Battle of Balikpapan (A Single Battle AAR)
May 12, 2020 18:26:05 GMT -6
garrisonchisholm, ieshima, and 2 more like this
Post by cv10 on May 12, 2020 18:26:05 GMT -6
Subject: Report on the Action off Balikpapan on 20th January 1921
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Recipient: Office of the State Secretary of the Navy,
Date: 23rd January 1921
Sir,
As directed by orders received on 8 October 1921, I hoisted my flag aboard Koning Willem III and assumed command of the newly designated Eastern Fleet. Eastern Fleet contained the bulk of Her Majesty’s warships in it, including all five battleships of the Battle Force and all four of the battlecruisers assigned to Battlecruiser Force. Pursuant to orders to take the Eastern Fleet to Batavia, there to protect our holdings and territories from the Japanese, Eastern Fleet departed on the 14th of October 1920. Our passage was orderly and quiet. Due to the closure of the Suez Canal to belligerent traffic, Eastern Fleet proceeded around Cape Horn, fueled and supplied by the Fleet Train. We arrived at Batavia on the 16th of January 1921. At this stage, the strategic situation in Southeast Asia had grown particularly serious, as the four light cruisers of Commodore Jansen’s East Indies Squadron were entirely incapable of protecting our own holdings from the Japanese South Seas Fleet.
The Japanese had taken advantage of this situation, repeatedly sailing near our military installations on Borneo, hunting for the East Indies Squadron. However, this behavior gave Commodore Jansen a number of valuable opportunities to determine the exact strength of the Japanese forces operating off the coast of Borneo, which was found to be a force of five battlecruisers and two battleships. This force was reduced to one battleship after O-20 sank the Japanese battleship Asahi (Yamashiro-class) on Christmas Day.
Due to these circumstances and the lack of Japanese intelligence as to Eastern Fleet’s arrival, I proceeded to Balikpapan after refitting at Batavia in hopes of catching a portion of the enemy fleet and destroying it before they became fully aware of Eastern Fleet’s arrival. The Japanese fleet routinely swept the waters near Balikpapan. Having joined with the Commodore’s squadron, Eastern Fleet reached Balikpapan on the 19th of January, and sought out the enemy.
On the 20th of January, lookouts from the battlecruiser Jacob van Heemskerk spotted an enemy cruiser of the Azuma-class at approximately 14:01 local time. Rear-Admiral Bakker turned Battlecruiser Force southeast and raised 25 knots to investigate. While closing with the cruiser, lookouts spotted a line of ships at 14:18, which was quickly identified as the enemy’s own battlecruiser squadron. Acting under orders to engage the enemy according to his best judgement, Admiral Bakker turned north and engaged the enemy battlecruisers, crossing their bows. Battlecruiser Force opened fire at 14:22, and Piet Hein scored the first main battery hit of the action at 14:30.
The Battlecruiser Force maintained action while steering from north to east, cutting off the Japanese force’s only line of escape. It was at this juncture where Destroyer Squadron 6 and Destroyer Squadron 10 executed a torpedo attack against the enemy line. This attack was successful, scoring a hit on a Japanese battlecruiser later identified as the Tsukuba.
While this action occurred, Battle Force made strenuous effort to close the distance, hoping to pin the Japanese force between two lines of battle. However, a series of well-aimed salvos knocked a number of Battlecruiser Force’s guns out of action and reduced the speed of Jacob van Heemskerk and Maarten Tromp. This forced Admiral Bakker to take evasive action and gave the Japanese an advantage in speed.
The Japanese made use of this to escape being trapped between the Battlecruiser Force and Battle Force, which had been been coming into extreme range at this juncture. While the enemy were successful in this, they were forced to leave the heavily damaged Tsukuba behind. At 16:00 local time, lookouts on board Koningin Wilhelmina spotted smoke to the north east. Further investigation revealed it to be a Japanese battleship of the Hyuga-class, later confirmed to be the Hyuga herself.
Having found an isolated battleship and with a damaged enemy battlecruiser in sight of the Battlecruiser Force, I deemed the pursuit of the Japanese squadron futile, and ordered Admiral Bakker to break off in order to ensure the destruction of both enemy ships This was accomplished in short order. The enemy battleship was caught between two fires, received many direct hits from the guns of both forces, and was finished off with torpedoes.
The enemy battlecruiser was pursued and trapped in a cove near Balikpapan. At 18:53, it was finished off at close range by a combination of fire from Battle Force and torpedoes from the screening destroyers. I then directed the battleships Nederland and Gelderland to heave to and land their marine detachments, as lookouts spotted survivors from the enemy battlecruiser swimming for shore. I further detached the cruisers of Commodore Jansen to remain on station should further reinforcements for the shore party be needed, to treat any enemy wounded who made it ashore, and to covey any prisoners safely to Balikpapan.
After making these arrangements, I directed the fleet to anchor at Balikpapan in order to begin repairs and tend to the wounded. While none of Eastern Fleet's surface ships, I regret to inform Her Majesty that Eastern Fleet suffered 187 dead and 239 wounded. An additional 37 officers and ratings are presumed lost aboard HMS O-23, which is overdue and has been listed as sunk. The battlecruisers Piet Hein and Maarten Tromp suffered moderate damage, and most of the casualties suffered where from those ships.
I would like commend the following officers and men under my command to Her Majesty’s attention for their gallantry and behavior in action: Andreas Bakker, Rear-Admiral, Battlecruiser Force; Willem Hayes, Lieutenant-Commander, HM’s Battleship Saaremaa; Wiebbe De Jong, Surgeon-Lieutenant, HM's Cruiser Tilburg; Johannes Visser, Lieutenant of Marines, HM’s Battlecruiser Piet Hein; and Jan Boone, Leading Rating, HM’s Destroyer Pieter Codde.
Respectfully,
Admiral Wietse Van Buren
Commanding Officer, Eastern Fleet
.
Recipient: Office of the State Secretary of the Navy,
Date: 23rd January 1921
Sir,
As directed by orders received on 8 October 1921, I hoisted my flag aboard Koning Willem III and assumed command of the newly designated Eastern Fleet. Eastern Fleet contained the bulk of Her Majesty’s warships in it, including all five battleships of the Battle Force and all four of the battlecruisers assigned to Battlecruiser Force. Pursuant to orders to take the Eastern Fleet to Batavia, there to protect our holdings and territories from the Japanese, Eastern Fleet departed on the 14th of October 1920. Our passage was orderly and quiet. Due to the closure of the Suez Canal to belligerent traffic, Eastern Fleet proceeded around Cape Horn, fueled and supplied by the Fleet Train. We arrived at Batavia on the 16th of January 1921. At this stage, the strategic situation in Southeast Asia had grown particularly serious, as the four light cruisers of Commodore Jansen’s East Indies Squadron were entirely incapable of protecting our own holdings from the Japanese South Seas Fleet.
The Japanese had taken advantage of this situation, repeatedly sailing near our military installations on Borneo, hunting for the East Indies Squadron. However, this behavior gave Commodore Jansen a number of valuable opportunities to determine the exact strength of the Japanese forces operating off the coast of Borneo, which was found to be a force of five battlecruisers and two battleships. This force was reduced to one battleship after O-20 sank the Japanese battleship Asahi (Yamashiro-class) on Christmas Day.
NID Diagram of HIJMS Asahi
Due to these circumstances and the lack of Japanese intelligence as to Eastern Fleet’s arrival, I proceeded to Balikpapan after refitting at Batavia in hopes of catching a portion of the enemy fleet and destroying it before they became fully aware of Eastern Fleet’s arrival. The Japanese fleet routinely swept the waters near Balikpapan. Having joined with the Commodore’s squadron, Eastern Fleet reached Balikpapan on the 19th of January, and sought out the enemy.
On the 20th of January, lookouts from the battlecruiser Jacob van Heemskerk spotted an enemy cruiser of the Azuma-class at approximately 14:01 local time. Rear-Admiral Bakker turned Battlecruiser Force southeast and raised 25 knots to investigate. While closing with the cruiser, lookouts spotted a line of ships at 14:18, which was quickly identified as the enemy’s own battlecruiser squadron. Acting under orders to engage the enemy according to his best judgement, Admiral Bakker turned north and engaged the enemy battlecruisers, crossing their bows. Battlecruiser Force opened fire at 14:22, and Piet Hein scored the first main battery hit of the action at 14:30.
NID Diagram: Disposition of Eastern Fleet at the start of action. Battle Force to the west and Battlecruiser Force to the east.
NID Diagram: Disposition of the Battlecruiser Force during initial contact with Japanese battlecruisers.
The Battlecruiser Force maintained action while steering from north to east, cutting off the Japanese force’s only line of escape. It was at this juncture where Destroyer Squadron 6 and Destroyer Squadron 10 executed a torpedo attack against the enemy line. This attack was successful, scoring a hit on a Japanese battlecruiser later identified as the Tsukuba.
NID Diagram: Disposition of the Battlecruiser Force during DesRon 6 and DesRon 10 torpedo attack.
While this action occurred, Battle Force made strenuous effort to close the distance, hoping to pin the Japanese force between two lines of battle. However, a series of well-aimed salvos knocked a number of Battlecruiser Force’s guns out of action and reduced the speed of Jacob van Heemskerk and Maarten Tromp. This forced Admiral Bakker to take evasive action and gave the Japanese an advantage in speed.
The Japanese made use of this to escape being trapped between the Battlecruiser Force and Battle Force, which had been been coming into extreme range at this juncture. While the enemy were successful in this, they were forced to leave the heavily damaged Tsukuba behind. At 16:00 local time, lookouts on board Koningin Wilhelmina spotted smoke to the north east. Further investigation revealed it to be a Japanese battleship of the Hyuga-class, later confirmed to be the Hyuga herself.
NID Diagram: Disposition of the Eastern Fleet and enemy forces when enemy battleship was spotted
Having found an isolated battleship and with a damaged enemy battlecruiser in sight of the Battlecruiser Force, I deemed the pursuit of the Japanese squadron futile, and ordered Admiral Bakker to break off in order to ensure the destruction of both enemy ships This was accomplished in short order. The enemy battleship was caught between two fires, received many direct hits from the guns of both forces, and was finished off with torpedoes.
NID Diagram: Enemy battleship at the moment of its destruction.
The enemy battlecruiser was pursued and trapped in a cove near Balikpapan. At 18:53, it was finished off at close range by a combination of fire from Battle Force and torpedoes from the screening destroyers. I then directed the battleships Nederland and Gelderland to heave to and land their marine detachments, as lookouts spotted survivors from the enemy battlecruiser swimming for shore. I further detached the cruisers of Commodore Jansen to remain on station should further reinforcements for the shore party be needed, to treat any enemy wounded who made it ashore, and to covey any prisoners safely to Balikpapan.
NID Diagram: Japanese battlecruiser sinking while Eastern Fleet destroyers continue to attack
After making these arrangements, I directed the fleet to anchor at Balikpapan in order to begin repairs and tend to the wounded. While none of Eastern Fleet's surface ships, I regret to inform Her Majesty that Eastern Fleet suffered 187 dead and 239 wounded. An additional 37 officers and ratings are presumed lost aboard HMS O-23, which is overdue and has been listed as sunk. The battlecruisers Piet Hein and Maarten Tromp suffered moderate damage, and most of the casualties suffered where from those ships.
I would like commend the following officers and men under my command to Her Majesty’s attention for their gallantry and behavior in action: Andreas Bakker, Rear-Admiral, Battlecruiser Force; Willem Hayes, Lieutenant-Commander, HM’s Battleship Saaremaa; Wiebbe De Jong, Surgeon-Lieutenant, HM's Cruiser Tilburg; Johannes Visser, Lieutenant of Marines, HM’s Battlecruiser Piet Hein; and Jan Boone, Leading Rating, HM’s Destroyer Pieter Codde.
Respectfully,
Admiral Wietse Van Buren
Commanding Officer, Eastern Fleet
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