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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 31, 2019 18:37:13 GMT -6
In my previous post, I copied two paragraphs from the Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze. Why 1943? Why was the morale so bad by 1943? Well, there were many reasons. By 1943, July there were some setbacks on every front. The German Air Force was loosing the air war everywhere and especially over Germany where the Allied Strategic bombing was now around the clock with the British area bombing at night and the USAAF using precision bombing during the day. Don't read too much into the concept of precision. If they hit the block in the city, they were happy. Stalingrad had happened a year before and Kursk had just occurred in Russia. Now the German armies were in retreat against the Russian onslaught. The German army was still maneuvering to keep the iron and metal ore deposits of the Ukraine, but only for a few months.
In Italy, Mussolini was gone and the Allies had invaded Sicily. Italy was not of strategic importance but the German's and Allies continued to fight until the end of the war. For Germany, this consumed rations, arms and men for no reason. But, the climate was good.
In April 1942, the food rations were cut and this made the Food Crisis real to everyone in Germany. Food was important for workers and everyone. The less food, the less workers can perform and this reduces production. This was occurring.
The start of the war and the worsening of the weather, had caused coal shortages. Rolling stock of trains were frozen and the carrying capacities of these trains was so reduced that the coal supplies to factories and homes was severely reduced. As the war proceeded, more coal was needed for steel production and for the new process of creating artificial oil from the Haber-Bosch process of hydrogenation. Another issue is the loss of so many men in the war. At least one-third of all boys born to German's between 1915 and 1924 were either dead or missing. For those born between 1920 and 1925 the losses amounted to 40 percent. This is hard to understand for those of us in the US, but this is a real tragedy and a loss of morale is to be expected.
Just a comment on the food rationing issue. All the participating nations in the war, rationed food. However, its one thing have rationed food and coal, and another to know that the war is a disaster and you are going to lose. You have the Allies on the west, near the Rhine and the Russian's in Southern Europe knocking the gates in Prussia and Poland. This would affect morale to a greater degree.
So, Wacht Am Rhein offensive accomplished for the Allies, exactly what they needed. A serious defeat of the German Armed forces. It came at a perfect time. Within three months, it was over.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 1, 2020 12:33:30 GMT -6
I stated in my previous posts that one major contributing factor to the loss of morale in the German Army and the German people was the losses in operations that were accumulating. So I decided for my own mind, to chart some of them. Here we go.
February 1943, the Loss of Stalingrad and over 91,000 men surrendered. The Soviets recovered over 250,000 German and Rumanian bodies but the total Axis losses were estimated to be 800,000. This was the first dent in the German armor and I am certain that it's effect on the German army and the nation were tremendous.
May 1943, The Axis forces in Tunisia surrender. 150,000 men and 12 Generals are included in that surrender. For the Germans, the loss of Tunisia was not a big strategic episode, but the loss of the first Tiger's and men was the biggest effect.
July 1943 to August 1943, the Battle of Kursk was conducted. It was an attempt to cut the salient around the Russian city of Kursk. The salient was headed towards Kiev, a major city. The attack was a failure as the Russians were aware it was coming. On July 14th the operation was terminated as the Allies had just invaded Sicily. German forces lost an estimated 200,000 men and 500 tanks not to mention the losses in aircraft by the Luftwaffe. This was the last major offensive operation in the east.
In August of 1944, the Battle of Mortain occurred. This was an attempt to cut off Patton's Third Army after its breakout from Avranches. Casualties were about 10,000 total. The remaining German forces in Normandy were surrounded although they managed to breakout but Normandy was lost and the German forces were forced to retreat back to the Rhine and Moselle Rivers. Most of the armor was destroyed. The main issue was that the Atlantic Wall that Hitler had placed so much faith in, had been pierced in one day and now France was lost. Another hit on German morale.
In September 1944, Patten's Third Army had reached the Lorrain Valley and Arracourt. They had run out of gas and had to sit for five days. In this time, the Germans launched an attack with newly created panzer brigades. The brigades consisted of tanks and panzer grenadiers but no artillery, engineers or logistics. The fighting was a stalemate at the end of September. The losses were 75,00 men for the German's captured and many tanks. This offensive was the last until Wacht Am Rein on December 16, 1944. It contributed to the German army morale loss but is hard to determine whether the nation actually knew about it. The surviving German officers and men might have communicated to their families about it. But who know.
The last big loss was the destruction of Army Group center on the Eastern Front by Operation Bagration. This occurred from June 23 to August 19, 1944. The Germans lost 400,000 men and about 500,000 wounded. This was a monumental loss for the German Army and the German people.
So, the losses of operations began on February 1943 and ended on January 16th, 1944 with the destruction of the salient after the Battle of the Bulge. This series of losses would destroy the German army and its morale, along with nations willingness to continue. The game was over.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jan 3, 2020 18:32:54 GMT -6
I want to touch on the failure of the Allied intelligence to discern the development of the Ardennes offensive Intelligence gathering is a combined effort of all levels of command. It involves collection from many sources, interpretation and analysis and distribution. The raw information should be assimilated into the system. There are many possible sources for this collection of information. Observation of the enemy movement, and positions by patrols, and capture of prisoners, interception of radio traffic, aerial reconnaissance and audio. So what happened to the Allies?
Well, the enemy always has a say in your plans. Hitler had observed that German radio traffic was no longer secure, and he forbid any messages from being sent from command headquarters both up the chain and down. This was easy now, since the fronts were retreating back on Germany so land lines could now be used for the transmission and receiving of information. This essentially eliminated ULTRA as a tool for land warfare. It was still useful for submarines and aircraft management, but it was not for land armies.
Another issue is the observation of movements and positions. This was hindered by the terrain in the Ardennes. It was hilly and heavily forested. It was also hindered by the weather in the northern Europe in December. This weather problem restricted armed reconnaissance in a major way. This was another source that was lacking. Along with this problem of observation of movements and positions, was the two divisions in the Ardennes. One was the 28th division, a very experienced division that had taken heavy casualties in the Hurtgen Forest and was no resting and being sent new troops. However, its intelligence gathering was still effective. Unfortunately, no one listened to their warnings about the capture of deserters. The other division was the 106th Infantry and they were totally new. They did not understand the value of sending out raiding parties and scouting parties for the gathering of intel. Again the Allies suffered.
There were other ways to cover the operational movement of men and supplies to the front. Flying large formations of aircraft over an area can deceive the sound detectors and changing the designations of the units. All these and other methods were used and were effective.
In the end, the Allies essentially made the same error in judgement the Japanese had made. The best analysis is based on what the enemy can do, not on what he will do. Don't try to guess at his next actions, just assess his capabilities and prioritize your responses.
One issue is interesting. As soon as Eisenhower, on the 16th of December, heard of the movement and attacks, he immediately, against the advice of his staff, ordered the movement of his strategic reserve which was the two parachute divisions but he also had the 11th Armored division and others. Eisenhower correctly assessed the threat immediately and took action. This was important. This is an action that I don't believe the German's could have ever guessed would happen and it probably never entered their planning. Many have attributed Eisenhower's ability to his leading the class at the Command school for the Army. Apparently he was far ahead of staff.
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