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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 7, 2014 14:42:09 GMT -6
Well, for those of us in the US, today is Pearl Harbor Day. Seventy-three years ago today , The First Striking Fleet was preparing the first wave of 183 fighters, bombers and torpedo planes for launch at 0600. The attack was commenced by the flight leader at 0755 and the attack ended at about 0945 with the second wave heading for home. The Japanese lost about 29 aircraft but we know that about 15 to 20 aircraft were pushed over the side due to excessive damage. All in all, they lost close to 45 aircraft. We lost four battleships but two were rebuilt. Three of the battleships were back in the fleet in two weeks, Nevada went to the yards for the repair of damage and her scheduled refit. She would rejoin the fleet in December 1942. The Navy lost 92 aircraft and 31 damaged, the US Army Air Corps lost about 77 destroyed and 128 damaged. Total casualties for Navy, Army, Marine and civilian were 2403. The age old question is why they chose a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the standard Japanese plan for starting a war. They had done it in the Russo-Japanese war and would now perform this same strategy in the War In the Pacific. What were the objectives?
Objective #1 was the sinking of four of our battleships. Due to the Washington Naval treaty, the ratio of battleships was 10 to 6. Using a standard formula devise in the 1920's called the N squared law, this becomes 100 to 36. In military terms, this puts the Japanese in a losing position, as 3:1 against a force generally is considered a losing position. Therefore, by sinking four battleships, they evened the odds and they felt that their superior training and ships would give them an advantage in the decisive battle. The problem with this objective is that is neglects the fact that four of their battleships were lightly armoured battlecruisers of the Kongo class. Even after upgrades these ships were vulnerable in their turrets, magazines and engineering spaces to US battleships and would have to remain outside 30,000 yards which would put their accuracy at a minimum and waste ammunition. So, even without the four sunken battleships at Pearl Harbor, we still had a large battleline and could if needed have destroyed the Imperial Japanese Fleet battleline.
Objective #2 was the immobilization of the Pacific Fleet for six months during the Japanese advance into the resource-rich areas of the Southern Pacific.
This conops was based on a navy plan titled War Plan Orange, which stated that the US Navy would collect at Pearl Harbor if the Philippines were attacked, then sail across the Pacific to rescue it. The decisive battle was estimated to occur near the Marianas. That plan however, due to budget shortages in the 1930's was found to be unsupportable by escorts and tankers, so the cautionaries won the day in the US Navy. The plan was disestablished in 1940 and the Rainbow plans were substituted. These called for Europe first. Therefore, objective #2 of the plan, to immobilize the US Fleet and give the Japanese six months or longer to invade the Southern Pacific region, consolidates their gains and prepare for the eventual movement by the US Fleet was no longer necessary. With the passing of the Pearl Harbor survivors and generation, we can now revisit the Japanese planning and execution without the emotions of the time. We can now apply operational analysis to the plan and really examine it for its strong and weak points. It was not “brilliant” as many at the time and immediately after the war, had stated. It was breaking new ground and for that it must be thought of as revolutionary but it did make some mistakes and was strategically a disaster for the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Japanese people.
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Post by kyle on Dec 19, 2014 13:17:59 GMT -6
HI Dennis, been a while but I'm now back trolling forums I find it very difficult to see the world as the Japanese did from there perspective prior to WW2. Further difficulties are that I can't think like they did. That being said... Regardless of what actions lead to the decision to move south and take the oil and materials needed, the Japanese had the US fleet to consider. They could have invaded the Philippines and made all their December 7 "kick off" moves without any attack on Pearl harbor. Did they know that though? If the BB's were available to the US, would we have done anything much different? Lots of unanswered questions. We have a good idea of what the US plans were, but once reality hit I find it uncertain that they would have implemented them. Again, hard to be objective - but the basic Japanese plan to attack was probably sound. They were (20/20 hind sight) too focused on the battleships at the expense of dock yards and fuel storage. Damaging the fleet support capabilities at PH would have been a greater blow than knocking several old battleships out. The Japanese seemed to have limited vision when it came to supplies and support and could see mainly combat ships as targets. This trend follows throughout the war.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 19, 2014 18:20:21 GMT -6
HI Dennis, been a while but I'm now back trolling forums I find it very difficult to see the world as the Japanese did from there perspective prior to WW2. Further difficulties are that I can't think like they did. That being said... Regardless of what actions lead to the decision to move south and take the oil and materials needed, the Japanese had the US fleet to consider. They could have invaded the Philippines and made all their December 7 "kick off" moves without any attack on Pearl harbor. Did they know that though? If the BB's were available to the US, would we have done anything much different? Lots of unanswered questions. We have a good idea of what the US plans were, but once reality hit I find it uncertain that they would have implemented them. Again, hard to be objective - but the basic Japanese plan to attack was probably sound. They were (20/20 hind sight) too focused on the battleships at the expense of dock yards and fuel storage. Damaging the fleet support capabilities at PH would have been a greater blow than knocking several old battleships out. The Japanese seemed to have limited vision when it came to supplies and support and could see mainly combat ships as targets. This trend follows throughout the war. Hi Kyle: I wondered if it was you. Nice to have you back. This is a complicated story. The best explanation is that the Japanese had managed in the early part of the century to get a copy of War Plan Orange. In its original form, it called for the US fleet to gather at Pearl Harbor and sail across the Pacific, taking islands, then fighting the decisive battle probably near the Bonins then moving south to rescue the Philippines. The name for those subscribing to this was the thrusters.However, after WWI, with the disarmament treaties, depression worldwide, the thrusters lost out and the cautionaries won. The cautionaries wanted to wait for about a year. As the world situation changed, the US decided that it was Europe first. There would be no thrusting in the Pacific for one to two years while we helped fight Hitler. This was the Rainbow plans. In 1940, WPO was eliminated in favor of the Rainbow Plans.
For the Japanese, they had no knowledge of the change and therefore planned all of their naval strategy around WPO. They did modify their naval strategy, now moving the scene of the decisive battle almost 2200 miles to the east due to partial information about the US naval strategy. So, in answer to your question, they did not know that the US fleet was not going to come marching across the pacific due to the Rainbow plans priority and lack of logistical support for the fleet to accomplish this movement. Had the Japanese not attacked Pearl Harbor and the Philippines, Roosevelt would have been hard pressed to convince the US nation to go to war over colonies of the European's
A good book on the subject of the Japanese decision to go to war with the US is "Rising Sun" by John Toland. Another is "From Mahan to Pearl Harbor" by Sadao Asado.
BTW. Here is a good "what-if" for you. Pearl Harbor was not the home of the US Pacific fleet until 1941. In fact, there was no US Pacific Fleet until late 1940. The home of the fleet in the Pacific was San Diego. After the 1940 Fleet Problem, Roosevelt, to coerce the Japanese ordered the fleet to stay in Pearl Harbor, much to the chagrin of Admiral Richardson who lost the job of CinCPac due to his criticism of the idea. So, if the fleet had just sailed back to San Diego and San Pedro, there probably would never have been a Pearl Harbor.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 20, 2014 9:37:10 GMT -6
Just some more thoughts on how the Japanese could have blundered into a war with the US. Here is an ultimatum sent to the Japanese by Cordell Hull on November 26,1941. It shows a complete lack of understanding by the US for the Japanese society and how it operates. Here are the principles that the Japanese leadership, specifically the Army, could not abide. "The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples: The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions. The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies. The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements. The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries. " www.sweetliberty.org/issues/wars/hull.htm - the whole document. After losing 120,000 men in China after the Marco Polo bridge incident, there was almost no way Japan would withdraw from China and Manchuria. Manchuria was the key to the economy of Japan. Japan, after the Meiji Restoration began to industrialize but had no natural resources. She also did not have enough arable land to feed her population. Manchuria had the land and resources for the expansion of the Japanese people. Japanese expansionism is what caused the sanctions and eventual war in the Pacific. The US demanded that she withdraw from Indochina, China and Manchuria. Had she done so, she felt she would have returned to being a third or fourth rate nation, not a world power. This was the Japanese Army's doing, not the navy who did not want the war and felt that it could not win it. In reality, the US government was a little naïve in its diplomatic strategy. It saw everything as either black or white, no shades of gray, no sensitivity to national character of other nations. It was our way or the highway. For the national character of Japan; the bushido principles meant that either you win, or you commit suicide. Well, starting a war with the most powerful nation on the planet. A nation with unlimited resources and power, was essentially national suicide. The idea to gain from all this, and this was very brief, is that Japanese expansionism was caused by economic issues and the war by their failure to understand that those problems could be resolved through trade with the US, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and other nations. The Japanese saw the success of the German forces and wanted their piece of the pie. They were really hoping that the German's would be successful against Soviet Russia and that they could move into Russian territory north of Manchuria. All this did not come about and the rest is history. As an aside, one of the key points of difference was the conflict between Buddhism and Shintoism versus the Western Christian religions. I will that right there.
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Post by kyle on Dec 21, 2014 17:07:11 GMT -6
I've read several books on the subject of the lead up to WW2. It's tragic that many of the steps taken by both sides lead to all that hell. The oil embargo comes to mind and the thought that Japan would feel the pinch and back down over time. In reality the Japanese didn't see it as a coercion but rather as a strangle hold that they must fight. I may be delving into politics (pre war, but politics none the less) too much so I'll stop right there. There were obviously misunderstandings on both sides prior to the bombs starting to fall.
Japan had issue with those principles. In their minds the West only started following them once they'd carved out their piece of the world.
On a more operational note - I wonder what the US would have actually done - war plans aside - had PH not been attacked. Kido Butai (the carrier fleet) could have been put to good use elsewhere. Would the US public have demanded that the old BB's at Pearl go plodding across the Pacific to try to relieve MacArthur? Of course that would have lead into Japanese hands to a point, though they did have a way of planning enemy actions for the enemy and not being very flexible when the enemy didn't do what he was supposed to!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 21, 2014 23:09:34 GMT -6
I've read several books on the subject of the lead up to WW2. It's tragic that many of the steps taken by both sides lead to all that hell. The oil embargo comes to mind and the thought that Japan would feel the pinch and back down over time. In reality the Japanese didn't see it as a coercion but rather as a strangle hold that they must fight. I may be delving into politics (pre war, but politics none the less) too much so I'll stop right there. There were obviously misunderstandings on both sides prior to the bombs starting to fall. Japan had issue with those principles. In their minds the West only started following them once they'd carved out their piece of the world. On a more operational note - I wonder what the US would have actually done - war plans aside - had PH not been attacked. Kido Butai (the carrier fleet) could have been put to good use elsewhere. Would the US public have demanded that the old BB's at Pearl go plodding across the Pacific to try to relieve MacArthur? Of course that would have lead into Japanese hands to a point, though they did have a way of planning enemy actions for the enemy and not being very flexible when the enemy didn't do what he was supposed to! In answer to your operational question, in the spring of 1941 all Army ground and air units were scaled back and sent to the Atlantic. The US Pacific Fleet lost one-fourth of the fleet. Kimmel was inferior to the Japanese in everything but battleships. Admiral Stark ordered that the US Pacific Fleet must not venture far to the west in case of an actual or perceived collapse of the British Isles. Plan Dog, sent on November 12,1940 essentially eliminated WPO and any offensive action. However, Kimmel was an offensive minded admiral, the question is whether he might have moved ahead and started island hopping. He did, in around May of 1941 admit that his fleet amphibious forces were "wholly unprepared" to attack islands to gain bases for the fleet's march across the central Pacific. Most of his transports and landing craft had gone to the Atlantic. So, what would the fleet do for six months to a year? Well probably just perform some mid-ocean sweeps, raids and feints to confuse the IJN, maybe divert some resources to the Malay Peninsula but overall, it would stay close enough to move to the Atlantic if and when needed. So where was the limit? The 180th Parallel was farthest they could go but it was extended to the 155th Parallel.
Here is the paradox; Rainbow five specifically instructed the Pacific Fleet to "act offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier". In other words, with the fleet in Pearl Harbor, the planners were hoping to tie down the IJN so that the Southern operation could not be executed. Kimmel knew that his mission was to save the Malay Barrier but the forces necessary to accomplish that mission were gone, so the island hopping amphibious drive was postponed. With these limitations, he essentially, could do nothing to harm or threaten the Japanese operations in the southern hemisphere. There was a plan to use Wake Island as a fortress and draw the IJN toward it for a "Jutland of the Pacific" but Wake was not really defensible.
So, what would the Pacific war look like with no Pearl Harbor? For the US, the US Pacific Fleet probably would not have sortied until Saratoga could have joined up from San Diego. That means, any operations might have started 7 to 10 days after the declaration of war. Saratoga would have to re-victual, refuel and then her TF would sortie and meet the other two TF's of Lexington and Enterprise. The mission objectives would be to reconnoiter Wake and the Marshall Islands but not engage the IJN. The battleships would sortie two days later with their escorts. Their responsibility would be to support the carriers in case they ran into the battle line of the IJN. The primary objective would always be to defend and protect the Hawaiian Islands including Midway. Would Kimmel, the ever ready battleship officer, try to engage in the "Jutland of the Pacific". He might have had those thoughts but he was also an officer in the USN. He had orders and he would abide by them. So, no Jutland of the Pacific.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 22, 2014 8:00:30 GMT -6
On the Japanese side, the carriers would be free to support the Southern expansion, all except Shokaku and Zuikaku. Their air wings were very new so most likely they would patrol around the Marianas with the battleships. The others would support the invasion of Malaya and the Philippines. The Southern expansion would have moved at the same speed but Operation MO, the invasion of Port Moresby might have been staged earlier because of the increased Naval air support now available. The IJN would have deployed its submarines in the Central Pacific and around Pearl Harbor so we could have taken losses in battleships and support ships. Would they be as considerable as the attack on Pearl Harbor? No, but in deep water, they would be total losses. Something else for Kimmel to consider.
Another consideration is the use of carriers in the enclosed and narrow seas around the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and that area. This makes them good targets for Dutch, British and US submarines. They might stay in the South China Sea where they have some maneuvering room. They could move around the southern tip of Indochina and into the Gulf of Siam, possibly heading down the eastern coast of Malaya. Problematic whether Prince of Wales and Repulse would sail to support defense of the Malay Peninsula knowing that the Japanese operation was covered by two fleet carriers and about 140 well trained pilots. That force might eventually leave Singapore and head to Ceylon. The IJN might send the two newest carriers to support the Wake Island invasion. If so, that invasion ends very quickly, as it did when they detached two carriers from the First Striking Fleet on its return from Pearl Harbor. If this occurs, there would be no attempt to support that force on the islands.
Lot's of possibilities to game out in SAS or War in the Pacific.
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Post by kyle on Dec 22, 2014 11:04:49 GMT -6
I agree that what common sense would force a defensive stance on the Pacific fleet even without the PH attack. I'm of the view that the Doolittle raid was not a smart operation and put carriers at risk without much gain. It was calculated risk - but still (good topic for another thread, probably!) It worked though (sort of) and rattled the Japanese into taking rash action. Would the US public, crying out for Japanese blood after PH have forced the Navy into some risky action?
I've gamed the pacific war - usually playing the Japanese side (underdog) vs the AI. Virtually nothing can be done to gain anything substantial. Even if the Japanese manage to sink all the US carriers with few losses, the steam-roller across the pacific goes much as it did historically, it just starts a little later. US land based air takes a greater role without US carriers but the results are similar. Attrition and the steady decline of Japanese forces that they cannot replace. As the US - plodding across the Pacific with the 'old ladies' from PH just gets them damaged or sunk in deep water. At sea they are hard to sink, but relatively easy to mission kill and force back for repair. As the US there are few options and the Japanese can predict them. Not a good recipe for success.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 22, 2014 16:17:53 GMT -6
I agree that what common sense would force a defensive stance on the Pacific fleet even without the PH attack. I'm of the view that the Doolittle raid was not a smart operation and put carriers at risk without much gain. It was calculated risk - but still (good topic for another thread, probably!) It worked though (sort of) and rattled the Japanese into taking rash action. Would the US public, crying out for Japanese blood after PH have forced the Navy into some risky action? I've gamed the pacific war - usually playing the Japanese side (underdog) vs the AI. Virtually nothing can be done to gain anything substantial. Even if the Japanese manage to sink all the US carriers with few losses, the steam-roller across the pacific goes much as it did historically, it just starts a little later. US land based air takes a greater role without US carriers but the results are similar. Attrition and the steady decline of Japanese forces that they cannot replace. As the US - plodding across the Pacific with the 'old ladies' from PH just gets them damaged or sunk in deep water. At sea they are hard to sink, but relatively easy to mission kill and force back for repair. As the US there are few options and the Japanese can predict them. Not a good recipe for success. It's hard in this time, to understand how the US military and people felt about Pearl Harbor. The raid was a retaliation for PH, but in hindsight was very risky. The leaders in Washington knew this and probably decided that the morale effect on the US nation was worth the risk. I can't disagree but I don't think I would ever have made the attempt.
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Post by kyle on Dec 24, 2014 12:49:27 GMT -6
It's hard but worth the effort sometimes to try to get into the mind set of the time. There was real concern about the Japanese raiding the west coast. There was real worry about an invasion of Hawaii. I'm not sure anyone thought that it would take a while, but victory was a done deal. It is hard for us as historians who deal with facts and figures to quantify the feelings of the time - morale, worries, fears. These certainly factor in - look at the fall of France for example, and the stubborn resistance of Great Britain.
PH was the fuse that set off the United states on a path to help win the war in Europe (thanks to Hitler for declaring war) and the Pacific. Without the PH attack more old battleships would have been available to the US fleet early on, but materially not much would have changed. The determination and anger of the US to fight would have been different though. Who knows what impact would have come if there were no "remember Pearl Harbor" to drive the US forces!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 24, 2014 14:16:11 GMT -6
It's hard but worth the effort sometimes to try to get into the mind set of the time. There was real concern about the Japanese raiding the west coast. There was real worry about an invasion of Hawaii. I'm not sure anyone thought that it would take a while, but victory was a done deal. It is hard for us as historians who deal with facts and figures to quantify the feelings of the time - morale, worries, fears. These certainly factor in - look at the fall of France for example, and the stubborn resistance of Great Britain. PH was the fuse that set off the United states on a path to help win the war in Europe (thanks to Hitler for declaring war) and the Pacific. Without the PH attack more old battleships would have been available to the US fleet early on, but materially not much would have changed. The determination and anger of the US to fight would have been different though. Who knows what impact would have come if there were no "remember Pearl Harbor" to drive the US forces! I agree and this is why the loss of that generation is so sad. We now have lost the generation of men and women who could give us those feelings. I believe that efforts get their thoughts on video is and was vital.
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Post by kyle on Dec 26, 2014 17:30:59 GMT -6
Having been interested in WW2 history virtually from 8 years old on I had the fortune of talking to my grand parents. My Mom's dad was in the Navy and was involved in the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, aboard the USS Pickens (supply ship). He would not talk about it too much to a young guy (he died when I was 12) but did mention the Kamikaze attacks and how terrifying they were. Knowing there was a person that was going to die on purpose to try to kill you... My other grandparents were lived here in Oregon. There was a real fear of the Japanese invading Hawaii and also the west coast. They had guards on local bridges through the coast range (max 3000 ft mountain range right along the coast). Of course we now find such fears rather amusing. There is no way that Japan could have successfully invaded Hawaii let alone the Oregon coast.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 26, 2014 18:01:07 GMT -6
Having been interested in WW2 history virtually from 8 years old on I had the fortune of talking to my grand parents. My Mom's dad was in the Navy and was involved in the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, aboard the USS Pickens (supply ship). He would not talk about it too much to a young guy (he died when I was 12) but did mention the Kamikaze attacks and how terrifying they were. Knowing there was a person that was going to die on purpose to try to kill you... My other grandparents were lived here in Oregon. There was a real fear of the Japanese invading Hawaii and also the west coast. They had guards on local bridges through the coast range (max 3000 ft mountain range right along the coast). Of course we now find such fears rather amusing. There is no way that Japan could have successfully invaded Hawaii let alone the Oregon coast. My father once said that he was sorry he waited so long to talk to me about his experiences in WWII. He was an aviation ordnanceman on board the USS. Saratoga. He was also on Guadalcanal in 1943.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 7, 2015 9:24:46 GMT -6
This is Pearl Harbor Day, 2015. The Pearl Harbor Association has shut down due to the age of participants but we can still remember those who were there and are now passed on. "Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it": George Santayana Update: www.foxnews.com/us/2015/12/07/pearl-harbor-dead-being-laid-to-rest-74-years-later/ - I wonder if we should let those bodies lie together as fallen comrades?
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 7, 2015 23:23:37 GMT -6
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