|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 30, 2014 11:32:42 GMT -6
I think the terms of that article are pretty much aimed at the PRC (or Russia, since they've reared their heads again). The other potential baddies don't have enough surface targets to warrant a large-scale AShM engagement. Hunting missile-armed FACs like those that make up the bulk of North Korea, Iran, and Syria's forces is more a job for carrier aircraft. A 500-pound LGB or Maverick would probably be gross overkill, let alone an AShM with a 1,000-pound warhead. The newer seeker-equipped version of the Small Diameter Bomb would work perfectly on those targets - I can pack 8 weapons on a buttoned-up F-35, or fit up to 16 using external pylons on an F-35 or F/A-18. Assuming two weapons per target, I can destroy 16-32 FACs with a 4-ship flight of aircraft. The AShM threat from those nations is also probably more concentrated in shore batteries - for which you'd need Tomahawks, not antishipping weapons. The more enclosed seas around North Korea and Iran is also prohibitive to surface ships mixing it up; even if they don't have any sensor contacts they have a rough idea of where you are and can fire missiles down a bearing if they don't much care about popping a few container ships in the process. So let's say in this postulated scenario the answers to questions 1-3 are major warships, PRC or Russia, and enclosed sea or open ocean. As far as 4, that's where it starts to get hazy for me, particularly in regards to why we would have surface ships engaging these targets. "Offensive sea control" is the term mentioned in the article. I get the feeling overall it smacks of a surface warfare officer dreaming of winning a Navy Cross for sinking a Chinese destroyer without those pesky airedales or bubbleheads getting a piece of it. The battleship age is over; if you're driving a surface ship and engaging an enemy ship that can hit back any hit will hurt badly. The whole Level I/II/III survivability index is probably more academic than anything; if you get hit you will lose people and it will be a matter of whether or not you can limp out of the engagement area. More to the point, I can't imagine an area commander being very happy about the thought of a lost or mission-killed Aegis platform. This is a more in-depth look at the idea: breakingdefense.com/2014/11/47-seconds-from-hell-a-challenge-to-navy-doctrine/
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 30, 2014 13:18:25 GMT -6
I think the terms of that article are pretty much aimed at the PRC (or Russia, since they've reared their heads again). The other potential baddies don't have enough surface targets to warrant a large-scale AShM engagement. Hunting missile-armed FACs like those that make up the bulk of North Korea, Iran, and Syria's forces is more a job for carrier aircraft. A 500-pound LGB or Maverick would probably be gross overkill, let alone an AShM with a 1,000-pound warhead. The newer seeker-equipped version of the Small Diameter Bomb would work perfectly on those targets - I can pack 8 weapons on a buttoned-up F-35, or fit up to 16 using external pylons on an F-35 or F/A-18. Assuming two weapons per target, I can destroy 16-32 FACs with a 4-ship flight of aircraft. The AShM threat from those nations is also probably more concentrated in shore batteries - for which you'd need Tomahawks, not antishipping weapons. The more enclosed seas around North Korea and Iran is also prohibitive to surface ships mixing it up; even if they don't have any sensor contacts they have a rough idea of where you are and can fire missiles down a bearing if they don't much care about popping a few container ships in the process. So let's say in this postulated scenario the answers to questions 1-3 are major warships, PRC or Russia, and enclosed sea or open ocean. As far as 4, that's where it starts to get hazy for me, particularly in regards to why we would have surface ships engaging these targets. "Offensive sea control" is the term mentioned in the article. I get the feeling overall it smacks of a surface warfare officer dreaming of winning a Navy Cross for sinking a Chinese destroyer without those pesky airedales or bubbleheads getting a piece of it. The battleship age is over; if you're driving a surface ship and engaging an enemy ship that can hit back any hit will hurt badly. The whole Level I/II/III survivability index is probably more academic than anything; if you get hit you will lose people and it will be a matter of whether or not you can limp out of the engagement area. More to the point, I can't imagine an area commander being very happy about the thought of a lost or mission-killed Aegis platform. This is a more in-depth look at the idea: breakingdefense.com/2014/11/47-seconds-from-hell-a-challenge-to-navy-doctrine/The article says about what I've said repeatedly over the years, that offense is the best defense. We need good intelligence gather capability and then kill the targeting systems, launch platforms, central command and control functionaries, then use stealth and last, but not least, firepower to eliminate the threats to a reasonable level. We have to adjust our attitude. We are going to take losses and they might be severe. As Sherman said "War is Hell". ( Actually, that is not what he said precisely, but who cares". We need to improve damage control and ship board protection capability and make it perfectly clear to the US nation that in case of a conflict, losses will be taken. I agree that the PUC and the Russians are the most likely adversaries that we should be concerned with. We have Europe and NATO to help with the Russians along with Turkey and other Med countries to assist in that region. North Korea has to added to the mix but I believe that India, Australia, just to name a few will be available to provide limited assistance with their sphere of influence.
UPDATE: I might have forgotten to post this link to the Naval War College Review current and archives. www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review.aspx- If I did forget, my apologies.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Nov 30, 2014 16:59:24 GMT -6
I agree on the best defense being a good offense; the part I disagree with is doing so with high-value surface ships. Provided a sub-launched version of the LRASM gets fielded, I can put the same weapon load on a much more survivable launch platform and get it in and out of places where a surface ship would be detected and sunk. Alternately, I can do it the old-fashioned way - creep up within 20k yards, launch torpedoes, and slip away. Mines are another tool in the kit; they can be deployed by subs or aircraft. Carrier aircraft equipped with LRASMs can have a pretty good reach. Another option I've heard - and one the Japanese are starting to enact and the Taiwanese certainly have done - is land-based AShMs to turn the whole A2/AD game around.
I agree on the attitude towards losses, but aside from the public perception there's the question of how those losses will affect a campaign. Damage control and shipboard protection capability are good for saving ships and lives, but if any vessel gets hit by a modern AShM it's probably going home for repairs and will be unavailable for months. Ships don't carry a foot of armor plate anymore - something the size of a Harpoon will make a big mess, let alone one of the big Russian AShMs. It's one of the reasons I'm amenable to a missile-armed LCS - yes, it will be more fragile; it will also be stealthier, faster, and if worst comes to worst losing one will leave a smaller hole in my force capabilities than having a DDG-51 limp home for repairs.
With all that said, are there situations where we can use surface ships offensively? Yes. Tomahawks are currently a great asset for that; they outrange most AShMs and provide a longer striking range than we can currently get from carrier birds (at least without involving a lot of tanker support). However, that's a different game than SUW. You're using that weapon to hit fixed targets, which eliminates the need to have other assets searching for moving targets and providing midcourse updates. Armed with a number of AShMs they can also play cleanup after I've degraded the enemy's striking capability.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 1, 2014 7:48:12 GMT -6
I agree on the best defense being a good offense; the part I disagree with is doing so with high-value surface ships. Provided a sub-launched version of the LRASM gets fielded, I can put the same weapon load on a much more survivable launch platform and get it in and out of places where a surface ship would be detected and sunk. Alternately, I can do it the old-fashioned way - creep up within 20k yards, launch torpedoes, and slip away. Mines are another tool in the kit; they can be deployed by subs or aircraft. Carrier aircraft equipped with LRASMs can have a pretty good reach. Another option I've heard - and one the Japanese are starting to enact and the Taiwanese certainly have done - is land-based AShMs to turn the whole A2/AD game around. I agree on the attitude towards losses, but aside from the public perception there's the question of how those losses will affect a campaign. Damage control and shipboard protection capability are good for saving ships and lives, but if any vessel gets hit by a modern AShM it's probably going home for repairs and will be unavailable for months. Ships don't carry a foot of armor plate anymore - something the size of a Harpoon will make a big mess, let alone one of the big Russian AShMs. It's one of the reasons I'm amenable to a missile-armed LCS - yes, it will be more fragile; it will also be stealthier, faster, and if worst comes to worst losing one will leave a smaller hole in my force capabilities than having a DDG-51 limp home for repairs. With all that said, are there situations where we can use surface ships offensively? Yes. Tomahawks are currently a great asset for that; they outrange most AShMs and provide a longer striking range than we can currently get from carrier birds (at least without involving a lot of tanker support). However, that's a different game than SUW. You're using that weapon to hit fixed targets, which eliminates the need to have other assets searching for moving targets and providing midcourse updates. Armed with a number of AShMs they can also play cleanup after I've degraded the enemy's striking capability. I don't like using high value surface ship’s either, but they are of no value if we can't risk them for a valuable, necessary objective. Our mission planning should prioritize and use the least vulnerable weapons system we have. However, if these are the only choice, so be it. Land base AshM’s are nice, if you have territory in the area, most times we don’t. Extended range AshM's seem to be the final answer, so we don't have to enter dangerous waters. The carrier strike groups will most likely stay in the open ocean. Unless the PRC decides to come out in our playground, I don't see much happening. If the Taiwanese, South Korean's and Japanese can equip themselves with land based AshM's, then movement of PRC ships will be infinitely more difficult and with the USAF aircraft and USN carrier strike groups lurking out of range, then attrition from the our allies might be the key to eliminating the need to put more ships in harms way. It's time for the Allies to step up and guard their own waters.
In regards to sea control, The NATO Maritime level of control to the level of risk: “The level of sea control required will be a balance between the desired degree of freedom of action and the degree of acceptable risk.” This should be a guiding principle for all sides. How much are you willing to risk for sea control and how much do you really need?
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Dec 1, 2014 18:45:54 GMT -6
The other issue with extended range AShMs is, as the Soviets discovered, targeting. This is an issue even for a Mach 2+ weapon; something subsonic like LRASM would take 30 minutes or so to cover 250 nm. A 1000-nm weapon such as described in that article, if speed is not increased, would take two hours to reach the target. Some kind of midcourse guidance will almost certainly be required; unless a satellite can do the job that means you need an aircraft (manned or UAV) or submarine. In both cases, it then becomes a question of why the aircraft or submarine couldn't do the job itself (although I can see the merit in one carrier bird/UCLASS drone calling in a strike from surface ships, rather than committing the whole air wing to an antishipping strike). Hypersonic weapons may eventually alleviate that problem.
As far as the high-value surface ships, they do have a valuable, necessary objective - preventing carriers, amphibs, and other higher-value warships from being hit. SUW is probably the last priority on their tasking; AAW and ASW are more dangerous threats.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 1, 2014 19:15:47 GMT -6
The other issue with extended range AShMs is, as the Soviets discovered, targeting. This is an issue even for a Mach 2+ weapon; something subsonic like LRASM would take 30 minutes or so to cover 250 nm. A 1000-nm weapon such as described in that article, if speed is not increased, would take two hours to reach the target. Some kind of midcourse guidance will almost certainly be required; unless a satellite can do the job that means you need an aircraft (manned or UAV) or submarine. In both cases, it then becomes a question of why the aircraft or submarine couldn't do the job itself (although I can see the merit in one carrier bird/UCLASS drone calling in a strike from surface ships, rather than committing the whole air wing to an antishipping strike). Hypersonic weapons may eventually alleviate that problem. As far as the high-value surface ships, they do have a valuable, necessary objective - preventing carriers, amphibs, and other higher-value warships from being hit. SUW is probably the last priority on their tasking; AAW and ASW are more dangerous threats. The simplest targeting system for extended range is to couple an Inertial Navigation system with GPS update to an electro-optical sensor. You use satellite photos and IR to find targets, data link that info to the ships, upload SINS to the missile INS and latest target location, range, heading, and then launch. When the electro-optical system is within range it activates, a target is designated and the missile locks on, tracks, then kills. Satellite information on the location and heading for targets is important but not vital. You can use high altitude drones, E2C Hawkeye's, AWACS or even SR-71 type systems. However, external links can be vulnerabilities so the missile should be autonomous. INS using ring lasers for stable platforms are very accurate, so I am not certain that GPS updates are necessary.
www.ausairpower.net/TE-EO-Systems.html
www.ausairpower.net/optical-warfare.html
www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/Long_Range_Anti-Ship_Missile_(LRASM).aspx
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 10, 2014 21:08:13 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Dec 10, 2014 21:53:58 GMT -6
Rather misleading how they lump LRASM and the ABM program together in that article. LRASM isn't going to particularly worry the Russians; my bet is they are far more concerned about taking a Mark-48 in the guts as soon as they leave port. As far as spooking the Russians, the Soviets were quite afraid of some of our capabilities and the end of the Cold War didn't alleviate those fears. Scott has provided some memorable little anecdotes in that regard.
As far as LRASM, it certainly looks like a neat weapon; I'm just a little skeptical of how well its "AI" would do without targeting support from other platforms. You still need to have a pretty darn good idea of where the other guy is, where he's going, and what the potential obstacles in the way are. Otherwise you'll likely need to get considerably closer to make sure your expensive ordnance doesn't run out of gas looking for the target or fly too close to something that can spoil the surprise.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 21, 2014 10:00:42 GMT -6
I thought this was apropos for this thread. It would seem that even the Chinese are fed up with the North Korean's.
www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/world/asia/chinese-annoyance-with-north-korea-bubbles-to-the-surface.html?_r=1
Here is the question then; If the NK government does fall, what are the geostrategic implications for the US, Japan and other nations in the region?
There is another paper written for Rand Corporation titled " Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse" by Bruce W. Bennett. You could go to their website and download the PDF. I am currently reading it on my Kindle.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Dec 28, 2014 22:11:02 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 29, 2014 8:14:07 GMT -6
Interesting article and subject, I will read it when my granddaughter is napping later.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 29, 2014 13:10:36 GMT -6
Looking at these models reminds me of the comment by Colonel Martin Hessler in the movie "The Battle of the Bulge"" "German's are still the best toy makers in the world" - We can change the wording to Chinese.
All kidding aside, except for the ski ramps, it doesn't have anything new that the Gerald R. Fords don't have. Here is a good comparison of ski ramps and catapults. rusnavy.com/science/hull/russiancarrier/5/index.php?print=Y
My opinion is that experience counts.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Dec 29, 2014 19:52:32 GMT -6
The first one (the purported CV-17 hull) I can sort of buy into. It's an evolutionary step from their current Russian-designed vessel (and not much of a stretch from the scrapped Ulyanovsk design). The other two mostly look like wishful thinking - I know that the PRC does at times copy even the appearance of a Western design, but the second pair of models are just Ford-class ships with a more Russian-style bow and PRC weapons (which seem to be in the exact same spots as the Western vessel's). I do enjoy the juxtaposition of the author saying the model-maker has a high degree of access to the PLAN and then noting that they apparently don't know enough to place details such as the catapults and JBDs properly, or list an obsolete American SLQ-29 system as part of the electronics fit.
The fact that the island - the ship's most recognizable feature and the one where you'd expect a lot of design differences based on differing electronics outfits - is a panel-for-panel copy of the Ford's is something of a giveaway.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 30, 2014 8:09:41 GMT -6
The first one (the purported CV-17 hull) I can sort of buy into. It's an evolutionary step from their current Russian-designed vessel (and not much of a stretch from the scrapped Ulyanovsk design). The other two mostly look like wishful thinking - I know that the PRC does at times copy even the appearance of a Western design, but the second pair of models are just Ford-class ships with a more Russian-style bow and PRC weapons (which seem to be in the exact same spots as the Western vessel's). I do enjoy the juxtaposition of the author saying the model-maker has a high degree of access to the PLAN and then noting that they apparently don't know enough to place details such as the catapults and JBDs properly, or list an obsolete American SLQ-29 system as part of the electronics fit. The fact that the island - the ship's most recognizable feature and the one where you'd expect a lot of design differences based on differing electronics outfits - is a panel-for-panel copy of the Ford's is something of a giveaway. My question is why ski ramps AND catapults? If you are using ski ramps, then you don't need catapults and vice versa.
|
|
|
Post by steel selachian on Dec 30, 2014 18:05:51 GMT -6
|
|