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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 12, 2015 8:14:58 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 12, 2015 10:53:00 GMT -6
Accuracy of GAU-22
5 milliradians diameter, 80 percent circle (1.4 milliradians, 1-sigma radius
5 mil, 80 percent", meaning that 80 percent of rounds fired will hit within a cone with an angle of five-milliradians. This equates to a 40 feet (12 m) diameter circle at the weapon's design range of 4,000 feet (1,200 m). This is the same as the GAU-8 on the A-10 meaning that it has the same accuracy but a smaller shell. The ratio of AP incendiary to HE incendiary should be about 5:1, same as the GAU-8A. The GAU-22 is a derivative of the GAU-12 which uses a 6.5 oz. HEI shell and a 7.6 oz. API. That size shell probably will not penetrate tank armor unless it gets a lucky hit on the engine area usually covered with steel ventilator plates. It will be useful against groups of soldiers, trucks, mobile AAA weapons, mobile gun carriers, APC's which are usually not heavily armored, and building. It can be useful against Surface to Surface missile batteries, artillery and small to medium boats and ships. One important caveat is that if you use your 25mm ammo, then it will not be available for Air to Air combat if it is necessary and on a air to ground mission, your AtoA weaponry will be minimal. You cannot count on escorts either, so you will have to be judicious in your use of the ammunition for the gun. Possibly in a flight of four, two will conduct the mission and two will stand by on tarcap if no escort is available.
www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006garm/thursday/maher.pdf
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 13, 2015 11:35:09 GMT -6
Just a review of what I know about the A-10 and the decision to retire the platform.
The program was initiated in the early seventies, with the first flight in May 1972. Its purpose was develop a platform to deal with the hordes of Soviet tanks expected to be used in any Warsaw Pact versus NATO scenario during the last stages of the Cold War. It was to be a low altitude, tank buster, subsonic built around a GAU-8 30mm rotary cannon using DU API shells. The cockpit area was heavily armored and over the years, the weapons suite has been upgraded. The main reason the USAF developed the plane was to eliminate the Cheyenne helicopter being developed by the Army, the plan succeeded and the Cheyenne was cancelled but the USAF was now saddled with an aircraft that it really didn't want and a mission it did not like to perform...low altitude, close air support.
Over the years, the USAF has tried to retire the aircraft, and now there are 350 out of about 720 originally built still flying. Almost all are reaching the end of their structural life and to maintain them, would require a life cycle improvement program which would include the wings and possibly the fuselage area along with replacing the older engines; this would be costly at a time of mandatory budget cuts.
The period of Warsaw pact versus NATO is over, and the need for a tank busting is gone. This does not mean that we won't be engaging in warfare with tanks, just not in the numbers that were possible with a North European Plain War. The USAF believes that with the development of drones, new air to ground missiles and weapons, close air support can be accomplished without the necessity of flying down below 5000 feet, a dangerous zone with the new crop of MANPADS. However, it is a much more complex issue and needs to be addressed by the Army, Marines and USAF.
Modern 21st Century combat is focused more on small scale, COIN operations with possible operations against less well equipped nations like Iraq, Syria and Iran. There are also some possibilities in the Ukraine and the Far East. How CAS doctrine has changed is complex, so I am providing an article from 2010 in Armed Forces Journal which explains it better than I can.
renekogutudartiklid.blogspot.com/2010/12/updating-close-air-support-new-doctrine.html
I am in disagreement with this statement in the above: "The COIN CAS airframe must be able to deliver ordnance on target accurately. But large effect or high-cost munitions are poorly suited and can be counterproductive. Small-effect munitions, carried in ample quantities, are what are required. These include minigun pods, 2.75-inch rockets (with a mix of flechettes and white phosphorus for marking), and an occasional precision guided munition for suppression of enemy air defenses. These munitions must be designed for anti-personnel work first. "
The new SDB II would provide the quantity needed and all weather use, plus eliminating the need to fly down to below 4000 feet. Four can be carried in the place of one 2000 lbs. bomb and it is much more accurate. I don't subscribed to the idea that the gun is a possible solution. It has limited ammunition, short range(4000 feet) and drag which slows down an aircraft in the dense lower atmosphere. These are all limitations that threaten the platform and pilots.
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 13, 2015 14:41:14 GMT -6
Just a review of what I know about the A-10 and the decision to retire the platform.
The program was initiated in the early seventies, with the first flight in May 1972. Its purpose was develop a platform to deal with the hordes of Soviet tanks expected to be used in any Warsaw Pact versus NATO scenario during the last stages of the Cold War. It was to be a low altitude, tank buster, subsonic built around a GAU-8 30mm rotary cannon using DU API shells. The cockpit area was heavily armored and over the years, the weapons suite has been upgraded. The main reason the USAF developed the plane was to eliminate the Cheyenne helicopter being developed by the Army, the plan succeeded and the Cheyenne was cancelled but the USAF was now saddled with an aircraft that it really didn't want and a mission it did not like to perform...low altitude, close air support.
Over the years, the USAF has tried to retire the aircraft, and now there are 350 out of about 720 originally built still flying. Almost all are reaching the end of their structural life and to maintain them, would require a life cycle improvement program which would include the wings and possibly the fuselage area along with replacing the older engines; this would be costly at a time of mandatory budget cuts.
The period of Warsaw pact versus NATO is over, and the need for a tank busting is gone. This does not mean that we won't be engaging in warfare with tanks, just not in the numbers that were possible with a North European Plain War. The USAF believes that with the development of drones, new air to ground missiles and weapons, close air support can be accomplished without the necessity of flying down below 5000 feet, a dangerous zone with the new crop of MANPADS. However, it is a much more complex issue and needs to be addressed by the Army, Marines and USAF.
Modern 21st Century combat is focused more on small scale, COIN operations with possible operations against less well equipped nations like Iraq, Syria and Iran. There are also some possibilities in the Ukraine and the Far East. How CAS doctrine has changed is complex, so I am providing an article from 2010 in Armed Forces Journal which explains it better than I can.
renekogutudartiklid.blogspot.com/2010/12/updating-close-air-support-new-doctrine.html
I am in disagreement with this statement in the above: "The COIN CAS airframe must be able to deliver ordnance on target accurately. But large effect or high-cost munitions are poorly suited and can be counterproductive. Small-effect munitions, carried in ample quantities, are what are required. These include minigun pods, 2.75-inch rockets (with a mix of flechettes and white phosphorus for marking), and an occasional precision guided munition for suppression of enemy air defenses. These munitions must be designed for anti-personnel work first. "
The new SDB II would provide the quantity needed and all weather use, plus eliminating the need to fly down to below 4000 feet. Four can be carried in the place of one 2000 lbs. bomb and it is much more accurate. I don't subscribed to the idea that the gun is a possible solution. It has limited ammunition, short range(4000 feet) and drag which slows down an aircraft in the dense lower atmosphere. These are all limitations that threaten the platform and pilots.
The A-10s have already been updated to A-10C standard, and that included at least starting the process of re-winging the 242 "thin-skinned" A-10s in the fleet. The remaining 100 were originally built with thicker wings that will not require refurbishment. They should be structurally sound for another 15-30 years. So that money has already been partially spent and we've bought the extra time on the airframes. I did check and the USAF's purported savings of $3.7 billion are over a 4-year period from 2015 to 2019, or less than $1 billion per year. That's chump change (or an accounting error) in the grand scheme of things; the USAF's annual budget is something around $110 billion. As far as the need for smaller-effect weapons, the reason for those is, and I underline for emphasis, so you don't frag your own guys while performing "close" air support. The SDB has a lethal radius of 200 ft; a 30 mm round has a lethal radius of 90 ft. Having the SDB as an all-solving hammer assumes that our magical sensor capabilities will spot enemy forces far enough away from our troops and call in air support before they get into what has historically been normal combat range for infantry rifles (100 yards or less). I believe there are a number of Army and Marine vets from the last 13 years, not to mention aircrews who might get shot down in hostile territory, who would term that assumption overly rosy. COIN stands for COunter INsurgency; one of the funny things about insurgencies is that they tend to be conducted by people who are not distinguishable as black hats until they open up on you at close range with whatever the local handheld weapon of choice is. CAS in these types of conflicts also tends to put a premium on combat endurance; you have to stay on the scene for a while and have enough weapons to keep shooting. Again, forget tanks and APCs; the F-35 and other aircraft can deal with them just fine. Killing enemy AFVs is typically an interdiction mission rather than CAS anyway; you want them dead well before they come into contact with your own ground forces (and preferably you want to kill their support elements like fueling depots/trucks). Overall, nothing I've seen convinces me that the USAF has a valid argument for immediately retiring the A-10 besides assuming that we will never, ever fight the kind of ground conflicts we've been in since 2001. Former SecDef Gates publicly dinged them hard for that kind of thinking a few years back (well, for that and misplacing a half-dozen nukes) and they don't seem to have gotten the message yet; while I think an independent air force is a good thing I get the impression that the USAF is the service most in need of a remedial "Play Well With Others" seminar. They need to have the notion that they can win wars all by themselves knocked out of their heads.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 13, 2015 15:44:50 GMT -6
I understand what has transpired in the updates to the A-10 but there is far more to this than you know. This idea that they will be good for "another 15-30 years" is pure poppycock. If you start using those birds in CAS operations in the Middle East you will shorten their lives. It's a known fact that combat flying reduces the life of an aircraft considerably. The only reason the current remaining A-10s have good structures is because no one has used them for combat in a quarter of a century. Flying around the US is nothing compared to combat hours.
I agree with you about COIN. Those operations require far better communications between the ground controllers and the pilots to ensure that the targets are clear of civilians and friendlies. This has not been done very well in the past and I believe that the services are recognizing this and are attempting to deal with it. A bullet, once fired, is a friend to no one. At least with a laser guided bomb and missile, you can move the designator and hopefully, avoid the fratricide if possible. Combat endurance is important in CAS missions,loiter time is the term. That's what tankers are for, to extend the loiter time for platforms. However, you cannot rearm in the air, so a limited ammunition weapon like the gun is the not the best of solutions. It takes many tools to conduct successful CAS missions; SDB's, JDAMs, missiles etc. The two keys to CAS missions are good intelligence and communications with the ground forces.
It is my considered opinion, that the A-10 should be maintained until the F-35 has been upgraded in its software and the GAU-22 is available; however long that takes. Once that is completed and fully tested in combat, the bird should be retired. During that time, the Army, Marines, Navy and USAF need to put together a better joint air to ground mission control system to ensure that intelligence is available for both the ground and air forces, good secure communications between the ground forces and pilots as to where the targets are, where the friendlies are and where the aircraft are, proper weapons load for the target and good post mission analysis for both sides to ensure target is destroyed so a need to return is not necessary. We need to protect the ground forces and the air crews, but still accomplish the missions.
UPDATE: I thought this would lighten up the discussion. It seems the Luftwaffe had a hand in the design of the A-10 - www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/12/american-warplane-s-forgotten-nazi-past.html
Now, you don't suppose the USAF is trying to get rid of the bird to cover up this Nazi involvement do you? Naw!
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Post by steel selachian on Mar 15, 2015 18:57:25 GMT -6
Rudel's influence on the A-10 isn't news; as I recall "Stuka Pilot" was required reading within the A-X program. Say what you will about the man's political opinions (despicable would work well), but he earned his title as a tank-killer. The 37 mm cannons on the Ju-87G only had six rounds per gun, which make the results quite impressive.
As far as fatigue issues - 25 years? The A-10 didn't have that much of a respite; it was active over the Balkans during our two little skirmishes there in 1994-1995 and in 1999, started flying in Afghanistan in 2002, was deployed to Iraq in 2003, and flew over Libya in 2011. They've been on the go for most of the past 12 years. By contrast the F-15C fleet hasn't been doing much combat flying lately, and one of those shook itself apart over Missouri in 2007 and the whole fleet was grounded for four months. Yet the USAF has spent lots of money upgrading the F-15C and we're looking at keeping those birds well into the 2020s. If the same logic was applied to the F-15C as the Air Force is applying to the A-10, the F-15Cs should have all been sent to the boneyard and Lockheed should have gotten another F-22 production contract.
The A-10's gun is generally good for about 10 bursts of fire; couple those with Hydra rockets (which do have a laser guidance section as an option nowadays) and an A-10 can hang around for quite a while laying down fire. You could probably even put the SDB on the A-10, giving it some more options. And while yes, bullets are nobody's friend once they leave the barrel, remember that PGMs also have a circular error probable along with their larger lethal radius. Add in any mistakes setting the target point and/or inclement weather conditions, and the bombs aren't anyone's friend either. A gun, you put the sight on the point you want to hit and pull the trigger. Sometimes point-and-shoot is still the best way.
One more note, seeing as sophisticated air defenses are one of the stated reasons for retiring the A-10. In the last couple of decades, the US has retired its fleet of dedicated jamming aircraft without replacement, and it's unclear whether the F-35A will adopt antiradiation missiles and take over the role of the F-16CG squadrons. Granted, there are other ways to shut SAM sites up (SDB being a particularly lethal option), but the USAF has been focusing on DEAD rather than SEAD. SEAD still has its uses; SAM sites can be a devil to find but if the operators are having issues cutting through jamming and/or are living in fear of Mach-4 missiles every time they flip their radar on even the ones you can't pin down will be severely crimped.
Aside from that, I agree with your suggestions. We should keep the A-10 around until it has a proven successor entering service and we have the kinks of modern CAS worked out. One wonders if a solution would be to modify the Key West Agreement to allow the Army to operate its own small force of dedicated non-stealth, non-fancypants fixed-wing CAS aircraft like the A-10 or the new Textron Scorpion.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 15, 2015 21:08:41 GMT -6
Rudel's influence on the A-10 isn't news; as I recall "Stuka Pilot" was required reading within the A-X program. Say what you will about the man's political opinions (despicable would work well), but he earned his title as a tank-killer. The 37 mm cannons on the Ju-87G only had six rounds per gun, which make the results quite impressive. As far as fatigue issues - 25 years? The A-10 didn't have that much of a respite; it was active over the Balkans during our two little skirmishes there in 1994-1995 and in 1999, started flying in Afghanistan in 2002, was deployed to Iraq in 2003, and flew over Libya in 2011. They've been on the go for most of the past 12 years. By contrast the F-15C fleet hasn't been doing much combat flying lately, and one of those shook itself apart over Missouri in 2007 and the whole fleet was grounded for four months. Yet the USAF has spent lots of money upgrading the F-15C and we're looking at keeping those birds well into the 2020s. If the same logic was applied to the F-15C as the Air Force is applying to the A-10, the F-15Cs should have all been sent to the boneyard and Lockheed should have gotten another F-22 production contract. The A-10's gun is generally good for about 10 bursts of fire; couple those with Hydra rockets (which do have a laser guidance section as an option nowadays) and an A-10 can hang around for quite a while laying down fire. You could probably even put the SDB on the A-10, giving it some more options. And while yes, bullets are nobody's friend once they leave the barrel, remember that PGMs also have a circular error probable along with their larger lethal radius. Add in any mistakes setting the target point and/or inclement weather conditions, and the bombs aren't anyone's friend either. A gun, you put the sight on the point you want to hit and pull the trigger. Sometimes point-and-shoot is still the best way. One more note, seeing as sophisticated air defenses are one of the stated reasons for retiring the A-10. In the last couple of decades, the US has retired its fleet of dedicated jamming aircraft without replacement, and it's unclear whether the F-35A will adopt antiradiation missiles and take over the role of the F-16CG squadrons. Granted, there are other ways to shut SAM sites up (SDB being a particularly lethal option), but the USAF has been focusing on DEAD rather than SEAD. SEAD still has its uses; SAM sites can be a devil to find but if the operators are having issues cutting through jamming and/or are living in fear of Mach-4 missiles every time they flip their radar on even the ones you can't pin down will be severely crimped. Aside from that, I agree with your suggestions. We should keep the A-10 around until it has a proven successor entering service and we have the kinks of modern CAS worked out. One wonders if a solution would be to modify the Key West Agreement to allow the Army to operate its own small force of dedicated non-stealth, non-fancypants fixed-wing CAS aircraft like the A-10 or the new Textron Scorpion.
I agree about the political views of a man like Rudel, who cares. As to the fatigue issue, The A-10 has had some brief periods since the Gulf War but nothing that would put many combat hours on the structure. I might look that up this week.
I still do not agree about point and shoot, it requires the platform to be low and slow for any good targeting capability, the rounds are not laser guided. The gun also puts undo stress on the forward fuselage structure not to mention the center barrel which also has the wing stresses transferred to it. The days of the gunslinger in the air are over.
As to the removal of the jamming fleet, I understand why that was done. If you are designing around the concept of stealth, then turning on a jammer is like turning on the lights in a dark hallway, you have now given your opponent a clear target. I've worked both sides of this issue; the radar side on the ground and the jamming equipment in the air. Passive detection is the best equipment to have on board. With that gear, you can now find your opponents search, acquisition and tracking radars, and with an electronically stealthy aircraft, fly around them. Jamming only announces your arrival.
My plan for the A-10 is simple. You cocoon half of the fleet, specifically the ANG birds which might be the oldest. Simply fly them to Davis Monthan, remove GFE and put into the logistic system for the other remaining active birds, put the cocoon on them, and line them in the desert as possible replacements. Deploy one squadron to the Far East, one to Germany, one to UAE and leave one as an active training and testing squadron possibly near Las Vegas and the bombing ranges down there. This allows you to test new equipment and tactics.
As to the F-35, the CAS mission specific ordnance and software must be accelerated and fully tested on the ranges against the A-10. The services need to know what part of the CAS mission it can execute well and the areas it might need help. My guess is down low in poor weather. The joint mission planning and control for close air support and BAI needs to be improved to cover the areas the F-35 will have trouble with.
All in all, there needs to be a better joining of doctrine between the US Army and the USAF. They both are on different pages. I believe that the days of the mission specific platform are over, and that we need to use multi-mission aircraft to perform the function with improvements in doctrine between the services. We should maintain a modest number of A-10s, but move ahead the replacement with the F-35.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 17, 2015 9:53:36 GMT -6
As I've researched close air support and its history, its come to mind that the real issue about the A-10 is the difference in doctrine or viewpoint between the air forces and the ground forces. In close air support, the ground commanders are in charge of the air support in that they specify the targets. They can become myopic and forget that strategic bombing and battlefield air interdiction can maintain the pace of the AirLand battle and stop the enemy from being able to create defensive positions which then will have to be assaulted resulting in a slowing of the campaign. Air commanders must be independent. They have to think in terms of air superiority and weak points in the transportation system along with key logistical points like fuel and ammo dumps, etc. The ground commander tends to look at what's in front of him, which is what he should be looking at. However, what's behind the front is vital to the campaign; this is where the overall commander comes into play, as Schwarzkopf did in the Gulf War. He kept the air commanders independent, provided the CAS the Army needed but realized that BAI and Strategic bombing could maintain the pace and end the war. In that war, the air campaign might, for the first time, been more important than the land campaign. In the 1940 campaign in France, in order to move the Panzer divisions across the Meuse, lines of Stuka's were used to keep the French heads down. This succeeded, and cooperation between the air commanders and land commanders was used to optimize CAS. On the Eastern front, the German land commanders were so focused on what was in front of them, using all the air force that was available, that the air commanders could not use BAI and strategic bombing to slow the movement of new Russian forces to the front and disrupt logistical support. This was very myopic and cost the German's that eastern campaign. In the Normandy Invasion, the heavy bombers of the Eighth AF were diverted from strategic bombing to air interdiction and in some cases CAS. Normandy was an unqualified success mostly because of BAI and CAS, but one wonders if the war might have ended sooner had the heavy bombers been able to continue bombing the hinterland of the German front, oil plants, ammo dumps, and production facilities. How much the three month delay cost the Allies in the destruction of the German petroleum industry is a matter of conjecture? In the Six Day War of 1967, the Israeli's used a combination of CAS and BAI to maintain contact with the Arab forces but keep the offensive on the move by attacking what was in front and what was moving up from behind. They did not use single purpose platforms but multi-mission platforms to accomplish this. They repeated this in the Yom Kippur War but in that conflict, initially the ground to air missiles took a heavy toll of their aircraft. This was the first instance of surface to air missiles beginning to restrict CAS missions. The air commanders of the world now had to develop new methods and platforms. In Vietnam, the USAF and the Navy were not prepared for CAS and had to use A-26 Invaders and eventually A-1 Skyraiders. The A-7d Corsair was the replacement for the A-1. In Vietnam, the weather and topography played a big role in how CAS missions were executed. The environment ranged from tropical rainforests to scattered trees and savannas with grass along with many cleared areas. The forests had three canopies; 80-100 feet; 50-60 feet and 20-30 feet. The ground seldom saw the sun and had no heavy with underbrush. In this environment finding targets was virtually impossible. Few weapons could reach the ground with such a layered growth. CAS in this environment became very complicated and special control procedures with FAC’s had to be developed. Many of characteristics and requirement for the A-10 were derived from the problems with controlling and executing CAS missions in Vietnam. It’s extended loiter time, all-around visibility, low speed, and heavy ordnance loads were all a direct result of lessons learned in Vietnam. The problem with the continued service of the A-10 is not that she can’t perform the mission for which she was specifically designed, but age and costs are creeping up on her. She is about forty years old in design and life cycle costs will start accruing. The wing removal and replacement is just the start of such updates. New engines, upgraded electronics and cockpits have and will continue to be required; center barrel corrosion and cracks have already begun to be detected and these kinds of repairs and replacements are expensive for aircraft for which the assembly line has been shut down for many years. The decision for any service is; when do we decide that these upgrades and repairs are not cost effective; that another aircraft will have to be tailored for the mission. This is exactly where we are, at this point in the history of the A-10. We’ve been at this junction before with other aircraft. The Navy had this issue after the Gulf War with the A-6’s and A-7’s. They opted to use the F-18 as the multi-mission platform by submitting requirements led to the EA-18 EW aircraft. The F-18 versions from the A model to the E model have replaced both of the older aircraft. If you can move funding from the older aircraft and use it to support the newer aircraft, but you can improve life cycle costs because the newer bird can perform more missions, faster and easier, which means you might not need as many to accomplish the same operations. My plan that I submitted in an earlier post, is about the best way to transition to a new platform and still maintain your capability. If one of the remaining A-10 has structural problems, you can retire that specific bird, remove the equipment, install it in a cocooned bird at Davis- Monthan and put the replacement in service. The spare aircraft can save you replacement and repair costs which can improve your budget for new and updated aircraft. If you are interested in AMARG, here is a link to an unofficial page describing how it works and the birds in it. www.airplaneboneyards.com/davis-monthan-afb-amarg-airplane-boneyard.htmThere is no easy path through budget reductions and the need to focus your spending on operations, maintenance and research and development. Retirements occur all the time; whether it is one or two aircraft, squadrons or the whole aircraft line, it always brings criticism by civilians and military alike. The process is never perfect, it can be haphazard and it can for a few years; reduce your capabilities which must be allowed for in your combat planning and operations. But, it has to be done. The retirement of the A-10 will occur, either in the 2016 budget starting on 1 October 2015 or in a couple of years, but it will occur. I don't think I have more to say on the subject until we see budget submissions for 2016 and the discussions in Congress. That will not be until July of 2015.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 17, 2015 12:47:42 GMT -6
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Post by ksbearski on Mar 17, 2015 19:57:43 GMT -6
I got an idea...let the Army handle their own CAS like the marines, transfer all the A-10's and their pilots to Army aviation. Army performs their own CAS mission up to five miles from the FEBA, Air Force handles air superiority missions, interdiction beyond the FEBA, strategic bombing, ICBM's, space warfare and oh yeah, reconnaissance and terrorist sniping with big boy drones. USAF doesn't want A-10's, army does, roll them over to the army and let USAF wash their hands of CAS...
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 17, 2015 20:43:40 GMT -6
I got an idea...let the Army handle their own CAS like the marines, transfer all the A-10's and their pilots to Army aviation. Army performs their own CAS mission up to five miles from the FEBA, Air Force handles air superiority missions, interdiction beyond the FEBA, strategic bombing, ICBM's, space warfare and oh yeah, reconnaissance and terrorist sniping with big boy drones. USAF doesn't want A-10's, army does, roll them over to the army and let USAF wash their hands of CAS... Nice thought, but you are a day late and a dollar short. Already been suggested and the US Army says "Not no, but h_ _ _ no".
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 12, 2015 8:21:32 GMT -6
Here is a quote from General Chuck Horner, the Air Boss during Desert Storm about the A-10 -
I think this speaks volumes. We now know why the A-10 combat losses per sortie were so good, compared to the other aircraft. It was pulled away from the most lethal environment; the Republican Guard. None of the articles that use the Desert Storm data use this as an explanation, they simply use the data to their own advantage. This does not demean the record of this aircraft, but it does put the record into proper perspective. This was twenty five years ago, and IAD systems have vastly improved. Another point is that the majority of the armor kills for the A-10 were by the use of the IR Maverick missile. The 30 mm Gatling was not the primary weapon, but was useful under the correct conditions. I hope this puts this issue into proper perspective. I say again, let's keep three or four squadrons for combat support for the Rangers, Green Berets and Seals against insurgents and special ops, but retire the rest.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 12, 2015 21:55:10 GMT -6
I believe a little while ago I posted an article about A-10 pilot training during the 1980s, and you're right - the cannon was not really going to be that effective against tanks in a combat situation. Even hitting a tank from behind, the effective range for the gun was probably a mile or less. medium.com/war-is-boring/cold-war-coloring-book-taught-a-10-pilots-to-kill-soviet-tanks-a26385113bf0During Desert Storm what proved wickedly effective were the "tank plinkers" - F-111Fs and F-15Es loaded with 4 or 8 500-lb LGBs flying at night. Nowadays we have the CBU-107 Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser that can carry a load of sensor-fused submunitions and the Small Diameter Bomb, which makes the same tactic even more lethal. An F-35 can carry 2-6 WCMDs or 8-24 SDBs, which would make it a pretty deadly tank plinker. The A-10's value is in being able to get in low and close and do its thing close to the friendlies, not in killing tanks. I like your idea - keep some A-10 squadrons and chop them over to AFSOC as CAS/FAC/"Sandy" platforms. Aside from being a good fit, it'll throw them in with the other oddballs and keep them away from the fighter jock generals.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Apr 13, 2015 7:27:55 GMT -6
It's possible that JSOC could field its own air component, it has its own recce aircraft. This component would be both fixed wing and rotary wing. The A-10 would be transferred to JSOC control and that's where funding would be derived for maintenance and training. This would take it out of the USAF budget and still maintain the aircraft for special ops and insurgents until the F-35 is finally fitted out for CAS missions.
What's interesting about this whole issue is that the A-10 was designed and built to kill tanks in a Fulda Gap scenario of a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; that scenario never occurred. When it was used against, modest hordes of tanks, specifically the Republican Guard it had to be withdrawn from that mission because of increasing losses and damaged aircraft. It gives one pause about its real performance. Also, if the primary tank killer is the AGM-65 Maverick, an IR missile with a maximum 17 nm. range, why do I need to go in close, an F-16 could launch it. We know the cannon is of limited usage, so why do I need the A-10 anymore.
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Post by steel selachian on Apr 13, 2015 18:32:19 GMT -6
Remember that the A-10 was designed in the mid-1970s, in large part on the Vietnam experience which featured copious amounts of optically-aimed AAA. PGMs were in their infancy and we didn't have the EO/IR systems like LANTIRN that came about in the 1980s; in fact the Central European environment was considered to be a major challenge for the early-gen EO sensors on the AGM-65A and B models. PGMs and targeting systems really weren't even available in large quantities during Desert Storm; the smart bombs made for great visuals but the bulk of the iron dropped was dumb bombs. Getting up close and personal with an armored airframe was probably necessary if you wanted to pick tanks off without having to carpet-bomb the whole area. There was also the factor that the USAF wasn't doing much to improve the A-10's capabilities; in the early 1980s they abandoned testing of a two-seat variant that had FLIR, LLTV, and terrain-following radar.
Also, remember that for a Fulda Gap scenario the idea of "acceptable losses" pretty much went out the window - we'd have been happy to hold the line and not get immolated with tactical nukes. One study estimated the A-10 force would get chewed up in two weeks of sustained fighting; then again pretty much every other piece of kit we were going to field in that theater or in any WWIII scenario was going to take serious losses.
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