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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 25, 2014 10:05:34 GMT -6
For those of you who use a Kindle ereader and the like, Amazon Kindle books now has the complete five volume set titled "From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow" written by the late Arthur J. Marder. In the paperback edition, each of these is $19.82 and in the Kindle edition, they are $9.99. I bought the complete series, and will start reading it after reading Paul Halpern's "A Naval History of World War 1". In many of the books that I have in my collection on the naval war during the First World War, this series is referenced liberally.
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Post by vonfriedman on May 2, 2015 10:52:35 GMT -6
Let me know if in your readings you have found the whole history of the troubles of the engines of HMS Canopus, just before the Battle of Coronel in 1914. It is said that the chief engineer made erroneous reports about her maximum speed. However it seems strange that in such serious circumstances as those faced by the Adm Cradock a thorough verification had not been carried out. In the memoirs of the Captain of Canopus H. S. Grant (My war at sea 1914-1916) there is no trace of those fake reports. He states, indeed, that the battleship would be able to reach 15 knots for short periods. In the chart of the course followed by HMS Canopus in the very day of that battle (see: www.rmg.co.uk/content/novembers-item-month-battle-coronel) a speed of 15 knots is shown for rather long periods of time.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 2, 2015 13:32:34 GMT -6
Let me know if in your readings you have found the whole history of the troubles of the engines of HMS Canopus, just before the Battle of Coronel in 1914. It is said that the chief engineer made erroneous reports about her maximum speed. However it seems strange that in such serious circumstances as those faced by the Adm Cradock a thorough verification had not been carried out. In the memoirs of the Captain of Canopus H. S. Grant (My war at sea 1914-1916) there is no trace of those fake reports. He states, indeed, that the battleship would be able to reach 15 knots for short periods. In the chart of the course followed by HMS Canopus in the very day of that battle (see: www.rmg.co.uk/content/novembers-item-month-battle-coronel) a speed of 15 knots is shown for rather long periods of time. I've searched volume two of the set and found many matches. The Chief Engineer on the Canopus at the time of the Coronel battle was an officer named S. P. Start, later Rear Admiral. Here is some information:
Marder, Arthur (2014-06-19). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Volume II: To The Eve of Jutland 1914-1916 (Kindle Locations 2711-2725). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.
Here is a link to the Royal Navy Log Books of World War I for the HMS Canopus from June 1913 to March 1915. There is a log entry for 23 July 1914 that states: 06.45pm: Altered course S77E Running in measured mile mean speed 18.68 Knots.
www.naval-history.net/OWShips-WW1-01-HMS_Canopus.htm
I will add that Cradock in his telegrams had misgivings as to the fighting strength of his squadron. "He was doubtful of his ability to force an action with the 12 knot Canopus attached to his squadron". This is from the Home Fleet Monographs Volume 1 monograph 1-Coronel Dtd November 1920. This was a classified document.
Enjoy
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Post by vonfriedman on May 3, 2015 7:56:34 GMT -6
Thank you so much for the information. It seems, however, that the armor of Canopus in total exceeded that of Good Hope (and also of the Invincible class BCs), and probably it would have withstood better to the gunfire of von Spee armored cruisers. If you use the tactics suggested by Churchill in "The World Crisis" in SAI Coronel scenario, which is to orderly withdraw towards the battleship (see for example: archive.org/stream/worldcrisis00chur#page/458/mode/2up), darkness falls before the Germans can do a lot of damage. In a possible night melee they can also be defeated.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 3, 2015 10:19:52 GMT -6
Thank you so much for the information. It seems, however, that the armor of Canopus in total exceeded that of Good Hope (and also of the Invincible class BCs), and probably it would have withstood better to the gunfire of von Spee armored cruisers. If you use the tactics suggested by Churchill in "The World Crisis" in SAI Coronel scenario, which is to orderly withdraw towards the battleship (see for example: archive.org/stream/worldcrisis00chur#page/458/mode/2up), darkness falls before the Germans can do a lot of damage. In a possible night melee they can also be defeated. I believe that faulty British naval strategy was the real cause of the defeat at Coronel. The strategy was the same as used in the past; patroling with lower classes or obsolete ships in areas of passage to foreign shipping and hence, perfect areas for guerre de course. Von Spee understood this and he was aware of the limited forces in the southern coast of South America. The rise in captures by the surface raiders caused the public to take a short term view of the situation and forced the Admiralty to disperse their already limited forces overseas. Craddock's force even with Canopus was very inferior to Von Spee. I don't believe that Canopus's obsolete 12 inch guns with a range of 14,000 yards were that much better than the 8.2 inch guns of the Scharnhorst. It's guns had a range of 13,500 yards according Brown. I believe that the Engineering officer stated that the Canopus, with her Royal Naval Reserve Lieutenants, had only fired a few rounds and that her gunnery efficiency was very low; add this to the fact that there is some disagreement about how fast she actually was. With a 12 knot force against a 21 knot force, the side with the speed can choose combat anytime, anyplace. So Von Spee could have just refused combat, and disappeared. The only real strategy was to combine Stoddard and Craddock on the west coast of South America and seek out Von Spee forcing back to the eastern side, and possibly catch him near the Falklands while coaling. The real question is why Craddock was so eager to catch a squadron of ships that were faster, better armed and possibly better trained that his. To me, it was simply a man who acted on impulse. I don't think Craddock mentally was capable of refusing action or postponing it. He would attack even if there was a small chance of victory. He acted against orders, not waiting for Canopus. It might be that Craddock knew of his impending defeat, but hoped he could damage and slow down Von Spee so Stoddard could finish him off. We just will never know. He might have been aware of what happened to Troubridge after the Goeben episode. If so, the Admiralty is partially at fault.
Your strategy presupposes that Von Spee was looking for a fight and that Craddock could control the situation. Both are not true. Von Spee was not looking for a fight and Craddock did not control the situation due to his inferiority in speed and fire power. The Far East Squadron was simply in the east to show the flag. Once the war started, there were no orders from the German Admiralty. It was up to Von Spee to devise a strategy. He could breakup his force for trade warfare or keep it together and head home, attacking shipping on his journey. With that strategy, he would not have followed Craddock and fought at night. He would have turned around and headed south.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 3, 2015 20:04:56 GMT -6
I've made an attempt to find the discrepancy between the reported 18.5 knots and the acknowledged speed of the Canopus. I think I've found it. In the actual log record of 23 July 1914, Canopus performed a full power trial at Talland Bay where there are measured mile marker towers 6080 feet apart. The ship reaches full power and is timed between the markers. Canopus performed those full power tests and records about six different speeds. One is difficult to read and could be 13.5 Knots or 18.5 knots. The others are 15 Knots, 16.5, 16.8, 17.2, 17.8 etc. Now, it is important to remember that the speeds are calculated based on a mechanical stop watch and the sight at the time the ship passes one marker tower and the other. It does not take into account tides, winds or anything else.
In the log record from that time onward, even in the South American operation around Coronel and the Falklands, the ship never attains more than 12 knots. Captain Grant, in his book about his exploits as the Captain of the Canopus, states that the ship could do 15 knots briefly, but only 12 knots for extended periods of time. This is consistent with Craddock's view. Churchill stated in his message that the ship could do 15.2 knots and he is correct, but only for a very brief time.
The Battle of Coronel occurred on 1 November 1914. The log record for that date shows the fastest speed on that date was 15 knots or 93 revs. On the day before and after, she never attains greater than about 13 knots. Was the Chief Engineer cooking the books? No, he recorded the time between the markers and Speed is equal to distance divided by time, a simple formula but accuracy is dependent on an exact measure of time and distance. It also must include currents etc. Canopus could do 15 knots for short periods, but 12 knots for extended periods. When sailing under less that battle or combat conditions, her speed was in the neighborhood of 8-9 knots.
I hope this clarifies the issue.
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Post by vonfriedman on May 4, 2015 10:17:51 GMT -6
Thanks for this other information. The British strategy was not entirely wrong, even if the hesitation in sending the CA Defence is questionable. Once the position of von Spee was ascertained there were other naval forces, besides those of Stoddard and Cradock, that would have been diverted on the spot. I am convinced that Cradock was moved by the desire to cut-off the Leipzig and for this purpose the slow Canopus would have been a hindrance. When he met the ships of von Spee he decided to engage battle perhaps in order to avoid a public disrepute similar to that bestowed on Troubridge about the escape of the Goeben. He probably hoped also to damage some German ships. If he had not advanced too far from Canopus and had adopted instead the tactics later recommended by Churchill he would have saved his ships, as von Spee would not have risked two CA against two CA and one B, whose shooting ability was unknown to him (after all, the Canopus did not shoot badly in the first phase of the battle of the Falklands.) Von Spee would probably have sailed around the slowly retreating British squadron and an entire different story would have been written. Post scriptum - Following a source of mine, which also cites Marder vol II page 107 note 8, the Canopus chief engineer was a Commander William Denbow.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 4, 2015 12:13:58 GMT -6
Thanks for this other information. The British strategy was not entirely wrong, even if the hesitation in sending the CA Defence is questionable. Once the position of von Spee was ascertained there were other naval forces, besides those of Stoddard and Cradock, that would have been diverted on the spot. I am convinced that Cradock was moved by the desire to cut-off the Leipzig and for this purpose the slow Canopus would have been a hindrance. When he met the ships of von Spee he decided to engage battle perhaps in order to avoid a public disrepute similar to that bestowed on Troubridge about the escape of the Goeben. He probably hoped also to damage some German ships. If he had not advanced too far from Canopus and had adopted instead the tactics later recommended by Churchill he would have saved his ships, as von Spee would not have risked two CA against two CA and one B, whose shooting ability was unknown to him (after all, the Canopus did not shoot badly in the first phase of the battle of the Falklands.) Von Spee would probably have sailed around the slowly retreating British squadron and an entire different story would have been written. Post scriptum - Following a source of mine, which also cites Marder vol II page 107 note 8, the Canopus chief engineer was a Commander William Denbow. Commander William Denbow had a breakdown and LT. Cmdr. S. P. Start took over repairs on 8 November 1914. As per the Captain of the Canopus in his book, My War at Sea.
Concentration of forces or lack thereof were a hallmark of British Naval strategy in WWI and it lost them opportunities for a more complete victory on numerous occasions. Anyway, that's it for me.
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Post by kyle on May 4, 2015 15:23:40 GMT -6
The British had ships to spare compared to the Germans. A mission kill of any of the German ships, that far from home was almost as good as sinking them outright. Much like his namesake ship in 1939 - Spee would have been forced to make some very unhappy decisions with any ship suffering any more than superficial damage. From Cradok's point of view, the risk may have been worth the battle even if he knew his odds of actually attaining a clear victory were slim.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 4, 2015 16:51:13 GMT -6
The British had ships to spare compared to the Germans. A mission kill of any of the German ships, that far from home was almost as good as sinking them outright. Much like his namesake ship in 1939 - Spee would have been forced to make some very unhappy decisions with any ship suffering any more than superficial damage. From Cradok's point of view, the risk may have been worth the battle even if he knew his odds of actually attaining a clear victory were slim. Actually, Kyle, Cradock had telegraphed the Admiralty on 8 October, that he had ordered Canopus to the Falklands to concentrate his forces. On the same day, he sent another telegraph and recommended two forces, each of which would be strong enough to deal with Von Spee's squadron, one on each coast. On the 14th of October, the Admiralty signaled that they agreed. The plan was for Cradock to join Stoddard's second force if Von Spee was able to avoid him. The Admiralty(actually Churchill) had always assumed that Canopus would be the "citadel around which Cradock would have security in case he met Von Spee". As we know, Canopus had engine problems and was much slower than realized. In fact, even with Canopus, he stood no real chance as Von Spee had he beat in speed and firepower. Cradock knew the actual speed of the Canopus and stated in his 18 October telegraph that Canopus upon arriving in the Falklands needed engine overhaul. Here is what Sir Julian Corbett stated"12-knot ‘I fear that strategically the speed of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots owing to Canopus, but shall trust circumstances will enable me to force an action.’ ‘These last words/ Corbett observes, ‘shows that his order to “search and protect trade” led him to believe that he was expected to seek out the enemy and bring him to action as best he could.’ One can only speculate on exactly what the Admiral had in mind, since his 12-knot squadron (or even 16 ½-knot squadron, had he known the true speed of the Canopus) could not possibly ‘force an action’ on a 21-knot squadron which did not choose to fight. If Spee did elect to fight, the speed of his squadron would give him a great maneuvering advantage. Marder, Arthur (2014-06-19). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Volume II: To The Eve of Jutland 1914-1916 (Kindle Locations 2728-2736). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.
So we have Cradock in inferior ships, manned by reservists, two of which had been mobilized at the outset of war and hurriedly sent to their stations, never fired their guns, sent against ships with the best gunnery records in the German Navy, both better protected. The Admiralty in fact telegraphed Cradock to not seek battle until his whole squadron had concentrated and that also included the HMS Defense, racing from the Falklands to join up with him. So, the situation as Cradock saw it, was hopeless so why do it. He tried to close on Von Spee and stay between him and sun, but Von Spee with faster ships was able to circle around and the fight was over in one hour. With the better gunnery and protection, Von Spee only had to stay out of range of Cradock and pound him. This is exactly what he did.
As to whether the British had plenty of ships, they did of questionable quality. As an example, the area of the China Station was over sixteen million square nautical miles to guard with nineteen warships. The 5th and 9th Cruiser Squadrons had over 5 million square miles to cover. Too much area to cover with too little poorly equipped ships. He who defends everything, defends nothing seems to fit. Cradock's best strategy, one that was certainly acceptable to the Admiralty and Churchill was to shadow Von Spee, wait for Canopus and Defense to join him and then when Von Spee tries to coal up, strike him hard again and again until he is destroyed. Von Spee could not stay in the Chilean waters forever. Wear and tear on his squadron would begin to wear down their speed and effectiveness. At some point he would have to head for home. After the battle, with 42 percent of his 8.2 inch ammunition expended, he did just that and was destroyed at the Falklands. The poor strategy can partially be laid at the steps of the Admiralty, as Sir David Beatty stated in a letter to Lady Beatty. Here is the best summation of the problem:
Marder, Arthur (2014-06-19). From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Volume II: To The Eve of Jutland 1914-1916 (Kindle Locations 2860-2872). Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 4, 2015 17:49:04 GMT -6
I've just finished reading through Volume 1, Naval Operations written by Sir Julian Corbett. This was an authorized history based on Admiralty documents. He states that neither side was aware of the other before the battle. Von Spee was searching for HMS Glasgow at Coronel, to cut her off while Cradock was searching for Leipzig and that this was the ship before him. This was, in the truest sense, a meeting engagement where neither side was aware of the other. I believe that Admiral Cradock knew that his squadron could not retreat towards Canopus and the Colliers she was guarding as she was still 300 miles to the south. With his superior speed, Von Spee could easily overtake and destroy him.
I believe that there was an alternate course of action. The first sighting was at 4:20 PM of the smoke of Von Spee. Von Spee did not sight Cradock until 6:00 PM. That left about one and a half hours of daylight in the southern hemisphere approximately at this time of the year. If Cradock had done an immediate 180 degree turn, he had a fair chance of distancing himself from Von Spee. At dusk, he could have changed course and disappeared into the night. In fact, Von Spee might never had know he was in the area, had the turn been done quickly. Cradock never made this attempt, he simply ordered line ahead, and closed with the enemy.
BTW, the order to guard the Colliers by Canopus, was Cradock's. If Canopus was too far away, it was Cradock's mistake. Had he simply slowed and let Canopus catch up, he might have had a better chance.
I will admit, that this is based on hindsight, the clearest vision in the world. However, as counterfactual as this might seem, it is not fantasy as these are the facts that were known at the time. Think of this as a lessons learned at the US Naval War College. We take the conditions and known facts at the time, and perform an analysis based on this information as to the best course of action.
UPDATE: Sunset in Chile on 1 November 1914 would have been around 7:09 PM. From the first sighting that gives Cradock about three hours to run back south. At 12 knots, that's about 36 miles.
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Post by vonfriedman on May 5, 2015 11:25:02 GMT -6
Excellent summary of this subject. Perhaps the speed of von Spee's CAs, after the long period spent in the Pacific, was not very different from that of Cradock's cruisers. Somewhere I read that at the Battle of the Falkland the German CAs reached about 20 knots. As to the Otranto, this slow AMC could have withdrawn first, if she could.
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Post by vonfriedman on May 5, 2015 11:44:18 GMT -6
Just another question: what do you know about the movements of HMAS Australia new BC? In Churchill's World crisis he write about an Anglo-Japanese task group, of which HMAS Australia would have to be part, sent to the American west coast, but somewhere else I read that HMAS Australia would have remained in the Pacific until December 1914.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 5, 2015 11:45:26 GMT -6
Excellent summary of this subject. Perhaps the speed of von Spee's CAs, after the long period spent in the Pacific, was not very different from that of Cradock's cruisers. Somewhere I read that at the Battle of the Falkland the German CAs reached about 20 knots. As to the Otranto, this slow AMC could have withdrawn first, if she could. First of all, thank you for the kind words, it was a pleasure. If you have another discussion about another battle, be it WWI or the Russo-Japanese or whatever, I am certain that we can proceed with a good intelligent discussion.
Second, The published speed of the German force from three sources was 23.7 knots based on trial speeds and they are notoriously higher than after sailing around for awhile. I agree that after leaving Tsingtao and sailing all the way across the Pacific Ocean, Von Spee's force was probably in a depleted state so 20 knots might have been his best speed and not for very long with coaling up. I don't know when his last coaling was, but will search for that information.
It is my opinion that Cradock, the on-scene commander had the final say in whether he should have attacked the German squadron, not the Admiralty. The Admiralty can advise and provide intelligence, but the squadron commander was ultimately responsible. As such, Cradock and Cradock alone is the person who failed. This is a basic principle of command through the centuries and still has not changed.
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Post by vonfriedman on May 22, 2015 10:29:11 GMT -6
Thanks for the kind invitation. For now I'd rather ask what books, that you have read, contain descriptions of battleship actions of some literary value. I intend to leave aside the historical or professional descriptions and also all those concerning the carrier air war, the submarine operations, etc. I am interested in those novelists and short story writers who were able to give a vivid representation of a naval action between battleships. As for me, I remember with pleasure Kennedy's "Pursuit: the sinking of the Bismarck", Filson Young Dogger Bank battle description on "With the battle cruiser", Dino Buzzati's "Battleship Tod". All of them had direct personal experience, even if Buzzati wrote a fantasy story about a German super-battleship at the end of WW2. I may add to them Thiess's "Tsushima", C.S.Forester Mediterranean convoy action in "The ship". I've probably read more, but the other books did not have impressed me in a special way.
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