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Post by sirchaos on Feb 16, 2015 9:33:16 GMT -6
In the definition of CAS, how would you define "immediate"?
Would you define it as "a similar interval between the request for support and the arrival of firepower on target as experienced with artillery"?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 16, 2015 11:30:28 GMT -6
In the definition of CAS, how would you define "immediate"? Would you define it as "a similar interval between the request for support and the arrival of firepower on target as experienced with artillery"?
The term "immediate" is really defined by the situation on the ground and how critical it is. Generally, in WWII, the fighters were orbiting the area on call from the FAC. With the improvement in communications and speed of jets, they did not have to really orbit the area, but rotary wing aircraft would be much closer. In Vietnam, the Marines had aircraft on standby at Danang ready to launch and provide support. They were supposed launch within five minutes of receiving the signal. The answer is then, that there is no numerical value that can be set, it really depends on the FAC. In critical situations, he might say "buster" meaning quickly. There were special coded words that the ground troops would use to signify a critical situation, and then all the aircraft in the area would be detached and sent to aid the endangered unit. Code words changed frequently. I will see if I can find a definite time. This link might provide some more information to better understand the term " immediate".
doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-03-D22-LAND-Type-CAS-Request.pdf
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 8, 2015 9:01:00 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 8, 2015 9:18:17 GMT -6
Why? This is SOP for the military, to eliminate older weapons systems to make way for newer systems. It frees up maintenance resources that can now be dedicated to the newer technology, frees up bases etc. This all translates into funding which is critical in times of budget cuts, as we are experiencing now. CAS has changed as the threats have changed. Drones, smart weapons, accurate navigation and location systems have changed how we view and execute CAS missions. It's time to eliminate the older weapons, and introduce the new.
It is apparent, that despite the capability of the A-10 in operations against insurgents and other threats that have limited ground to air capability, they do not believe that they can support this bird any longer; that other aircraft including drones can perform the mission as well or better.
Here is a statement by a person, on line in DODBUZZ. Its seems to make sense and ask a good question.
So, is there a better plane for CAS against insurgents?
NOTE: Comparison of costs per fight hour: Predator drone-$3,769;A-10-$17,716; F-35-$31,900.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 8, 2015 21:07:40 GMT -6
FYI:
Here is a list of Cost per flight hours:
A-10C $17,716 B-1B Lancer - $57,807 B-2A Spirit - $169,313 B-52H - $69,708 F-15C - $41,921 F-16C Viper - $22,514 F-22A Raptor - $68,362 MQ-1B Predator Drone - $3,679 Mq-9A Reaper Drone - $4,762
This is a brief edited list, I have the original spreadsheet for aircraft dating from 2008-2012. I don't think things got cheaper since then.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 8, 2015 21:48:39 GMT -6
I gather the Casablanca reference went whistling past: www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjbPi00k_MEI'm not surprised because the USAF has been trying to kill off the A-10 for about a quarter-century now. 25 years ago it was the F-16 that was supposed to replace the A-10 in the CAS role. Well, that didn't work out as planned. Now they're making the argument that the A-10 needs to go to make way for the F-35, never mind that the annual operating budget of the A-10 fleet is a pittance compared to the gaping chasm that is the F-35 program. Oh, and never mind that the F-35 won't be able to fulfill the CAS requirement for some time, and given the history of the program I wouldn't put hard money on that jet having its full weapons suite available when L-M and the Pentagon say it will. Furthermore, I have my doubts about the crews and capability being shifted over to the F-15E and F-16 in the interim; the F-15E fleet is not all that big and the F-16s have also had their modernization upgrades gutted by budget cuts. We're removing a capability we have and getting vague promises about what is to replace it. I suppose I've just heard this story before in the USAF history (and to be fair, US military history in general). First it was the idea that strategic bombers could penetrate enemy airspace without fighter escort. Whoops, WWII disabused us of that notion. Then it was that strategic bombers with A-bombs rendered armies and navies obsolete. Whoops, Korea. Then it was the idea that all air-to-air engagements would be BVR encounters with heavy bombers. Whoops, Vietnam. I just question whether or not the USAF actually made an objective analysis of the need for a dedicated close-in, low-cost CAS platform or whether or not it was a predetermined decision along the lines of "we hate that ugly airplane and the mission it does, and we want to buy more F-35s for nine figures a pop." As you've noted in the past, A-10 drivers don't typically constitute much of the senior USAF leadership - it's fighter jocks and bomber pukes whose idea of what the service is about is not getting down and dirty and having to cooperate with the Army grunts on the ground. Some of the stories trickling out of the USAF about the efforts to trash the A-10's reputation, ranging from using cooked statistics to outright threatening airmens' careers ( foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/at-what-point-does-the-usafs-war-against-the-a-10-becom-1685239179 ), do not leave me with a lot of trust in the USAF's objectivity here. The A-10 is good at its job, relatively inexpensive to operate, capable of remaining in service well into the 2020s (as I recall, the fleet was recently re-winged and had the A-10C precision engagement upgrades), and unlike the F-35 it can take abuse while getting down and dirty. Now, if we can be assured that current and upcoming weapons and sensor technologies will allow the F-35 or other fast-movers to conduct the CAS mission in all its aspects - correctly identifying hostile ground targets, delivering ordnance in close proximity to friendly troops (bearing in mind that at minimum you'll be using 250-lb bombs, not 2.75-in rockets or 30 mm cannon rounds), and being able to adjust on the fly - from a nice safe altitude and airspeed, then we can probably get rid of the A-10. Otherwise, what you have is a $100 million stealth aircraft getting into prime golden BB range to do a job it's not suited for at about double the hourly flight costs. What we need the F-35 for in the near term is replacing the F-16 fleet, which fills the same role and is showing its age (both in terms of airframe wear and dated avionics). Kicking the A-10 out can wait until the F-35 is a known quantity as a CAS platform.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 9, 2015 10:10:56 GMT -6
I gather the Casablanca reference went whistling past: www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjbPi00k_MEI'm not surprised because the USAF has been trying to kill off the A-10 for about a quarter-century now. 25 years ago it was the F-16 that was supposed to replace the A-10 in the CAS role. Well, that didn't work out as planned. Now they're making the argument that the A-10 needs to go to make way for the F-35, never mind that the annual operating budget of the A-10 fleet is a pittance compared to the gaping chasm that is the F-35 program. Oh, and never mind that the F-35 won't be able to fulfill the CAS requirement for some time, and given the history of the program I wouldn't put hard money on that jet having its full weapons suite available when L-M and the Pentagon say it will. Furthermore, I have my doubts about the crews and capability being shifted over to the F-15E and F-16 in the interim; the F-15E fleet is not all that big and the F-16s have also had their modernization upgrades gutted by budget cuts. We're removing a capability we have and getting vague promises about what is to replace it. I suppose I've just heard this story before in the USAF history (and to be fair, US military history in general). First it was the idea that strategic bombers could penetrate enemy airspace without fighter escort. Whoops, WWII disabused us of that notion. Then it was that strategic bombers with A-bombs rendered armies and navies obsolete. Whoops, Korea. Then it was the idea that all air-to-air engagements would be BVR encounters with heavy bombers. Whoops, Vietnam. I just question whether or not the USAF actually made an objective analysis of the need for a dedicated close-in, low-cost CAS platform or whether or not it was a predetermined decision along the lines of "we hate that ugly airplane and the mission it does, and we want to buy more F-35s for nine figures a pop." As you've noted in the past, A-10 drivers don't typically constitute much of the senior USAF leadership - it's fighter jocks and bomber pukes whose idea of what the service is about is not getting down and dirty and having to cooperate with the Army grunts on the ground. Some of the stories trickling out of the USAF about the efforts to trash the A-10's reputation, ranging from using cooked statistics to outright threatening airmens' careers ( foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/at-what-point-does-the-usafs-war-against-the-a-10-becom-1685239179 ), do not leave me with a lot of trust in the USAF's objectivity here. The A-10 is good at its job, relatively inexpensive to operate, capable of remaining in service well into the 2020s (as I recall, the fleet was recently re-winged and had the A-10C precision engagement upgrades), and unlike the F-35 it can take abuse while getting down and dirty. Now, if we can be assured that current and upcoming weapons and sensor technologies will allow the F-35 or other fast-movers to conduct the CAS mission in all its aspects - correctly identifying hostile ground targets, delivering ordnance in close proximity to friendly troops (bearing in mind that at minimum you'll be using 250-lb bombs, not 2.75-in rockets or 30 mm cannon rounds), and being able to adjust on the fly - from a nice safe altitude and airspeed, then we can probably get rid of the A-10. Otherwise, what you have is a $100 million stealth aircraft getting into prime golden BB range to do a job it's not suited for at about double the hourly flight costs. What we need the F-35 for in the near term is replacing the F-16 fleet, which fills the same role and is showing its age (both in terms of airframe wear and dated avionics). Kicking the A-10 out can wait until the F-35 is a known quantity as a CAS platform.
Oops! I missed that allusion, nice. As I stated in an earlier post, the USAF has never had an affinity for CAS in its history. It has used the birds on hand to perform the mission, but with the advent of the attack helicopter, it has really tried to leave that mission to the Army and Marines themselves. Keep in mind, that CAS is a mission, not a platform, that it is a mission under the direct control of forces on the ground against an enemy force in contact with those friendly forces. The line between CAS and interdiction has grayed out a little, but there is still that line. The USAF reluctance to continue with CAS is evidenced by the fact that an aircraft with longer service, higher maintenance and far less purpose; the B-52H, is not considered in the process of eliminating one aircraft program to save money, it probably should be the first to go.
The USAF, actually all the services, are moving toward multi-mission aircraft. The F-35 with all its budgetary and operational faults, is that kind of aircraft. It is more cost effective to have an aircraft built with that capability because, over time, it will save money. The A-10 is a great tank buster, but we can kill tanks with drone, far cheaper and with less risk to pilots. All the rest of the targets that an A-10 can kill are reachable with other aircraft using smart weapons and missiles.
All the services need to cut billions from their budgets while minimizing the loss of capability. The elimination of platforms provides the greatest cost savings. There is an estimated savings of $3.5 billion dollars contained within the elimination of the A-10. Trust me, the USAF is reluctant to make this move, but it has to do something. As I said, it should retire the B-52H, and maintain two squadrons of A-10 for COIN operations.
www.dodbuzz.com/2013/07/12/air-force-begins-massive-b-52-overhaul/ - This should convince you that the USAF likes heavy bombers and not single purpose CAS aircraft although a cost savings from retiring this relic of the Cold War would probably make far more sense.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 9, 2015 21:25:21 GMT -6
And the $3.5 billion saved by eliminating 300 A-10s will cover ... oh, about 30 F-35As. Not including their annual support costs and what it takes to transition the crews and maintainers. Even assuming that's saving $3.5 billion per year, we'll make up the airframe deficit in oh, about a decade. The benefit for the A-10 is not that it's a tank buster; tanks are relatively easy to spot and there are lots of ways to kill them. An F-35 armed with say, 16-24 SDB-IIs would be a nightmarish tank-buster - pick them out from the air or have FAC spot them, and two aircraft can plink a whole armor battalion from a safe altitude and probably a decent standoff range. If you're REALLY facing a lot of tanks, that's what we designed the Sensor-Fused Weapon cluster bombs for. The GAU-8/A 30 mm cannon, for all it's prowess, was not the primary tank-killer on the A-10; even on the older Soviet tanks like the T-62 it was judged only effective from certain angles and slant ranges of less than 6,500 ft. AGM-65s, cluster bombs, and dumb or smart 500-lb munitions would probably have been the A-10's preferred weapon against tanks: medium.com/p/a26385113bf0What the A-10 brings to the table that the F-35 doesn't is the ability to get in close and pick things off next to the friendlies. Even the SDB, which last I checked is the smallest warhead planned for the F-35, has a "danger close" radius measured in hundreds of feet. The F-35 also relies on sensor targeting; I doubt any sane pilot is going to want to take an F-35 down low to eyeball the situation out his canopy. Maybe sensor technology is that good (although reportedly the F-35's internal EO/IR targeting system is less capable than current-gen targeting pods, due to space constraints), but I can see a situation where poor weather or other conditions make it hard to tell who's who from 20,000 ft up. In that case, you might prefer something that can fly low and carry a lot of cannon rounds and 2.75-inch rockets. Remember that the A-10's other roles include FAC and CSAR support. In my opinion, if we still need heavy bombers we'll still need the B-52 until a replacement comes up. I'm not sure if the B-1 has improved its readiness levels and operational costs of late, but for a while at least the B-52 was still the cheapest and most reliable heavy bomber in the fleet. It also makes up almost half the bomber fleet. The recent upgrades were to give it enhanced PGM capabilities. Personally I would prefer to see this sequestration numbskullery disposed of, but that's getting into politics. Barring that, the USAF should try and cut some money from the tail end of the force (last I checked it has the highest ration of officers to enlisted of any US armed service - a fighter wing is an O-7 level command, whereas a CVW with more aircraft of more types is an O-6 command in the Navy or Marines); as stated earlier if they have to cut something my first suggestion would be the Minuteman ICBM force. Unlike the A-10 or B-52, that is really a single-mission entity with other platforms that can readily replace it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 10, 2015 13:52:05 GMT -6
The USAF almost retired the A-10 in 1984 because it felt that the bird could not survive Soviet Air Defenses for the '90's. It began to evaluate options such as modifications to the F-16 to convert it into the A-16 to provide army air support. The bird only survived because the Soviet Union collapsed and the requirements and air defense environment was expected to change. Since the purpose of the A-10 was to fight masses of Soviet tanks, with the elimination of the Soviet Union and the expected European land war, the rationale for a large fleet of A-10's disappeared.
In the Gulf War, 132 aircraft conducted 8084 sorties but that pushed many of the A-10s near to their 8000 hr. service lives.
Here is some data from the USAF on CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006-2013 Table 1. Close Air Support Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (2006 - October 2013) Aircraft % of sorties A-10 19 F-16 33 F-15E 12 B-1B 8 All other U.S. fixed wing 28
The USAF actually agrees with opponents of the retirement however it is going to perform CAS in a different manner than before using newer technology. UAV's are superior in endurance and survivability of the pilot; the long range bombers can carry more weapons load and have a greater endurance.
As to the tank busting, the GAU-8 Avenger 30mm cannon was designed to kill tanks from the top which is the weakest area of armor. At 4000 feet it could deliver a 2 second burst of 65 pounds of depleted uranium with an accuracy of 80 percent. CEP was 20 feet at that range. But what would it encounter at 4000 feet? Air defenses have changed dramatically since its introduction. Well, in the Gulf War, six were lost out of 135. One was hit by a SA-9, four by AAA and one by a SA-13. It has gotten worse, down close it very dangerous these days.
BTW, the retirement of the A-10 was blocked by the NDAA compromise of 2015. The lawmakers rejected the idea and stated that the bird was needed in Iraq. It gives the bird only a one year respite from retirement. It is entirely possible that this was a ruse to get funding for the Life Cycle Improvement program for the platform.
This whole issue is a matter of three things: money, smart bombs and threats.
You have to retire the whole fleet of this aircraft to reap the benefits financially.
Smart bombs can now be dropped by any aircraft thereby eliminating the need for a specialized platform such as the A-10. These other platforms are faster and able to defend themselves better.
Remember that the other side has smart weapons also. No one is certain how many MANPADS were removed from Libya after the fall of the regime. Iraqi insurgents, ISIS and Taliban all have these weapons. So, we wait, as one squadron and possibly two will make their appearance in the Middle East. We might see a change in the idea of retirement if the A-10 proves very effective.
Just a note: the F-35 carriers a 25mm gatling with182 round, the B & C models carry 220 rounds. This is similar to the 30 mm cannon in the A-10.
UPDATE: Anonymous A-10 Pilot: The A-10 is slow, but the earth is patient.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 10, 2015 21:41:16 GMT -6
The USAF almost retired the A-10 in 1984 because it felt that the bird could not survive Soviet Air Defenses for the '90's. It began to evaluate options such as modifications to the F-16 to convert it into the A-16 to provide army air support. The bird only survived because the Soviet Union collapsed and the requirements and air defense environment was expected to change. Since the purpose of the A-10 was to fight masses of Soviet tanks, with the elimination of the Soviet Union and the expected European land war, the rationale for a large fleet of A-10's disappeared.
In the Gulf War, 132 aircraft conducted 8084 sorties but that pushed many of the A-10s near to their 8000 hr. service lives.
Here is some data from the USAF on CAS missions in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2006-2013 Table 1. Close Air Support Missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (2006 - October 2013) Aircraft % of sorties A-10 19 F-16 33 F-15E 12 B-1B 8 All other U.S. fixed wing 28
The USAF actually agrees with opponents of the retirement however it is going to perform CAS in a different manner than before using newer technology. UAV's are superior in endurance and survivability of the pilot; the long range bombers can carry more weapons load and have a greater endurance.
As to the tank busting, the GAU-8 Avenger 30mm cannon was designed to kill tanks from the top which is the weakest area of armor. At 4000 feet it could deliver a 2 second burst of 65 pounds of depleted uranium with an accuracy of 80 percent. CEP was 20 feet at that range. But what would it encounter at 4000 feet? Air defenses have changed dramatically since its introduction. Well, in the Gulf War, six were lost out of 135. One was hit by a SA-9, four by AAA and one by a SA-13. It has gotten worse, down close it very dangerous these days.
BTW, the retirement of the A-10 was blocked by the NDAA compromise of 2015. The lawmakers rejected the idea and stated that the bird was needed in Iraq. It gives the bird only a one year respite from retirement. It is entirely possible that this was a ruse to get funding for the Life Cycle Improvement program for the platform.
This whole issue is a matter of three things: money, smart bombs and threats.
You have to retire the whole fleet of this aircraft to reap the benefits financially.
Smart bombs can now be dropped by any aircraft thereby eliminating the need for a specialized platform such as the A-10. These other platforms are faster and able to defend themselves better.
Remember that the other side has smart weapons also. No one is certain how many MANPADS were removed from Libya after the fall of the regime. Iraqi insurgents, ISIS and Taliban all have these weapons. So, we wait, as one squadron and possibly two will make their appearance in the Middle East. We might see a change in the idea of retirement if the A-10 proves very effective.
Just a note: the F-35 carriers a 25mm gatling with182 round, the B & C models carry 220 rounds. This is similar to the 30 mm cannon in the A-10.
UPDATE: Anonymous A-10 Pilot: The A-10 is slow, but the earth is patient.
Politics played a role, but as I recall there were also some technical issues. The F-16 is a lightweight fighter airframe; the plan for the A-16 involved extra armor, strengthened wings, additional hard points, and gun pods. The F-16s of the New York ANG's 174th TFW did test out the 4-barreled 30 mm GAU-13 cannon mounted in a GPU-5/A Pave Claw pod. It was mounted on the centerline station with 353 rounds of ammo. Testing in 1991 only lasted two days; it was found the vibrations from the gun pod made aiming and for that matter controlling the airplane difficult. Level of surprise: 0% As stated - fine, we have smart bombs. Problem comes down to how "close" that close air support is. Bombs have a much bigger lethal radius than cannon fire or rockets. Not a problem if the other guy is 500 yards or more away. Since Vietnam, adversaries have tried to negate American air support by getting in as close as possible to our guys on the ground. Now the F-35 does have a gun, but with only about 1/10 the rounds of the A-10. It doesn't have the low-speed handling performance or the ability to take ground fire. I highly doubt rocket pods will be integrated with the F-35. In some CAS scenarios (especially the "Sandy" role), that's far more vital than speed and stealth; LO features don't help when the other guy can see you with a Mark 1 Mod 0 eyeball: www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/466762/bagram-pilots-save-60-soldiers-during-convoy-ambush.aspxOverall, it smells a lot like the argument that preceded Vietnam - "We don't need guns or dogfight training." Now it's we won't need to get down and dirty for CAS and pilots are going to be dropping PGMs from 20,000 ft up while sipping their coffee and watching their MFDs. The USAf can dress it up all they like; it still smells like they want out of the CAS business. We did lose 4 A-10s in Desert Storm to enemy fire, plus another three that made it back home but were written off after landing. The 4 losses were all SAM hits. 3 F-16s were lost to enemy fire during the war, two of them during the 72-aircraft "Package Q" strike on Baghdad in daylight. Another 2 F-16s were damaged but returned to base in separate incidents. Granted there were more F-16s in theater, but they were also operating at higher altitudes.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 10, 2015 22:45:34 GMT -6
FYI: Danger Close: Minimum Safe Distance
MK-82 LD AB 300 meters MK-83 LD AB 340 meters MK-84 LD AB 380 meters GBU-38 C/AB/v4 185/230/100 meters 155mm 200-450 meters 2.75 FFAR 140-410 meters AGM-65 95 meters AGM-114 K/M/N 110/125/120 20/25/30/40/105mm 60/100/65/75/165 meters
As far as the Vietnam issue, the problem in Vietnam was a political one - the ROE's. These stated that you had to have visual contact with a bogie to engage him. The problem was, we couldn't interrogate them to get a proper response since our IFF systems only had transponders. By the time you had visual ID of the bogie, grapefruit size shells were coming at you and now you were in a dogfight that you had no real training or weaponry to cope with. With the addition of the APX-76(I worked on that system) you could now interrogate the bogie at long distance and then prepare for him. Yes, the Ault Report gave us Top Gun on March 3, 1969 at Miramar NAS. We improved the AI Radars with MTI and the AIM-7, AIM-9 missiles along with improved targeting systems for dogfighting. What you see is a natural policy of improvement in your platforms and doctrine in response to stimulus from your opponents. This happened after the Gulf War, an improvement in platforms and doctrine in response to stimulus by your opponents. You are always one war behind, always. You always start a war with the platforms and doctrine from the last one.
Is the USAF attempting get out of conducting CAS missions? No, but I suspect they would like to adopt a new methodology of dealing with the missions. I think they would like to have better joint command of CAS missions so that they can conduct them before the requirement to go in low and slow presents itself. In other words, better intelligence to allow more interdiction missions to keep the enemy from engaging our land forces in close combat. It might be pie in the sky, but I can't disagree with the concept. We were lucky in the Gulf War that the Iraqi forces were not well equipped with MANPADS in great numbers, had they been, we would have lost a lot more A-10s. Currently in the world, it is estimated that there are over 500,000 MANPADs in inventories and a few thousand outside of the control of governments. These missiles systems are effective up to 3 miles in range and up to 15,000 feet. These are only one possible threat to aircraft flying low and slow, there are others too numerous to mention.
It is my fervent hope that the USAF and all the services can jointly find a good solution to conducting CAS missions because it is not just a USAF problem, it is a problem for all land and air forces in the Pentagon. Sticking our heads in the ground and hoping the mission goes away is not the answer, but then neither is holding on to an aircraft that maybe extremely vulnerable to the new current crop of manpads or other AAA weapons. If there is a better solution, that will save pilots and accomplish the missions, then lets find it. If that is to retire the A-10, so be it. I don't really know the answer and I suspect, neither does anyone else. It may take another war to find it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 11, 2015 7:34:12 GMT -6
The situation with the A-10 and CAS missions is very reminiscent of the A-1 Skyraiders in the Vietnam War. It was a piston driven aircraft used exclusively for low and slow CAS missions. In all, before the remaining A-1's were shifted to the South Vietnamese AF in February 1972 over 266 of these birds were lost, 67 by the USN. They were tough well armored aircraft but the region below 5000 feet was and still is very dangerous. I hope we don't wait for these kind of losses before we realize and have to relearn the lesson again.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 11, 2015 7:34:24 GMT -6
The situation with the A-10 and CAS missions is very reminiscent of the A-1 Skyraiders in the Vietnam War. It was a piston driven aircraft used exclusively for low and slow CAS missions. In all, before the remaining A-1's were shifted to the South Vietnamese AF in February 1972 over 266 of these birds were lost, 67 by the USN. They were tough well armored aircraft but the region below 5000 feet was and still is very dangerous. I hope we don't wait for these kind of losses before we realize we have to rethink our doctrine of CAS. Let's not wait for another war to relearn these lessons for the fourth time; WWII, Korea, Vietnam and the Gulf War. Four wars should be enough to emphasize to the Pentagon that low and slow CAS missions are very dangerous to the pilots and the ground troops. 30 mm cannons are not the answer to this problem, because it takes multiple runs to complete the mission. One aircraft might make it through on the first run, but if others have to come in to complete the mission, the opponent is now on alert. The DOD must as a group find ways of completing these missions without the unnecessary risk.
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Post by sirchaos on Mar 11, 2015 12:39:14 GMT -6
UPDATE: Anonymous A-10 Pilot: The A-10 is slow, but the earth is patient.
Sir Terry Pratchett: "The turtle does not have to be fast - only fast enough to chase down a cabbage."
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 11, 2015 18:49:38 GMT -6
UPDATE: Anonymous A-10 Pilot: The A-10 is slow, but the earth is patient.
Sir Terry Pratchett: "The turtle does not have to be fast - only fast enough to chase down a cabbage." Nice, I will have to remember that one.
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