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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 20, 2013 11:00:52 GMT -6
Sorry to not respond for a few days... Reading your last post, I don't think we're that far apart. I agree that an offensive drive into France in the southern Alps is really a non-starter. Greece, like you say, isn't going anywhere and once the decay and fall of Italy's erstwhile allies AH & OE come to fruition, the Balkans and eastern Med will be ripe for future exploitation. If the early part of the war in the Med is focused on naval activity, it will help assuage the Italian people's aversion to casualties. Once naval superiority is established, Italy can focus it's limited resources on attainable, low cost objectives. Next question: Assuming Italian intervention on the side of the central powers takes place, and the straits of Otranto aren't the choke point they became historically, what does AH do with its fleet? I don't think either one of us believe a high level of operational cooperation would take place between AH and Italy, more like co-belligerents with their own independent strategic objectives. If you were CinC of the AH navy, what kind of campaign would you wage? Response time isn't important, I am retired and don't expect people to be able to respond as fast as I do. In fact, this counterfactual forced me to review topography, technology and actual history. We aren't that far apart, I just believe that fighting in the mountains is wasteful. History just about proves that, especially with nice flat deserts to fight in across the Med. As to the next question, a cruiser-destroyer force supported by submarines should close the Straits of Sicily. With the shoals, it should be easy to accomplish and vital in closing off the Eastern Mediterranean and forcing a sea battle between France and Italy, which might help AH in the Straits of Otranto. That strait is only 47 miles wide and MAS boats, submarines and possibly some aircraft can help AH close that to traffic. Depends on how much cooperation you can expect from the Austro-Hungarians. Just because it is in their best interest, doesn't mean they will do it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 24, 2013 18:09:48 GMT -6
Was the placement of the CSA capital at Richmond a bad choice?
Robert E. Lee once stated that Richmond was a millstone around the Army. I agree and that is the subject of this counterfactual. Was it badly placed and should it have been left in its original location. The first capital was at Montgomery, Alabama. This is where the first convention was held for all other seceded states to form the CSA. Jeff Davis took the oath of office on the steps of the state capital in Montgomery. When Virginia seceded, it was considered that the capital should move to Richmond, where the hot, muggy weather was less pronounced. In my opinion, a terrible reason to move a capital right into the heart of main combat arena. Jeff Davis was opposed and believed, as I believe and Lee, it should remain in the deep south. Alas, he lost and the capital was moved.
Virginia of course brought the largest population, the highest single state industrial capacity and the famous Tredegar Iron Works which was the only heavy ordnance facility in the South. Her heritage as the birthplace of Washington, Jefferson and others was not lost on anyone.
With Richmond as the capital and Virginia being the most important state economically, Lee or any CSA commander had to protect the line across the Rappahannock River. This is exactly what Lee was tied to and used offensive action to attempt to move the AOP from that region to defend against an outflanking movement into Washington. All of actions, in both the Antietam and Gettysburg operations along with his defensive battles at Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Seven Days battles and subsequent battles against Grant were aimed at this goal. This was the "millstone" around the ANV.
So, the counterfactual; Would the capital remaining in Montgomery substantially change the strategic nature of combat operations in the east. Would it have substantially changed how the Civil War was fought and its results. Something to consider: Washington D.C. never moves and it is the key strategic objective of any ANV operation if the south wishes to end the war. Defensive operations might succeed in wearing down the AOP, but I have doubts it would have forced the Union to conclude a peace agreement.
However, you might disagree. Love to hear someone else's ideas.
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Post by spook053 on Oct 25, 2013 22:33:48 GMT -6
I've been more of the view that locating the capital at Atlanta would have more optimal, though between Atlanta and Montgomery I couldn't say for now. Was Montgomery similar to Atlanta in its rail net?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2013 23:07:24 GMT -6
I've been more of the view that locating the capital at Atlanta would have more optimal, though between Atlanta and Montgomery I couldn't say for now. Was Montgomery similar to Atlanta in its rail net? I don't think it makes any real difference. Sherman used a rail line leading from Louisville, Kentucky, through Nashville, Tennessee, through Chattanooga to Atlanta. However, if you use this map from the Westpoint Atlas's, Southeastern United States RR's of the Confederacy and Border States: www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/American%20Civil%20War/ACW02.gif; examine the RR line heading west out of Montgomery and its terminus. It's Vicksburg, Mississippi. Think about what happened the day after the end of Gettysburg. Would Jeff Davis have overruled Lee about helping Johnson at Jackson to put together a stronger force to prevent Vicksburg's fall with Montgomery, the Capital of the CSA, just down the road a piece. There are at least three north-south flowing rivers that could be valuable as defensive positions; one at Jackson; one at Meridian and one at Selma which actually flows through Montgomery. It would make a nice avenue to move supplies and troops to and from the retreating armies of the CSA. The only problem is south of Selma; Mobile, Alabama which was attacked by the Union Navy. This could be an avenue of attack. Opinion?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 26, 2013 10:07:02 GMT -6
Fall of Constantinople
Here is a counterfactual that I've read in Virtual History by Niall Ferguson. I will not quote but summarize:
We know that the Industrial Revolution was due to modern science and that modern science is due to Galileo. We can debate that but lets assume the statement is correct. We know that Galileo's work was due to Copernicsus and that his work was due to the Renaissance. Now, the Renaissance was due to the fall of Constantinople.
Now the counterfactual: What if Constantinople had not fallen?
No, I don't have a real good answer, but I can make some assumptions. However, maybe some of you have studied the Byzantine Empire more than I have.
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Post by ksbearski on Oct 26, 2013 15:01:30 GMT -6
I've been more of the view that locating the capital at Atlanta would have more optimal, though between Atlanta and Montgomery I couldn't say for now. Was Montgomery similar to Atlanta in its rail net? I don't think it makes any real difference. Sherman used a rail line leading from Louisville, Kentucky, through Nashville, Tennessee, through Chattanooga to Atlanta. However, if you use this map from the Westpoint Atlas's, Southeastern United States RR's of the Confederacy and Border States: www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/American%20Civil%20War/ACW02.gif; examine the RR line heading west out of Montgomery and its terminus. It's Vicksburg, Mississippi. Think about what happened the day after the end of Gettysburg. Would Jeff Davis have overruled Lee about helping Johnson at Jackson to put together a stronger force to prevent Vicksburg's fall with Montgomery, the Capital of the CSA, just down the road a piece. There are at least three north-south flowing rivers that could be valuable as defensive positions; one at Jackson; one at Meridian and one at Selma which actually flows through Montgomery. It would make a nice avenue to move supplies and troops to and from the retreating armies of the CSA. The only problem is south of Selma; Mobile, Alabama which was attacked by the Union Navy. This could be an avenue of attack. Opinion? I think Montgomery makes more sense.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 26, 2013 15:13:34 GMT -6
I don't think it makes any real difference. Sherman used a rail line leading from Louisville, Kentucky, through Nashville, Tennessee, through Chattanooga to Atlanta. However, if you use this map from the Westpoint Atlas's, Southeastern United States RR's of the Confederacy and Border States: www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/American%20Civil%20War/ACW02.gif; examine the RR line heading west out of Montgomery and its terminus. It's Vicksburg, Mississippi. Think about what happened the day after the end of Gettysburg. Would Jeff Davis have overruled Lee about helping Johnson at Jackson to put together a stronger force to prevent Vicksburg's fall with Montgomery, the Capital of the CSA, just down the road a piece. There are at least three north-south flowing rivers that could be valuable as defensive positions; one at Jackson; one at Meridian and one at Selma which actually flows through Montgomery. It would make a nice avenue to move supplies and troops to and from the retreating armies of the CSA. The only problem is south of Selma; Mobile, Alabama which was attacked by the Union Navy. This could be an avenue of attack. Opinion? I think Montgomery makes more sense. Why? Topographically, is this better ground? Politically? Economically?
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 24, 2016 22:45:22 GMT -6
Figured I'd resurface this thread for a laugh: warisboring.com/its-startling-how-close-the-nazis-came-to-invading-britain-ff491fee31e6#.sflursinhI'd be very interested to know if Forcyzk devotes any attention to Operation Sea Lion's real Achilles' heel - Germany's complete unpreparedness for any kind of seaborne amphibious assault - or if the author of that article gave the book a cursory read and assembled a headline-grabbing synopsis via cherry-picking one-sided snippets. Crossing 12 miles of rough water in unpowered river barges is tough enough even without anyone attempting to shoot at you. I find it amusing that alternate histories where Sea Lion succeeded are reputed to be the origin of the "alien space bats" trope in sci-fi: tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/AlienSpaceBats
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2016 8:27:45 GMT -6
Figured I'd resurface this thread for a laugh: warisboring.com/its-startling-how-close-the-nazis-came-to-invading-britain-ff491fee31e6#.sflursinhI'd be very interested to know if Forcyzk devotes any attention to Operation Sea Lion's real Achilles' heel - Germany's complete unpreparedness for any kind of seaborne amphibious assault - or if the author of that article gave the book a cursory read and assembled a headline-grabbing synopsis via cherry-picking one-sided snippets. Crossing 12 miles of rough water in unpowered river barges is tough enough even without anyone attempting to shoot at you. I find it amusing that alternate histories where Sea Lion succeeded are reputed to be the origin of the "alien space bats" trope in sci-fi: tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/AlienSpaceBatsWell, my first comment is on the paragraph that states This statement flies in the face of every successful invasion in the war. Both in the Mediterranean, coast of Africa, and the Pacific for sure, successful invasions had a prerequisite of complete air supremacy at the point of attack. It isn't a question of whether they could sail across the twenty-six miles successfully, it was a question of being able to sustain their forces until they could develop a successful and thriving logistic support system for all the items needed for modern warfare. Without complete air supremacy, this logistic support system would not work. Was the British Navy vital? Yes and no. The Royal Navy without air supremacy would not have risked their few capital ships in the narrow straits of the English Channel. They would have relied on submarines, MTB's and destroyers with possibly a few heavy and light cruisers. The defense of the coast rested on the Army and the Air force. The Royal Navy's job would be to isolate the battlefield i.e the Channel from any outside influence by the small German fleet which had already taken losses in Norway and was depleted. The coastal defenses like pill boxes, fire traps etc. were not ready until late August or September. Lastly, although there is much more, the German's could never be certain as to what the Soviets would do once they, the Germans were involved in a land battle with the English. It was better to isolate the British with submarines and a few air attacks, and send the bulk of their forces against their real land based threat- the Soviet Union. Remember that the German's got much of their oil from the Romanian oil fields and those were vulnerable to a simple short trip by the Soviet army. While the Germans proved that army was no match for them, if they had been involved in combat across the English Channel, it would not have been difficult for the Soviets to simply drive to the Adriatic and disrupt the German oil production. For the German's, it was the Russian's who were their biggest enemy and that's where they focused their attention. So, could the German's have put boots on the ground in England? Yes, of course, that isn't the question. The question is could they have survived if the Soviet's turned on them. The Nazis regime could not take that chance. I enjoy alternative history but it has to be based on factual evidence that the events could have turned out differently with a few minor changes. But this is not factual evidence, its fantasy. UPDATE: I just bought the book for my Kindle and will start it later after babysitting. I also have a book edited by Niall Ferguson about Virtual History with numerous historians making comments on Virtual historical ideas. There is a chapter on Nazi England which I am going to go back and read.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 26, 2016 4:02:51 GMT -6
Lastly, although there is much more, the German's could never be certain as to what the Soviets would do once they, the Germans were involved in a land battle with the English. It was better to isolate the British with submarines and a few air attacks, and send the bulk of their forces against their real land based threat- the Soviet Union. Remember that the German's got much of their oil from the Romanian oil fields and those were vulnerable to a simple short trip by the Soviet army. While the Germans proved that army was no match for them, if they had been involved in combat across the English Channel, it would not have been difficult for the Soviets to simply drive to the Adriatic and disrupt the German oil production. For the German's, it was the Russian's who were their biggest enemy and that's where they focused their attention.
So, could the German's have put boots on the ground in England? Yes, of course, that isn't the question. The question is could they have survived if the Soviet's turned on them. The Nazis regime could not take that chance. Germany decided to face this very same risk by initiating the Battle of France. In fact, the rapid collapse of France could not be taken for granted. Despite this, Germany decided to attack. Being able to do the right thing - with sufficient air and naval superiority - Germany would also have landed in England, since its army was relatively weak.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 26, 2016 6:35:23 GMT -6
Germany decided to face this very same risk by initiating the Battle of France. In fact, the rapid collapse of France could not be taken for granted. Despite this, Germany decided to attack. Being able to do the right thing - with sufficient air and naval superiority - Germany would also have landed in England, since its army was relatively weak. Don't forget that the bulk of Soviet Forces had been involved in the Russo-Finnish War from November 1939 to March 1940. The Russian army suffered very heavy losses and began a complete assessment and changes to how their operated. It would have been very difficult for them to move into another combat situation within a month and half. However, if the German's would have invaded England in September, this would have been more than enough time to recover from the Finnish War and the German forces would have been tied up across the Channel in a more difficult position to move back to Germany to stop any advance by the Soviets.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 26, 2016 11:10:34 GMT -6
An interesting point of view. On the other hand, before the overwhelming victory over France the strength of the Wehrmacht was not fully understood. And the effect of the purges of senior soviet officers was not unknown to the Germans.
About the previous discussion about an entry of Italy into the first world war alongside AH and Germany, I found some data about the Italian imports in those years. It appears that Italy in 1911 depended heavily on imports from France, UK and Russia, especially for primary goods. An extension of its possessions in North Africa (Tunisia?) would not have improved much its situation. In 1939 the Italian import situation was somewhat less unfavorable. It may also be presumed that the old hostility between AH and Italy would have kept blocked various naval forces in the Adriatic. In any case a SAI campaign of this type might be very interesting to play.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 26, 2016 11:43:45 GMT -6
An interesting point of view. On the other hand, before the overwhelming victory over France the strength of the Wehrmacht was not fully understood. And the effect of the purges of senior soviet officers was not unknown to the Germans. About the previous discussion about an entry of Italy into the first world war alongside AH and Germany, I found some data about the Italian imports in those years. It appears that Italy in 1911 depended heavily on imports from France, UK and Russia, especially for primary goods. An extension of its possessions in North Africa (Tunisia?) would not have improved much its situation. In 1939 the Italian import situation was somewhat less unfavorable. It may also be presumed that the old hostility between AH and Italy would have kept blocked various naval forces in the Adriatic. In any case a SAI campaign of this type might be very interesting to play. The German's had testing and training facilities in the Soviet Union prior to WW2. They had a small officer training school in Moscow and Keitel, Manstein along with Model all attended it. The Allies knew of the Purges and that is one reason that they did not see the Soviet Union as a threat, neither did the Germans. The problem for the Allies was not their assessment of the strength of the Wehrmacht, but their continued reliance on a plan to defend France and Low Countries that represented WW1 thinking. They assumed that the German's would reuse the Schlieffen Plan which in fact they were going to do. The lost of an aircraft and capture of the plans changed their thinking when Manstein presented his plan to attack through the Ardennes. That plan completely unhinged the Allies. Their doctrine of using their tanks in small formations to assist the infantry was still fixed in WW1, France had only just begun to raise two armored formations but they were not ready for combat. The British were in the same boat. It was the German Ardennes plan along with the coordination of air and ground that caused the problems but the Allies were aware of the German capability. It's one thing to know an enemy's capability, its another to face it and beat it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 29, 2016 20:55:30 GMT -6
One item that the author has not brought up concerning Sealion invasion plan is weather over the English Channel. The weather is highly variable, especially from October to April. It is cold, cloudy, wet with strong winds and very poor visibility which would almost certainly produce very strong waves and tides which are already strong especially near the Straits of Dover. So, you can forget an invasion after September 1940 until sometime after April 1941. Now, what was the Wehrmacht doing in April of 1941? Well it was invading Yugoslavia and Greece to save the butts of the Italians. The invasion ended near the 25th of April. So, the German Wehrmacht was not available until probably June 1941, because after the completion of the Yugoslav-Greek operation, it would have taken time for them to recover, rebuild and reequip their forces. So, what happened on June 21, 1941? That's right, the Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. So, what difference would extending the period of a possible invasion make in the long term. None actually, it made no difference. If the invasion did not go off from July 1940 to September 1940, the German's were done until they had eliminated the Soviet Union. We all know how that adventure turned out. I've said this many times, counterfactual history must use actual, available facts to keep the idea from turning into fantasy. In this instance, weather over the channel was vital and never considered in this book. Hitler cancelled Sealion on September 17th, 1940 ostensibly due to the lack of air superiority over the Channel. However, the real combination of reasons was simply that the after September, it was not meteorologically possible to conduct the invasion and maintain a supply system once it had been started. They could and did have superiority over the Channel, but it would too late to conduct the invasion and support it. After that, events in Europe took their own turn. It is a myth that the German's did not have air superiority over the Channel. Remember that the victor gets to tell the history, not the loser. Update: Just a further note about this. The weather played an important part in the fourth phase of the German air offensive against England. The German Luftwaffe was very tired and morale in the fighters was low because they had been accused by the bombers that they were not giving adequate protection to them during combat operations. However, as Adolf Galland says" The advance of autumn revealed another disadvantage for us: the weather". He says later "Weather conditions over the Channel were the last of a series of reasons why the German Command eventually discontinued the day raids on London on October 20th, 1940". It wasn't the British defenses but also the weather. This same weather would prevent barges, fishing boats etc. from crossing the 26 miles across the Channel. Rarely in war, is their only one reason for the failure of an action or the failure to take action. In this case, it was weather and combat losses in the Luftwaffe that prevented the invasion. My guess is the weather prevented the invasion, which really made no sense to continue to take the losses over England. So, they switched to night bombing, which was successful for long time. FYI: This link is the Met Office records in England. It has the Monthly Weather Report 1940's. www.metoffice.gov.uk/learning/library/archive-hidden-treasures/monthly-weather-report-1940s
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Post by director on Nov 25, 2016 22:37:17 GMT -6
Germany was not gaining air supremacy, and I think was never going to do so - RAF fighters were able to keep control of the skies, most of the time and in most places. Germany was not gaining sea supremacy - the German Navy was utterly inadequate to hold the channel open for the passage of troops and supplies. The German Army's minimal requirement was orders of magnitude over what the German Navy could provide. Amphibious landings are the trickiest military operations, requiring much practice, planning, organization and great co-operation from all services. Germany met the requirement for none of that. Even the Allies, in 1944 and 1945, were still struggling to master amphibious assaults - D-Day could easily have been a catastrophe and that's WITH total control of the air and sea, the destruction of railroads in the rear and every advantage (including massive parachute drops) that two of the largest economies on the planet could come up with.
The absolute best way to shorten the path to an Allied victory would be for Germany to launch Sea Lion. The losses in men and equipment, and the propaganda effects, would have been enormous.
As to the fall of France... Manstein's plan very nearly fell apart early on; the battles around Sedan (at the crucial point of his attack through the Ardennes) were closer than you might think. It was the massed use of Stukas as flying artillery that paralyzed French divisions and let the Germans force their way across the river. I'm not sure the French could have stopped it - their command apparatus would be responding to a March attack in August - but they could, with a little initiative, have thrown the fear of God into the German panzers and made more of a fight of it.
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