefully, the whole picture comes to light.
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Post by director on Apr 14, 2019 18:19:16 GMT -6
And the key to World War One is the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck got it right when he encouraged Kaiser Wilhelm to make a peace with France that did not demand territory. The Kaiser wanted the forts at Metz and Strasbourg and insisted on taking Alsace and Lorraine.
If the French had had a little better luck, a but more time or somewhat better diplomacy it all might have turned out differently. Or not; that's the nature of 'if'.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 14, 2019 18:26:43 GMT -6
And the key to World War One is the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck got it right when he encouraged Kaiser Wilhelm to make a peace with France that did not demand territory. The Kaiser wanted the forts at Metz and Strasbourg and insisted on taking Alsace and Lorraine. If the French had had a little better luck, a but more time or somewhat better diplomacy it all might have turned out differently. Or not; that's the nature of 'if'. Yes, that is entirely true. How thingS could have been with a bit more brains like Otto Von Bismarck's.
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Post by MateDow on Apr 14, 2019 21:47:19 GMT -6
What changes to the overall structure of our military system both In Pearl Harbor and Washington, might have prevented the debacle at Pearl Harbor? Well, here are some of my thoughts, not in any priority. 1. One overall commander in Pearl Harbor. He would be a Naval admiral in charge of the whole Pacific Fleet. He would have had the fourteenth Naval District under his command, Army, Army Air Force and Naval Intelligence. He would have only been responsible to a Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. This would have been much more difficult politically. With two separate cabinet level positions (War and Navy) this would have meant eliminating the Army's influence in the Pacific theater. Until you have the example of Pearl Harbor, this would not happen without action from the President or Congress. We now know that they were too slow for carrier operations. They were an important part of the war plans, and I don't see the US Navy wanting to split the fleet between Pearl Harbor and the West Coast. See my response to point #1. With the need for radar sets, do you put multiple sets in the Hawaiian Island chain, or try and get some for the multiple fields in the Philippines where war is expected to break out? How about sending sets to the Russians or British that were actually engaged? I agree with you that more effective use of the sets that were actually there is a good solution. A force of 36 PBYs and 72 B-17s doing long range surveillance flights. There were 68 PBYs, 33 B-18s, and 12 B-17s assigned to Hawaiian Island commands the December 1941. Additional aircraft for these patrols would have to come from the Philippines or the US East Coast. In my opinion, it would have been better to use a lot of PBYs for ASW patrols on the US East Coast to protect coastal shipping routes. This would put a large strain on your maintenance crews in what is still peacetime operating routines, and I believe, would go against the USAAF doctrine of concentration at large airfields. Where would these destroyers come from? Do you remove them from fleet operations? Do you strip them from the US East Coast? Remember that the US just "gave away" 50 of their reserve destroyers in exchange for basing rights. Until we were forced to have a joint staff system for planning with the British this didn't exist, and didn't exist until 1942 when the contingencies of wartime forced it on the Army and Navy. You had the Joint Board which was a planning body not an operational body. My feeling is a lot of these are hindsight suggestions to solve the Pearl Harbor problem but don't fit the issues that confronted the Navy and Army at the time. Both were scrambling to move forces to where they were needed; whether this was the Philippines or the European Theater. Without a need, or direction from higher authority, neither force was going to voluntarily give control of their forces to the other service. Even once the war started, look at how difficult it was for the Navy to get USAAF aircraft to support operations in the Pacific theater when faced with the USAAF priorty of building up air forces in Europe.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 14, 2019 22:35:36 GMT -6
What changes to the overall structure of our military system both In Pearl Harbor and Washington, might have prevented the debacle at Pearl Harbor? Well, here are some of my thoughts, not in any priority. 1. One overall commander in Pearl Harbor. He would be a Naval admiral in charge of the whole Pacific Fleet. He would have had the fourteenth Naval District under his command, Army, Army Air Force and Naval Intelligence. He would have only been responsible to a Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President. This would have been much more difficult politically. With two separate cabinet level positions (War and Navy) this would have meant eliminating the Army's influence in the Pacific theater. Until you have the example of Pearl Harbor, this would not happen without action from the President or Congress. We now know that they were too slow for carrier operations. They were an important part of the war plans, and I don't see the US Navy wanting to split the fleet between Pearl Harbor and the West Coast. See my response to point #1. With the need for radar sets, do you put multiple sets in the Hawaiian Island chain, or try and get some for the multiple fields in the Philippines where war is expected to break out? How about sending sets to the Russians or British that were actually engaged? I agree with you that more effective use of the sets that were actually there is a good solution. A force of 36 PBYs and 72 B-17s doing long range surveillance flights. There were 68 PBYs, 33 B-18s, and 12 B-17s assigned to Hawaiian Island commands the December 1941. Additional aircraft for these patrols would have to come from the Philippines or the US East Coast. In my opinion, it would have been better to use a lot of PBYs for ASW patrols on the US East Coast to protect coastal shipping routes. This would put a large strain on your maintenance crews in what is still peacetime operating routines, and I believe, would go against the USAAF doctrine of concentration at large airfields. Where would these destroyers come from? Do you remove them from fleet operations? Do you strip them from the US East Coast? Remember that the US just "gave away" 50 of their reserve destroyers in exchange for basing rights. Until we were forced to have a joint staff system for planning with the British this didn't exist, and didn't exist until 1942 when the contingencies of wartime forced it on the Army and Navy. You had the Joint Board which was a planning body not an operational body. My feeling is a lot of these are hindsight suggestions to solve the Pearl Harbor problem but don't fit the issues that confronted the Navy and Army at the time. Both were scrambling to move forces to where they were needed; whether this was the Philippines or the European Theater. Without a need, or direction from higher authority, neither force was going to voluntarily give control of their forces to the other service. Even once the war started, look at how difficult it was for the Navy to get USAAF aircraft to support operations in the Pacific theater when faced with the USAAF priorty of building up air forces in Europe. First, thanks for your replies and your opinions. It is important for all to submit our ideas and thoughts. There were PBY’s operating in support of the Atlantic “neutrality patrols” at the time of Pearl Harbor. I am certain that the Philippines, East Coast and Hawaii would all have appreciated more PBY’s but alas, there were not enough. Hudson’s. B-17’s and other types of multi-engine aircraft had to be used. The dispersion of fighters to auxiliary airfields had occurred. Haleiwa fighter strip was used but there were other Army air fields on the Northern and Southern sides of Oahu where fighters temporarily could be parked, fueled and armed for possible use in case of an emergency. They could be moved back to their permanent airfields once a week for maintenance and testing very easily. Well, let’s see. There were nine destroyers in San Diego, 2 more available at Mare Island Navy Yard. One at Bremerton, Washington. That makes about 12 destroyers that could have been made available for duties on patrols. You would not take them all, but half would be an improvement. Military historians and analyst have been examining the failures at Pearl Harbor for well over 77 years. Hindsight is the clearest sight in the world but the ideas I expressed were not mine but the product of the Joint Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack and those historians and analyst. It's just a matter of speculation.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 15, 2019 9:12:12 GMT -6
I've put up here, Chapter VI The Reinforcement of Oahu from a book on the Army Military History website, titled "Guarding the United States and Its Outposts". I thought we could review its contents and use it as a discussion piece. history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch6.htmNote: In the article it states that the interceptors would have to have their engines warmed-up before launch. That is true for radial-engine aircraft like the Peashooter and P-36. The P-40 was an in-line engine. They did not need to be warmed up, just started, check oil pressure, mag drops and watch the temp gauge rise to the standard level. This would have not been for more than about five to eight minutes.. They could then launch.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 15, 2019 12:30:55 GMT -6
This website has the list of aircraft available at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. www.ww2pacific.com/aaf41.htmlWe can discuss the details if you would like. fyi- P-26 and P-36 fighters were radial engine, P-40 was in-line. The Naval fighters were all radial engine.
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Post by yemo on Apr 15, 2019 17:26:15 GMT -6
Can't vote anymore, but I strongly suggest you read it. Why? Because your prof recommended you to read it... And your prof is the one who grades your work.
Just go over the argument in your head: Prof: I recommend you read this book. You: I asked the internet about it and they said it is not very good because... ! I read it and concur with this assessment, because ... Prof: Oh, ok, nevermind then. Thank you for changing my view on this topic. You might have a great, open minded prof, but are you willing to gamble your grades on that? And this is the good version, where you read the book.
The other version: Prof: I recommend you read this book. You: I asked the internet about it and they said it is not very good because... ! I therefore did not read it. Prof: Ok then...
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 15, 2019 19:51:01 GMT -6
I've been reviewing a book titled "Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History" by Gordon Prange. Specifically, I've been researching the books description of the US nation and its attitude towards internationalist or as they call it in the book; interventionalist. The commentary is very illuminating, and I thought I would briefly try to describe it.
We know that in the 1930's, there were two factions; interventionist and isolationist. Both sides wanted a strong military, but the isolationist believed, incorrectly, that the seas around the US would protect us, as they always had. The isolationists firmly believed that the nations of Europe had "roped us" into the First World War and they were not going to let that happen again. The problem with this attitude was that most American's did not realize that the seas were not a protective barrier against aggression and that the nation that could control those seas, would control the world. In the Pacific, if we allowed the Japanese to control far out into the Pacific, we would not be safely protected.
It must be said, however, that isolationists were not pacifists. They agreed that strong armed forces were necessary, it was just a matter of how much was necessary to protect our borders. Charles Lindbergh was one of those who believed that notion. The isolationist believed as the book mentions, that the US could remain cloistered if it wished. They also believed that air defense made an attack on the US very costly if not impossible. The war in Spain, Ethiopia and in China should have made them realize the aggressive nation of the Axis and the power of the airplane. The interventionist as the book calls them, I prefer internationalist, believed in the exact opposite. They did not believe that you could bury your head in the sand and hope the problem would go away. It would not. The interventionalist believed that the democratic world, had to stand together to prevent the Axis takeover. Closing your eyes and ignoring, hoping it will go away wasn’t the solution. September 3rd, 1939 appears to have been the eye-opener for the isolationist. That closing your eyes was not going to make the issue go away.
Many of the reports after Pearl Harbor did try to blame the whole nation for the debacle at Pearl Harbor. I don’t subscribe to that idea. Yes, there was a disagreement in our nation between the isolationists and the interventionists, but this is how a democratic, free society operates and functions. It has always operated that way and it still does. It’s our version of the Socratic method.
The book doesn't bring this point up, but I will. Keep in mind, that the nation was going through one of its worst depressions in its history. No jobs, banks failing etc. People tend to focus on the bank books and mortgages, not worry about if the Axis are taking over the world. Was that wrong? Short sighted maybe, but not wrong.
We, as citizens could not deploy the air reconnaissance aircraft around Pearl Harbor, maintain the radar network for 24 hrs. nor could we deploy the torpedo nets. This was the job of Kimmel, Short and their bosses in Washington D.C. We could not ensure that the Alert Status was not changed and never conveyed to Washington. That is the job we gave to our military leaders and expected them to perform. Unfortunately, they failed us and tried to blame the nation. Nice try, gentlemen.
Thanks
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