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Post by noshurviverse on Jul 5, 2020 18:48:48 GMT -6
This originally started as a response to oldpop2020's thread on Radar, but it kind of grew into it's own thing.
One thing that has always interested me in RtW is that much of the game, from the march of technology to the relative power of nations, is closely linked to the march of such things in the original time line (OTL). This is not an unreasonable thing, because it is very difficult to appreciate how much change might eventually occur from an event in history being altered. As the authors of Shattered Sword said:
An example we can consider when thinking about alternative history is the tech progression in RtW. A prime area to examine is the period of World War II, between 1939-1945*. Many of the technologies that are represented in this time period are the results of the conflict of the time, rather than a limitation of what was possible. For example: "Improved ASW tactics" is a technology that is, in-game, tied to the year 1943. Given the record of Allied anti-submarine efforts in the OTL, this makes sense. But in-game, such a timing may seem extremely odd. If in one game a major war is fought in the early 30's where one side utilizes massed submarines while the other attempts to counter them with large numbers of ASW escorts, one would assume the technology would appear at that point. In another game the 1930s-40's may be entirely peaceful or submarines might be banned, making such advancements strange. Of course, the argument could be made that such tactics were only possible with advancing mechanical technology and that the "tech" in game is rather the application of such technological advancement.
Amphibious Operations is another example. The last three techs on the list come in 1941, 42 and 43, beginning with "Higgins boats". I do not feel that it is unreasonable to say that such rapid advancements were the result of necessity, as the armed forces of the day had to overcome challenges that had not been given proper consideration prior. Necessity is the mother of invention, as they say. Naval Aviation and Shipboard Aircraft Operation is yet another place we can look. Some of the techs that exist in the progression are based around doctrinal choices made based on the war of the period. If such a war didn't exist or a different conflict arose, would it not be expected that the timing of these "techs" would also change? My final example would be something not in the game at all, but again requiring an excerpt from Shattered Sword.
Now, there is no tech directly associated with this particular advancement**, but if such a tech did exist, called "fuel line draining" or similar, it would most likely be linked to the year 1942. But I would argue that this would be a mistake, as the practice arose not as the result of the year, but of another event, the loss of the Lexington. Had the US joined the Pacific theater in 1937 and the event of Coral Sea taken place in 1938, it is likely that the same timeline (loss due to gas fires, innovation of safety) could have taken place.
So where does all this lead us?
I believe that the advancement of technology and doctrine in Rule the Waves is too closely linked to the OTL. While I agree that doing this is rather understandable, given the complexity that it would require in order to effectively make all technological fields "fluid", I do think that it does lead to some situations that are not very logical or "realistic". My solution to this is as follows:
Designate some techs as doctrinal. These should be techs that, as examined above, are not explicitly linked to a physical technology but rather an application of existing resources. Continue to have these techs accumulate research points via the normal method, but also have them gain points through crew experience relating to the tech. Long wars of attrition and submarine warfare should cause an accumulation of ASW technology research points. Invasions should teach lessons for future operations. This could even extend to techs that aren't doctrinal; if a player utilizes destroyers extensively, does it not make sense that Light Forces and Torpedo warfare should get a bonus?
*While obviously the impacts of the conflict on naval technology reach both before and after this period, for simplicity's sake I am limiting my examination. **The closest would probably be, "Increased fire hazard awareness", a tech set for 1935.
Now then, having considered this idea, there is another I want to discuss. This is actually the thought that originally brought this post to life. In this thread (https://nws-online.proboards.com/post/74520/thread) the topic of radar is discussed. Of note is that a primitive form of a surface radar was operational in 1904, but did not garner any real interest. This is of course not an uncommon occurrence, during WWI there were several technologies (wire guided munitions, primitive beam-riding guided missiles) that were experimented with but did not mature into practical usefulness.
However, I must ask: is one point of an alternative history not to explore the paths not taken? Had these technologies been embraced, how might the march of technology be changed? This is of course where we start to move from educated guess to conjecture, so I feel that making this a part of the "normal" RtW experience may not be appropriate. Inclusion of these possibilities, on the other hand, I feel is more than acceptable. A basic idea of how I feel might be useful to include alternative paths would be:
Create a new campaign modifier that expands upon the "Varied Tech" option. When this option is selected, the start dates of many technologies will be altered. Radar in a very simple sense may emerge before even the first airship, while heavier-than-air travel might be delayed a decade or more. This could also make for an interesting use for the "eccentric scientist" event. It may be worth having some theoretical techs added in to account for early adoption, such as radar techs that are highly limited and worse than the "normal" radar. Additionally, there were many ideas that ultimately failed, such as the USSR's attempts to mount a 12" recoiless rifle on a destroyer. Having occasional theoretical techs like this show up could add variety to a game, as designs that would never work in our reality find purpose.
I'm certain I'll think of something else I wanted to mention, but for now that sums up a few of my thoughts I wanted to get out on paper.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 6, 2020 16:31:49 GMT -6
Counterfactual history has never been well received by the historians of the world. But it is interesting that we all on occasion say to ourselves "what if I had done this different". Ah, the big "what if". Pro Forma statements by accountants are in fact, counterfactual accounting statements. My one concern for the game is that the events in the flow chart of the game, are actual technological or geostrategic events. When we get the the decision point in the chart, all the facts leading up to that decision must be factual and accurate. This is why in my Radar thread, I entered the actual events and estimated dates so that we could, possibly, move the decision point for primitive radar to be built, back in time. This is what I believe is the most accurate way of creating campaign modifiers.
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Post by wlbjork on Jul 7, 2020 2:03:22 GMT -6
It's also important to consider that just because something could be done, it doesn't mean it's actually practical.
Consider the first Turing-type computers. They were enormous - often taking up an entire room, and capable of doing little more than complex mathematics. Yet technology proceeded and by the 90s a calculator capable of doing the same thing was roughly the size of a modern mobile phone. Another 20 years* and we have the smart phone capable of doing even more than a desktop computer of the late 90s. In 60-70 years, capabilities have grown massively and the size of the machines needed has shrunk dramatically.
*Smart phones are a good example in themselves as they were around for over a decade before they became both practical and commercially viable.
Having said all that, one factor also needs to be added: simplicity. Fixing the development timeline makes things far simpler, which in turn makes it less likely to bug out.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 7, 2020 7:24:40 GMT -6
It's also important to consider that just because something could be done, it doesn't mean it's actually practical. Consider the first Turing-type computers. They were enormous - often taking up an entire room, and capable of doing little more than complex mathematics. Yet technology proceeded and by the 90s a calculator capable of doing the same thing was roughly the size of a modern mobile phone. Another 20 years* and we have the smart phone capable of doing even more than a desktop computer of the late 90s. In 60-70 years, capabilities have grown massively and the size of the machines needed has shrunk dramatically. *Smart phones are a good example in themselves as they were around for over a decade before they became both practical and commercially viable. Having said all that, one factor also needs to be added: simplicity. Fixing the development timeline makes things far simpler, which in turn makes it less likely to bug out. One of the first computers for practical use was ENIAC. It weighed over 27 ton's and occupied about 18,000 square feet with vacuum tubes and diodes. We had a set that occupied 22000 square feet of room. The set I am referring to is the FSQ-7 It was tube based computer. You had to do a cold tube check every shift. Here are some pictures of the FYQ-47 and FST-2B. The scopes are called RAPPI's or Random Access Planned Position Indicators. FST-2B - www.google.com/search?q=FYQ-47+computer&client=firefox-b-1-d&sxsrf=ALeKk03eQVEzpyb6mExIx3rNhjlr8ts5Yg:1594128240631&tbm=isch&source=iu&ictx=1&fir=Vk4wHO68oBYp-M%252CMS-wFXVOCkr_PM%252C_&vet=1&usg=AI4_-kRnasMWdy2faVcZ1oXimOAfgKxFYA&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi28Ii8nrvqAhUaCTQIHTqZAycQ9QEwAHoECAYQAw&biw=1920&bih=938#imgrc=Vk4wHO68oBYp-M
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Post by ieshima on Jul 7, 2020 21:46:21 GMT -6
All right, this caught my interest so i'll throw in my two cents.
The problem with "Alt History" that practically everyone runs into is that starting from the point of divergence, or PoD, everything that comes after it is a fluid mess of what ifs conjured from the head of whoever is writing it. That can have serious effects depending on where the PoD is in the timeline. If it takes place in, say, the first Gulf War, then short of nuclear war things should look roughly the same as they are today. But if the PoD takes place in, for no particular reason, 1862 when two Union soldiers decide to toss away a wrapper around some cigars, suddenly 158 years of history goes out the window because Lee beats McClellan a week later. Now the author (poor bastard) needs to somehow piece together a believable narrative from that mess. The easiest way to do that is to crack open a history book and try to follow it as closely as you can.
This is where you get your specific problem of technology not adapting to the changes that are made in the alternate timeline. I believe it was S. M. Stirling who said "You can do trains when it is train time, but not before." Because the only thing we have to go off of is our own history, I.E timeline, any major deviations from that are extremely difficult to puzzle out. Which means that a lot of people don't bother to actually put in the work. The shear amount of lazy "Tesla {for it is always Tesla} invents this amazing (blank) in (Insert year between 1870 to 1940) and suddenly (choice of steampunk, dieselpunk, atompunk, fantasy, etc.) world exists" narratives that exist is mindboggling.
That's what appears to have happen in RtWs. The developers, (the team is, what, three guys with full time jobs beside this?) just opened a naval history book, wrote down rough dates as to when certain applicable techs were developed, gave the player some leeway with the tech development speed slider and the 'low, medium, high' preference ingame and called it a day. Because as fun as this game is, it is literally just a game devoted to creating and commanding a Mahanian navy with very little wiggle room outside that, as several people who tried the Jeune Ecole style found out. The developers did not set out to make an alt history sandbox.
Now, that said, how would one go about implementing the idea of, lets call it, Time Adjustable Research, because it looks like there are a few ways of doing this:
1. Make it adjust according to number of X type of ship in a nations fleet. More DDs means faster research in techs that apply to DDs, as a nation that devotes a large percentage of its fleet to light craft would also, logically, devote a fair amount of time into improving those ships.
2. Make it adjust according to number of ships sunk by a given nations X type of ship. More 'kills' would logically result in more up and coming officers wanting to be in the part of the navy that sees the most action and therefore glory, leading to a constant stream of fresh, open minds willing to experiment.
3. Make it adjust according to most ingame miles covered. Probably the weakest of the bunch, but the ship that sees the most 'use' in a given navy would also, logically, be the ship that gets a good chunk of development devoted to it.
4. Make it adjust according to a set of achievements. First ship type to sink X number of battleships gets all applicable tech advanced by X amount of years, first nation to sink x number of warships with submarines, etc.
5. Make it adjust randomly according to historical 'What Ifs'. As much as I dislike the man, if Tesla had focused more on his radio control efforts instead of the lunacy that was wireless power transmission, maybe we would have had true combat capable drones by the 1960's.
These are just a few ideas, but add any more if you can think of some.
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Post by wlbjork on Jul 7, 2020 23:04:30 GMT -6
That would work for a multiplayer game. Not so much for a single player game.
Remember that in this game the AI has a few limitations. It doesn't design ships as such, rather it selects a template and applies a few modifications. This has resulted - and still can result - in the AI selecting a design that it doesn't have the technology to build. However, whereas the human player would not be able to save the design, the AI has no such limitation. A couple of games ago, I tried the 10% technological advancement rate, only to encounter an enemy cruiser with centreline guns and above deck tubes that couldn't be built due to those techs not being researched.
Sadly, the AI would not be able to adapt to such changes in technological development.
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Post by noshurviverse on Jul 8, 2020 2:07:31 GMT -6
That would work for a multiplayer game. Not so much for a single player game. Remember that in this game the AI has a few limitations. It doesn't design ships as such, rather it selects a template and applies a few modifications. This has resulted - and still can result - in the AI selecting a design that it doesn't have the technology to build. However, whereas the human player would not be able to save the design, the AI has no such limitation. A couple of games ago, I tried the 10% technological advancement rate, only to encounter an enemy cruiser with centreline guns and above deck tubes that couldn't be built due to those techs not being researched. Sadly, the AI would not be able to adapt to such changes in technological development. I don't quite see this as a limitation of single player games, but rather the currently rather simplistic manner in which the AI designs ships. As you showed, the AI already bumps shoulders with the modifiers we can already apply, so I don't think it's unreasonable to hope for a refinement of their ship design algorithms.
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Post by arminpfano on Jul 8, 2020 8:04:56 GMT -6
Now this is an interesting thread, so please allow me to add my thoughts.
IMHO the main argument against too much alt history in RTW2 is the OTL-socialization of all players. We all read the books, built the plastic models, learned about the real incidents. The reason why one plays RTW2 or similar simulations is: he/she likes the topic and wants to act, interact and "live" within it. This is what gives the joy of playing RTW, I think. One feels "at home" within a more or less abstracted/streamlined version of the original events. This is the framework to understand specific game results, like "oh, my DDs are quite effective today, sinking three BBs in one battle." (Even the language is influenced, we all talk US navy slang with these abreviations ;-)
This means: if you go too far from OTL, the FUN (and reason for spending life time for the game) is likely to decrease.
This hypothesis may be supported by empirical data. On the anectodical level: I rarely play the the "varied technologies" option, because I do not like to loose the "at home" feeling. Maybe the devs have some wider data about this - how often the option is used by test players or so. Or maybe the discussions in the forum can give some hints. Unfortunately I do not overview all of the threads.
Enough speculation for now. I am called to the bridge, those enemy battlefleets do not sink by themselves!
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 8, 2020 10:53:31 GMT -6
Personally, I don't want RTW2 to become Star Wars. I want this game to be based on actual geopolitical and economic situations. I want the technology to be based on actual technological advancements that could have happened at different times, based on the geopolitical and economic atmosphere. This is an historical naval game. We have the benefit of hindsight and documentation from the time period, probably not available to all at the time. However, we were not there, we don't know the psychological reasons some decisions were made, the way they were. We can only guess. This gives all of us some real latitude on the decisions that we make.
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Post by xt6wagon on Jul 8, 2020 19:30:50 GMT -6
Yet, things could have gone very different with very small changes in timing. Imagine if quick firing guns arrived before torpedoes became even slightly effective. The development of ships would be massively different as torpedo boats wouldn't exist, thus no torpedo boat destroyers, etc. The massive investment in those technologies would have been put into something else.
If aircraft were at WWI levels when radar controlled gunnery became a thing, would have aircraft carriers as we know them ever existed? Sopwith Camels vs radar controled, proximity fuse 5.25" would not go well for the aircraft. It didn't go well for end war ww2 Japanese aircraft.
How would things have changed to have screw propulsion delayed by decades? Paddle wheel was absolutely horrible for warfare. I don't even know how they would square that corner where steam propulsion is limited to low range ships that are quite vulnerable to losing all ability to maneuver. Fine for coastal stuff, but how would England keep an empire where their long range ships are weak wood sailing ships, and everyone and their dog has steam powered ironclads that could sail just far enough to clear a blockade?
I think there is room to explore more settings than delayed aircraft and random tech. Torpedo effectiveness, radar early/late, etc But the really wild things don't seem possible without being a full conversion mod.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 8, 2020 19:39:51 GMT -6
Yet, things could have gone very different with very small changes in timing. Imagine if quick firing guns arrived before torpedoes became even slightly effective. The development of ships would be massively different as torpedo boats wouldn't exist, thus no torpedo boat destroyers, etc. The massive investment in those technologies would have been put into something else. If aircraft were at WWI levels when radar controlled gunnery became a thing, would have aircraft carriers as we know them ever existed? Sopwith Camels vs radar controled, proximity fuse 5.25" would not go well for the aircraft. It didn't go well for end war ww2 Japanese aircraft. How would things have changed to have screw propulsion delayed by decades? Paddle wheel was absolutely horrible for warfare. I don't even know how they would square that corner where steam propulsion is limited to low range ships that are quite vulnerable to losing all ability to maneuver. Fine for coastal stuff, but how would England keep an empire where their long range ships are weak wood sailing ships, and everyone and their dog has steam powered ironclads that could sail just far enough to clear a blockade? I think there is room to explore more settings than delayed aircraft and random tech. Torpedo effectiveness, radar early/late, etc But the really wild things don't seem possible without being a full conversion mod. They certainly could have. The first screw propeller was developed in 1826 and used in 1839. Yet, the first warship to carry the screw propeller was in 1846. That's twenty years later. Militaries are by their nature, very conservative... and they have to be. They are risking the lives of men and women, so they have to be careful. The first successful sinking of a ship by a torpedo was in 1876 but the first quick firing gun was in 1889. As I said, militaries have to be conservative.
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Post by wlbjork on Jul 9, 2020 5:58:46 GMT -6
Hmm, the screw propeller that was used on SS Archimedes was a design that wasn't patented until 1835, and was tested for several years in boats on various waterways in and around GB, attracting the interest of one Sir William Barrow very early on - the then Secretary of the (Royal) Navy.
These experiments, apart from resulting in a major revision in 1836, lead to the construction of the first ship to be equipped with a screw propeller, the aforementioned SS Archimedes starting in 1838. This was at the request of the RN for a full sized demonstration vessel. She was then loaned to the RN for trials in 1840, with considerable success.
Following these trials, the RN ordered HMS Rattler (presumably in 1841) which was laid down in February 1842 and completed in 1843, although she had much more extensive than usual trials and so was not commissioned until 1845.
So in fact it was 7 years from initial patent to a vessel being laid down, or just 1 year from full-scale tests to order.
Yes, a couple of years could have been chopped off that time period - the Surveyor of the Navy who observed a demonstration in 1837 was unimpressed and felt it would be difficult to steer whilst the Admiralty as a whole considered that screw propellers wouldn't work as well at sea. On the other hand, it was pure chance that another experimental vessel was spotted making headway in a stormy sea just a few months later, reigniting the RN interest in screw propulsion and the suggestion that lead to SS Archimedes.
One other point - within 10 years of the commissioning of HMS Rattler, the RN had equipped 174 warships of all sizes with screw propulsion
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 9, 2020 6:33:54 GMT -6
Hmm, the screw propeller that was used on SS Archimedes was a design that wasn't patented until 1835, and was tested for several years in boats on various waterways in and around GB, attracting the interest of one Sir William Barrow very early on - the then Secretary of the (Royal) Navy. These experiments, apart from resulting in a major revision in 1836, lead to the construction of the first ship to be equipped with a screw propeller, the aforementioned SS Archimedes starting in 1838. This was at the request of the RN for a full sized demonstration vessel. She was then loaned to the RN for trials in 1840, with considerable success. Following these trials, the RN ordered HMS Rattler (presumably in 1841) which was laid down in February 1842 and completed in 1843, although she had much more extensive than usual trials and so was not commissioned until 1845. So in fact it was 7 years from initial patent to a vessel being laid down, or just 1 year from full-scale tests to order. Yes, a couple of years could have been chopped off that time period - the Surveyor of the Navy who observed a demonstration in 1837 was unimpressed and felt it would be difficult to steer whilst the Admiralty as a whole considered that screw propellers wouldn't work as well at sea. On the other hand, it was pure chance that another experimental vessel was spotted making headway in a stormy sea just a few months later, reigniting the RN interest in screw propulsion and the suggestion that lead to SS Archimedes. One other point - within 10 years of the commissioning of HMS Rattler, the RN had equipped 174 warships of all sizes with screw propulsion Ok, the time frame was shorter, but had the original design been offered to the British Navy, it might have been tested and implemented far sooner. How valuable for sailing and reliability of naval ships would it have been.
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Post by director on Jul 9, 2020 6:54:49 GMT -6
The adoption (or not) of new technologies during the Civil War is one 'test case' that we can examine. I don't propose to go into a list of ideas that were adopted or not; what I would like to talk about is the process by which ideas were adopted - or not.
Rifle-musket firearms had been available in Europe for a generation and were being adopted in the US by 1861, though the available number was small and most were just 'upgrades' of the standard Springfield pattern. The 12-pounder Napoleon was a relatively recent invention but offered the chance to reduce the types of guns in a battery as it could perform as a gun and a howitzer. Rifled muzzle-loading artillery was becoming acceptable as it offered extremely high accuracy at very long ranges.
What were not accepted? Breech-loaders, rapid-fire rifles or carbines, machine guns. Why? Either tests showed they were too fragile, too heavy or too difficult to maintain in the field, or there were concerns that a soldier would fire away the entire ammunition allowance in a few moments. Additionally, there was the sheer press of numbers - so many people pushing the War Department to try their new gadget or gun or thingummy - while the Department was swamped with the task of getting enough conventional weapons and materiel to equip the men they needed. Among that crowd were a lot of crackpots, a great number of impractical but interesting ideas, and only a few grains of useful ideas.
The few firearms that showed real promise (Burnside, Spencer and Sharps carbines to name a few) were eventually adopted because they interested people high enough up the decision tree. The same goes with the revolutionary ideas of John Ericcson and 'Monitor' or the Pook/Eads river ironclads - as there was no-one who knew how to build an ironclad, pretty much all ideas were tried.
Military departments were and sometimes still are: 1) never as well-funded as they would like 2) run by older, conservative types who would rather have three tried-and-true weapons than one experimental 3) influenced by what enemies and allies are doing 4) not inclined to throw out established training and procedures 5) skeptical of claims and promises 6) wary of things that need a lot of transport, maintenance or special care (as for example machine guns, early radar sets or tanks)
So the problem seems to be keeping an invention in the public eye long enough to interest enough new officers to build some prototypes which generates enough income for manufacturers to make enough improvements to get performance up to the point that even dis-interested officials can admit, 'there might be something in it'.
Ironclad development in the Civil War was driven by necessity on both sides, but those lessons were largely set-aside after the war. Tanks were relegated to the dustbin after WW1, except for a few examples, until German lower-level officers generated enough enthusiasm for the politicians to over-rule the senior generals. Aircraft developed slowly over forty years, with people who could see their potential over-stating what was possible and conventional, senior officers and politicians digging their heels in all the way... Radar, of such vital importance in WW2, was initially under-utilized or ignored by senior American officers during the bitter surface fights of 1942.
So it isn't a surprise to me that we didn't get key inventions, sooner. You'd need a well-developed, rugged prototype, a convincing demonstration, proven manufacturing ability, strong high-level political pressure and enough time to let open-minded junior officers become senior-enough to effect change... or, as in the case of the 12-pounder Napoleon, a weapon that extends uniformity, requires little extra in the way of training and produces clear benefits for little extra cost.
Screw propellers are a bit of a different case because the real issue was how much tonnage could be devoted to what was seen as a filthy auxiliary propulsion system, not to the propulsive method. Through the 1880s steam-power was viewed as a necessary evil, with an emphasis on 'evil'. A screw propeller was better than side-wheels (for a lot of reasons, including not blocking broadside armament) but the principal objection was still to steam - to dirty coal, recalcitrant engineers, tonnage used for boilers and engines, to sails blocked by funnels and dirtied by smoke. Many senior officers wanted to do away with coal and steam and go back to sail-power alone... and ships had to demonstrate power under sail for years even after steam became the primary motive power.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 9, 2020 7:47:20 GMT -6
The adoption (or not) of new technologies during the Civil War is one 'test case' that we can examine. I don't propose to go into a list of ideas that were adopted or not; what I would like to talk about is the process by which ideas were adopted - or not. Rifle-musket firearms had been available in Europe for a generation and were being adopted in the US by 1861, though the available number was small and most were just 'upgrades' of the standard Springfield pattern. The 12-pounder Napoleon was a relatively recent invention but offered the chance to reduce the types of guns in a battery as it could perform as a gun and a howitzer. Rifled muzzle-loading artillery was becoming acceptable as it offered extremely high accuracy at very long ranges. What were not accepted? Breech-loaders, rapid-fire rifles or carbines, machine guns. Why? Either tests showed they were too fragile, too heavy or too difficult to maintain in the field, or there were concerns that a soldier would fire away the entire ammunition allowance in a few moments. Additionally, there was the sheer press of numbers - so many people pushing the War Department to try their new gadget or gun or thingummy - while the Department was swamped with the task of getting enough conventional weapons and materiel to equip the men they needed. Among that crowd were a lot of crackpots, a great number of impractical but interesting ideas, and only a few grains of useful ideas. The few firearms that showed real promise (Burnside, Spencer and Sharps carbines to name a few) were eventually adopted because they interested people high enough up the decision tree. The same goes with the revolutionary ideas of John Ericcson and 'Monitor' or the Pook/Eads river ironclads - as there was no-one who knew how to build an ironclad, pretty much all ideas were tried. Military departments were and sometimes still are: 1) never as well-funded as they would like 2) run by older, conservative types who would rather have three tried-and-true weapons than one experimental 3) influenced by what enemies and allies are doing 4) not inclined to throw out established training and procedures 5) skeptical of claims and promises 6) wary of things that need a lot of transport, maintenance or special care (as for example machine guns, early radar sets or tanks) So the problem seems to be keeping an invention in the public eye long enough to interest enough new officers to build some prototypes which generates enough income for manufacturers to make enough improvements to get performance up to the point that even dis-interested officials can admit, 'there might be something in it'. Ironclad development in the Civil War was driven by necessity on both sides, but those lessons were largely set-aside after the war. Tanks were relegated to the dustbin after WW1, except for a few examples, until German lower-level officers generated enough enthusiasm for the politicians to over-rule the senior generals. Aircraft developed slowly over forty years, with people who could see their potential over-stating what was possible and conventional, senior officers and politicians digging their heels in all the way... Radar, of such vital importance in WW2, was initially under-utilized or ignored by senior American officers during the bitter surface fights of 1942. So it isn't a surprise to me that we didn't get key inventions, sooner. You'd need a well-developed, rugged prototype, a convincing demonstration, proven manufacturing ability, strong high-level political pressure and enough time to let open-minded junior officers become senior-enough to effect change... or, as in the case of the 12-pounder Napoleon, a weapon that extends uniformity, requires little extra in the way of training and produces clear benefits for little extra cost. Screw propellers are a bit of a different case because the real issue was how much tonnage could be devoted to what was seen as a filthy auxiliary propulsion system, not to the propulsive method. Through the 1880s steam-power was viewed as a necessary evil, with an emphasis on 'evil'. A screw propeller was better than side-wheels (for a lot of reasons, including not blocking broadside armament) but the principal objection was still to steam - to dirty coal, recalcitrant engineers, tonnage used for boilers and engines, to sails blocked by funnels and dirtied by smoke. Many senior officers wanted to do away with coal and steam and go back to sail-power alone... and ships had to demonstrate power under sail for years even after steam became the primary motive power. To my knowledge, there were Breech-loading carbines for the cavalry. There was the Burnside percussion carbine, .54 caliber. 55,000 were bought by Mongomery Meigs of the Federal Army. The Smith Carbine, .52 Caliber. The Starr Carbine, .54 Caliber, 25,000 were purchased. The Gallager Carbine, .54 caliber, over 22,000 were purchased. The Joslyn, .52 caliber, over 10,000 purchased and the Sharp Hankins Cartridge Carbine, .52. Some of these were bought for the Federal Navy. The failure to adopt repeating rifles was the fault of Montgomery Meigs and many federal officers objected knowing their effectiveness. The Henry was purchased by state troopers. 10,000 were purchased. The Spencer and the Sharps. There was the Colt which was a revolving rifle, adopted for the Seminole War in 1838. The 1855 model was issued to sharpshooters like the Berdan Sharpshooters. I remind everyone that militaries are by their very nature, conservative and the supply chain has to ensure sufficient supplies of weapons. This was partly the problem with the muzzle loader and the breech loader. We know, or at least there is evidence that on the first day of Gettysburg, John Buford's First Cavalry division was equipped with the Spencer Rifles, Burnsides, Merrills, Ballards and Maynards. The rapid fire from these weapons is what gave John Buford the advantage over Harry Heth's division moving up Herr and McPherson's ridge. The delay allowed the infantry time to get to the battlefield. The average rounds per minute for a muzzle loader is about five, for a breech loader, it is about 15 to 20.
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