72 years ago naval warfare got changed forever. A tip of the tea mug to the sailors on both sides at the Battle of Coral Sea.
Good catch, I wasn't sure anyone knew it. Operation MO should have been a lessons learned for the Japanese about the need for concentration of carriers in overwhelming strength at the point of attack. A principle they had followed at Pearl Harbor and in the Indian Ocean. However, they veered away from the principle and it cost them many good pilots, one carrier, and one severely damage; two of those were out for Operation MI. They also failed to provide for adequate scouting by using some of their torpedo bombers to augment the scouting group. They failed to learn the lessons at Midway and it cost them four carriers and one cruiser. Most military disasters consist of failure to learn; failure to anticipate and a failure to adapt. They committed all of those at Midway. Another issue with Coral Sea was the fact the Imperial Naval General Staff considered MO a success, when it actually was a tactical draw and a strategic failure. They should have followed it up with another invasion attempt.
I am baby sitting for my granddaughter today so I don't know how much I can write. I hope you stay with us, I miss some good historical discussions. Steel and I are hammering away at fifth gen fighters and LCS's. We have some great discussions.
Last Edit: May 4, 2014 14:21:22 GMT -5 by oldpop2000
One of the little known lessons that we had learned from Coral Sea but had actually acted upon before the war is the increase in fighter strength for air groups. Both the IJN and the US had 18 fighters in an air group during Coral Sea however, we had already issued instructions to increase that to 27. A document dated 27 May 1940, relating to FY1942 Aircraft Allocations, states in a footnote for carrier air groups that the figure was "to be increased from 18 to 27 on 1 October 1941". The problem was the lack of available fighters, specifically F4F-5s. At Midway, the air groups had 27 fighters, which greatly aided in both air group escort and CAP for the carriers. Unfortunately, the IJN had not recognized that. After Midway, they decreased their torpedo squadron strength and increased their fighter strength. A lesson learned, but far too late to do any real good.
Last Edit: May 5, 2014 14:28:46 GMT -5 by oldpop2000