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Post by spook053 on Oct 18, 2014 9:07:02 GMT -6
Hara’s observation about Yamamoto has no foundation, it is retrospective in its view, and does not reflect the situation as seen by the higher authorities at the Naval General Staff or the Combined Fleet.
Kind of backpedaling a bit, but I couldn't help taking note of your initial reference. I remember reading Hara's book quite a few years ago when I was gathering info on a historical article for two prominent IJN destroyers.
Ironic is the initial comment given past the front cover:
"Errors in US accounts of famous sea battles are set right by inside reports of high-level Japanese strategy meetings and Hara's eyewitness accounts of six years of war."
However, while Hara was assisted in editing by Fred Saito and Roger Pineau, with the inclusion of clarifying footnotes at given points within the book, no correction was made of Hara's assertions that both the US cruisers San Francisco and Helena were sunk in the night battle of 12-13 Nov 1942. It would have been a simple matter of verifying against multiple battle accounts and ships' operational histories when this book was first published circa 1958.
Aside from your earlier notes, Hara also asserts later in the book the standard "conventional wisdom" of that time that Kurita was mistaken in his turnaround off Samar. Hara borrows from C Vann Woodward the quote: "What was needed on the flag bridge of Yamato on the morning of the 25th was not a Hamlet but a Hotspur....." In retrospect, and from repeated discussions in places such as here in NWS, I consider this standing view of Kurita as unfair.
In sum, I think that Hara's reference is limited (perhaps too much so) for opinions on the "big picture" of Pacific operations and critical strategic decisions. This doesn't counter rather than augment your earlier points, Dennis.
All the same, I think Hara's book is invaluable in his recounting of his own direct battle experiences, even with the historical errors. For one thing, repeatedly in this book, Hara is forthright in laying out his own mistakes and shortfalls in judgment at given moments. That level of candor helps in the recounting of the tactical events.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 18, 2014 20:39:56 GMT -6
Hara’s observation about Yamamoto has no foundation, it is retrospective in its view, and does not reflect the situation as seen by the higher authorities at the Naval General Staff or the Combined Fleet.
Kind of backpedaling a bit, but I couldn't help taking note of your initial reference. I remember reading Hara's book quite a few years ago when I was gathering info on a historical article for two prominent IJN destroyers.
Ironic is the initial comment given past the front cover:
"Errors in US accounts of famous sea battles are set right by inside reports of high-level Japanese strategy meetings and Hara's eyewitness accounts of six years of war."
However, while Hara was assisted in editing by Fred Saito and Roger Pineau, with the inclusion of clarifying footnotes at given points within the book, no correction was made of Hara's assertions that both the US cruisers San Francisco and Helena were sunk in the night battle of 12-13 Nov 1942. It would have been a simple matter of verifying against multiple battle accounts and ships' operational histories when this book was first published circa 1958.
Aside from your earlier notes, Hara also asserts later in the book the standard "conventional wisdom" of that time that Kurita was mistaken in his turnaround off Samar. Hara borrows from C Vann Woodward the quote: "What was needed on the flag bridge of Yamato on the morning of the 25th was not a Hamlet but a Hotspur....." In retrospect, and from repeated discussions in places such as here in NWS, I consider this standing view of Kurita as unfair.
In sum, I think that Hara's reference is limited (perhaps too much so) for opinions on the "big picture" of Pacific operations and critical strategic decisions. This doesn't counter rather than augment your earlier points, Dennis.
All the same, I think Hara's book is invaluable in his recounting of his own direct battle experiences, even with the historical errors. For one thing, repeatedly in this book, Hara is forthright in laying out his own mistakes and shortfalls in judgment at given moments. That level of candor helps in the recounting of the tactical events.
What's interesting about the statement of Hara about his conversation with Kurita, is that it contradicts what he, Kurita, told interrogators after the war about why he turned north. Here is what he said:
Now, I can understand that Kurita was tired. He was tossed into the water when his flagship was sunk by the Darter and Dace. He was attacked by carrier based air and lost Musashi with two other battleships damaged, then has a running fight with TAFFY 3 and some destroyers. He has heard nothing from Nishimura in the Surigao Straits, he has received little from the Toyoda, the CinC of the Combined Fleet and has only brief messages from Ozawa about what his state is. It's possible that Kurita and his staff, just felt that they could do no more damage under the conditions and that they would try to meet up with Ozawa for a night action. I read two interrogations of Japanese officers and both confirmed that the decision was approved by Kurita's staff and that the reason was lack of intelligence as to what was transpiring in the bay and surrounding area. Can we rely on those interrogations? Who knows.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 16, 2015 2:14:29 GMT -6
In Wikipedia, at the page "Regia Marina", the more extended Italian version contains the following phrase, regarding the fate of the italian warships after the armistice of September 1943: "As for the battleships Littorio class, they were interned in the Great Bitter Lake, in Egypt, until 1947. Although it had been proposed to use them in the war in the Far East, the idea was rejected by the British Admiralty.
At the page "Littorio-class battleships", in a similar way we find: "The Littorios were not used in any mission on behalf of the Allies, even though W. Churchill had wanted to use them in the Far East, considering the alternative of leaving them or less under the Italian flag."
I wonder if you have read something more about this issue.
Even if I walk somewhat away from the topic of this discussion, I thank you in advance for a kind reply.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2015 7:42:17 GMT -6
In Wikipedia, at the page "Regia Marina", the more extended Italian version contains the following phrase, regarding the fate of the italian warships after the armistice of September 1943: "As for the battleships Littorio class, they were interned in the Great Bitter Lake, in Egypt, until 1947. Although it had been proposed to use them in the war in the Far East, the idea was rejected by the British Admiralty. At the page "Littorio-class battleships", in a similar way we find: "The Littorios were not used in any mission on behalf of the Allies, even though W. Churchill had wanted to use them in the Far East, considering the alternative of leaving them or less under the Italian flag." I wonder if you have read something more about this issue. Even if I walk somewhat away from the topic of this discussion, I thank you in advance for a kind reply. The Littorio was assigned to the US but we did not retire her and gave up rights on 5 October 1947. After that she was ordered demilitarized by cutting the main guns and smashing the reduction gears. She was sold to the breakers on 7 December 1951 and dismantled by 1954. I would not worry about drifting away from the subject, just put your question or discussion points in here, and let's have at it. Hope this helps.
Addendum: According to the Cunningham Papers, in a document dated 7 October 1943, the Littorios were steamed by their own crews to an American port for overhaul and complete examination with a view to employment in the Pacific manned by American or British.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 16, 2015 10:39:49 GMT -6
Thank you for your early reply. Admiral Cunningham document is a proof that some plans were made. As a fact these battleships remained in Egypt until 1947. I presume that they would have been almost useless in the Pacific, having no radar, relatively few anti-aircraft guns, relatively limited range and scarce ammunition ready for shore bombardment purposes.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2015 11:03:35 GMT -6
Thank you for your early reply. Admiral Cunningham document is a proof that some plans were made. As a fact these battleships remained in Egypt until 1947. I presume that they would have been almost useless in the Pacific, having no radar, relatively few anti-aircraft guns, relatively limited range and scarce ammunition ready for shore bombardment purposes. My pleasure, interesting subject actually.
As to their usefulness, I think you are on track but we also know that these ships probably weren't maintained after Taranto, so who knows the condition they were in.
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