|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 4, 2014 7:57:39 GMT -6
Nice, they finally figured out how to get her to launch and trap without mishap. Let's wait till the regular pilots get a hold of her before we judge. Operational Test and Evaluation pilots are the best.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 4, 2014 8:01:59 GMT -6
The US Navy was not "unprepared and complacent", it gathered intelligence, analyzed it, and developed technology and tactics to counter the threats. Now, over the years, there were other priorities like close air support and interdiction during Vietnam, Desert Storm etc. but the Soviet Maritime bomber threat was always taken seriously. I can't speak for others, I don't know what they think, but I saw and worked on the technology and it was as good as was necessary to do the job. Losses in war are to be expected, everyone knew that, the idea was to minimize them. And they would have, I can assure you. Maybe Scott could enlighten both of us, if he reads this and has time. And depending on how much of it you two can talk about in public, of course. The two takeaways that stuck for me were Soviet Naval Aviation's distrust of satellite tracking and their acknowledgement that they would likely take 50% losses if attacking a CVBG with a large force of Backfires (~100 aircraft, or about three regiments presumably). That was before every tin can had Aegis, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a few other tricks. I'm trying to look into what they have left nowadays; reportedly in the past few years the 50-60 Naval Aviation Backfires were divested from Navy control and sent back to the Russian Air Force. I'd be interested to know if those airframes and aircrews still have an antishipping focus; even if the whole Backfire force (100-150 aircraft) is trained and armed for carrier-busting they might have a hard time taking on one carrier group without losing a big chunk of their strategic bomber force (assuming they were not being overly pessimistic about their odds of getting planes back). Take a look at this article, it has some interesting facts. www.ausairpower.net/APA-Backfire.html
www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146
I was doing some figuring with the numbers from this article. We have about 11 Carrier Battle Groups, but only four are currently at sea and available. If the Russian's only have about 105 Backfire's still operational, and with a 1% non-availability figure(I think that is low)level, then they will have about 104 Backfires. If they carry only one missile due to drag, which will reduce speed and range, then each of our CBG's has to deal with only 26 missiles per CBG. Note: I have not included MEU's centered around amphibious assault ships, those would be viable targets. That is not a large figure and it's hard to determine how many bombers will not make it to the launch point. We also have to factor in the change in geography with the demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of some of its former states which probably removed some of their bases. Also, the Russian Air Force might need some of these Backfire's for land missions. All in all, I don't see a real threat out there, except in the Mediterranean area. However, we can't discount other, newer technological threats to the Carrier Battle Groups, that do not come from Backfires.
Your Thoughts?
|
|
|
Post by sirchaos on Nov 4, 2014 14:01:42 GMT -6
And depending on how much of it you two can talk about in public, of course. The two takeaways that stuck for me were Soviet Naval Aviation's distrust of satellite tracking and their acknowledgement that they would likely take 50% losses if attacking a CVBG with a large force of Backfires (~100 aircraft, or about three regiments presumably). That was before every tin can had Aegis, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and a few other tricks. I'm trying to look into what they have left nowadays; reportedly in the past few years the 50-60 Naval Aviation Backfires were divested from Navy control and sent back to the Russian Air Force. I'd be interested to know if those airframes and aircrews still have an antishipping focus; even if the whole Backfire force (100-150 aircraft) is trained and armed for carrier-busting they might have a hard time taking on one carrier group without losing a big chunk of their strategic bomber force (assuming they were not being overly pessimistic about their odds of getting planes back). Take a look at this article, it has some interesting facts. www.ausairpower.net/APA-Backfire.html
www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146
I was doing some figuring with the numbers from this article. We have about 11 Carrier Battle Groups, but only four are currently at sea and available. If the Russian's only have about 105 Backfire's still operational, and with a 1% non-availability figure(I think that is low)level, then they will have about 104 Backfires. If they carry only one missile due to drag, which will reduce speed and range, then each of our CBG's has to deal with only 26 missiles per CBG. Note: I have not included MEU's centered around amphibious assault ships, those would be viable targets. That is not a large figure and it's hard to determine how many bombers will not make it to the launch point. We also have to factor in the change in geography with the demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of some of its former states which probably removed some of their bases. Also, the Russian Air Force might need some of these Backfire's for land missions. All in all, I don't see a real threat out there, except in the Mediterranean area. However, we can't discount other, newer technological threats to the Carrier Battle Groups, that do not come from Backfires.
Your Thoughts?
First thought: Why do you assume that the Russians will split their bombers between the CBGs? I´d assume they mass them against one of them.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 4, 2014 15:58:17 GMT -6
Take a look at this article, it has some interesting facts. www.ausairpower.net/APA-Backfire.html
www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146
I was doing some figuring with the numbers from this article. We have about 11 Carrier Battle Groups, but only four are currently at sea and available. If the Russian's only have about 105 Backfire's still operational, and with a 1% non-availability figure(I think that is low)level, then they will have about 104 Backfires. If they carry only one missile due to drag, which will reduce speed and range, then each of our CBG's has to deal with only 26 missiles per CBG. Note: I have not included MEU's centered around amphibious assault ships, those would be viable targets. That is not a large figure and it's hard to determine how many bombers will not make it to the launch point. We also have to factor in the change in geography with the demise of the Soviet Union and the independence of some of its former states which probably removed some of their bases. Also, the Russian Air Force might need some of these Backfire's for land missions. All in all, I don't see a real threat out there, except in the Mediterranean area. However, we can't discount other, newer technological threats to the Carrier Battle Groups, that do not come from Backfires.
Your Thoughts?
First thought: Why do you assume that the Russians will split their bombers between the CBGs? I´d assume they mass them against one of them. We are not really assuming such a strategy, it is what the original article in the Naval War College Review actually states: I quote:
It was the Soviet strategy, as presented. Now, in later times, they might concentrate on the CVBG in the Mediterranean and the MEU's in that same area, along with such units in the Indian Ocean. It depends on their new geostrategic concepts.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 4, 2014 19:01:28 GMT -6
Also figure those Backfires would be split between regional commands - before Russian Naval Aviation divested their Backfires, the 50-60 operational aircraft were split between the Northern and Pacific Fleets. Massing Backfires against one target would leave an entire coast without heavy maritime strike aircraft - possibly for good if they took heavy losses.
One of the reasons I raised this issue was that while the Bad Old Days seem to be in vogue again with the Russians, the current black hat of choice for future conflict scenarios is still China. PLAN Naval Aviation currently has about 30 operational H-6 Xian bombers - aircraft that are much less capable and survivable than the Backfire - plus a couple dozen Su-30s and maybe 130 or so JH-7s that are capable of maritime strike missions. The fighter-bombers are going to be limited to operations in littoral areas around the Chinese coastline and will likely be carrying shorter-ranged weapons. This is probably a good reason for them to be developing antiship ballistic missiles and a stronger sub fleet; if they try to go after a CSG with their current maritime strike assets they will have a hard time getting out there and would probably pay dearly in aircraft and aircrews. However, the ASBMs will require reliable targeting information ... which brings us back to the games we used to play with the Soviets.
|
|
|
Post by williammiller on Nov 5, 2014 9:21:23 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 5, 2014 22:13:14 GMT -6
That set of articles was what kicked off this discussion, yes. I have yet to read through the original document that they discuss, which is what makes this interesting. While I'm sure a number of the posters on these boards know more about the USN's side of the game than they're allowed to let on, having the Soviet take is interesting.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2014 8:11:52 GMT -6
That set of articles was what kicked off this discussion, yes. I have yet to read through the original document that they discuss, which is what makes this interesting. While I'm sure a number of the posters on these boards know more about the USN's side of the game than they're allowed to let on, having the Soviet take is interesting. I would agree that having the "other side" explain some of its procedures and strategies is very interesting. There is probably much more locked up in vaults inside the Kremlin. It appears to me, that Putin is reliving old strategies currently but appears, not to have a valid strategy. He doesn't have the forces to really execute the old Soviet geostrategy. However, neither do we, as the current force list that I supplied indicates.
|
|
|
Post by sirchaos on Nov 6, 2014 14:18:38 GMT -6
That set of articles was what kicked off this discussion, yes. I have yet to read through the original document that they discuss, which is what makes this interesting. While I'm sure a number of the posters on these boards know more about the USN's side of the game than they're allowed to let on, having the Soviet take is interesting. I would agree that having the "other side" explain some of its procedures and strategies is very interesting. There is probably much more locked up in vaults inside the Kremlin. It appears to me, that Putin is reliving old strategies currently but appears, not to have a valid strategy. He doesn't have the forces to really execute the old Soviet geostrategy. However, neither do we, as the current force list that I supplied indicates. I wouldn´t call what Putin is doing "reliving old strategies". It´s more like putting up a bold front, trying to make people think he is still capable of implementing old strategies - or at least that his ability to implement those strategies has not been reduced by more than others´ ability to counter said strategy. The goal of that, most likely, is to keep outsiders from intervening while he carries out his agenda - re-establishing Russian supremacy over the other ex-Soviet Republics.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2014 14:36:58 GMT -6
I would agree that having the "other side" explain some of its procedures and strategies is very interesting. There is probably much more locked up in vaults inside the Kremlin. It appears to me, that Putin is reliving old strategies currently but appears, not to have a valid strategy. He doesn't have the forces to really execute the old Soviet geostrategy. However, neither do we, as the current force list that I supplied indicates. I wouldn´t call what Putin is doing "reliving old strategies". It´s more like putting up a bold front, trying to make people think he is still capable of implementing old strategies - or at least that his ability to implement those strategies has not been reduced by more than others´ ability to counter said strategy. The goal of that, most likely, is to keep outsiders from intervening while he carries out his agenda - re-establishing Russian supremacy over the other ex-Soviet Republics. Putin is a product of the Cold War; a former KGB agent. He is "reliving" the Stalinist era after WWII in which the Soviets expanded into Eastern Europe and other areas. His geostrategy is essentially the same; gain additions to the Russian republic that will enhance its economic power and return it to its former glory. One problem with that is that Europe is now much, much stronger, so are the Arabs, the Chinese and the whole world. Russia lacks the economic and military strength to accomplish these goals and economically he could and has already suffered. This is all smoke and mirrors.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 6, 2014 18:24:20 GMT -6
Yes, for all the bluster the Russians are still struggling to cut out and replace the post-Soviet rot in their military. I was amused that they only recently admitted they were not going to return the first two Kirov-class missile cruisers to service. Admiral Ushakov (ex-Kirov) had been taken out of service almost 25 years ago following a reactor accident; in that time period the Russians hadn't even bothered to de-fuel her. The one inactive example they are modernizing, the Admiral Nakhimov, has been laid up since 1999 and isn't expected to return to service until 2018 (at a price that would pay for a pair of Mistral-class LHAs, arguably more useful power projection platforms). Most of the Dolgorukiy-class SSBNs are built from surplus Akula-II hulls that have been sitting around the Severodvinsk yard for years. That's not to say they aren't potentially dangerous opponents, but there's a definite sense their toys are being kept together with duct tape and super glue these days.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2014 21:18:13 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 7, 2014 8:35:24 GMT -6
Here is another source of force structures which includes other factors. I can't verify the accuracy of these figures, but if we get enough sources, we can then cross check the numbers. Also, Russian's like to use smoke and mirrors, trust me. I've been watching these people for the past half century.
www.globalfirepower.com/
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 10, 2014 12:33:49 GMT -6
Just a casual thought about the current Russian geostrategy. I wonder if Putin reread Mackinder and feels that he has to reassert the influence of the Heartland. Maybe he should read Spykman and his revision of that Heartland Theory, the concept developed after WWII that the Rimland has more control, not the Heartland.
UPDATE: Interesting article about the current Russian air activity - www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/report-warns-of-russian-aggression/article21527904/
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 10, 2014 20:45:49 GMT -6
Another consideration there is that the bluster is aimed at shoring up support at home. Remember, Putin won re-election with less than the expected margin of victory and that was followed by protests. Setting up a major confrontation with the West (which, either as a propaganda tactic or out of genuine suspicion, gets blamed for supporting protests) is a time-honored means of whipping up patriotic fervor and making it easier to label dissenters as traitors.
Back on the topic, as stated we may be able to apply the information in those articles to the current splashiest menace in the "carriers are dead" argument, the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. Leaving aside the fact that this is (as far as we know) a completely untested weapons system, it seems to be heavily reliant on satellites to find and engage targets. How likely is it that in actual use the DF-21D would be forced to rely on more "hands-on" targeting methods such as surveillance aircraft, submarines, and surface ships given the Soviet experiences with trying to find CVBGs using surveillance satellites?
|
|