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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 22, 2013 11:41:08 GMT -6
I've just finished a small book entitled "Leadership Lessons from the Battle of Gettysburg". Now, why would I read this book, especially since I've been retired for twelve years. Well, I have no idea but I had to see how leadership techniques in the 21st century could be gleaned from a battle that took place, 150 years ago. My first problem with the book was the authors bone fides. He graduated from the USMA in 1997. He states " I have had the tremendous experience of working with selfless leaders....". Okay, nice but you've only been in the working environment for sixteen years, how much could you have learned unless you started at the middle and worked up. But no matter, now the meat of the book. His main reference is Gettysburg a Day by Day Account edited by Time-Life books. Really, and his other source includes classes at the USMA and battlefield tours. He includes his personal experiences. Which ones and how many battles have you fought and led troops in. I know, I 'am being rotten, but "C'mon, Man".
Ok, to the main event, Chapter 1: The Importance of knowing your Communication Style(First, know thyself). He chooses George Gordon Meade and Robert E. Lee, with comparisons of their styles, to illustrate this first point. Meade was the CinC of the Army of the Potomac during Gettysburg and was in fact the last in a long line. He was appointed three days before the battle after Hooker submitted his resignation not expecting it to be accepted, but alas Lincoln was waiting for it, because he had decided that Hooker was never going to lead the AOP into battle again. As the author explains, Meade was leading his first battle with an army that had lost to Lee many times. He had to reinvigorate the army but make them understand his goals and objectives. He used a war council of corps commanders and consultation to perform that. This ensured that they realized he had confidence in them, however, ultimately any and all decisions rested with himself. He was especially good at providing clear orders and followed them up with staff officers to ensure they were being followed. Nice touch, I think.
He compares Meade's style with lee's. Lee, the author claims, never discussed his leadership style with his two new corps commanders, men who had previously fought under officers who gave specific commands and expected them to be followed. Lee gave general orders, rarely asked for advice and had become used to his two excellent corps commanders especially Stonewall Jackson. Both had superb leaderships and battlefield skills. Now, I agree that Lee's leadership style was suited to an organization that had fought together for a long time and understood each other. Interesting, because that does match the ANV precisely. All these officers had fought together for well over two years, since Lee had taken command. A month before the operation, Lee had conferences with his new leaders to explain his conops. He must have had discussions about how it was going to be approached and what to do about encounters with the AOP. Longstreet states that he did.
Now, we know that Lee had specifically ordered all commanders to avoid contact with the enemy until the whole army was in position and we know that Harry Heth of A.P. Hill's corps failed to follow that command. This is the point at which the author uses the disagreement between Ewell and Lee about the order to take Culp's Hill on the first day. This hill is located east and north of the main fish hook position. It commands the rear area and the back of Cemetery Ridge and the associated hill by the same name. It is connected by a spur. it is steep on the northern edge and difficult to bring up artillery from that side and there are few spots to site artillery for support. But, on the first day, even into the evening it was unoccupied for all intents and purposes. Lee could see that if he took that position and held it, the Union would have to abandon the fish hook and retreat to the Pipe Creek line. He sent an order to Ewell to take the hill, "if practicable". Those last two words were the fatal flaw, because Ewell, against the recommendations of three other general officers decided his troops were too disorganized, lacked water and ammunition plus they were exhausted. He could only manage about 6-7000 troops to take the hill. Lee was furious, and rode over to him, wondering why he hadn't taken the hill.
Now, Lee's own memoirs state " Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten for forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour".
Without going to more boring details, it appears that based on his memoirs, and "Gettysburg" by E.F.Coddington, a book that is considered the most detailed, and even handed book written, that Ewell followed Lee's orders all day. He moved his corps from Carlisle to the northern flank of the AOP, fought a hard won battle, then chased the Union soldiers all the way through the town, over barricades, snipers etc. to reach the base of Culp's hill. The battle of the northern end of McPherson's ridge started at 1430 hrs in the afternoon after 20 mile march in the heat, for Ewell's Corps and now at 1800 hrs, with no food, low on ammunition and low on water, they were expected reorganize and take a hill which might or might not be occupied and with more enemy corps moving from the east to the fish hook position. These corps were seen and investigated. Lee's orders were explicit, don't cause a general engagement until all of the army is up. Don't attack the hill unless practicable. In Ewell's opinion, based on his knowledge of his corps and what it had already accomplished, this was a fool's errand and Ewell, the commander on the scene and in charge knew it. It is my belief that Ewell decided that while he might take that hill, the enemy might attack and push him off just as easily either that evening or in the morning, if he could not reinforce it.
The author has failed to make his point because he failed to research the details of the incident completely. He based his leadership point on an incident that did not represent his leadership problem as stated. This does not mean his leadership point is not valid, on the contrary, with a new management team, discussing your objectives and goals along with how you want to address issues both externally and internally is a good policy. I've done it with new teams, however, this was a critical wartime situation. Did these men actually have the time to sit down and discuss all this or was moving the operation along more important. All of these men were USMA graduates and had fought together in the Mexican War. They had all plenty of experience with Lee. There is no reason to expect them to have to sit down and discuss all this. This was war, not the conference table at a major corporation.
This is the first installment of my critique of this short book. I am going to go chapter by chapter.
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Post by spook053 on Dec 9, 2013 19:59:32 GMT -6
My primary critique against Lee on 1 July wasn't so much about his "discretionary" orders to Ewell.
Rather, it's that the best means to force Cemetery Hill wasn't with Ewell's immediate troops. It was under the noses of both Lee and A P Hill themselves on Seminary Ridge.
Consider. Early's division had done a great job rolling up the Union XI Corps troops on its front (supported by Doles from Rodes' division), but not without cost. One of the hard-charging brigades was Gordon's, but even it took about 20-30 percent losses north of the town. And needless to say, moving thru the town afterwards didn't do wonders for divisional cohesion. And Rodes' division, largest of the ANV at the battle's start, fared much worse in its fight with Robinson's division of the Union I Corps. That division's attacks were poorly coordinated, and at least three of Rodes' brigades were badly shredded before the following echelon under Ramseur prevailed.
Rodes's division was thus "hors de combat" for the remainder of that day. Early's division was better off, but needed time to reorganize.
But what of the troops still coming down Chambersburg Pike that late afternoon and into the evening? Anderson's division (Hill's corps) could've gotten into the action in the last hours of light if pressed forward to do so, but was told to stand down and encamp. And as noted earlier, Johnson's division (Ewell) came along the same way in parallel, but spent the evening not pressing on Cemetery Hill but to wind along through the town on to Ewell's left flank in the east.
Hill was there with Lee. Between the two, they could have pressed the matter (borrowing Johnson's division from Ewell) by forming and attacking from Seminary Ridge. Why that didn't happen would be an entirely valid topic in itself.
On the flip side, I do think that Ewell erred at Gettysburg, but not so much over the matter of Cemetery Hill. (from Coddington) Rather instead, in the very early morning hours of 2 July, Lee had actually started planning orders to have Ewell pull off from his extended left flank position and to march around to the right flank, as Longstreet had prescribed earlier on 1 July. Ewell, getting wind of the planned order, offered to "demonstrate effectively" from his existing position during Longstreet's attack, and Lee conceded to this. Thus Ewell, in this act, served to keep the ANV stretched on an exterior line that made reinforcement of any critical action (from 2 July onwards) very problematic.
EDIT: One must temper judgements of Lee, Hill and Ewell from the inevitable effects of 20/20 hindsight. Still, I think that given the limited number of CSA cavalry troops available to keep watch until Stuart came up with the bulk, maintaining an extended (exterior) line in unfamiliar terrain was fraught with potential risks. Lee would've been the one most responsible to observe this. But he wasn't well aided by Ewell's resolve to hold his existing positions.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 9, 2013 21:49:37 GMT -6
My primary critique against Lee on 1 July wasn't so much about his "discretionary" orders to Ewell.
Rather, it's that the best means to force Cemetery Hill wasn't with Ewell's immediate troops. It was under the noses of both Lee and A P Hill themselves on Seminary Ridge.
Consider. Early's division had done a great job rolling up the Union XI Corps troops on its front (supported by Doles from Rodes' division), but not without cost. One of the hard-charging brigades was Gordon's, but even it took about 20-30 percent losses north of the town. And needless to say, moving thru the town afterwards didn't do wonders for divisional cohesion. And Rodes' division, largest of the ANV at the battle's start, fared much worse in its fight with Robinson's division of the Union I Corps. That division's attacks were poorly coordinated, and at least three of Rodes' brigades were badly shredded before the following echelon under Ramseur prevailed.
Rodes's division was thus "hors de combat" for the remainder of that day. Early's division was better off, but needed time to reorganize.
But what of the troops still coming down Chambersburg Pike that late afternoon and into the evening? Anderson's division (Hill's corps) could've gotten into the action in the last hours of light if pressed forward to do so, but was told to stand down and encamp. And as noted earlier, Johnson's division (Ewell) came along the same way in parallel, but spent the evening not pressing on Cemetery Hill but to wind along through the town on to Ewell's left flank in the east.
Hill was there with Lee. Between the two, they could have pressed the matter (borrowing Johnson's division from Ewell) by forming and attacking from Seminary Ridge. Why that didn't happen would be an entirely valid topic in itself.
On the flip side, I do think that Ewell erred at Gettysburg, but not so much over the matter of Cemetery Hill. (from Coddington) Rather instead, in the very early morning hours of 2 July, Lee had actually started planning orders to have Ewell pull off from his extended left flank position and to march around to the right flank, as Longstreet had prescribed earlier on 1 July. Ewell, getting wind of the planned order, offered to "demonstrate effectively" from his existing position during Longstreet's attack, and Lee conceded to this. Thus Ewell, in this act, served to keep the ANV stretched on an exterior line that made reinforcement of any critical action (from 2 July onwards) very problematic.
EDIT: One must temper judgements of Lee, Hill and Ewell from the inevitable effects of 20/20 hindsight. Still, I think that given the limited number of CSA cavalry troops available to keep watch until Stuart came up with the bulk, maintaining an extended (exterior) line in unfamiliar terrain was fraught with potential risks. Lee would've been the one most responsible to observe this. But he wasn't well aided by Ewell's resolve to hold his existing positions.
You are correct that 20/20 hindsight is the clearest vision in the world. But we must remember that battlefield management was very bad in those days. But we must place the blame on Lee for what transpired at Gettysburg. Lee received information on the 28th about the Union army having crossed the Potomac River. Yet, he decided to consolidate his forces at Cashtown, and simply wait for the Union. Ewell was outside of Harrisburg and then has to turn about and head south, not knowing where Cashtown was even located. On our tour this year, I had trouble finding it on the maps, so did the Confederates. Ewell's men march a total of 70 miles, and then went into battle, chased the XI and part of the 1st corps back through town and up the ridge. I can't blame Ewell for not wanting to try to reorganize his troops and attack up that steep hill. While there was intel that the hill was unoccupied, no one was certain. Johnson and Anderson never arrived until after 2000 hrs. I seriously doubt, even with urging and prodding, they would have done any better. I was at that location this summer, and it was over 90 degrees and 85% humidity. I can't see them in those wool uniforms doing much after the march. Lee's conduct of the campaign is not very high class and actually downright amateurish. Lee had no real plan, faced an army of unknown strength on ground that was unknown to him and decided to attack that army under those conditions. These failures led to the loss of the battle. There were occasions in the three days, where if one action or another had been different, he might have won that battle, but the cost would have precluded him from continuing his pursuit of the Union forces who would have been retreating back towards their logistics base, not so for the Army of Northern Virginia. There is a good chance, that Lee would still have had to move back across the Potomac River towards his supply base in Virginia. Any further movement into the north probably would have ended in disaster.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 10, 2013 10:27:24 GMT -6
My primary critique against Lee on 1 July wasn't so much about his "discretionary" orders to Ewell.
Rather, it's that the best means to force Cemetery Hill wasn't with Ewell's immediate troops. It was under the noses of both Lee and A P Hill themselves on Seminary Ridge.
Consider. Early's division had done a great job rolling up the Union XI Corps troops on its front (supported by Doles from Rodes' division), but not without cost. One of the hard-charging brigades was Gordon's, but even it took about 20-30 percent losses north of the town. And needless to say, moving thru the town afterwards didn't do wonders for divisional cohesion. And Rodes' division, largest of the ANV at the battle's start, fared much worse in its fight with Robinson's division of the Union I Corps. That division's attacks were poorly coordinated, and at least three of Rodes' brigades were badly shredded before the following echelon under Ramseur prevailed.
Rodes's division was thus "hors de combat" for the remainder of that day. Early's division was better off, but needed time to reorganize.
But what of the troops still coming down Chambersburg Pike that late afternoon and into the evening? Anderson's division (Hill's corps) could've gotten into the action in the last hours of light if pressed forward to do so, but was told to stand down and encamp. And as noted earlier, Johnson's division (Ewell) came along the same way in parallel, but spent the evening not pressing on Cemetery Hill but to wind along through the town on to Ewell's left flank in the east.
Hill was there with Lee. Between the two, they could have pressed the matter (borrowing Johnson's division from Ewell) by forming and attacking from Seminary Ridge. Why that didn't happen would be an entirely valid topic in itself.
On the flip side, I do think that Ewell erred at Gettysburg, but not so much over the matter of Cemetery Hill. (from Coddington) Rather instead, in the very early morning hours of 2 July, Lee had actually started planning orders to have Ewell pull off from his extended left flank position and to march around to the right flank, as Longstreet had prescribed earlier on 1 July. Ewell, getting wind of the planned order, offered to "demonstrate effectively" from his existing position during Longstreet's attack, and Lee conceded to this. Thus Ewell, in this act, served to keep the ANV stretched on an exterior line that made reinforcement of any critical action (from 2 July onwards) very problematic.
EDIT: One must temper judgements of Lee, Hill and Ewell from the inevitable effects of 20/20 hindsight. Still, I think that given the limited number of CSA cavalry troops available to keep watch until Stuart came up with the bulk, maintaining an extended (exterior) line in unfamiliar terrain was fraught with potential risks. Lee would've been the one most responsible to observe this. But he wasn't well aided by Ewell's resolve to hold his existing positions.
I researched in my books and E.P. Alexander had, what I believe is some interesting information about the first day and Cemetery Hill. Early and Pender's division passed through the town, chasing the fleeing Union soldiers of the 1st Corps capturing about 5000. The rest were seen passing over the hills. This was 1500 hrs. Hancock's report states that he arrived at Gettysburg at this time and the 1st and 4th corps were retiring through the town. He gave orders immediately to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill. Alexander states that sunset was at 1930 hrs, twilight was long and moon was full. He states that there was enough time and force, two reserve brigades, to carry the hill. However, this was at 1500 hrs. Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals at 1400 hrs and Taylor was sent to Ewell to tell him to press those people. Keep in mind that Lee was on Seminary ridge which means he couldn't really see what is transpiring on the back side of Cemetery, or the end facing away from him.
Johnson's division was ordered by Ewell to pass the town and occupy Culp's Hill, one half mile to the east. Before Johnson, who was followed by Anderson, could get up to the area, to begin his move, an unknown force was reported moving to outflank the extreme left. Ewell finally after time, determined that they were his own men but it was now sunset, 0730 hrs and the hill was now occupied by Wadsworth's division along with some of Steinwehr's men who had been ordered to fortify.
Eventually Johnson did move around the base of Culp's hill but a recon party found it was now occupied. Johnson after the war stated he was in position to attack up Culp's hill but was halted for which reason he did not know. The reason is clear, Ewell received reports of unknown forces moving on Johnson's extreme left and that force had to be idenified before Johnson, Ewell's only unengaged division made the journey up Culp's hill. By the time Johnson and Anderson arrived, a conference determined that the hills were now occupied and it would be hazardous to make the attempt in the waning light.
My point in providing this brief narrative is to illustrate how poor battlefield management was at that time and that without cavalry to scout the flanks, and moving his army is such a disorganized manner, with over 30 miles between corps, contributed to the failure to move up the two hills at the time they were actually vacant, and that is about 1400 to maybe 1600 hrs, after that, it was too late. Johnson and Anderson were no where near the other side of town at this time. Lee's army covered over 2600 square miles, in placement far greater than the AOP. Another problem for Johnson was that his logistics train was over 14 miles behind him. This issue of logistics trains for the ANV is a nightmare, when you delve into it. The third day action with Alexander not knowing where his reserve ammunition is located because it was moved, it appalling. The post war accounts all attempt to whitewash Lee's handling of the campaign and battle, throwing the blame on Ewell and Longstreet. But it wasn't Ewell or Longstreet who failed, it wasn't even Stuart's, it was ultimately Robert E. Lee's. He knew Stuart's propensity for wandering off on cavalry hunts, and knew how important his information and flank protect was in the coming operation. Lee had two cavalry brigades that Stuart had left, but they were never used, because Lee did not trust them. Apparently Stuart did, because he left them for Lee. In my opinion, much of what happened over those three days has to do with poor battlefield management by Lee and the failure of the only source of information on the enemy, his force structure, location and direction of movement by General Stuart. Lee and Army of Northern Viriginia's lack of a real logistics train to maintain the armies in the field forcing them to live off of the land contributes to the wide separation of the corps because if all were together, they would quickly reduce the food and fodder in the area forcing them to move on. This was again a General Lee problem, with his highly reduced staff. This is what a staff is supposed to do, logistics, collecting information and developing alternative plans to present to the CinC. None of this occurred.
I am really interested to hear some more from you on my conclusions, as I believe that you have studied this.
Sources: Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative by E.P. Alexander They Met at Gettysburg by General Edward Stackpole Four Years with General Lee by Walter Herron Taylor The Great Invasion by Jacobe Hoke The Gettysburg Campaign by Edwin Coddington
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 13, 2013 10:09:21 GMT -6
I've been doing some research using the Southern Historical Society Papers about the issue of the First Day on the left flank of the Confederate line near Cemetery Hill. The document is dated February 19th, 1905 submitted by Major James McDowell Carrington who at the time of the battle was a captain of the Charlottesville Artillery. His story is corroborated by Colonel Harry Gilmore of Maryland in his book," Four Years in the Saddle,"
He quotes from a speech by General Jubal Early," "There was a time, as it appears now, immediately after the enemy was driven back, when, if we had advanced vigorously, the heights if Gettysburg would possibly have been taken. But that was not then apparent. I was in favor of the advance, but I think it doubtful whether it would have resulted in any greater advantage that to throw back the two routed corps on the main body of the army, and cause the great battle to be fought on other grounds. Moreover, it is not improbable that the arrival of two fresh corps may have turned the fate of the day against our troops."
General Ewell commented this way,"I notified the general commanding of my movements, and was informed by him that in case we found the enemy's force very large, he did not want a general engagement brought on until the rest of the army came up." Evidently there was a good deal for General Ewell to think about. In another part of his report he says: "The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring the artillery to bear upon it, and all the troops with me were jaded by a number of hours of marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnston's division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged), was close to the town."
Finally, General Lee ""General Ewell was therefore instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable; but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnston's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour." Now, General Lee left it entirely to the discretion of his subordinate, when he might have given a peremptory order. Of course, that grand man is too magnanimous to blame him for the way he exercised this discretion. The responsibility placed upon General Ewell was tremendous. Instead of blaming him, for he says: "It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops"
In another source, "Moving Moutains: A Study in Civil War logistics", the author states this " As Lee moves north, his supply line becomes attenuated. He now has the revolutionary option of ignoring his line of supply, parking all his wagons except those carrying ammunition, and living off the rich Pennsylvania farmland.[167] Confederate trains are deployed by division, thus creating columns that are necessarily slowed by their organic impedimenta. The traffic jam coming through the South Mountain passes can be relieved by a troops first wagons last policy. On the June 29th, Maj. General Edward Johnson’s Division in Ewell’s Second Corp which should be ahead of Longstreet, has its fatiguing march of 25 miles made more difficult because of obstructions caused by wagons of Longstreet’s corps.[169] Just why Johnson’s division should be impeded by trains from any of Longstreet’s units is not clear in the record. It is apparent that the entire Army of Northern Virginia is suffering from extremely poor train discipline. This lack of control is soon even worse as Lee attempts to concentrate his army. On the road from Chambersburg are marching elements of the First, Third, and part of the Second Corps (with all of their trains), with but a single track, the Chambersburg-Gettysburg turnpike.[170] If there is ever any question as to why Lee is unable to achieve an overwhelming victory on July 1, 1863, a suitable culprit must be a clogged main artery."
There is much to read, but it is important because the answers as to why Culp's Hill and Cementery Hill were not assaulted seems to rest with poor train management, poor campaign management and lack of scouting information. Lee's corps are much to far apart, considering they are in enemy territory and two of the commanders are new. Without any good scouting, traveling up the Shenandoah Valley and Cumberland Valley blinds Lee as to what the Northern army is doing, yet the AOP has good scouting as their cavalry has improved markedly. This route was safe in 1862 when the Union cavalry was poor, but this situation has changed. Lee is essentially blind, his corps are too far apart and if the AOP is located, he cannot combine his army fast enough to be able to deal with the situation of a meeting engagement. In this type of engagement, timing is everything. You have to move quickly, combine and attack. Lee, an experienced commander, offered the job that Halleck now holds, should have realized this. He seems to have failed to understand that the AOP was different, they have improved and were now equal in all respects Their artillery was better organized and far more effective, their logistics were superbly managed and their leadership had been honed to a fine edge. This was not the same army he had met in the past. Even at Chancellorsville, after his flank movement, the Union army easily Even on the second day, we can see the results of the problems with the ANV. Pickett is not arrived from Chambersburg to support Longstreet's attack on Cemetery Ridge, he is still moving because he was forced guard the trains in Chambersburg due to lack of cavalry. Longstreet takes too much time to get into attack position because no scouting was performed and the guide gets lost. While this is going on, the Federal observers on Little Round top have spotted Longstreet's wagons and their placements which gives them the direction of attack. Those wagons will carry the wounded and the ammunition supply during the attack. In Ewell's section, Johnson had been ordered to swing around the left flank and attack up Culp's Hill but poor scouting fails to recognize Sykes's VI corps sitting on Powell's Hill which is less than mile from Johnson's jump off point. Johnson only has about 6300 men, but Sykes has 11,000 and they are all veterans. If he did attack in the morning, Sykes will simple hit him in the flank and destroy his division, then continue around the Ewell's flank hitting each attacking division in succession, most likely destroying Ewell's corp and rolling up lee's left flank.Forget the third day, there will not be a need for it, Lee's army will be crushed beween Sykes and cemetery ridge. On the third day, after the failed attack, Lee goes around saying "it is all my fault". He is not referring to the attack failure, but the whole campaign which he now realizes was poorly conceived and managed. Would a larger more complete staff have helped, possibly. It appears that the south got all the fighters, but the north got all the organizers and as the victorious general said after Desert Storm, " Amateurs speak of tactics, professionals speak of logistics". Seems to fit here, IMHO.
On the third day, Alexander's ammunition wagons are moved, without telling him and when his gunners head back to refill the caissons, those wagons are gone and they have to find them. Alexander thus is running out of ammunition and has to slow his firing, and Hunt for the AOP, see's this and withdraws much of his artillery to await the attack he knows is coming. This fails to break the federal troops at the angle and the rest is history.
All of this due to poor train management, battlefield management and a campaign that is poorly planned and executed.
Jonathan K. Rice (2011-03-23). Moving Mountains: A Study in Civil War Logistics (p. 64). Xlibris. Kindle Edition.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 20, 2013 12:36:51 GMT -6
Mistake in Gettysburg, the movie.
Well, I found a dreadful error in the movie Gettysburg and here it is.
Three hours and sixteen minutes into the movie, Longstreet is drawing on the ground how he wants the three division commanders to deploy their brigades for Pickett's charge. Longstreet shows General Trimble leading on the left with J. Johnston Pettigrew following in support. Pickett's Brigades on the on the right with Garnett and Jimmy Kemper leading side by side, with Lo Armistead in support. WRONG.
It was Pettigrew that was leading with four brigades and Trimble, with two brigades in support and it did make a difference. How could the movie make such a mistake since one of the actors playing General Webb at the clump of trees for the AOP was the late Brian Pohanka, a Civil War historian, advisor and reenactor on many Civil War history movies like Cold Mountain and Glory. This is a mistake that should never have happened.
My sources are a book by the AOP Artillery Chief Henry L. Hunt, the Great Invasion by Jacob Hoke, plus numerous other sources from the Confederate side including Longstreet's and Lee's chief's of Staff.
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Post by sirchaos on Dec 20, 2013 13:06:38 GMT -6
Nothing gets past you, does it?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 20, 2013 14:10:40 GMT -6
Nothing gets past you, does it? Oh, probably lot's of things. My wife gets mad on tours when I catch the tour guide making mistakes. She tells me to keep quiet. I was really given orders on our guided tour of Gettysburg battlefield and at the end, the guide seriously asked me if in the future, during the summer if I wanted to be a paid tour guide. My wife could not believe it. I have fun especially watching movies.
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Post by sirchaos on Dec 21, 2013 12:16:22 GMT -6
Nothing gets past you, does it? Oh, probably lot's of things. My wife gets mad on tours when I catch the tour guide making mistakes. She tells me to keep quiet. I was really given orders on our guided tour of Gettysburg battlefield and at the end, the guide seriously asked me if in the future, during the summer if I wanted to be a paid tour guide. My wife could not believe it. I have fun especially watching movies. Sorry, but that made me laugh. At least I only catch the mistakes in movies like "Midway". You remind me of a good friend of mine, who used to be a huge Star Trek fan in his youth, then went on to study physics, and finally got his physics PhD. He told me he still enjoys Star Trek overall, but when they it gets scientific, he never knows whether to laugh or cry.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 21, 2013 18:41:43 GMT -6
When movies are trying to replicate an event like Midway, the equipment is going to be hard to duplicate. One reason that I like the movie Battle of Britain is that they used period aircraft that had been collected together. The only real problem was the Me-109's were Hispano-Suiza equipped Spanish Air Force versions which had the exhaust pipes at the top of the fuselage, whereas the actual ME-109E had a Daimler Benz DB601 that was installed inverted, so the stack were at the bottom. Only a few of us fools would catch that, but when you are presenting a movie like Gettysburg that has educational value to the younger set, it needs to get the basics correct.
BTW, if you ever see the movie, there were no shoes in Gettysburg, that was bogus.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 23, 2013 8:11:51 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 23, 2013 8:26:35 GMT -6
These are cool, thanks. I don't catch everything, sometimes I know the technology is wrong but I don't know what the substitute is, like the Puma helos. I knew the helos were wrong and they looked like French helos. I am not much of a sailor, so the sails might have gotten by me, but I will be more observant.
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