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Post by steel selachian on Oct 27, 2013 8:17:38 GMT -6
I figured I would start this thread after seeing this piece about another would-be entrant to aircraft carrier operations: www.defensenews.com/article/20131026/DEFREG03/310260005/S-Korea-Envisions-Light-Aircraft-CarrierTopics may vary include the challenges of building carriers and training for operations, the potential uses of carriers by specific nations, and ... well, this being an NWS discussion, just about anything to do with modern carriers and probably some historical topics.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 27, 2013 9:41:23 GMT -6
I figured I would start this thread after seeing this piece about another would-be entrant to aircraft carrier operations: www.defensenews.com/article/20131026/DEFREG03/310260005/S-Korea-Envisions-Light-Aircraft-CarrierTopics may vary include the challenges of building carriers and training for operations, the potential uses of carriers by specific nations, and ... well, this being an NWS discussion, just about anything to do with modern carriers and probably some historical topics. Excellent topic for discussion, possibly we can expand it to include carrier strike groups. I believe the South Korean light carriers is an excellent idea. With many of the countries in that part of the world doing far better economically, they can start providing assistance or even take control of their own destiny. I think it will be beneficial to all including the US Navy.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 27, 2013 10:25:05 GMT -6
Well, admittedly it is something of a naval arms race in that area - the ROK, Japan, and the PRC are in something of a round-robin game regarding various disputed pieces of rock such as the Senkaku and Dokdo Islands (not surprisingly, the ROKN's current helicopter carrier is named after the latter). Militarily, it makes sense. Helicopter carriers make it easier to hold, take, or retake islands, and carrier-based fixed-wing birds would have an easier time maintaining patrols than land-based ones. However, one does sense an element of "keeping up with the Joneses" - hopefully someone remembers how that one turned out for the European powers prior to WWI.
With that said though, Japan and the ROK adding carrier aviation capabilities does make life simpler for the USN. ASW/possibly full-on "Sea Control" carriers like the Japanese Hyuga and Izumo classes as well as the current and proposed ROKN ships are good escort and patrol assets; I could see them conducting disaster relief, blockade inspections, convoy escort, ASW hunter-killer, and littoral operations. If they want to deploy to places like Indonesia and the Horn of Africa, that means more anti-piracy assets. That frees up the USN from having to police the normal small stuff in peacetime and wartime and task CSGs and ESGs with being offensive assets. Likewise, the ability of European nations to maintain a deployable carrier capability allows the USN to put places like the Med on the back burner and focus maintaining CSGs and ESGs in the IO and western Pacific.
Expanding the topic to include carrier strike groups is something I agree with. Following from the above, the more responsibility regional navies like the JMSDF and the ROKN can take on, the more surface escorts and replenishment ships we can pull back to supporting our own carriers. Given the amount of discussion about nations like the PRC using antiship ballistic missiles, conventional antiship missiles, and subs to try and keep CSGs at bay, the more Burkes and Ticos I can have around my flattops the better.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 27, 2013 11:58:44 GMT -6
Well, admittedly it is something of a naval arms race in that area - the ROK, Japan, and the PRC are in something of a round-robin game regarding various disputed pieces of rock such as the Senkaku and Dokdo Islands (not surprisingly, the ROKN's current helicopter carrier is named after the latter). Militarily, it makes sense. Helicopter carriers make it easier to hold, take, or retake islands, and carrier-based fixed-wing birds would have an easier time maintaining patrols than land-based ones. However, one does sense an element of "keeping up with the Joneses" - hopefully someone remembers how that one turned out for the European powers prior to WWI. With that said though, Japan and the ROK adding carrier aviation capabilities does make life simpler for the USN. ASW/possibly full-on "Sea Control" carriers like the Japanese Hyuga and Izumo classes as well as the current and proposed ROKN ships are good escort and patrol assets; I could see them conducting disaster relief, blockade inspections, convoy escort, ASW hunter-killer, and littoral operations. If they want to deploy to places like Indonesia and the Horn of Africa, that means more anti-piracy assets. That frees up the USN from having to police the normal small stuff in peacetime and wartime and task CSGs and ESGs with being offensive assets. Likewise, the ability of European nations to maintain a deployable carrier capability allows the USN to put places like the Med on the back burner and focus maintaining CSGs and ESGs in the IO and western Pacific. Expanding the topic to include carrier strike groups is something I agree with. Following from the above, the more responsibility regional navies like the JMSDF and the ROKN can take on, the more surface escorts and replenishment ships we can pull back to supporting our own carriers. Given the amount of discussion about nations like the PRC using antiship ballistic missiles, conventional antiship missiles, and subs to try and keep CSGs at bay, the more Burkes and Ticos I can have around my flattops the better. With land based aircraft in South Korean and Japan, along with those nations LPH's, it could mean that we will not have to risk our CSGs in enclosed seas, which is a danger to them. We'll have to see how this plays out. They planned a long way out.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 27, 2013 13:00:24 GMT -6
Historically speaking, it sort of hearkens back to WWII when we had the escort carriers taking care of ASW and direct support of landing operations while the fast carrier TFs stayed on the loose out in blue water as a "Sunday Punch" to be aimed at key targets. If I have a major offensive asset like a CSG, I want it on the move so a) the other guy is spending time and effort trying to find it and holding striking resources back, and b) I can shift it around to hit targets as I please.
On a long-term scale, it helps with another conundrum, that of fleet planning. We've had more than a few discussions on these boards about whether or not the USN would be better off with a partial or full fleet of midsize carriers rather than 8-11 supercarriers. If the allies are taking care of the light carrier angle, the USN can stick to supercarrier construction and operations, which are what it knows and does well.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 27, 2013 13:41:02 GMT -6
Historically speaking, it sort of hearkens back to WWII when we had the escort carriers taking care of ASW and direct support of landing operations while the fast carrier TFs stayed on the loose out in blue water as a "Sunday Punch" to be aimed at key targets. If I have a major offensive asset like a CSG, I want it on the move so a) the other guy is spending time and effort trying to find it and holding striking resources back, and b) I can shift it around to hit targets as I please. On a long-term scale, it helps with another conundrum, that of fleet planning. We've had more than a few discussions on these boards about whether or not the USN would be better off with a partial or full fleet of midsize carriers rather than 8-11 supercarriers. If the allies are taking care of the light carrier angle, the USN can stick to supercarrier construction and operations, which are what it knows and does well. I am not entirely certain, that our sticking with super carriers is the best policy. Many of the nations that we are relying on have governments that are fickle in how and where they support us. We need to be self-sufficient and must have the smaller carriers.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 27, 2013 15:02:47 GMT -6
As it stands we have the Wasp and America class ships, which in terms of capability are as good or better than the current aviation deck vessels in service or planned for our Pacific allies (Japan, South Korea, and Australia). Those can handle the light carrier role with the right aircraft. I'm not convinced sacrificing supercarrier numbers and replacing them with midsized ships won't come back to bite us in the rear down the road: breakingdefense.com/2013/10/why-america-needs-aircraft-carriers/www.informationdissemination.net/2013/09/naval-supremacy-cannot-be-piggybacked.htmlAs for fickle allies, if we have issues with support from the ROK and/or Japan in a regional conflict, we've got bigger problems - like say a few divisions of troops, multiple airbases, and 7th Fleet HQ. We've made significant investments and commitments to the defense of those nations over the years, and we operate and train extensively with them. Anything can happen in world affairs, true, but I think given recent trends and the likely black hats in the region we can count on support from those nations in the near future. If so, it's prudent to include those assets in our planning. I would not necessarily say the same about the various European navies; between budget issues and pressures at home they appear to be focused on their own interests. They also do not have a large unifying threat such as North Korea or China at present.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 27, 2013 20:40:01 GMT -6
For the foreseeable future, we are going to have to field classes of light carriers as we have probably about twenty five years or so. How the two classes, Wasp and America hold up, depends on budgets and geopolitical conditions. We might want to research and discuss their length of service. My personal opinion is that China will have to step up and control her friend, NK because problems in this area are bad for business. But preparation by Japan and South Korea is a good policy. As to the question of whether we need many supercarriers, I am not all that certain. We need two in the Indian Ocean, two in the Pacific, one in the Med with one on each coastline under repair. We need two in ready-reserve, one on each coastline. Overall, maybe ten at the most. Will the lack of supercarriers come back to haunt us? Not if we are careful in our geopolitics because force cannot makeup for poor diplomacy. We need to maintain good relations with key nations around the world and get allowances to use their air bases in case of emergency. Land based air is always more effective than sea based. Carrier air wings are limited in the time they can spend over the target and by ordnance loads. They chew up ordnance very quickly and must then back away and replenish. Scott might have more detailed information. Land based air throughout the history of the use of aviation has always been the more effective at getting at the targets and staying on them to destroy them. As to our Allies, nations are basically like humans(amazing), worried more about themselves than anyone else. Sometimes, they are myopic and cannot see the threats until they are upon them. It takes someone, standing at a distance and not involved, to see a problem. Sounds just like some humans I know. One has to just try to make them understand the threats and how to face them. Many times I probably sound like a pacifist. Nothing could be farther from the truth, however war has always been a part of my life with my crippled father, two friends lost in Vietnam and other factors. We need a strong defense, much of it based on naval power. We need carriers; large ones and small ones. We also need submarines, drones, and a good bomb truck. We need good long range accurate land attack missiles and anti-ship missiles. We need the best training for the kids and help at home for their families. All of this is very expensive. We need a good balanced naval force. Sorry for the editorial. EDIT: See if the ideas in this article appeal to you - warontherocks.com/2013/08/carrier-calculus-how-many-do-we-need/
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 28, 2013 20:43:10 GMT -6
On the article, I disagree with some of Dr. Kuehn's assessments, particularly the idea that forward-deploying naval forces is a provocation as opposed to keeping a lid on things. In particular he passes along an assertion that the British naval deployment to the Falklands in 1982 gave the Argentinians a "use it or lose it" mentality that made war inevitable; most analyses I've read state that it was the lack of British naval presence in the area that convinced the Argentinians they could get away with taking the Falklands. Having a CSG on-station in a problem area is the difference between being able to respond within hours or days and needing weeks to put things together. Time is not a luxury we can expect to have in a conflict.
What I do somewhat agree with is that we cannot expect to cover all the usual bases; we are going to have to pick and choose. I would argue that for starters we can take the Med off the CSG beat. It's an enclosed sea, we can generally get land-based air power, and the various NATO countries have their own smaller carriers and surface ships that are better suited to those waters. Also, that area is of more national interest to them than us; if they're not going to play with their ships in that bathtub there's not much point to them spending the money on navies. We are probably going to require a continuing CSG presence in the IO, given uncertainties with Iran's nuclear program (although the current flurry of diplomatic activity gives me a sliver of hope that we can eventually put that one on the back burner as well) and Pakistan's instability (which I would personally rate as the second or third biggest national security concern of the US, after North Korea and China). Additionally, that carrier would be available for operations in the Pacific on a few weeks' notice. We should have at least one and possibly two CSGs on station in the Pacific area, given North Korea's potential for going batty and respect for China's naval capabilities. At the very least we should have one CSG on station and another at readiness at either Yokosuka or Pearl. Short form, we should put the carriers where a) there is the possibility of major trouble, and b) where land-based air will have issues getting close enough.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 28, 2013 21:12:55 GMT -6
On the article, I disagree with some of Dr. Kuehn's assessments, particularly the idea that forward-deploying naval forces is a provocation as opposed to keeping a lid on things. In particular he passes along an assertion that the British naval deployment to the Falklands in 1982 gave the Argentinians a "use it or lose it" mentality that made war inevitable; most analyses I've read state that it was the lack of British naval presence in the area that convinced the Argentinians they could get away with taking the Falklands. Having a CSG on-station in a problem area is the difference between being able to respond within hours or days and needing weeks to put things together. Time is not a luxury we can expect to have in a conflict. .... I believe that if you read what Robert Rubel wrote, he actually states that had the British had a CSG forward deployed, there would have been no war. Here is the direct quote: As to the Med, once the British and French deploy their carriers, we might be able to deploy a CSG consisting of two smaller carriers supported by land bases in Italy and Southern France. However, for the time being, to assist Turkey in the control of the Eastern Med from Russian incursions, we will have to deploy a full CSG. It also helps to control the Suez Canal, which is still the fastest way to the IO and Far East. Geography hasn't changed that much, believe me.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 29, 2013 18:13:37 GMT -6
Point taken on the Rubel quote; I misinterpreted it given the context of the other article. As far as the Med, I don't think Russian incursions are a near-term issue - first off they do not and will not for a good while have the military capability to do anything in the Med besides show the flag; second to get there they have to either get through the Bosporus or send forces from the Northern or Baltic fleets, which would have a) a long trip and b) have to pass through at least two NATO-controlled chokepoints of their own (GIUK or Skagerrak and Gibraltar). What's available on the Russian side isn't worth a CSG's attention. Controlling the Suez is important, but there are other ways to handle that such as allies (if Egypt or an invading nation decided to play games with access rights, the Israelis would come down on them followed by much of Europe) and ESGs/baby carriers (unless you're planning on bombing them till they say uncle, you'll need Marines). Furthermore, as a risk reduction measure I would want to reduce the number of CSG transits through the Suez. That's a very narrow waterway in an area with a number of bad actors currently running around, and a prime opportunity for someone to get a potshot in on a passing supercarrier. All it would take is someone dropping a few homemade mines or sneaking a rocket battery into the area.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 29, 2013 18:41:14 GMT -6
Point taken on the Rubel quote; I misinterpreted it given the context of the other article. As far as the Med, I don't think Russian incursions are a near-term issue - first off they do not and will not for a good while have the military capability to do anything in the Med besides show the flag; second to get there they have to either get through the Bosporus or send forces from the Northern or Baltic fleets, which would have a) a long trip and b) have to pass through at least two NATO-controlled chokepoints of their own (GIUK or Skagerrak and Gibraltar). What's available on the Russian side isn't worth a CSG's attention. Controlling the Suez is important, but there are other ways to handle that such as allies (if Egypt or an invading nation decided to play games with access rights, the Israelis would come down on them followed by much of Europe) and ESGs/baby carriers (unless you're planning on bombing them till they say uncle, you'll need Marines). Furthermore, as a risk reduction measure I would want to reduce the number of CSG transits through the Suez. That's a very narrow waterway in an area with a number of bad actors currently running around, and a prime opportunity for someone to get a potshot in on a passing supercarrier. All it would take is someone dropping a few homemade mines or sneaking a rocket battery into the area. Here are two news articles about the Russian fleet in the Med. www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-05/standoff-mediterranean-us-vs-russian-navies rt.com/news/navy-warship-syria-mediterranean-800/ Never under estimate your opponent.... and never trust a friend like the Turks.
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Post by steel selachian on Oct 30, 2013 19:11:44 GMT -6
As I've stated in other discussions, overestimating your enemy can sometimes hurt you just as bad as underestimating him. You may end up tying down forces facing an inferior foe when a more dangerous threat is not getting the attention it deserves. A recent example being Iraq; we grossly overestimated the threat level and severely impeded our ability to act elsewhere in the world over a long period.
As far as the articles on Russia reinforcing their "Mediterranean fleet," they have no staying power there. Tartus may not be available to them in the future, given how the chips fall in Syria. As it stands now it's a friendly port call and refueling station, not a viable forward fleet base. If they start trouble in the Med, they have no place to retreat, no capability for sustained combat operations, no reinforcements, no air cover, and it will not take a CSG to make life hard for them. Sending more "battleships" to the area to do anything more than make faces, collect intel, and show the flag is throwing resources down a hole - ask the Russian Second Pacific Squadron how well things went at Tsushima. Overall, Russia as a whole is well down my list of potential naval threats because their fleet power is scattered between four isolated pockets hemmed in by choke points, their capability to maintain and sortie meaningful numbers of ships is awful, and despite all the pronouncements out of their Kremlin new fleet assets are entering service at a snail's crawl. About the only two things that do worry me about them are their SSBN force and their capability to snoop on our vessels and pass technical info along to unfriendly client states.
As far as trusting the Turks, let's go back to Kissinger there - "America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests." That goes for everyone else. Turkey and Russia have been rivals since the days of the tsars and the Ottoman Empire, and while I wouldn't trust the Turks to stick their necks out for our interests in the area I'd expect them to counter any Russian moves towards increased control over the Eastern Med. They have had themselves a very good strategic deal with being able to shut the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the Med at whim and I don't see them giving that up anytime soon. If you can't trust your allies, make sure they at least have bigger problems in the neighborhood to keep their attention occupied.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2013 19:45:32 GMT -6
As I've stated in other discussions, overestimating your enemy can sometimes hurt you just as bad as underestimating him. You may end up tying down forces facing an inferior foe when a more dangerous threat is not getting the attention it deserves. A recent example being Iraq; we grossly overestimated the threat level and severely impeded our ability to act elsewhere in the world over a long period. As far as the articles on Russia reinforcing their "Mediterranean fleet," they have no staying power there. Tartus may not be available to them in the future, given how the chips fall in Syria. As it stands now it's a friendly port call and refueling station, not a viable forward fleet base. If they start trouble in the Med, they have no place to retreat, no capability for sustained combat operations, no reinforcements, no air cover, and it will not take a CSG to make life hard for them. Sending more "battleships" to the area to do anything more than make faces, collect intel, and show the flag is throwing resources down a hole - ask the Russian Second Pacific Squadron how well things went at Tsushima. Overall, Russia as a whole is well down my list of potential naval threats because their fleet power is scattered between four isolated pockets hemmed in by choke points, their capability to maintain and sortie meaningful numbers of ships is awful, and despite all the pronouncements out of their Kremlin new fleet assets are entering service at a snail's crawl. About the only two things that do worry me about them are their SSBN force and their capability to snoop on our vessels and pass technical info along to unfriendly client states. As far as trusting the Turks, let's go back to Kissinger there - "America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests." That goes for everyone else. Turkey and Russia have been rivals since the days of the tsars and the Ottoman Empire, and while I wouldn't trust the Turks to stick their necks out for our interests in the area I'd expect them to counter any Russian moves towards increased control over the Eastern Med. They have had themselves a very good strategic deal with being able to shut the Russian Black Sea Fleet out of the Med at whim and I don't see them giving that up anytime soon. If you can't trust your allies, make sure they at least have bigger problems in the neighborhood to keep their attention occupied.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2013 8:53:24 GMT -6
The Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean are one geostrategic area, not two. They are both linked economically by oil and gas. The economic relations between Russia and the Turks have grown over past ten years. A pipeline titled the Blue Stream pipeline delivers large quantities of gas from Russia to Turkey and her markets. They are interdependent. There are new pipelines from the Baku oilfields that will bring oil to Europe and the Med. This type of economic interdependence will affect strategic agreements and may cause Turkey to turn her head if the Russians want to move her fleet back and forth through the Dardanelles. All nations have their own self-interest at heart. The concept of Realpolitik where nations act not on their ideals but their own self-interest leads to the idea that might makes right. Kissinger is not wrong. This is a concept handed down by the Ancient Greeks and introduced into the Nixon Whitehouse by Kissinger himself.
As to Iraq, there was no overestimation, just a simple failure to examine the history, ethnicity and geography of that region. It might be better to tolerate an oligarchy rather than the alternative. I think I've reached the edge of the ban on politics, hopefully not.
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