19 August 1916 - Blind Man's Buff.
This is an operational scenario where neither side is in contact and the opposing forces are far enough apart that both sides have a number of options. The original version lost with the hacking of the old forum has been tweaked and updated for SAI v1.6.
Drop the contents of 19 August 1916.zip into the ...\:NWS\Steam and Iron\Custom Files folder and all should be well.
Background:Nobody was really satisfied by the results of the Battle of Jutland, or as the German's called it; the Skagerrak Battle. Although German propaganda and the catastrophic destruction of three British battlecruisers pointed to a great victory, the reality facing the Naval Staff and High Seas Fleet commander was actually quite bleak. VAdm Scheer had failed to destroy an isolated portion of the Grand Fleet and had fled back to port in what was very close to a rout. So, the possibly apocryphal champaign toasts offered on his return to the Jade anchorage on the morning of 1 June 1916 may also be seen has less a victory celebration and more of an acknowledgement of a disaster narrowly diverted. Still, there was a holiday for the school kids and honours for RAdm Hipper, now VAdm von Hipper (Scheer refused ennoblement) while the problem of the British blockade remained as implacable as ever.
Scheer and the Naval Staff were now leaning heavily on the reopening of unrestricted submarine warfare but the political will to take this drastic step was not yet present. However, the economy was in trouble, and the battles on the Somme (starting 1 July) and Verdun (major offensive operations there ceased in June) were proving rather traumatic so something had to be done. Scheer resolved to make one last attempt to isolate and destroy a portion of the Grand Fleet.
Although claiming victory, the High Seas Fleet was badly hurt at the Skagerrak. The loss of the brand new
SMS Lutzow could not be made good any time soon and the equivalent of an entire scouting group of light cruisers had been sunk. Without superior scouting the German's could easily sail into another trap without any guarantees that the onset of darkness would save them again. Scheer decided that good visibility and long days were essential but the severe damage to his best ships delayed any opportunity for a sortie until 18 August and even then the large cruisers
Seydlitz and
Derfflinger remained in dockyard hands.
Across the North Sea there was a sense that the Royal Navy had been robbed while to the general public, German claims of victory seemed valid as they read of five great ships blowing up with virtually no survivors and the German's apparently escaping with only minor losses. On the whole however, the people kept their faith in the Navy and soon more disasters on the Western Front would push Jutland off the front pages and allow the RN to get back to fighting the naval war.
For the Royal Navy, the fallout from Jutland proved decisive. All plans to aggressively force the High Seas Fleet into action in the southern part of the North Sea were discarded. Work on re-basing the Grand Fleet to the Firth of Forth was accelerated, a Protection Committee was formed to examine the apparent vulnerability of British ships to shell fire. Damage control, fire-fighting and ammunition handling were all improved and anti-flash protective clothing was rushed into service with the Fleet. Tactically, the Grand Fleet Battle Orders were amended to provide greater flexibility and some scope for initiative to the squadron commanders and subordinates were advised that they could not assume that their commanders knew everything about the situation or could see what they saw. Fleet signalling procedures were improved, star shells were ordered into production for naval guns and the RN successfully made great strides to becoming more combat effective. The poor overall performance of AP shells and the problems with their Lyddite filling when they did actually work as designed was recognized but for the most part, fixes would have to wait until 1918.
Scheer intended to implement his Sunderland Plan from the previous May. The High Seas Fleet would cover Hipper's Scouting Group 1's bombardment of the fortified town near the River Tyne towards last light on 19 August. The Grand Fleet would then run over successive lines of U-Boats as it pounded south and the main HSF battle squadrons would annihilate any isolated British squadron that was encountered. By culling cruisers from the Baltic Fleet, Scheer was able to rebuild his light cruiser scouting groups and with the Flanders flotillas of U-Boats placed under temporary High Seas Fleet command, over 20 submarines were deployed in lines along the British east coast and in the gaps between recently laid offensive minefields. In addition seven naval zeppelins would patrol the North Sea to ensure that Scheer did not sail into a trap. Scouting Group 1, composed of just
Moltke and
Von der Tann reinforced with a detachment from Squadron III consisting of
Grosser Kurfurst,
Markgraf and the new 15" gunned
Bayern left the Jade at around 9:30 PM on 18 August followed closely by the remaining 16-battleships of the High Seas Fleet.
Having learned much about processing information into intelligence, the Admiralty and Room-40 had a very solid idea of what the German's had planned although they were unable to determine the overall objective of the operation was Sunderland. By 9:30 AM on 18 August, orders were sent to the Grand Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet to prepare for sea to meet eventualities. The Grand Fleet was temporarily under command of Adm Sir Cecil Burney, commander 1BS as Adm Jellicoe was at Aberdeen on sick leave. Burney and Beattie would rendezvous a near 0* long and N56* lat in full daylight at about 7:00 AM on the 19th. Jellicoe would join the fleet at sea in
HMS Royalist, which had been placed at his disposal in case of such an eventuality. Unlike the Jutland operation, the Harwich Force sailed early under Commodore Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt and was nominally under Grand Fleet command so Jellicoe had this powerful force at his disposal. There were also at least six British submarines in the Helgoland Bight and these were advised by wireless during the night that the German's were expected to be at sea the next day.
In the event, there was no fleet action. Both sides spent the day chasing spurious contacts or avoiding submarine attacks. Scheer's U-Boat trap sank two British light cruisers,
Nottingham (
U-52) and
Falmouth (
U-66 and
U-63) while
HMS/M E-24 hit
SMS Westfalen early in the operation forcing Scheer to detach her and send her home under escort. The Zeppelins had proven inadequate as scouts, reports could not get through in a timely manner and lacked both clarity and accuracy. Position finding by the airship navigators was poor and
L-13 misidentified the Harwich Force as a detached battle squadron, which caused Scheer to cancel the bombardment program and another inaccurate
L-13 report convinced him to cancel the entire operation and return to base. Around dusk, the HSF was spotted by elements of the Harwich Force but Tyrwhitt determined that no night torpedo attack was possible and since the Grand Fleet was already heading back to Scapa, he had no support as so broke contact with Scheer.
Once again Scheer had sunk more ships than he lost (
Westfalen would be repaired) but it made no difference. The HSF had fled ignominiously back to base at the merest hint of the Grand Fleet being at sea and the U-Boat trap demonstrated once again that the boats were unable to penetrate the British screening forces and get to the capital ships. The HSF would lose tactical control of all but a few U-Boats with the majority allocated to commerce raiding under the current prize regulations. Scheer and the Naval Staff in Berlin pushed even harder to execute unrestricted submarine warfare as the only practical antidote to the blockade. Naval zeppelins would continue to patrol the North Sea but their main efforts were now directed into the strategic bombing of Britain that would at first yield some success but would ultimately end in defeat.
Curiously, this aborted surface operation proved a boon to the RNAS. Although the Grand Fleet's seaplane carrier
HMS Campania again missed the sortie, her kite balloon was mounted on the battleship
Hercules as an experiment to extend the battlefleet's visual horizon. Beattie brought along the Jutland veteran
HMS Engadine, which launched a number of Short seaplanes to intercept or drive off the zeppelins that were dogging the Fleet and suspected (wrongly as it turned out) to be providing Scheer with accurate scouting reports.
Engadine's early attempt a fleet air defence spurred the RN into increasing the presence of aircraft with the fleet and developing flush-decked carriers and flying-off platforms for high performance aircraft including fighters.
The operations on 19 August 1916 were the last time both fleets were at sea in full strength until April 1918.
Scenario Designer Notes:
- The OOB's are as accurate as I could make them. The positions of the minefields and submarines are from Marder, who's Chart-16 from Vol 3 of From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow proved invaluable.
- There's some scenario designers licence with the deployments. Historically, when
Nottingham was hit (and other torpedo tracks reported) Burney reversed course of the entire Grand Fleet taking it back north, which delayed the rendezvous with Beattie. I tried to replicate this by placing the British forces so that the actual meeting time should be achievable as opposed to the planned time.
- The British had two large swept channels in the German minefields, the L-Channel and the M-Channel. They are on the map although the German's would have probably had no knowledge of their designation or location.
-
HMS Valiant and
Warspite had collided on 22 July and were still repairing.
HMS Lion was in dock putting the finishing touches on her rebuilt Q-turret and missed the sortie by a couple of days.
References consulted include:
Marder: From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol3 Jutland and After
Jellicoe: The Grand Fleet 1914-16
Scheer: Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War
Hough; The Great War at Sea
Attachments:19 August 1916.zip (17.03 KB)