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Post by William Miller on Jun 6, 2014 19:37:45 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 6, 2014 20:57:20 GMT -6
Interesting piece, the jets would have had to be moved to within 300 miles of Normandy to be effective and in fact, they only shot down their first aircraft in July, 1944. The engines due to poor metals only had a life of 10 hours before replacement. This means that they would have been only good for about 10 missions. If they flew 2 missions per day, that's five days. The issue of having more panzer divisions close is bogus. Of the ten panzer divisions France, five were near the landings, with one more on the Somme. That's half of the force, more than enough to stop the invasion. But Rommel makes it clear, "Due to enemy's air superiority, it proved impossible to bring 1st SS Panzer Corps, the Nebelwerfer Brigade, ...... fast enough to enable them to counter-attack the enemy forces after the landing." Even the movement of minor formation on the battlefield.....is instantly attacked from the air with devastating effect." I think that says it all. If you didn't have air supremacy, nothing moved during the day.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 6, 2014 21:37:23 GMT -6
Agreed.. I think far too few historians realize just how devastating FBs were to any movement. Interdiction was FAR FAR FAR more effective then CAS in terms of destroyed, damaged, and disrupted enemy units - ESPECIALLY LOGISTICS. A truck or ox-cart is NO match for any bullets. Even a silly WW1 style biplane could strafe a truck/cart column with good results. Even open topped HTs and SPGs could be clobbered badly - especially by cannon and HMG armed aircraft. (A point few wargames properly model - especially OPAW) IMHO, the jets would have been a joke. Zipping in and zapping a lowly bomber flying slower then a seagull with tons of bombs on board is not the same thing as hundreds, or even thousands, of far more nimble FBs flying all over the countryside blowing apart anything that moves, airfields, etc.. Jets were not fighters yet, they were still "interceptors" .. and there is a huge difference, something that almost all historians flat fail to understand. Bombers benefited from air superiority but they did not, directly, help maintain it. That was the job of the fighters.. if you can't defeat the fighters in the air, and on the ground, then you cannot gain aerial superiority - end of story. The Me262 range was poor, combat endurance was poor, and logistics/quality pilot/crew training was a serious problem to maintain for the Germans. Its only real asset was speed.. not much else. If the jets started to be a PITA.. well, you could rest assure the Allies would respond with some counter-measures, as did happen with effect in air combat, and even more effectively at their airfields, in 1944-45. Low combat range vs enemy planes with longer range.. is simply bad news. They can reach your airfields.. you can't, so being caught on, or near, the ground is a real problem. Would have been far smarter to build a bucket load of FW-190s.. a far better "fighter" then the Me262 ever was, easier on logistics, repairs, fuel, and most of all.. not-so-expert pilots. In the end the "super-jet" had to be protected by prop planes at their own airfields! Just my few cents.. Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Jun 6, 2014 23:33:37 GMT -6
As a note of comparison and an abstract example of why the Me262 would not have succeeded as an air superiority fighter, (and before the jet-jockeys state "there were Me262 aces against fighter prop jobs during WW2!")
Kill ratios : Me262 = 3-4.5 to 1 (mostly vs bombers) F4F Wildcat = 6 to 1 P-51 = 12 to 1 P-47 = 8 to 1 F6F = 12-13 to 1
Note, the substantially higher kill ratios for the F6F and P-51 should be tempered with the fact that they were facing far fewer experienced enemy pilots and (for the Pacific especially) less quality aircraft then their predecessors in general.
Point being.. even IF the Me262 reached front line service earlier, or in greater numbers (IF they could find enough good pilots - this was not a simple to fly or fight plane), and keep up high-tech logistics and maintenance, and cover their airfields effectively.. would the kill ratio been much better or even close to enough to gain air superiority at any point past 1943?
I seriously doubt it.
If they started to be a real pain in the ass you can rest assure that serious pressure would have been put on their airfields, factories, fuel, parts, etc... and/or the P-80 and Meteor would have been pushed forward and/or improved upon much sooner.
Thanks.
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Post by randomizer on Jun 7, 2014 14:27:41 GMT -6
Found the article pretty much under-whelming, mostly a combination of uber-German mythology and blinding glimpses of the obvious.
Particularly the Panzer Division argument although there is some mention of the logistical issues with getting the tanks to Normandy in the face of Allied domination of the air. Even then I think that the author vastly understates the potential for Allied tactical air to wreck havoc on the Panzer forces transiting to the battle area and overstates their probable effectiveness in hedgerow country and the power of naval gunfire support.
I also think that the chemical weapon argument is a silly red herring. Everybody was waiting for somebody else to cross that particular threshold but nobody did because doing so offered no long-term military advantage and even the prospects of short term gain was problematic. The closest any belligerent came (excepting the Japanese vs. the under equipped and unprepared Chinese) was probably the USMC proposal to dump some 2000 tons of Mustard Gas on Iwo Jima in 1945 and that was shut down at the political level.
In whole-hearted agreement with Christopher's ME-262 analysis.
That said, D-Day and counter-factuals mostly lie outside of my areas of interest.
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Post by spook053 on Jun 7, 2014 16:12:32 GMT -6
Agreed.. I think far too few historians realize just how devastating FBs were to any movement. Interdiction was FAR FAR FAR more effective then CAS in terms of destroyed, damaged, and disrupted enemy units - ESPECIALLY LOGISTICS. A truck or ox-cart is NO match for any bullets. Even a silly WW1 style biplane could strafe a truck/cart column with good results. Even open topped HTs and SPGs could be clobbered badly - especially by cannon and HMG armed aircraft. (A point few wargames properly model - especially OPAW)
OPAW? The earlier Talonsoft "Operational Art of War" series, or something else?
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Post by William Miller on Jun 7, 2014 16:24:08 GMT -6
Agreed on the chemical part, their use would have been unpredictable fiasco as much for the using side as the receiving side - WW1 proved conclusively that chemicals were a bad idea. With forces not so static and trenched up as was done during WW1 the chemicals could scatter over friendly troops as easily as enemy troops. Even though chemicals caused "casualties" the death rates were only a fraction of those effected during WW1 (~3% on the Western Front, ~7% on the Eastern Front). The entire chemical warfare of WW1 was a major waste of energy, money, and time and with very limited overall tactical effects. Example, the British had 4x more men killed on just the first day of the Somme then all chemical attacks combined throughout the entire war. The idea that they would have been used during WW2 on any serious level is bogus.. even Hitler was not that stupid, the Japanese (as CC stated).. well their disregard for human life (especially the Chinese) and political fallout, and seriously underestimating the resolve of the US, was clearly evident. If they would have used chemicals on US troops then I think the response would have been severe.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 7, 2014 16:36:39 GMT -6
To Spook,
Yes, OAW.. all armored vehicles have top armor - even if they didn't have any. So strafing, bombing, air attacks, and artillery are almost useless against any armored vehicle, especially with the lack of accurate anti-armor ratings for HE ordnance. The above makes armored vehicles, no matter how thin their armor is - or lack of top armor in reality, almost impervious to even the heaviest HE ordnance, which is not accurate. I have verified this in several custom scenario tests using everything from lots of P-47s with 500lb bombs to entire batteries of 75mm-155mm field guns vs armored vehicles on open terrain not moving and heavily concentrated. The effects were almost non-existent. Non-specific armor piercing ordnance is rated on the "anti-personnel" ratings for effects on armor - but in reality this reverses the realistic effects of heavier shells and bombs if an armored vehicle is "near missed" or directly hit. During WW2 armored vehicles often had parts dislodged, tracks blown off, spalling, shock-effect, or even turned over by near misses from heavy artillery and bombs. In OAW such weapons do nearly nothing at all. I would love the series if not for that serious detraction. I was hoping the TOAD team, which verified this problem, would fix it.. they were trying to find a work-around, not sure if they succeeded yet. You can edit the weapons.. but that would take a LOT of time. Ironically, Norm Koger DID have such anti-armor effects for HE ordnance, even heavy mortars, better modeled in TANKS!... go figure.
Thanks.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 7, 2014 18:35:01 GMT -6
I don't believe in fantasy in military analysis but I do subscribe to counterfactual analysis. The military uses this procedure all the time to develop doctrine, war plans and requirements for new weaponry. It's used in economics, finance, failure analysis almost everywhere. If you do a budget for your house, you use what-if analysis. Historians hate it, at least most because it can devolve into fantasy and because most don't understand it. Partly this is because there is no set established rules for performing such an analyses but it is important. Now, Normandy.
Let's put aside the article, it brought up some items that were, how do you say, silly or fantasy. Let's look at the facts simply. First, use Google Earth, center on France and draw lines stretching 300 miles from the middle of southern England to France. First along the Belgian border southward to Luxemburg and the Franco-German border. Save that. Now, draw another line from the same start location 300 miles along the coast of France. That polygon is the maximum distance fighter bombers leaving England could fly with a full load of fuel, external tanks, cannons, bombs and rockets. When talking about fighter bombers, kill ratios are meaningless, its loiter time that's important. The ability to stay over the assigned sector waiting for something to move. Here are some examples for US fighter bombers:
P-38L - 2 x 500 lb. bombs, internal fuel of 410 gallons, no external tanks, combat radius of 260 miles
P-47D - 2- 500 lb. bombs, fuel load of 370 gallons, no external tanks, combat radius of 260 miles
P-51B,C,D- 2 x 500 lbs. bombs, fuel load of 269 gallons, no external tanks, combat radius of 325 miles.
Note the lack of external tanks, its meaningful. The combat radius without loiter time for a P-51D with drop tanks was 1180 miles. You need 10% fuel for safety. This leaves you with about a 450 mile range for straight fly out, hit the target and scram for home. If you loiter, then cut that to 250 to 300 miles. With heavier cannons and bombs, cut that loiter time down. My point here is to show that even the German's knew all this and could work out the polygon on France. The question was where? Well, look at the topography, the Germans had good geographers and geologists. They could easily determine the best locations for an invasion with that coastal region. One that provided little cross-currents, less storms, and harder soils. Even the road network behind the front was important. The problem for the Germans was their lack of experience in seaborne invasions. Because of this, they chose the narrowest path to the French coast, they mirror-imaged. They filled in the unknown gaps by assuming the Allies would do what they would do. The CIA warns against such gap filling by saying "be wary of Mirror Images". Sometimes, you don't have any choice, because you have no experience in an area, and are forced into such a gap filling, but you shouldn't have a lot of confidence in the judgment. However, they did fortify the Calvados coast and did station at least three panzer divisions in the immediate area so they did recognize its potential. They didn't need spies or such things, just good operational analysis and confidence in their judgments.
One last issue is the use of gas. Does anyone think that a government with their reputation with gas really would be worried about the Allied retaliation if they used it. They didn't use it because it made no sense militarily. This was the age of combined arms, mobile warfare; a war of maneuver. A style of war that the Germans pioneered so they knew better than anyone that the use of gas would be counterproductive to a war of maneuver even defensively.
So, what were the German failures? Well, was this a military disaster? I don't think so, it was a military setback but they still fought on for eleven more months even with the Russian's sniffing at the doors.
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Post by spook053 on Jun 7, 2014 19:34:51 GMT -6
To Spook, Yes, OAW.. all armored vehicles have top armor - even if they didn't have any. So strafing, bombing, air attacks, and artillery are almost useless against any armored vehicle, especially with the lack of accurate anti-armor ratings for HE ordnance. The above makes armored vehicles, no matter how thin their armor is - or lack of top armor in reality, almost impervious to even the heaviest HE ordnance, which is not accurate. I have verified this in several custom scenario tests using everything from lots of P-47s with 500lb bombs to entire batteries of 75mm-155mm field guns vs armored vehicles on open terrain not moving and heavily concentrated. The effects were almost non-existent. Non-specific armor piercing ordnance is rated on the "anti-personnel" ratings for effects on armor - but in reality this reverses the realistic effects of heavier shells and bombs if an armored vehicle is "near missed" or directly hit. During WW2 armored vehicles often had parts dislodged, tracks blown off, spalling, shock-effect, or even turned over by near misses from heavy artillery and bombs. In OAW such weapons do nearly nothing at all. I would love the series if not for that serious detraction. I was hoping the TOAD team, which verified this problem, would fix it.. they were trying to find a work-around, not sure if they succeeded yet. You can edit the weapons.. but that would take a LOT of time. Ironically, Norm Koger DID have such anti-armor effects for HE ordnance, even heavy mortars, better modeled in TANKS!... go figure. Thanks. Oh, yes, that's right, now I remember about that "hard/soft" element.
My workaround, on a scenario-specific basis, was to use the TOAD-crafted "equipment editor"; that would allow the effects as described above. However, again, it'd be scenario-specific, and if multiplayer, the other player had to also load up the modded equipment database file.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 8, 2014 3:59:10 GMT -6
I think retaliation was a consideration in their thoughts but this is a highly debatable, and very hypothetical, topic.. either way, the Germans knew it was a bad idea. You pretty much repeated what I said above with the "maneuver warfare" response. As to the Japanese.. that would be another thread, and likely would get quite political.
As to the F/Bs stuff.. I think one should bear in mind that P-51s had the free range to hunt down whatever they could shoot up on the way back from escort missions whenever the Luftwaffe didn't put up much of a fight, just as one example. Secondly, I could care less if they carried bombs and rockets or not, the good old .50s and Hispanos could kill it all just fine and were FAR more effective at hitting stuff. Before anyone goes "but gosh they can't kill tanks!".. wrong, totally wrong. Kill the trucks and you kill the tanks, just run them out of gas/ammo/spare parts - now you have a hunk of abandoned junk. Interdiction was the the most effective way to disrupt the German army, and they were far more often "hit and run" raids vs the typical "CAS loitering" types of attacks.
The only reason for the "kill ratios" was to show that the Me262 was not nearly as effective as many historians hyped it up to be for a lot of different reasons and it surely would never have gained complete aerial supremacy no matter how many they might have built, and then prayed they could support them with VERY WELL trained pilots, ground crews, and supplies - it was not designed for it. It was designed to zip in and zap bombers, plain and simple - not run all over France chasing down buckets and buckets of F/Bs while trying to avoid being overwhelmed by allied fighter patrols and/or not get shot to hell while taking off or landing.
I like your "mirror image" context, the Germans did a lot of that during the war in various ways and yes, they were almost clueless about "amphibious" invasions - especially anything of THAT scale, which no one had even thought of doing before.
No, it was not a "military disaster" as the Germans caused far more damage to the invasion forces fighting it out for Caen. Even if the Germans chewed up more allied troops at Normandy they were never going to stop it IMHO. There was simply too much naval and aerial firepower near the coast to see another Dunkirk and the landing was simply too massive to stop it entirely.
What do you all think? Could the Germans have pushed the Allies back into the sea? I doubt it personally. Does make for interesting discussion.
Thanks
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 8, 2014 11:41:27 GMT -6
I am going to address the fighter bomber aspect of the Normandy invasion, the gas issue is a non-starter.
I agree that the kill ratios for the ME-262 compared to other fighters was not that good, but then you wouldn't expect that of a bomber killer. In this primary role, she was able to kill 100 bombers however lack of parts, highly trained pilots, and destruction on the ground prevented them from doing more damage. Out of 1400 produced, only 300 ever saw combat. The planes would break up in flight and the guns would jam regularly. These problems and lack of pilots prevented it from being effect. So, in this sense, the kill ratio was meaningless as was any thought of using it as a close air support weapon. Most jets, even today operate more efficiently at higher altitudes than at low, they are fuel hogs at low altitude so using the ME-262 at low altitude would have shortened her already reduced range. Specific fuel consumption for the Jumo 004 engine was 1.39 lbs. of fuel per pound of thrust per hour. For 1800 liters that gave her a range of about 650 miles depending on altitude. Thrust was about 1980 lbs, and the engines were not efficient at low airspeeds, altitudes or reduced power settings. This means that you can not conserve fuel by throttling back, its firewall the throttle and climb, meet the on coming bomber stream and make one or two passes and then scram for home. This is not the characteristics of a low altitude fighter-bomber. As far as kill ratios for the other propellor driven aircraft, the problem was not lack of aircraft but trained pilots and airfields close enough to get up, find the incoming FBs and then attacking them. This was attempted during the Mortain offensive and they were intercepted and destroyed. If you don't have air superiority over the battlefield, even your own aircraft will not survive. Unless the Luftwaffe could attack southern England airfields before the invasion and reduce them, there was almost nothing the Germans could do to stop or retrieve air superiority over the battlefield.
One issue that we have to think about is effectiveness. There were three missions for FB; armed reconnaissance, interdiction and close air support. The first and third for tactical operations were the primary ground attack modes, the second was more of a strategic or operational level mission. After Normandy, OR found that the only effective weapon against tanks was the 3 inch unguided rocket the British used but it was very inaccurate. For a Panther tank, it too 144 rockets on 8 sorties to achieve a 50% kill ratio. The hardest targets were small gun emplacements; the easiest was buildings as would be expected. The most important effective of fighter bomber attacks was the psychological effects. Many tanks were found abandoned with engines running after an air attack. The best targets, as pointed out was soft-skinned motor transport including halftracks with open tops, artillery and gun tow vehicle. We can debate this but simply, without air support or naval support, I can see no way for the German's to stop this invasion. For the Allies, there were three criteria for a landing zone: A section of beach close to southern English ports to facilitate the movement of supplies and reinforcements essentially turn-around-time, a beach with a low gradient (ratio of rise to run) and a beach within range of fighter bombers and medium bombers for air supremacy. Note that Pas De Calais was not suitable due to high sand dunes backing up the beach. The last requirement was a road network capable of supporting the necessary truck traffic needed to support the forward movement of the Allied ground forces. Apparently, lack of knowledge of suitability of beaches, hampered the German assessment or they would have realized that Pas De Calais was not suitable.
In summary, unless the German’s could interdict the sea movement of supplies and reinforcements, prevent the land movement of supplies and Allied armies along with suppressing Allied air power, they could never hope to actually stop the invasion. It was going to take more than just the one of those factors to stop this invasion, plus some help from the weather. There is never just one simple solution this kind of problem; that of stopping a massive invasion. It really takes a combination of factors and a lot good old fashioned luck plus help from your opponent. Unfortunately, weather helped but they had none of the rest of the factors available in their favor to allow them to stop the invasion. The three front war prevented them from preparing adequately for this invasion.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 8, 2014 13:18:28 GMT -6
Quoted from Chapter II, Outline Overlord, Cross-Channel Attack, The European Theater of Operations, United States Army in World War II.
For the German's to have stopped this invasion, their operational analysis had to mimic SHAEF, it didn't. My apologies for the length, this piece was far better than anything I could provide and have done so.
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Post by William Miller on Jun 8, 2014 19:00:01 GMT -6
To Dennis, For the most part I think you and me mostly agree in general - although with a few differences of opinion. Note, I used "kill ratios" as an *abstract* measure of circumstantial evidence of the general effect of the Me262 compared to other aircraft, along with some notations of the differences. In the final tally, I would have expected better from the Me262 even if zapping primarily bombers with heavy cannon and rockets to regard it as a good interceptor, but like we both agree on - lack of a GOOD pilots, and other problems, were a big problem for such an advanced aircraft. I do not believe kill ratios can be totally ignored either even if they are only one abstract part of the "combat effectiveness" equation. The F4F Wildcat has been regarded forever by historians as being totally inferior to the A6M2 yet it held a kill ratio nearly on par with it even against the "best naval aviators" in the world at the time. Counter-tactics, rugged reliability, and good firepower helped the F4F challenge the "aerobatic" A6M2 wonder that torched its own pilots on a regular basis due to not having good armor. In the end the F4F, according to one source, held a final ratio of 6:1, mostly against the Japanese - so maybe it was not so "inferior" after all? Is that a detailed analysis.. of course not, but a reasonable general deduction. Now of course.. I am being short winded here rather then giving an elongated analysis - which you and me have done in the past many times over my friend - so as not to bore our audience or to jump too far away from the primary topic, so I was sticking with the more simplistic and abstract methods of comparisons. As to the entire "they could not stop the invasion" piece.. I agree. I have always had the opinion that the Germans did not have nearly enough mobile strength - especially with lack of total air cover - to make any major effect on the invasion. It is interesting to note.. of all amphibious assaults that held full aerial superiority not one ever failed, yet those that did not, did fail - as far as I can recall, unless someone wants to dig that hole a bit further as I do not have time at the moment to look all of them up. Anyone want to take a shot at that one? Thanks.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jun 9, 2014 8:20:16 GMT -6
To Dennis, For the most part I think you and me mostly agree in general - although with a few differences of opinion. Note, I used "kill ratios" as an *abstract* measure of circumstantial evidence of the general effect of the Me262 compared to other aircraft, along with some notations of the differences. In the final tally, I would have expected better from the Me262 even if zapping primarily bombers with heavy cannon and rockets to regard it as a good interceptor, but like we both agree on - lack of a GOOD pilots, and other problems, were a big problem for such an advanced aircraft. I do not believe kill ratios can be totally ignored either even if they are only one abstract part of the "combat effectiveness" equation. The F4F Wildcat has been regarded forever by historians as being totally inferior to the A6M2 yet it held a kill ratio nearly on par with it even against the "best naval aviators" in the world at the time. Counter-tactics, rugged reliability, and good firepower helped the F4F challenge the "aerobatic" A6M2 wonder that torched its own pilots on a regular basis due to not having good armor. In the end the F4F, according to one source, held a final ratio of 6:1, mostly against the Japanese - so maybe it was not so "inferior" after all? Is that a detailed analysis.. of course not, but a reasonable general deduction. Now of course.. I am being short winded here rather then giving an elongated analysis - which you and me have done in the past many times over my friend - so as not to bore our audience or to jump too far away from the primary topic, so I was sticking with the more simplistic and abstract methods of comparisons. As to the entire "they could not stop the invasion" piece.. I agree. I have always had the opinion that the Germans did not have nearly enough mobile strength - especially with lack of total air cover - to make any major effect on the invasion. It is interesting to note.. of all amphibious assaults that held full aerial superiority not one ever failed, yet those that did not, did fail - as far as I can recall, unless someone wants to dig that hole a bit further as I do not have time at the moment to look all of them up. Anyone want to take a shot at that one? Thanks. I quite agree that while this is interesting, let's not detour from the original subject of Normandy. As far as your question, Operation Jubilee, the Dieppe Raid had air superiority but never lasted long enough for close support and interdiction to really have an effect. However, it really qualifies as a raid, not an invasion. I'll wait for more participation. Interesting to consider.
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