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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 4, 2014 8:51:29 GMT -6
Our different viewpoints reflect our different experiences. I've been through reduction in forces both in the civilian sector and service. I watched our fleet go from 600 ships to less than 300 ships. Our geostrategic capability was severely impaired. I can relate somewhat to what the RN and USN went through after the WW1. Were the decisions perfect? No and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that but the war was at least two decades away and no matter how many war games at the war colleges and fleet exercises you perform and review, nothing prepares for war except war itself. Was the battlecruiser a good match for the war in the pacific? Possibly, but the General Board did a good job of preparing our fleet for it. The treaty navy fought the IJN to a standstill, then the wartime navy destroyed it.
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Post by spook053 on Aug 5, 2014 18:36:48 GMT -6
Note: In one of my books, there is the picture below of the USS Wisconsin parked outboard of the recovered hull of the Oklahoma. The caption was "Yamamoto exchanged fighting the Oklahoma class battleship with 14 inch guns for the Iowa class, radar equipped 16 inch guns that could strike and did at over 32 miles. Think he made the right decision?
Concerning the reference, in point of fact the keels of ALL of the four Iowa BB's were laid down before the PH raid. Any decision of Yamamoto's was therefore immaterial.
Noteworthy of the Iowa BB's were that being the first "non-treaty" ships by design after the naval treaty's collapse in 1937, they were relieved from any shackles concerning displacement and weaponry, therefore no corners had to be cut concerning armor protection, displacement, or speed. The preceding North Carolina and South Dakota classes, fine ships as they were, still labored under one treaty limit or another in their design.
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Post by spook053 on Aug 5, 2014 19:34:05 GMT -6
What fascinates about this title is how things come full circle in time; recalling how it was the refurbishment of Fighting Steel that introduced me to the NWS crew.
(God, that seems the other side of my life in so many ways now...... )
There's really little to debate on the main points made earlier here. But what may still be useful here is to remind of the "aura" that the BB's held up to the beginning of WWII.
One case in point is a book, "US Naval Vessels 1943," which is a NIP reprint of the Nov 1943 ONI-54. This pictorial reference was created as a ship recognition aid. And the first class covered in the book? The BB's.
From Conway's History of the Ship series: "Eclipse of the Big Gun, The Warship 1906-45." The leading warship of discussion is again the BB/BC, but understandable in this case of the segue from pre-WWI to WWII.
Richard Worth's more recent reference, "Fleets of World War II," breaks from prior tradition and discusses CV's of a nation's navy before the BB's/BC's (for those nations having them, of course). In this book are two little nuggets of US naval thinking, on the heels of the PH raid.
Page 7, the Chilean Navy: "The desperation after Pearl Harbor prompted an offer from the United States to purchase Almirante Latorre and some destroyers, but Chile declined."
Pg 96, on Great Britain: "A peculiar, clandestine scheme arose during the war when a high-ranking American official proposed trading eight American heavy cruisers (presumably CA24-31, 33, 35) for the Duke of York. The British recovered from their surprise and expressed some interest, but they lacked the manpower to crew eight new ships. Inspiring more curiosity than enthusiasm, the scheme faded away."
Unfortunately, neither of these comments were footnoted, so they can't be further vetted for authenticity here. Yet if presumed true, these events indicate the value and prestige that BB's still held in the eyes of higher power within the USN or the US Govt overall. All the more in that neither Latorre nor the KGV class were particularly auspicious BB designs IMO.
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Post by fredsanford on Aug 8, 2014 11:21:17 GMT -6
This question goes into serious counter-factual territory, but I wonder what everyone's opinion on what WOULD have been the most effective fleet compositions for various countries from say WW1 through WW2? In other words, say you were playing an uber-campaign of SAI that went from 1900-1950, and you could use the DesignShip (theoretically expanded to allow all type of vessels) to create your navy within certain 'budgetary' and technological parameters. Pick nation-what would you build?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 8, 2014 12:19:06 GMT -6
Hi Fred:
We did "drift" into the virtual world of history. As far as your question, here is my opinion.
The fleet compositions from 1900 to 1950 changed for geostrategic, technological and a lot of economic and political reasons. We have the rise of the US in the world, the German unification, the rise of Japan in the east, China and the Middle East. Some these changes were caused by technology such as the move to fuel oil. For Britain and Germany, coal was found locally, but not fuel oil. That had to come from the Middle East, Southwest Pacific or the US. Now commerce protection really became important. The advent of the self-propelled torpedo and the submarine changed the whole nature of the guerre de course. Commerce raiding was now being accomplished by a stealthy, quiet but deadly weapons system. Now light cruisers and destroyers would be important. The move to steam turbines changed the size and nature of the engine rooms. The open hearth furnace for the production of high quality steel now required nickel, manganese and chromium, in short supply in Europe. Wireless radio improved communication both with the land and at sea. The aircraft saw its dawn. These and many other changes went far to modify and change how fleets operated and fought. We sometimes forget that Pax Britannica was more a combination of land and sea power. It was the industrial revolution which provided the UK, Germany, France and the US with their increased economic wealth. This wealth translated to bigger and better fleets.
My choice would be England. By 1900, British wealth and power began to wane. Geostrategic issues became paramount with the new alloy requirements for high strength steel, sources for fuel oil etc., she needed to provide protection in the Far East, Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean along with the North Sea. Each of those fleets would have to be based on the light cruisers, destroyers and submarines plus some smaller patrol boats. The battle fleet probably would be stationed along the eastern coast of England with at least four squadrons of 15 inch battleships when those guns became available. Initially 12 to 13.5 inch guns would be standard. A battle cruiser scouting force would be necessary, but the battle cruisers would make up the capital ship requirements in the Far East, Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. In the Med, Malta would be the base, Singapore for the Far East and possibly an Indian city for that small force.
As a policy, I would scrap, as soon as possible all pre-dreadnoughts to save money and assets. The armored cruisers do have a place in the Far East but might be better suited in the Indian Ocean.
For the North Sea and a blockade of Germany, submarines should be a priority, with a good force of a subchaser type vessel to augment anti-submarine warfare requirements probably stationed in and around Southeast England to protect the English Channel. I would emphasize mining operations and a good mine warfare ship based on older destroyers could be a good mix with the subchasers. These are all inexpensive ships but vital for commerce protection along the coast of England. I don't know how far to go with this, but this would be my force structure. Remember I have the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. I have stopped my assessment pre-1914.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 8, 2014 14:42:57 GMT -6
For the battle cruisers, I believe that 12 to 13.5 inch guns are adequate. This keeps the beam width at a respectable size thereby maintaining an excellent length to beam ratio always important for speed. I would not arm them with torpedo tubes, these are not a valid requirement for their missions. They should be excellent sea boats as their missions would require blue water operation. A good freeboard, especially in the forecastle would be a requirement for their missions. Steam turbines are a must. Displacement should not exceed about 30,000 tons with a range of at least 5000 to 6000nm at 18 knots. Accommodations should be roomy and work areas spacious. This boat will probably be at sea for long periods of time, and crew morale is important.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 9, 2014 17:50:26 GMT -6
Our different viewpoints reflect our different experiences. I've been through reduction in forces both in the civilian sector and service. I watched our fleet go from 600 ships to less than 300 ships. Our geostrategic capability was severely impaired. I can relate somewhat to what the RN and USN went through after the WW1. Were the decisions perfect? No and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that but the war was at least two decades away and no matter how many war games at the war colleges and fleet exercises you perform and review, nothing prepares for war except war itself. Was the battlecruiser a good match for the war in the pacific? Possibly, but the General Board did a good job of preparing our fleet for it. The treaty navy fought the IJN to a standstill, then the wartime navy destroyed it. At times when conventional wars took 2-4+ years to be decided the complacency between wars was more forgivable.. but as conventional wars got shorter and weapons often took longer to procure and produce in quantity that sort of complacency is no longer an option. Granted some wars fought after the 1950s that took longer then WW2 were not fought conventionally but either way, expensive complex weapons are not designed and built as fast as they used to be. Example, had war erupted in Europe (WW3) it likely would have been over in weeks.. not years like Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Korea. Even GW1991 was over in days (disregarding the buildup/air campaign). FW1982 was over within weeks also.. and the RN was in no way prepared for that situation without serious help no thanks to being cannibalized by the UK government. But as it goes during wartime everyone loves the idea of "peace" (makes for great politics - but that is another story) while thinking that the worst enemy of the human race will magically be vanquished by wishful thinking.. that being human nature itself. As the saying goes - to maintain peace countries must always be prepared for war. Been that way since man could swing a club. Thanks
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 10, 2014 10:43:06 GMT -6
I am reminded of a scene in the 1965 movie, Battle of the Bulge between Martin Hessler and his driver, Conrad. It has always stuck with me about war. Here it is, quoted from IMDB
Cpl. Conrad: The truth... is that I'm a fool. I believed in you, but all that you believe in, is the war. You have the war, you like the war. And all I have are my sons and I don't want to lose them. Col. Martin Hessler: I am not responsible for your children. Cpl. Conrad: You are. You would make them soldiers. Col. Martin Hessler: Yes, and they will fight. Cpl. Conrad: And they will die? Col. Martin Hessler: If necessary. Cpl. Conrad: Necessary for who? For you? Col. Martin Hessler: You are not only a fool, you are a traitor. Cpl. Conrad: And you are a murderer! You would murder my sons. You would murder my country. You would murder the whole world, to stay in that uniform.
'nough said.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 11, 2014 17:36:28 GMT -6
I am reminded of a scene in the 1965 movie, Battle of the Bulge between Martin Hessler and his driver, Conrad. It has always stuck with me about war. Here it is, quoted from IMDB Considering that Robert Shaw is one of my favorite classic actors I know that scene quite well. Yes, some people are in love with death.. so common sense should tell countries to be prepared to defend against such people at all times. As you said.. nuff said. Thanks
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Post by William Miller on Aug 11, 2014 17:46:06 GMT -6
In terms of the BC concept my thoughts - being simplified to save time - big enough guns to cause possible dismay for a BB if needed and to fight off CRs at longer then effective CR gunnery ranges, armor protection that lands somewhere between a BB and a CA, a decent SB/AAB, good fire controls - preferably with excellent radars, and good 30+ knot maintainable speed with a long cruising range at 20+ knots.
During WW2 (where the BCs were more controversial then during WW1 when specific classes were built) the RM CD/GC classes, KM S/G, USN Alaska, MNF Dunkerques, RN Hood/R&R classes, and IJN Kongos/Hiei classes all fell into that category to varying degrees. IMHO, the Alaskas were the finest and most lethal BCs ever designed, especially considering they were the only USN BCs ever designed.
Trivia, I had the chance to talk to one of the first and last crew of the USN Alaska a few years back and the crew never called the Alaska a "large cruiser" (the political classification) and always considered her a fine ship and a definite "battlecruiser".
Thanks.
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Post by spook053 on Aug 13, 2014 18:24:46 GMT -6
In terms of the BC concept my thoughts - being simplified to save time - big enough guns to cause possible dismay for a BB if needed and to fight off CRs at longer then effective CR gunnery ranges, armor protection that lands somewhere between a BB and a CA, a decent SB/AAB, good fire controls - preferably with excellent radars, and good 30+ knot maintainable speed with a long cruising range at 20+ knots. During WW2 (where the BCs were more controversial then during WW1 when specific classes were built) the RM CD/GC classes, KM S/G, USN Alaska, MNF Dunkerques, RN Hood/R&R classes, and IJN Kongos/Hiei classes all fell into that category to varying degrees. IMHO, the Alaskas were the finest and most lethal BCs ever designed, especially considering they were the only USN BCs ever designed. Trivia, I had the chance to talk to one of the first and last crew of the USN Alaska a few years back and the crew never called the Alaska a "large cruiser" (the political classification) and always considered her a fine ship and a definite "battlecruiser". Thanks. In "Fleets of World War II," R Worth was pretty dour about the Alaska design, and yes, I remember the earlier forum dust-ups on that viewpoint.
That said, one comment of his was of the class being the "least maneuverable in the fleet except for old Saratoga." But I've not seen the numbers to some metric like turn radii at given speeds, and how they'd compare with those for other BC's or BB's.
Of course, the Fletcher's also had large turn radii within-class, but that didn't ultimately detract too much from an otherwise well-balanced design.
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Post by spook053 on Aug 13, 2014 18:50:55 GMT -6
I am reminded of a scene in the 1965 movie, Battle of the Bulge between Martin Hessler and his driver, Conrad. It has always stuck with me about war. Here it is, quoted from IMDB Cpl. Conrad: The truth... is that I'm a fool. I believed in you, but all that you believe in, is the war. You have the war, you like the war. And all I have are my sons and I don't want to lose them. Col. Martin Hessler: I am not responsible for your children. Cpl. Conrad: You are. You would make them soldiers. Col. Martin Hessler: Yes, and they will fight. Cpl. Conrad: And they will die? Col. Martin Hessler: If necessary. Cpl. Conrad: Necessary for who? For you? Col. Martin Hessler: You are not only a fool, you are a traitor. Cpl. Conrad: And you are a murderer! You would murder my sons. You would murder my country. You would murder the whole world, to stay in that uniform. 'nough said.
The conversations which I thought would make a reasonable alternate view were those between the dramatized Lee & Longstreet in the "Gettysburg" movie.
One scene, Lee to Longstreet: "A true commander loves the army to the utmost." Presumably, this meant to the commander seeing to the needs, morale, and discipline of his command. Then he follows up: "And therein is the trap. He must also be ready to sacrifice the army he loves." My read of that was that the burden of command responsibility must not be taken likely.
Later, after the failed 3 July assault, and Lee is wrought with the responsibility of the failed attack, his later comment: "They don't fight for us, thank God for that."
I must admit, though, that I wasn't terribly enthralled with Martin Sheen being cast as Lee.....
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 13, 2014 20:00:27 GMT -6
I am reminded of a scene in the 1965 movie, Battle of the Bulge between Martin Hessler and his driver, Conrad. It has always stuck with me about war. Here it is, quoted from IMDB Cpl. Conrad: The truth... is that I'm a fool. I believed in you, but all that you believe in, is the war. You have the war, you like the war. And all I have are my sons and I don't want to lose them. Col. Martin Hessler: I am not responsible for your children. Cpl. Conrad: You are. You would make them soldiers. Col. Martin Hessler: Yes, and they will fight. Cpl. Conrad: And they will die? Col. Martin Hessler: If necessary. Cpl. Conrad: Necessary for who? For you? Col. Martin Hessler: You are not only a fool, you are a traitor. Cpl. Conrad: And you are a murderer! You would murder my sons. You would murder my country. You would murder the whole world, to stay in that uniform. 'nough said.
The conversations which I thought would make a reasonable alternate view were those between the dramatized Lee & Longstreet in the "Gettysburg" movie.
One scene, Lee to Longstreet: "A true commander loves the army to the utmost." Presumably, this meant to the commander seeing to the needs, morale, and discipline of his command. Then he follows up: "And therein is the trap. He must also be ready to sacrifice the army he loves." My read of that was that the burden of command responsibility must not be taken likely.
Later, after the failed 3 July assault, and Lee is wrought with the responsibility of the failed attack, his later comment: "They don't fight for us, thank God for that."
I must admit, though, that I wasn't terribly enthralled with Martin Sheen being cast as Lee.....
Good scenes, both. I do believe that Robert Duvall did a better job in the second movie. I agree on your interpretations.
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Post by William Miller on Aug 14, 2014 4:23:45 GMT -6
That said, one comment of his was of the class being the "least maneuverable in the fleet except for old Saratoga." But I've not seen the numbers to some metric like turn radii at given speeds, and how they'd compare with those for other BC's or BB's.
Of course, the Fletcher's also had large turn radii within-class, but that didn't ultimately detract too much from an otherwise well-balanced design.
Well.. unless a ship is designed specifically to do water donuts to try and evade air attack (which no other BC was more capable of defending against then the Alaska) to avoid bombs and torpedoes I do not really think it mattered much. The Yamato could do lovely water donuts.. yet she hardly shot down any planes in her final battle and each air attack landed damaging hits. A ship that could push nearly 38 mph was never an easy target to hit.. no matter how tight the water donuts were, and for surface engagements speed and gunnery accuracy were far more important then water donuts. I remember his whole "TPS" thing as well.. not like TPS was an anti-torpedo shield and IMHO, speed again was more important then testing the theoretical TPS. One was a proven defense against being hit, the other was far more theoretical and still resulted in a damaged hull if hit which would slow the ship down anyways (unless the torp just splatted itself on thick armor plate because of being too shallow - a notorious habit of the British) plus anyone could build a better torpedo far easier then anyone could build a better TPS - as was proven repeatedly. Personally, I would MUCH rather have the better ability to kill the torpedo launching platform then to try and test a theoretical TPS. Nuff said. Thanks.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 14, 2014 9:00:29 GMT -6
Just some facts that I have discovered over the years about TCD or turning circle diameter.
The size of the rudder is important as is the number of rudders. The larger the rudder, the smaller the TCD. The number of screws makes a different. Single screw ships turn faster towards the side of rotation. Most twin screws are contra rotating to eliminate that problem. The longer the ship, the wider the turning circle diameter. This was especially the case with the Lexington class ships. They have a LtoB of over 9.0 to 1. In fact, the LtoB of the Iowa's was patterned after the Lexington class but lowered to provide a narrower bow and a larger torpedo bulkhead. Ships at maximum speed will turn in a wider circle than when traveling below maximum speed, which makes sense. If you turn to port, the ship will initially veer to starboard before making the turn. TCD also increases in shallower waters. A ship that is loaded near max, will be far more sluggish than a lightly loaded ship, and wind against the superstructure does have an effect. Torpedoes launched from submarines are far harder to spot than aircraft launched torpedoes. Aerial torpedoes under normal circumstances will dive to 150 feet before rising to their calibrated depth. Submarine torpedoes will rise gradually then run at the assigned depth. It is vital that inner patrols fly at lower altitudes to help the spotters on the ships to identify subs and torpedoes. The solution to aerial torpedoes is to shoot down the assailant before he can drop their torpedoes this is why CAP's are so important.
As to the Lexington's, They had a single rudder and were narrower, all these factors increased their speed, but also increased their turning radius, causing the Sara to get torpedoed twice. My dad said she just couldn't turn fast enough to avoid them. Interestingly, the Montana class BB's also had a single rudder, although the Iowa's had dual. This was done to improve the speed of the Montana's. Also, the Alaska's had a single rudder, so the idea that they had wider turning circle diameters is probably true. Note that other US heavy cruisers also had single rudders and the Alaska design was derived from the treaty heavy cruisers.
Hope this is useful. I am researching in my naval engineering books for a formula. One does exist.
Update: Here are some more interesting numbers. For a slender ship, 4.5 -7 x length is about the turning circle. For a short or wider ship, its about 2.5-3. For the Alaska's that means that their turning radius was probably about anywhere from 5656 feet to 3636 feet. This is a very rough estimate. I have the exact turning circle diameter for Titanic which was generated by her trials. Note that a ship will begin to slow down in a full circle which most warships under cruising orders will not do. So they can, at full speed make quick changes to heading to comb torpedoes. Again, it depends on the rudder size which will develop a certain pound of force for her square area. This translates into a force to turn the ship. You really have to do sea trials and then develop for the future officers of the ship, the turning circle diameters at different speeds for their use.
Another fact in cruising orders is screening distance. For WWII cruisers, it was 2000 yards for close screening of carriers, 4000 yards for intermediate. Obviously, if you have a 3500 foot diameter turning radius for 360 degrees, for 180 degrees its going to be tight unless you turn away from the carrier. These and many other factors have to be known before turning in cruising formation. I am certain that this pertained also to WWI and earlier.
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