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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 6, 2014 12:55:22 GMT -6
I've just finished "Japanese Destroyer Captain" by Tameichi Hara. I've had the book in my paperback collection since it was first published in 1958. Hara was the IJN torpedo tactics expert and served as captain of two destroyers and a destroyer division of four destroyers in the Solomons campaign. It's a superb book however he does criticize the Naval General Staff and Yamamoto for what he see's as terrible blunders. The blunder that I believe was not entirely correct is the comment on Page 94, after the Midway Operation that Yamamoto after Midway returned all the fleet ships back to Kure Naval Base in the Hashirajima Anchorage. I don't believe that is entirely true and he does agree that their might have been good reasons. His criticism is based on the fact that two months later, we invaded Guadalcanal and now all those ships were not nearby at Truk to conduct immediate offensive operations to eliminate the invasion force. All that was available was the Kurita cruiser-destroyer force at Rabaul and some at Truk. Here is my assessment of that criticism. First, the only force that needed to be rebuilt and retrained, along with repairs, was the First Striking Fleet and the Aleutian force. The latter had two carriers whose airwings had to return to the main base, rebuild and train for future operations. All the remaining carriers including the 5th Carrier Division which did not participate in the Midway operation had to assemble at Kure, to reorganize, move newer fighters to the converted carriers and train with those converted and slower ships. This would also mean the escorts including the battlecruisers, cruisers and destroyers which needed updates and repairs. This was an absolute must for Yamamoto, to rebuild the First Striking fleet to ready it for any future operation.
My next comment is his reason for his criticism about all the ships returning to Kure Naval Base. There was no way for Yamamoto to know that we would invade Guadalcanal. The Japanese assessment was that we would not be ready for offensive operations until 1943, which was originally our plan. The building of the runway on Guadalcanal changed that plan and our preparations for the invasion were hurried. There was a sizeable Japanese Naval air force at Rabaul but the new fighters could not reach Guadalcanal and have sufficient time over target to protect the bombers. The Japanese had introduced a new model of Zero, the Model 32 which had a larger engine, but used more fuel. It also had more ammo for the 20mm guns and required an extended nose to house the engine. All this added weight but did increase its altitude. The Japanese could have remedied this by building a runway system at Munda and basing the fighters on that airfield. They could have built a series of these down the Solomon's chain prior to starting the runway at Guadalcanal, but their construction techniques were always very slow. If the Japanese Navy had built the necessary infrastucture down the Solomon's they would not have needed the carriers and eventually, after refit and training, they then could have moved to Truk to support operations in the Solomon's and Central Pacific. This leads to the last comment.
Truk was not a well developed base. It had the greatest lagoon shaped like a triangle with each side 30 miles long. It was occupied during WW1 and administration was given to the Japanese by treaty. The Japanese believe it or not, followed the treaty specification quite strictly. When the war was started in the Pacific there was only a half of a runway completed on the small island of Takeshima. There were no underground storage for oil, no repair facilities on land and Truk was not really a naval base. So, even six months later, this base was not really equipped for a large force. Tankers and repair ships had to be placed in the Lagoon to service damaged warships and to provide a rest area. Even after the war started, the Japanese did not accelerate its improvements to turn it into an adequate naval base for Southwest Pacific or Central Pacific operations. Japanese preparations for war, centered around a short war so improvement of forward bases was not necessary. After Midway, the idea that the war would be short, was no longer viable and now the bases were not ready nor were there adequate construction teams and capability.
In summation, I don't know the reasons for his sharp criticism of Yamamoto possibly the thought of the losses taken by his destroyer comrades soured him on the great wartime leader but his reasoning is faulty and does not fit the facts that we know. The old adage of "You won with what you brung" seems to be fitting. Yamamoto had to play the cards dealt to him, and he did.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 7, 2014 20:16:50 GMT -6
The other possible issue there, I would think, was that the fuel consumption of the battleships and the confined waters of the Solomons made them ill-suited to operations there. Yamamoto would have been loathe to send the big boys to play in that stretch of water, especially if they didn't have good air cover.
As it was, the Japanese forces in the area got some serious licks in; it's arguable that cruisers and destroyers (with decent air support, or operating under the cover of night before Henderson got up and running) was all they needed. Bringing down the Kongo-class BBs a few months later was a gamble that did not pay off for the IJN.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 7, 2014 20:52:30 GMT -6
The other possible issue there, I would think, was that the fuel consumption of the battleships and the confined waters of the Solomons made them ill-suited to operations there. Yamamoto would have been loathe to send the big boys to play in that stretch of water, especially if they didn't have good air cover. As it was, the Japanese forces in the area got some serious licks in; it's arguable that cruisers and destroyers (with decent air support, or operating under the cover of night before Henderson got up and running) was all they needed. Bringing down the Kongo-class BBs a few months later was a gamble that did not pay off for the IJN. The real problem for Japan in the Solomon's was the lack of available cargo ships and fuel to feed them. Destroyers are 30 times less efficient than large cargo ships. The answer was a series of airfields down the Solomon's to maintain air cover of Henderson and then land sufficient troops and supplies to retake the island. Only certain battleships should have been used, the battle cruisers and the Yamato class were the most efficient of the battleships. They could have flattened the runway and reduced the air group to nothing. They were far more fuel efficient than the older classes. They should have deployed them immediately. However, IMO there was no need to defend the runway on Guadalcanal. All they had to do was simply reinforce the other islands building airfields and then keep Henderson under attack at all times. They should never have allowed themselves be drawn into a battle of attrition, they knew that was not a good strategy against an industrial power like the US.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 8, 2014 16:15:57 GMT -6
Just a note: Let's try to keep this discussion centered around operations and strategies of the Pacific war from June 6, 1942 to around November 20th, 1943. This would be from the end of the Midway Operation to the beginning of the Invasion of Tarawa. Let's not get involved in battle discussions, we've beat those to death. Let's try to analyze and discuss the deployment and strategies of both sides.
I researched the Japanese reaction to Operation Watchtower on August 7th, 1942 and Ugaki states simply that the Japanese were caught by surprise and he was somewhat embarrassed since they had two days warning. Yamato was at Kure and Musashi had just finished sea trials. Communications with Tulagi and the 1600 troops on Guadalcanal were lost very quickly so they had no real intelligence. This would explain a lot about Yamamoto's decision after Midway.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 9, 2014 14:04:48 GMT -6
I've been researching in "Islands of Destiny: The Solomon's Campaign and the eclipse of the Rising Sun" by John Prados. His prologue is very helpful in understanding much of what transpired after Midway. He makes the statement that "Both sides thought their South Pacific plans aimed at a backwater the adversary ignored. No one imagined themselves in a race for strategic position. That universal ignorance meant the actors stumbled blindly into what became the decisive campaign of the Pacific War." Prado states that the prime reason for the return to Kure, was to conduct a "full dress conference" to be held over the weekend of June 20, 1942. Senior officers and planners from the Navy General Staff and the ministry, and officers from the fleet, all participated. We know that Yamamoto's main fleet was based at Kure so it made sense to return there, pending the meeting to decide the next course of action, which might have been the offensive against the FS [Fiji-Samoa] line planned prior to Midway. I am going to pursue this meeting in the Ugaki Diary. I am also reading the English translation of a section of the official Japanese Naval history of the war, Senshi Sosho. It states that at 4:40 pm on 6 June Admiral Ugaki sent this message to the Chief of operations in the Navy General Staff.
It was then recommended that the Midway Operation be ended and further research would be need on the future of the FS operation against New Caledonia and Fiji areas or the FS Operation. On 7 July, one month before the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal, the Navy Operations Section submitted to the army a plan to temporarily discontinue the FS Operation. This is a significant event, especially after the 20th of June meeting in Kure. The loss of four fleet carriers, plus maintenance personnel, aircraft and some first line pilots was not assessed as being a disaster by the IJN. They did believe it was a major defeat and an embarrassment. Even the failure of two important operations like MO and MI, both of which ended with the loss of carriers was not considered to be worth changing their strategic plans only postponing them. They were certain that our offensive operations would not start until 1943 at the earliest. Their reaction was to postpone FS operation, rebuild the First Striking Fleet with slower, converted carriers centered around the 5th carrier group and Ryujo. The land based Naval Air Service would have to take over more offensive air operations and thus the runway at Guadalcanal was initiated. The two major construction units did not commence work until after 9 July 1942 which is significant since it was after the meeting in June at Kure and the above reference message on 7 July discontinuing the FS Operation. Now, the IJN realized that it needed a base in the southern portion of the Solomon’s to provide air reconnaissance over the seas to the south and east. All this caused the US to rush the invasion of Guadalcanal and an attrition operation began which was contrary to the doctrine of the IJN. They could not suffer through an attrition operation against the US. Hara’s observation about Yamamoto has no foundation, it is retrospective in its view, and does not reflect the situation as seen by the higher authorities at the Naval General Staff or the Combined Fleet.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 9, 2014 20:04:43 GMT -6
Just to ask, at the time what were the Japanese assessments of how badly the USN's losses were at Coral Sea and Midway? The IJN was a bunch that throughout the war seemed to fall for the "never found the body (or wreckage)" trope. It's possible they felt that they had sunk 3 or 4 US carriers in the course of those two battles and thus didn't realize that we had three fully operational carriers available in the Pacific plus one being transferred from the Atlantic. Not a great situation, but better than the curb-stomped state the IJN carrier force was in.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 9, 2014 21:06:06 GMT -6
Just to ask, at the time what were the Japanese assessments of how badly the USN's losses were at Coral Sea and Midway? The IJN was a bunch that throughout the war seemed to fall for the "never found the body (or wreckage)" trope. It's possible they felt that they had sunk 3 or 4 US carriers in the course of those two battles and thus didn't realize that we had three fully operational carriers available in the Pacific plus one being transferred from the Atlantic. Not a great situation, but better than the curb-stomped state the IJN carrier force was in. The Japanese had assumed they had sunk two carriers at Coral Sea. At Midway, they assumed they had sunk one by bombs and one by submarine. In point of fact, the latter was the same ship. They decided then that we only had Hornet and Enterprise. I am not sure about the torpedoing of the Sara in January because they reported it sunk, and of course it wasn't. I will try to research in Ugaki's diary and other locations about the actual numbers. Nice question, because they always assumed they had sunk a ship instead of just damaging it. They decided that the Neosho was a carrier and that they sunk it at Coral Sea.
Update: Unfortunately, the records of the 27 June meeting were destroyed and Senshi Sosho is in Japanese except for some random translations. I believe they estimated that we had one, possibly two carriers.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 10, 2014 9:17:18 GMT -6
I found at the US Navy History site, a Japanese document concerning the Midway operation. This document states that the Japanese estimated we had two or three fleet carriers and two or three special carriers. They do not define special carriers but my guess is that they were describing the Bogue. In the paragraph at the end, item 6, they estimate that we lost two carriers and that due to these losses, "they will not be able to effect any large-scale operation in the near future".
This information leads me to believe that their intelligence estimate following the operation was that we had one carrier, possibly a Saratoga class carrier still remaining in the Pacific. However, in the Ugaki diary, he discounts many combat reports as being excessive so he must have been aware of the propensity of Japanese personnel to exaggerate their accomplishments. I may go back and see what he estimates our carrier strength was in late July 1942.
As it stands now, my guess is one carrier available. This evaluation brings up the same specter as before, planning for what the enemy will do, instead of his capability. This caused the failure of both Operations, MO and MI.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 13, 2014 17:41:22 GMT -6
I found at the US Navy History site, a Japanese document concerning the Midway operation. This document states that the Japanese estimated we had two or three fleet carriers and two or three special carriers. They do not define special carriers but my guess is that they were describing the Bogue. In the paragraph at the end, item 6, they estimate that we lost two carriers and that due to these losses, "they will not be able to effect any large-scale operation in the near future". This information leads me to believe that their intelligence estimate following the operation was that we had one carrier, possibly a Saratoga class carrier still remaining in the Pacific. However, in the Ugaki diary, he discounts many combat reports as being excessive so he must have been aware of the propensity of Japanese personnel to exaggerate their accomplishments. I may go back and see what he estimates our carrier strength was in late July 1942. As it stands now, my guess is one carrier available. This evaluation brings up the same specter as before, planning for what the enemy will do, instead of his capability. This caused the failure of both Operations, MO and MI. I've often wondered if at any point they realized how wildly off the mark their claims were, given how certain oft-claimed targets such as Enterprise, Saratoga, and North Carolina popped back up ready to fight again. It must have been really disconcerting that three or four of the carriers they claimed during Coral Sea and Midway were the same ship, and that on two of those occasions she was sufficiently not sunk as to keep on fighting.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 13, 2014 20:54:14 GMT -6
I found at the US Navy History site, a Japanese document concerning the Midway operation. This document states that the Japanese estimated we had two or three fleet carriers and two or three special carriers. They do not define special carriers but my guess is that they were describing the Bogue. In the paragraph at the end, item 6, they estimate that we lost two carriers and that due to these losses, "they will not be able to effect any large-scale operation in the near future". This information leads me to believe that their intelligence estimate following the operation was that we had one carrier, possibly a Saratoga class carrier still remaining in the Pacific. However, in the Ugaki diary, he discounts many combat reports as being excessive so he must have been aware of the propensity of Japanese personnel to exaggerate their accomplishments. I may go back and see what he estimates our carrier strength was in late July 1942. As it stands now, my guess is one carrier available. This evaluation brings up the same specter as before, planning for what the enemy will do, instead of his capability. This caused the failure of both Operations, MO and MI. I've often wondered if at any point they realized how wildly off the mark their claims were, given how certain oft-claimed targets such as Enterprise, Saratoga, and North Carolina popped back up ready to fight again. It must have been really disconcerting that three or four of the carriers they claimed during Coral Sea and Midway were the same ship, and that on two of those occasions she was sufficiently not sunk as to keep on fighting. I am certain it was disconcerting. One of the keys to success in operations is good intelligence both visual and signal. I've read that the Japanese seaplane fliers were not real adept at ship recognition and this caused numerous problems. At Coral Sea they identified Admiral Crace's force of cruisers as battleships. However, in combat it is difficult in the heat of the moment to be precise. Unless you can stay around to watch the sinking, you almost have to use a gut feeling as to the amount of damage that has been done. After the action reconnaissance by submarines or patrol planes is a good way to verify your results but that is not always possible. The key is good recognition but if you are flying at 15,000 to 20,000 feet, everything looks like a dot. Most patrol planes flew at less than 5000 feet for scouting and many times did not have a chance to stay around and get close to the enemy force. Here is an example of the kind of recognition material you are issued to perform scouting missions.
www.coatneyhistory.com/IJNBBsCVsCAs.jpg
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 14, 2014 18:01:00 GMT -6
That wasn't just a Japanese problem. As I recall, Allied aerial patrols badly misjudged the nature of Mikawa's cruiser force en route to Guadalcanal prior to the night action at Savo Island. Reports described several seaplane tenders in the group and the assumption was that those ships were tasked with establishing a new seaplane base. Instead it was a force of seven cruisers that badly pantsed the joint US-Australian cruiser force and jeopardized Operation Watchtower in its opening days.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 14, 2014 20:32:09 GMT -6
That wasn't just a Japanese problem. As I recall, Allied aerial patrols badly misjudged the nature of Mikawa's cruiser force en route to Guadalcanal prior to the night action at Savo Island. Reports described several seaplane tenders in the group and the assumption was that those ships were tasked with establishing a new seaplane base. Instead it was a force of seven cruisers that badly pantsed the joint US-Australian cruiser force and jeopardized Operation Watchtower in its opening days. That is exactly true, Mikawa's force spotted twice by RAAF aircraft and the sighting was disputed. Two B-17's spotted the force and one identified as four cruisers, and one destroyer heading west while the other reported it as four unidentified ships. S-38 had the entire force pass right next to him, and all of this information was reported Richmond Kelly Turner who decided his force was larger and it wasn't a threat. Here is a nice quote that summarizes all of this:
So it isn't just getting the information, but putting all together, analyzing and assessing it based on the concept of what the enemy could do, not what he will do. This was not done before Savo Island. The last sighting, at 1026 on the 8th of August was by an Australian Hudson bomber operating east of Bougainville. The pilot reported three cruisers, three destroyers and two seaplane tenders. The information was assessed as being an indication that the Japanese were planning to establish a forward base closer to Guadalcanal. Allied intelligence decided that due to the limited surface strength of the Japanese fleet, that air operations would be the weapon of choice to stop the invasion.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 16, 2014 20:45:29 GMT -6
I've been researching in "Islands of Destiny: The Solomon's Campaign and the eclipse of the Rising Sun" by John Prados. His prologue is very helpful in understanding much of what transpired after Midway. He makes the statement that "Both sides thought their South Pacific plans aimed at a backwater the adversary ignored. No one imagined themselves in a race for strategic position. That universal ignorance meant the actors stumbled blindly into what became the decisive campaign of the Pacific War." Prado states that the prime reason for the return to Kure, was to conduct a "full dress conference" to be held over the weekend of June 20, 1942. Senior officers and planners from the Navy General Staff and the ministry, and officers from the fleet, all participated. We know that Yamamoto's main fleet was based at Kure so it made sense to return there, pending the meeting to decide the next course of action, which might have been the offensive against the FS [Fiji-Samoa] line planned prior to Midway. I am going to pursue this meeting in the Ugaki Diary. I am also reading the English translation of a section of the official Japanese Naval history of the war, Senshi Sosho. It states that at 4:40 pm on 6 June Admiral Ugaki sent this message to the Chief of operations in the Navy General Staff.
It was then recommended that the Midway Operation be ended and further research would be need on the future of the FS operation against New Caledonia and Fiji areas or the FS Operation. On 7 July, one month before the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal, the Navy Operations Section submitted to the army a plan to temporarily discontinue the FS Operation. This is a significant event, especially after the 20th of June meeting in Kure. The loss of four fleet carriers, plus maintenance personnel, aircraft and some first line pilots was not assessed as being a disaster by the IJN. They did believe it was a major defeat and an embarrassment. Even the failure of two important operations like MO and MI, both of which ended with the loss of carriers was not considered to be worth changing their strategic plans only postponing them. They were certain that our offensive operations would not start until 1943 at the earliest. Their reaction was to postpone FS operation, rebuild the First Striking Fleet with slower, converted carriers centered around the 5th carrier group and Ryujo. The land based Naval Air Service would have to take over more offensive air operations and thus the runway at Guadalcanal was initiated. The two major construction units did not commence work until after 9 July 1942 which is significant since it was after the meeting in June at Kure and the above reference message on 7 July discontinuing the FS Operation. Now, the IJN realized that it needed a base in the southern portion of the Solomon’s to provide air reconnaissance over the seas to the south and east. All this caused the US to rush the invasion of Guadalcanal and an attrition operation began which was contrary to the doctrine of the IJN. They could not suffer through an attrition operation against the US. Hara’s observation about Yamamoto has no foundation, it is retrospective in its view, and does not reflect the situation as seen by the higher authorities at the Naval General Staff or the Combined Fleet. One thing I notice missing in this assessment is that even though American servicemen devised the term, Imperial Japan during WWII was perhaps the prime example of a JANFU - Joint Army-Navy ... er, Foul-Up. Except they may not have even given the "Joint" portion lip service. How much of the Japanese campaign in the Solomons was dependent on the Army's whims, as opposed to what the Navy had in mind?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2014 22:04:40 GMT -6
I've been researching in "Islands of Destiny: The Solomon's Campaign and the eclipse of the Rising Sun" by John Prados. His prologue is very helpful in understanding much of what transpired after Midway. He makes the statement that "Both sides thought their South Pacific plans aimed at a backwater the adversary ignored. No one imagined themselves in a race for strategic position. That universal ignorance meant the actors stumbled blindly into what became the decisive campaign of the Pacific War." Prado states that the prime reason for the return to Kure, was to conduct a "full dress conference" to be held over the weekend of June 20, 1942. Senior officers and planners from the Navy General Staff and the ministry, and officers from the fleet, all participated. We know that Yamamoto's main fleet was based at Kure so it made sense to return there, pending the meeting to decide the next course of action, which might have been the offensive against the FS [Fiji-Samoa] line planned prior to Midway. I am going to pursue this meeting in the Ugaki Diary. I am also reading the English translation of a section of the official Japanese Naval history of the war, Senshi Sosho. It states that at 4:40 pm on 6 June Admiral Ugaki sent this message to the Chief of operations in the Navy General Staff.
It was then recommended that the Midway Operation be ended and further research would be need on the future of the FS operation against New Caledonia and Fiji areas or the FS Operation. On 7 July, one month before the Allied invasion of Guadalcanal, the Navy Operations Section submitted to the army a plan to temporarily discontinue the FS Operation. This is a significant event, especially after the 20th of June meeting in Kure. The loss of four fleet carriers, plus maintenance personnel, aircraft and some first line pilots was not assessed as being a disaster by the IJN. They did believe it was a major defeat and an embarrassment. Even the failure of two important operations like MO and MI, both of which ended with the loss of carriers was not considered to be worth changing their strategic plans only postponing them. They were certain that our offensive operations would not start until 1943 at the earliest. Their reaction was to postpone FS operation, rebuild the First Striking Fleet with slower, converted carriers centered around the 5th carrier group and Ryujo. The land based Naval Air Service would have to take over more offensive air operations and thus the runway at Guadalcanal was initiated. The two major construction units did not commence work until after 9 July 1942 which is significant since it was after the meeting in June at Kure and the above reference message on 7 July discontinuing the FS Operation. Now, the IJN realized that it needed a base in the southern portion of the Solomon’s to provide air reconnaissance over the seas to the south and east. All this caused the US to rush the invasion of Guadalcanal and an attrition operation began which was contrary to the doctrine of the IJN. They could not suffer through an attrition operation against the US. Hara’s observation about Yamamoto has no foundation, it is retrospective in its view, and does not reflect the situation as seen by the higher authorities at the Naval General Staff or the Combined Fleet. One thing I notice missing in this assessment is that even though American servicemen devised the term, Imperial Japan during WWII was perhaps the prime example of a JANFU - Joint Army-Navy ... er, Foul-Up. Except they may not have even given the "Joint" portion lip service. How much of the Japanese campaign in the Solomons was dependent on the Army's whims, as opposed to what the Navy had in mind? It is a complex story . The IJA never really thought the Pacific war was as important as the war in China, to them it was the focus of their operations. The Army and Navy were equal partners in the IGHQ and policy was carried out in parallel with each service providing what was necessary to achieve the jointly agreed aims. However, this situation came apart after Midway because the Navy did not tell the army the extent of the defeat, Tojo knew, but not many other army planners were aware. Prior to Operation MI, the army and navy had jointly agreed on the FS operation which was the invasion of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. This was considered the 2nd Phase operation, the southern invasion at the start of the war was the 1st Phase. The 2nd phase would occur on July 8th, 18th and 21st, in that order. Again, the Japanese had the idea that this was a backwater area that the US had ignored. The IJA agree to provide the troops for those invasions. In short the IJA considered the "strike south" which started the war as a sideshow, allocating just ten divisions to conquer Malaya, the Philippines, Burma and the Dutch East Indies and garrisoning those places. For the Bismarck's and Solomon's, just 5,500 men had been allocated as the South Seas Detachment. This was clearly not enough and the lack of available transports just added to the problems. Lack of carriers after Midway and the failure to build airfields down the Solomon's chain to provide fighter support for the bombers contributed to the attrition campaign that was the Solomon's Campaign. So, the short answer is that the Solomon's campaign was not necessarily dependent on the whims of the IJA. From the beginning the IJA had made it known to the Navy that China, Manchuria and Burma were their center of operations and focus. Everything else was a side show.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 17, 2014 11:44:09 GMT -6
The South-Southwest Pacific islands had no inherent strategic value. Nothing of importance to the war effort except its geographic relationship to other areas. [ From "Fire in the Sky"]. Air bases themselves became the only strategic objects of importance. Everything you needed had to be brought in, gas, most of the food, spare parts etc. Movement between the bases was mostly by ship, not air transport. However, air dominance was vital. This was not lost on either side.
As important as carrier air power was, it was not permanent. The bases capable of refueling, repairing and handling carriers were few and far between Truk and New Caledonia were the only two, available. It was land based air, from strategically placed bases that were critical. The proper and timely building of air bases was an absolute necessity. The Japanese recognized all this and more, but were myopic. They did not realize that time was important and the construction of air bases, not just on New Guinea but down the Solomon's chain was vital. It was even more vital after the losses at Midway. The failure of Operation MO, Invasion of Port Moresby, should have galvanized the Japanese into moving quicker down the Solomon's chain. They did not, and eventually lost the battle of the build-up at Guadalcanal.
While this thread is focused on post-Midway, the two months between Midway and the invasion of Guadalcanal were not enough time to correct the mistakes made in March and April of the same year. After the capture of Lae and Salamaua on March 8th,1942, the Japanese should have moved quickly to occupy the Solomon's, not just the Shortland’s and Tulagi. Those were just seaplane bases and were good for scouting but not for maintaining air dominance over the region.
Once the bases at Kieta and the Shortland’s were developed, movement down the Solomon’s was vital, but we have an historical perspective that the IGHQ did not have at the time. It is my personal belief that this failure was the most critical one. They should have delayed Operation MI, attempted to take Port Moresby again by sea and occupied the other islands in the Solomon’s chain before attempting the Midway attack. Lack of speed and focus on vital strategic areas caused a dissipation of effort.
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