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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 5, 2015 8:39:57 GMT -6
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 8, 2015 16:32:58 GMT -6
I'll bite on the SSBN replacement program. One thing I've wondered is what's the logic (besides interservice rivalry and pork politics) that keeps the land-based ICBM force around. I suppose in theory its place in the nuclear triad is that it combines the speed of a missile with having more communications options available than a sub, meaning those will probably be the first warheads launched. Against that, they're vulnerable to counterforce attacks and they currently don't carry MIRVs. You also have the well-publicized rash of screwups in the missile force community. With that in mind, would it make sense to not replace Minuteman, phase the land-based silos out, and use that pot of money that would have gone to new ICBM to fund the new SSBN and the new USAF bomber program?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 8, 2015 17:28:01 GMT -6
I'll bite on the SSBN replacement program. One thing I've wondered is what's the logic (besides interservice rivalry and pork politics) that keeps the land-based ICBM force around. I suppose in theory its place in the nuclear triad is that it combines the speed of a missile with having more communications options available than a sub, meaning those will probably be the first warheads launched. Against that, they're vulnerable to counterforce attacks and they currently don't carry MIRVs. You also have the well-publicized rash of screwups in the missile force community. With that in mind, would it make sense to not replace Minuteman, phase the land-based silos out, and use that pot of money that would have gone to new ICBM to fund the new SSBN and the new USAF bomber program? Steel, you never put all your eggs in one very small basket. While missile boats are difficult to find and destroy before they launch, its prudent to maintain a modest number of US missile silos, randomly placed to make locating them difficult. They are hard targets to destroy despite media claims. It takes almost a direct hit to kill them and the problems as of late are solvable. They are another tool in the tool box.
www.nti.org/gsn/article/pentagon-seen-acquiescing-congress-plan-cuts-land-based-nuclear-missiles/
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 8, 2015 22:04:42 GMT -6
I'll bite on the SSBN replacement program. One thing I've wondered is what's the logic (besides interservice rivalry and pork politics) that keeps the land-based ICBM force around. I suppose in theory its place in the nuclear triad is that it combines the speed of a missile with having more communications options available than a sub, meaning those will probably be the first warheads launched. Against that, they're vulnerable to counterforce attacks and they currently don't carry MIRVs. You also have the well-publicized rash of screwups in the missile force community. With that in mind, would it make sense to not replace Minuteman, phase the land-based silos out, and use that pot of money that would have gone to new ICBM to fund the new SSBN and the new USAF bomber program? Steel, you never put all your eggs in one very small basket. While missile boats are difficult to find and destroy before they launch, its prudent to maintain a modest number of US missile silos, randomly placed to make locating them difficult. They are hard targets to destroy despite media claims. It takes almost a direct hit to kill them and the problems as of late are solvable. They are another tool in the tool box.
www.nti.org/gsn/article/pentagon-seen-acquiescing-congress-plan-cuts-land-based-nuclear-missiles/
I wouldn't exactly call those missile silos "hard to find." They've been there for ... forty or more years? The Russians probably have every one of those silos dialed in with multiple warheads, or at least they do if they've got enough MIRVs to go around. Even without that, some diligent searching on commercial satellite imagery would probably turn up every single one of those silos. I picked out a few on Google Earth; they are not camoflaged. I agree about not putting all eggs in one basket, and ideally I would have no issues keeping the silos. However, we're also in an era of tight budgets and the land-based ICBM force needs a lot of work - not just in hardware, but crew morale is bad and there have been some serious personnel issues lately. The SSBN force is the most survivable leg; even on its best day I doubt the old Soviet Navy would have been able to take out enough of the boomer fleet to make a big difference. Given the current state of the bomber force (~100 nuclear-capable bombers split between three main bases plus a couple overseas installations like Anderson and Diego Garcia) it's even more vulnerable than the ICBM silos, but that man-in-the-loop delivery option is too valuable to give up. The land-based missiles by contrast are there as an insurance policy, albeit one that could be taken out in a rather straightforward fashion provided the opponent has enough accurate warheads to go around.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 9, 2015 8:55:33 GMT -6
Steel, you never put all your eggs in one very small basket. While missile boats are difficult to find and destroy before they launch, its prudent to maintain a modest number of US missile silos, randomly placed to make locating them difficult. They are hard targets to destroy despite media claims. It takes almost a direct hit to kill them and the problems as of late are solvable. They are another tool in the tool box.
www.nti.org/gsn/article/pentagon-seen-acquiescing-congress-plan-cuts-land-based-nuclear-missiles/Logout
I wouldn't exactly call those missile silos "hard to find." They've been there for ... forty or more years? The Russians probably have every one of those silos dialed in with multiple warheads, or at least they do if they've got enough MIRVs to go around. Even without that, some diligent searching on commercial satellite imagery would probably turn up every single one of those silos. I picked out a few on Google Earth; they are not camoflaged. I agree about not putting all eggs in one basket, and ideally I would have no issues keeping the silos. However, we're also in an era of tight budgets and the land-based ICBM force needs a lot of work - not just in hardware, but crew morale is bad and there have been some serious personnel issues lately. The SSBN force is the most survivable leg; even on its best day I doubt the old Soviet Navy would have been able to take out enough of the boomer fleet to make a big difference. Given the current state of the bomber force (~100 nuclear-capable bombers split between three main bases plus a couple overseas installations like Anderson and Diego Garcia) it's even more vulnerable than the ICBM silos, but that man-in-the-loop delivery option is too valuable to give up. The land-based missiles by contrast are there as an insurance policy, albeit one that could be taken out in a rather straightforward fashion provided the opponent has enough accurate warheads to go around. I did not say, "impossible" just hard. Our current remaining ICMB silo's are stationed at three bases; Minot, Warren and Malmstrom. However, each silo is about five to ten miles apart making aiming difficult for Russian missiles. They cover an impressive amount of distance. This distance between them, varies greatly. So, while you can find some silos, possibly inactive silos, there is no way to know which are loaded or not. Don't be certain those are active silos, they are possibly the ones that are being sold. Keep in mind that these land based missile are part of a triad; Bombers, land-based and sea based. The land based are an insurance policy. The Russians would have to spread their current crop of missiles around to be able to reduce a retaliatory strike. The bomber leg consists of only two bases: Whiteman in Missouri and Barksdale. The submarine threat, the primary nuclear threat, only has two naval bases: Kings Bay and Bangor. All in all there are at least 8 aim points in the USAF, 2 Navy bases and 4-5 deployed missile boats. So, the land based silos are important. This is the minimum that the SecDef believes is necessary for a deterrent. Note: there are 450 active missile sites out of the 1000 sites originally deployed. Many have been imploded, but many are still intact.
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Post by kyle on Feb 9, 2015 16:03:09 GMT -6
I would not be a bit surprised if the AF had some ICBM's somewhere the public doesn't generally know about. An attacker would have to be pretty sure that they've KO'd enough so that what ever formula they use for our retaliation is such that it's acceptable. The more we keep a potential nuclear powered enemy guessing, the better. Short of the radicalized groups or nation states that seem to be run by 'crazies' anyone else would really need to either BE nuts and not care about their people and/or think they have a winning strategy. No one right now has any hope of fielding enough nukes except Russia. China a distant second, unless they've upgraded their capabilities a lot that I'm not aware of (and I'm not aware that I'm not aware Nuking Kings bay or Bangor would take out some submarines, but the ones at sea are to my knowledge still virtually impossible to find - even when we send one of our own SSN's to try to do it and know roughly where to look. Those SSBN's at sea... well they would not be happy when hearing their home bases were slagged! They'd be MAD (pun intended).
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 9, 2015 19:55:24 GMT -6
I wouldn't exactly call those missile silos "hard to find." They've been there for ... forty or more years? The Russians probably have every one of those silos dialed in with multiple warheads, or at least they do if they've got enough MIRVs to go around. Even without that, some diligent searching on commercial satellite imagery would probably turn up every single one of those silos. I picked out a few on Google Earth; they are not camoflaged. I agree about not putting all eggs in one basket, and ideally I would have no issues keeping the silos. However, we're also in an era of tight budgets and the land-based ICBM force needs a lot of work - not just in hardware, but crew morale is bad and there have been some serious personnel issues lately. The SSBN force is the most survivable leg; even on its best day I doubt the old Soviet Navy would have been able to take out enough of the boomer fleet to make a big difference. Given the current state of the bomber force (~100 nuclear-capable bombers split between three main bases plus a couple overseas installations like Anderson and Diego Garcia) it's even more vulnerable than the ICBM silos, but that man-in-the-loop delivery option is too valuable to give up. The land-based missiles by contrast are there as an insurance policy, albeit one that could be taken out in a rather straightforward fashion provided the opponent has enough accurate warheads to go around. I did not say, "impossible" just hard. Our current remaining ICMB silo's are stationed at three bases; Minot, Warren and Malmstrom. However, each silo is about five to ten miles apart making aiming difficult for Russian missiles. They cover an impressive amount of distance. This distance between them, varies greatly. So, while you can find some silos, possibly inactive silos, there is no way to know which are loaded or not. Don't be certain those are active silos, they are possibly the ones that are being sold. Keep in mind that these land based missile are part of a triad; Bombers, land-based and sea based. The land based are an insurance policy. The Russians would have to spread their current crop of missiles around to be able to reduce a retaliatory strike. The bomber leg consists of only two bases: Whiteman in Missouri and Barksdale. The submarine threat, the primary nuclear threat, only has two naval bases: Kings Bay and Bangor. All in all there are at least 8 aim points in the USAF, 2 Navy bases and 4-5 deployed missile boats. So, the land based silos are important. This is the minimum that the SecDef believes is necessary for a deterrent. Note: there are 450 active missile sites out of the 1000 sites originally deployed. Many have been imploded, but many are still intact.
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HICS_Lines_Connectivity2.PNGYes, highly secret ... The issue with those missile bases is that they were designed before the advent of more accurate targeting for missiles and warheads. All three of those bases started fielding the Minuteman in the early 1960s. Dispersing hardened silos over a large area was an effective counter to weapons that had a CEP measured in miles. Nowadays MIRVs often have CEPs of 200 meters or less. The Russians were the first to really design a capable counterforce ICBM, the R-36M/SS-18 "Satan" with up to 10 MIRVs (with up to 40 decoys) or a single 25-Mt warhead. That set off a scramble in the US that led to the development of the LGM-118 Peacekeeper ICBM and a variety of (sometimes harebrained) schemes for "super-hardened" or mobile land-based missile launch complexes. The US has known those silos are vulnerable since the 1960s, and tried to replace them up until the end of the Cold War. Really the only thing that gives them a bit of a reprieve has been the cuts in ICBM arsenals; back in the 1980s the Soviets had a total of 308 R-36M silos. Now they're down to 50 or so of those missiles (plus another 58 MIRVed RS-24 missiles), although the Russians are testing newer weapons that are also tailored towards counterforce strikes with large numbers of MIRVs. The bomber bases present fewer targets, but unlike the ICBMs the bombers can be dispersed. Furthermore, the bombers have not been the linchpin of an all-out nuclear exchange since the 1960s - they're there for more precise and limited strikes. If everything's flying, the missiles are going to do the bulk of the damage. In addition to the bases you listed, the airfield at Minot also holds a couple of B-52 squadrons and there are usually detachments of B-2s or B-52s at Anderson AFB in Guam and possibly ones at Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in the UK. There are only two boomer bases, but last I checked 10-12 of the 14 subs are on deployment at any given time (4 on "hard alert" in their patrol boxes and the remainder on workups or in transit). Take out those two bases and you'd still leave about 1,200 warheads at sea. Really the only feasible way to take out the boomers would be to do what we did to the Russians - park SSNs right outside their bases and pin a tail on every one that leaves. Given the gauntlet a Russian or PRC sub would have to run to get to the US continental shelf (and the small number of SSNs they have available), that's not an easy proposition. Overall, the Minuteman silos have been there for half a century. Scattered or not, it seems that their locations are not a secret, and it probably wouldn't be too hard to narrow down the number of potentially active silos.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 9, 2015 22:08:22 GMT -6
I did not say, "impossible" just hard. Our current remaining ICMB silo's are stationed at three bases; Minot, Warren and Malmstrom. However, each silo is about five to ten miles apart making aiming difficult for Russian missiles. They cover an impressive amount of distance. This distance between them, varies greatly. So, while you can find some silos, possibly inactive silos, there is no way to know which are loaded or not. Don't be certain those are active silos, they are possibly the ones that are being sold. Keep in mind that these land based missile are part of a triad; Bombers, land-based and sea based. The land based are an insurance policy. The Russians would have to spread their current crop of missiles around to be able to reduce a retaliatory strike. The bomber leg consists of only two bases: Whiteman in Missouri and Barksdale. The submarine threat, the primary nuclear threat, only has two naval bases: Kings Bay and Bangor. All in all there are at least 8 aim points in the USAF, 2 Navy bases and 4-5 deployed missile boats. So, the land based silos are important. This is the minimum that the SecDef believes is necessary for a deterrent. Note: there are 450 active missile sites out of the 1000 sites originally deployed. Many have been imploded, but many are still intact.
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:HICS_Lines_Connectivity2.PNGYes, highly secret ... The issue with those missile bases is that they were designed before the advent of more accurate targeting for missiles and warheads. All three of those bases started fielding the Minuteman in the early 1960s. Dispersing hardened silos over a large area was an effective counter to weapons that had a CEP measured in miles. Nowadays MIRVs often have CEPs of 200 meters or less. The Russians were the first to really design a capable counterforce ICBM, the R-36M/SS-18 "Satan" with up to 10 MIRVs (with up to 40 decoys) or a single 25-Mt warhead. That set off a scramble in the US that led to the development of the LGM-118 Peacekeeper ICBM and a variety of (sometimes harebrained) schemes for "super-hardened" or mobile land-based missile launch complexes. The US has known those silos are vulnerable since the 1960s, and tried to replace them up until the end of the Cold War. Really the only thing that gives them a bit of a reprieve has been the cuts in ICBM arsenals; back in the 1980s the Soviets had a total of 308 R-36M silos. Now they're down to 50 or so of those missiles (plus another 58 MIRVed RS-24 missiles), although the Russians are testing newer weapons that are also tailored towards counterforce strikes with large numbers of MIRVs. The bomber bases present fewer targets, but unlike the ICBMs the bombers can be dispersed. Furthermore, the bombers have not been the linchpin of an all-out nuclear exchange since the 1960s - they're there for more precise and limited strikes. If everything's flying, the missiles are going to do the bulk of the damage. In addition to the bases you listed, the airfield at Minot also holds a couple of B-52 squadrons and there are usually detachments of B-2s or B-52s at Anderson AFB in Guam and possibly ones at Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford in the UK. There are only two boomer bases, but last I checked 10-12 of the 14 subs are on deployment at any given time (4 on "hard alert" in their patrol boxes and the remainder on workups or in transit). Take out those two bases and you'd still leave about 1,200 warheads at sea. Really the only feasible way to take out the boomers would be to do what we did to the Russians - park SSNs right outside their bases and pin a tail on every one that leaves. Given the gauntlet a Russian or PRC sub would have to run to get to the US continental shelf (and the small number of SSNs they have available), that's not an easy proposition. Overall, the Minuteman silos have been there for half a century. Scattered or not, it seems that their locations are not a secret, and it probably wouldn't be too hard to narrow down the number of potentially active silos. Throughout the years, the Defense Department has consistently used the worst-case scenario to push weapons upgrades claiming silo, submarine and bomber vulnerabilities. They used these worst case scenarios to develop weapons that were too expensive, too complex and frankly unnecessary. Silo vulnerability was always predicated on Soviet missile performance that was always overrated, and still is. It always ignored the early warning systems in place, to detect the Soviet missiles. GAO, in numerous reports through the years since the 1960's has refuted the claims that the silos were vulnerable. Vulnerability does not mean they can't be found, it means that they can't be destroyed without a direct hit. Sites are hardened to pressure per square inch, the Titan I sites were only hardened to 100 PSI, the Minuteman is reported to be hardened to least 2200 PSI. Many current silos are empty but the missiles can be reloaded quickly and used. So, even if you can find the silo, you don't know if it is ready for launch. I will clarify my statement. It is hard to find, a fully loaded and operational silo. Is that more accurate?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2015 11:13:31 GMT -6
Why don't we discuss the triad: ICBM's, SLBM's, strategic bombers; specifically whether they are required in the current geopolitical world, how to improve them, and whether they are vulnerable. We should also cover how each adds to the triad in the area of vulnerability. I will acknowledge, that the old land based silos can be found easily however, whether they are active and loaded is another issue.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 11, 2015 13:11:32 GMT -6
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 11, 2015 19:38:01 GMT -6
I saw that video on another site - those have to be the luckiest pigeons in the world, although I imagine there were some bird droppings on the deck afterwards. Giving Tomahawk an antishipping capability frankly makes more sense to me than arming surface vessels with the LRASM; the problem with developing all these specialized gollywog missiles is that you only have so many VLS slots on a warship. You start trying to add a little of everything and then find you have ships that can't fight a sustained engagement. On the other hand if I have the bulk of my missile cells loaded out with Standard missiles (long range AAW/terminal phase ABM and mid range SUW), ESSMs (short-range AAW and SUW), and Tomahawks (long-range SUW and strike) all I need are a handful of VL-ASROCS for taking out the odd sub and maybe some SM-3s in case of a dedicated ABM mission.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 12, 2015 10:45:32 GMT -6
In the purchase of weaponry, there is the conflict between upgrading and developing new technology. Industry wants you to pursue new technology because it makes them more money, politicians can't make up their minds except what is cheaper unless the company or companies producing the weapons is in their district, then of course its whatever makes the most money. The military wants whatever worked and is tested in the past, and lots of it. I've seen this over the years, it happened with the F-14.
On the issue of phasing out the tomahawk in favor of the newer LRASM, the question is really; can we really afford the new missile in the era of Pentagon budget cuts of 46 Billion dollars and 600000 civilian workers forced on furloughs to reduce costs. Keep in mind that the battle is between O&MN, and new procurements. Does our combat capability really diminish if we upgrade the tomahawk versus producing a new LRASM? How does this affect our defense industry over time because this is vital, to maintain the defense industry capability. You don't hear this discussed much, but it is vital. So, what are the threats, how immediate, what capability do we need to have to cope with these threats now and in the next twenty years? Do we need new technology or a mix of new and old? How do we prepare for the current threats and predict the future threats and tailor our procurement for these eventualities?
Lots of questions and lots of different answers depending on whether you are defense department personnel, congressional or industry or just a lay person who wants to know where your tax dollars are going and whether it will affect your tax bill. Fun, huh!!
Here is an article that points out some of these differences of opinion with the Defense department. tucson.com/business/local/raytheon-fetes-tomahawk-but-next-gen-system-in-doubt/article_4d146ad5-e490-587d-b33a-dc663f5d3fe6.html
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 12, 2015 18:24:45 GMT -6
In the purchase of weaponry, there is the conflict between upgrading and developing new technology. Industry wants you to pursue new technology because it makes them more money, politicians can't make up their minds except what is cheaper unless the company or companies producing the weapons is in their district, then of course its whatever makes the most money. The military wants whatever worked and is tested in the past, and lots of it. I've seen this over the years, it happened with the F-14.
On the issue of phasing out the tomahawk in favor of the newer LRASM, the question is really; can we really afford the new missile in the era of Pentagon budget cuts of 46 Billion dollars and 600000 civilian workers forced on furloughs to reduce costs. Keep in mind that the battle is between O&MN, and new procurements. Does our combat capability really diminish if we upgrade the tomahawk versus producing a new LRASM? How does this affect our defense industry over time because this is vital, to maintain the defense industry capability. You don't hear this discussed much, but it is vital. So, what are the threats, how immediate, what capability do we need to have to cope with these threats now and in the next twenty years? Do we need new technology or a mix of new and old? How do we prepare for the current threats and predict the future threats and tailor our procurement for these eventualities?
Lots of questions and lots of different answers depending on whether you are defense department personnel, congressional or industry or just a lay person who wants to know where your tax dollars are going and whether it will affect your tax bill. Fun, huh!!
Here is an article that points out some of these differences of opinion with the Defense department. tucson.com/business/local/raytheon-fetes-tomahawk-but-next-gen-system-in-doubt/article_4d146ad5-e490-587d-b33a-dc663f5d3fe6.html That was what I was getting at in the earlier discussion - it's not that land-based ICBMs lack value, but when the budgets are tight do we really want to sink the money into a Minuteman replacement? Absent the funding situation being sorted out we will have to make some choices about what goes and what stays. In that light, the land-based ICBM force is the lowest-hanging fruit on the nuclear triad. I think LRASM is still a necessary system. For one we can't fit Tomahawks onto a carrier bird and Harpoon is past its prime; if aircraft are going to stay in the standoff SUW business they will need a new weapon. Additionally, the LRASM's seeker capabilities (at least as advertised) appear to far exceed what's currently being tested on the Tomahawk. The ideal answer might be to purchase LRASM as an air-launched weapon and mate the seeker to the Tomahawk airframe, or have surface ships carry LRASM as a limited-quantity "silver bullet" weapon for when a spotter aircraft/UAV or satellite datalinks are unavailable.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 12, 2015 19:13:13 GMT -6
I believe that we need to keep the triad in place but improve its capability. Now the question is in what areas do we need to improve the capability? Accuracy, meaning CEP, maintenance, meaning improve reliability and reduce manpower needed to keep it operational, or do we need to improve the silos, by improving their ability to resist damage. What do we need to do? How do we improve the SLBM's; more subs, longer range? How about the manned bombers?
As to the second statement, what are the threats, how immediate etc. Do we need aircraft mounted LRASM's, do they meet our criteria as to dealing with threats. Well, we haven't even defined the threats. Ok, anti-ship missiles; what kind of ships, what are their capability etc. We are trying to get into detail about the two weapons and haven't even defined their primary threat that they are dealing with. But let's start with a statement by the program manager at DARPA about the LRASM program and its goal.
There are no detailed threats mentioned, just capabilities that must be available in the new weapon. Stand-off is mentioned without any actual range figure except outside of potential adversaries direct counter fire range. There is more detail but you can read it. Someone define "potential adversaries direct counter fire range". Maybe that's the place to start. Can an improved tomahawk accomplish the same and are their other weapons like submarines that can do the job better, with more stealth.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 19, 2015 19:16:22 GMT -6
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