What happened to the Kirishima?

[kyle]

Very interesting (to a battleship geek like me at least) information on this page.  Additionally there are diagrams showing the Nagato internal armor scheme post refit and there is good info on the hits on the South Dakota at Guadalcanal.

Side note - I was looking at the estemated armor penetration capabilities of the Japanese 14" shells the Kirishima was firing.  At the range she was at firing at South Dakota - it's a good thing her fire control wasn't more accurate.  A turret or barbette hit would have likely KO'd the mount and from what I can piece together even the side protection of the SoDak was vulnerable - possibly magazine.


www.navweaps.com/index_lundgren/index_lundgren.htm

[director]

Kirishima did hit the SoDak barbette but the shell did not penetrate. If you get close enough, even a cruiser's guns can wreck your battleship's day.
You're right about the Lundgren analysis - it's a masterpiece.

The short version is this: her armored deck connected to the bottom of her armored belt, below the waterline. Hits from Washington penetrated the belt and let water in; the more water came in the heavier she got and the more water came in - above the deck; that's important. The compartments above the armored deck were large and open which let the water slosh from side to side. Damage control crews kept counter-flooding to try to keep her level. Eventually the weight of water on top of the buoyant (and still dry) hull below the armored deck caused her to flip over.

[oldpop2000]

One of the issues with Lundgren's analysis, is the failure to provide an analysis of the ships performance characteristics, including the fact that she and her sisters were built as battlecruisers with less armor. The decks were strengthened, but her side armor was still only 8 inches. The Nagato's had 11.5 inches. It would be nice to begin your analysis with a brief description of each ship. Despite being re-designated as a battleship, the Kongo's were never battleships, just upgraded battlecruisers. Most of the upgrades were in propulsion but the deck was upgraded. This class was also designed and built during the First World War.

Another issue is a description of the battle area. This is vital in the analysis of this action. It is pitch black at night around Savo Island and the Sealark Channel. Without radar, the only way to see is to fire an illumination shell and when you do that, you have announced yourself and shown the enemy where you are. In his analysis he states that Hashimoto reported .... "illuminated by enemy star shells..." Who, on the US side, fired those shells? I don't see anything in the report that states one of our ships did that.

www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/w/war-damage-reports/uss-south-dakota-bb57-war-damage-report-no57.html

Here is the original battle damage report from the US Navy. According to this report, she was only hit by one 14-inch shell, everything else was 5-inch, 6-inch and 8-inch.

Generally, in my studies, Japanese shells and bomb fuses failed to detonate. This occurred at Pearl Harbor where both 1900 lbs. AP bombs that hit West Virginia, failed to explode. There were many others. Generally, these issues were attributed to poor quality control in the production. However, it does affect the amount of damage that can be created on an enemy ship.
I still have a problem using fifty year old underwater investigations of the wreck to prove anything but such is the nature of trying to analyze an action that long in the past.

[oldpop2000]

This action at Guadalcanal, reflects on the Japanese concept of Interceptive Operations, decisive battle and force on force ratio. The Japanese plan at Pearl Harbor included the destruction of four battleships to reduce the force on force ratio from 10:6 to 6:6. Those numbers for the Japanese included the four battlecruisers which even with improved deck armor, were no match under 30,000 yards for US battleships. At close range, they would be put out of action very quickly, the Naval War College calculations were proven to be correct by this action. So, even with the destruction of four battleships, the Japanese would still be at a disadvantage in a force on force ratio, possibly 6:2 or less. If we square those numbers, the power ratio is 36:4 over 3:1 and that is considered a defeat ratio. It really depends on which battleships they were going to use because some like Yamashiro and Fuso were already considered obsolete and set as training ships.  This is an important analytical point that should be made. The question is why did they send those two battlecruisers into an area like the Solomon Islands, the Slot and the narrow passages. It was dangerous for many reasons. My guess is speed, the battlecruisers were faster and could enter the sound, fire their guns then leave at a faster rate of speed to be out of the area by daylight. We know that that did not work, as Hiei was attacked and sunk as she was limping home. Would it have been better to send just cruisers and destroyers to perform the night bombardment missions, I don't know. Good question to explore.