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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 13, 2013 9:43:00 GMT -6
These two statements are part of the PLANs doctrine. The first refers to the first major archipelagos off the East Asian continental mainland, including Japan, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, Indonesia, Philippines and Australia. As one author calls them, "sort of a Great Wall in Reverse". Each of these archipelagos is a guard tower reaching from Japan to Australia blocking China's access to the blue waters of the Pacific and Indian Ocean. The PLAN see their navy as being blocked in by these fortresses and the US Navy. The main purpose then of its navy is to ensure freedom of movement of trade and the protection of its coastal maritime system. Their whole naval doctrine is centered around access-denial to the US fleet in the inner areas of the First Island Chain specifically, the South China Seas. Taiwan, is of course, the main sticking point and center fortress in this chain of island fortresses. There are four straits that are of importance in the movement of oil and trade goods from the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and Europe. They are the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Macassar straits. Almost all of China's oil tankers and merchants pass through one of these four straits all controlled by US friendly forces. Some of most interesting comments about this issue of the South China Sea, call it a possible "Asian Mediterranean". Interestingly, one of our friends is, in fact, Vietnam, who views us less of an enemy, than the Chinese who are on their doorstep. Time does heal all wounds. Weapons possibly used by the PLAN, could include land, air and sea launched anti-ship missiles, mines; most probably conventional and nuclear submarines.
I want to tie this thread in with the other three or four threads; The Carrier Club, 21st Century Naval Ships, F-35 and possibly Modern Stealth bombers. We should add another thread about the Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 13, 2013 19:07:23 GMT -6
The question for me is how dependent the PRC is on those four straits for its economic lifeblood. I seem to recall them making gains as far as trading routes and oil pipelines through the Central Asian landmass. However, if they are heavily dependent on those four straits, it brings up a question of how well their access-denial strategy would work if opposing fleets could just hang back at the First Island Chain and bottle them up. That would force the PLAN to venture out of its usual comfort zone - the Chinese mainland littorals - and take on opponents away from their home court. Right now the Japanese are putting up land-based AShMs on some of their island holdings, which would turn the access-denial strategy right back at the PRC if it caught on. As a side note, of late I've seen a few examples of the PRC not playing their hand very well, compared to how the US runs things in that corner of the world. The most recent of these is the disaster response to Typhoon Haiyan; you have the US, Japanese, Australian, and other military forces providing disaster assistance to the Philippines. The PRC is a no-show. Granted, there's not a lot of love lost between the Philippines and PRC due to the Spratly dispute, but giving the neighbors the impression that your ships and planes are only there to point weapons at them isn't the best idea when you depend on chokepoint access. The US has been given permission of late to operate out of Northern Australia and may soon reestablish a non-permanent deployment presence in the Philippines, which is kind of an example of intimidation tactics backfiring badly. thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/10/16/chinas-hermit-navy/breakingdefense.com/2013/09/does-china-have-a-pacific-strategy-or-are-they-bumbling-along/breakingdefense.com/2013/09/chinas-dangerous-weakness-part-1-beijings-aggressive-idea-of-self-defense/
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 13, 2013 21:27:50 GMT -6
According to government sources, 15.2 million barrels of oil per day flowed through the Malacca straits with crude being 90% of that. At least 60,000 vessels pass through that strait yearly. China according to those sources is completing the Myanmar-China crude oil and gas pipeline to relieve the pressure. Two lines from the Bay of Bengal ports to Yunnan province in China. The pipeline's capacity is 440000 bbl/d. Those same sources state that 80% of China's oil passes through this strait.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 14, 2013 16:01:12 GMT -6
I thought I would provide some interesting quotes and get your opinion.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 14, 2013 23:13:45 GMT -6
Hmm, let me see. The first one is interesting because while they've done quite well outside the region, they've pretty much managed to PO everyone but the North Koreans in their neck of the Pacific. Largely I imagine this is because of their dependence on those trading routes; they would probably prefer not having to ask nicely regarding their economic lifelines. There I do not think they are an uber-realist power; bickering with Japan over the Senkakus is far more trouble than its worth and their renewed focus on the Spratlys has caused the Philippines to invite the USN back in after rather enthusiastically sending us packing from Subic Bay two decades ago. Playing big brother to North Korea is also increasingly looking like a bad deal for them; apparently they would rather have the world's most likely cause for a major (and possibly nuclear) war on their doorstop than a US ally.
As far as an existential threat, I agree - the PRC and the US are two powers that really, really would prefer not to get in a scrap with each other. The potential economic damage to both countries and the globe is a major mutual deterrent, possibly a better one than nuclear weapons. I tend to focus on them because as far as potential threat projections for the US they are the one first-rank worst-case scenario left; unlike the Russians these days they have the money and willpower to build capable hardware in meaningful quantities and have it do more than sit pretty in dock or at MAKS.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 15, 2013 10:40:35 GMT -6
I believe the Chinese are attempting to Finlandize the countries bordering them, but I suspect that isn't going to work in the 21st century. These nations, like Vietnam, Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia to name a few will simply develop their own version of SEATO. Couple this with India's new naval strength, and you will see that the Chinese geopolitics isn't going to work like they hope. They also have the problem of internal dissent from areas like Tibet. There are bordering states like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and others who really don't want China attempting to influence their geopolitics as they already have the Russian's causing them grief.
As to disputes over the Spratley Islands, I suspect that Vietnam may provide some assistance to the Filipino's since they have no desire to have the Chinese Navy sailing up and down their coastline. Time will tell.
Time will also tell on the Chinese government. I believe that there is a hope that possibly there will be a peaceful revolution that will change the form of government. The same is the hope for North Korea and possibly a reunification with Seoul as the capital. If that does occur, China has more problems. Right now the South Korea Navy and the Japanese Navy are larger than the Chinese and Taiwan is a fortress that even China probably won't want to tackle.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 17, 2013 18:10:24 GMT -6
Taiwan is certainly in more trouble than they were 15-20 years ago; with improvements in the PRC's aircraft, ships, and missiles they've lost their qualitative edge in air and sea combat. With that said however, the PRC is still lacking in amphibious capability. I imagine if they tried to set boots on Taiwan they'd have a very rough ground war, even if they pounded the bejeebers out of the place first. Also, I'm not really sure what strategic value they'd gain from a forced reunification. Their main logic behind any attack on Taiwan would probably be to deny its usefulness to the US in a larger war. South Korea and Japan are major regional military challenges for them; that's even without the likely assumption that an attack on one of those nations would draw a US response.
One question I believe I posed in another thread was what direction the PLAN is going in with regards to fleet capabilities. Certain aspects - the DF-21D, a rather large fleet of Type 022 missile boats and Type 056 corvettes, and their diesel subs suggest an A2/AD focus. Others - their aircraft carrier program, blue-water combatants like the Type 052C and 052D DDGs and Type 054 FFG, their not-insubstantial force of AORs, and their SSN program - suggest a focus on blue-water power projection. In the latter case, how much of that planning is an actual predicted strategic requirement and how much of it is simply "keeping up with the Joneses?"
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 18, 2013 8:31:28 GMT -6
Taiwan is certainly in more trouble than they were 15-20 years ago; with improvements in the PRC's aircraft, ships, and missiles they've lost their qualitative edge in air and sea combat. With that said however, the PRC is still lacking in amphibious capability. I imagine if they tried to set boots on Taiwan they'd have a very rough ground war, even if they pounded the bejeebers out of the place first. Also, I'm not really sure what strategic value they'd gain from a forced reunification. Their main logic behind any attack on Taiwan would probably be to deny its usefulness to the US in a larger war. South Korea and Japan are major regional military challenges for them; that's even without the likely assumption that an attack on one of those nations would draw a US response. One question I believe I posed in another thread was what direction the PLAN is going in with regards to fleet capabilities. Certain aspects - the DF-21D, a rather large fleet of Type 022 missile boats and Type 056 corvettes, and their diesel subs suggest an A2/AD focus. Others - their aircraft carrier program, blue-water combatants like the Type 052C and 052D DDGs and Type 054 FFG, their not-insubstantial force of AORs, and their SSN program - suggest a focus on blue-water power projection. In the latter case, how much of that planning is an actual predicted strategic requirement and how much of it is simply "keeping up with the Joneses?" Recently, Taiwan concluded a trade agreement with Shanghai. This should be a vision of the future. The nations bordering the Chinese are watching how they conduct themselves with the Taiwanese. I believe firmly that trade and partnerships, economics if you will, is more important than adding more territory and people. The Taiwan government just has to be patient, eventually the democratic wave that started in Tunisia will arrive at China's doorstep. They will eventually transition to their form of democracy. And it might not look like ours, but it will tailored to their geographic and ethnic background. Once this has occurred, then things will settle down in the Far East. Until then, vigilance by Taiwan, US, Japan, South Korea and other First Island Chain nations.
The PLAN is still a relatively small navy, designed for brown water, not blue water. Their job is to protect the inside regions of the First Island Chain and not allow other navies to intrude. Their technology will reflect that concept of operations.
Overall, the PRC can and will use coercion instead of force just as Rome did during the republican era. She has plenty of troops to take and occupy bordering nations. Will that change? It did for Rome, in the third period she felt the need to occupy Mediterranean nations, this might happen to China if she doesn't turn democratic before then. Right now, economic policy and coercion are the name of the game.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 19, 2013 11:00:35 GMT -6
Some of the opinions by experts(hate that word) about China's naval modernization are that while the progress in ASBM's, SAMs, mines , aircraft, subs, carriers etc. is substantial, the real important issues of joint operations, sustained operations by larger formations at a distant is not developed. According to these same "experts", she is dependent on foreign suppliers for propulsion, which is a limitation she will have to adjust in the future. I think the primary problem is her lack of naval experience in power projection naval operations. The US has been doing this since the 1920's, almost 100 years of testing on gaming tables, and yearly wargames and WWII, the Cold War and beyond. If the Chinese stay within their intended missions, they will have no problems. If they try to go beyond those missions, they will get hammered. Even the Japanese and South Koreans have more experience than the PLAN.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 19, 2013 17:56:40 GMT -6
I have some suspicions that much of the blue-water oriented developments for the PLAN are as much rooted in national prestige as strategic requirements. I find it rather telling that PRC sources refer to their new Type 052D DDGs as "Aegis" ships; likewise aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are hallmarks of "great powers." Likewise, their force of five oceangoing AORs facilitates long-range "show the flag" operations. That's not to say they just built the darn things as showpieces; just that they may be trying to mirror the general structure of a blue-water fleet without really sitting down and planning how to effectively use it.
However, going back to history, Imperial Germany decided to build themselves a blue-water navy (again, largely for prestige reasons rather than strategic necessity) and within 20-25 years they could give the Royal Navy a serious fight.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 19, 2013 18:30:04 GMT -6
I have some suspicions that much of the blue-water oriented developments for the PLAN are as much rooted in national prestige as strategic requirements. I find it rather telling that PRC sources refer to their new Type 052D DDGs as "Aegis" ships; likewise aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines are hallmarks of "great powers." Likewise, their force of five oceangoing AORs facilitates long-range "show the flag" operations. That's not to say they just built the darn things as showpieces; just that they may be trying to mirror the general structure of a blue-water fleet without really sitting down and planning how to effectively use it. However, going back to history, Imperial Germany decided to build themselves a blue-water navy (again, largely for prestige reasons rather than strategic necessity) and within 20-25 years they could give the Royal Navy a serious fight. The fleet that Admiral Tirpitz and Wilhelm built was never a real blue water fleet. It lacked sufficient cruisers with which to challenge the British fleet because of the German geographic position and their lack of foreign bases. The fleet was built to confront the British "between Helgoland and the Thames", nothing more. One way to tell, is to compare the freeboard for the Moltke and the British battle cruisers. The German ship had a lower freeboard, indicative of a coastal vessel, not a blue water vessel. In fact, at top speed, her bow was washed over by waves which disrupted her firing. Tirpitz stated in a handwritten note to the emperor:
Tirpitz believed that Germany needed a fleet to protect and expand their overseas interests (sound familiar) but the production of dreadnought was expensive and necessary for the Baltic and North Sea operations, so he sacrificed them. In a memorandum in 1873, it was put this way. " The mission of the battle fleet is the defense of the coasts of the nation. ... Against larger sea powers the fleet has only the significance of a "sortie fleet" (Ausfullsflotte). Any other objective is ruled out by the limited naval strength that the law provides. ".
The Chinese are not interested, at this time or in the foreseeable future, a blue-water navy, as it were. Their navy is regional, just like the Germany Navy was in the period before WW1. Their ships are designed for limited conflicts against much weaker opponents. The South China Sea is China's North Sea and Baltic, pure and simple. They are geared towards fighting pirates, rescuing Chinese civilians overseas in trouble spots and some show-the-flag type operations. In most cases, they are replacing aging ships, not increasing the size, the problem is no one is focusing on the ships that are aging and retiring, just a couple of new subs, one old carrier and some Chinese version of Russian aircraft.
I wonder if there is data, for free, that could confirm this like Jane's etc.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 19, 2013 22:33:46 GMT -6
I'll provide what I can that seems reliable. Here's what we have on their current and upcoming crop of surface combatants. What I'm listing here are designs they have built in quantity, not one-of or two-of classes. They've got 4 modern DDGs (2 Type 052B 2 Type 051C) that fall into that category; you may also include the 4 Sovremenny-class DDGs they picked up in that category. There's also the Type 052 Luhu DDGs, the single Type 051B Luhai DDG, the two Type 054 FFGs, ten Type 053H3 FFGs, that are relatively young ships but obsolete in terms of sensors and armament. Type 052D DDG (assume some guesstimates; like most new PLAN ships they were first spotted on satellite imagery and Chinese websites): 7,500 tons displacement, Active Phased Array Radar, 64 VLS cells with HHQ-9 SAM, hangar for 1 helo. 1 on sea trials, 3 under construction, reportedly another 4 planned. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_052D_destroyerType 052C DDG: 7,000 tons displacement, Active Phased Array Radar, 48 VLS cells with HHQ-9 SAM, hangar for 1 helo. 6 built. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_052C_destroyerType 054B FFG: Reported 5,000-ton follow-on to the Type 054A design with a larger hull and more firepower, including HHQ-16 SAM and possibly standoff ASW missiles. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_054B_frigateType 054A FFG: 4,000 tons displacement, 32 VLS cells with HHQ-16 SAM, hangar for 1 helo. 15 built and 5 more on the way. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_054A_frigateTotal including the oddballs and excluding the on-paper Type 054B is 22 first-line DDGs and 20 first-line FFGs, with another 3 second-line DDGs and 12 second-line FFGs that are young enough to stick around for a while. On the obsolete crap side of the equation, they still have 7 Type 051 Luda DDGs, 4 Type 053H2G Jiangwei-I FFGs, and ~15 Type 053 Jianghu FFGs left, out of an original 17, 4, and 35 respectively. Some of the Ludas are being given modern AShMs and some of the Jianghus have reportedly been refitted as fire support ships with Multiple Rocket Launchers. You also have the 1,400-ton Type 056 corvette/OPV, which the PLAN is ordering at least 20 of and will probably replace a lot of those old Jianghus. For reference, the Ludas displace about 3,600 tons and the Jianghus displace between 1,600 and 1,900 tons depending on the variant. As far as afloat replenishment, they have 5 AORs - 4 purpose-built 23,000 ton Type 903s and a 37,000 ton former Soviet merchant tanker. Overall, the size of their fleet is probably going up a tick, but not significantly. What is significant is that the ships they're getting are far more capable vessels. As recently as 15 years ago, the PLAN surface fleet was pretty much a joke. Now, on paper at least, they're roughly comparable to the Japanese navy, have the South Koreans outnumbered, and have the Taiwanese both outnumbered and outgunned. That does point to a regional navy intent on operating primarily in its own neighborhood; they do have the assets for some blue-water deployments but probably not in a meaningful power projection role. It will be interesting to see how they integrate aircraft carriers into their fleet deployments.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 20, 2013 8:54:51 GMT -6
Here is an interesting website, that you may have seen. www.sinodefence.com/navy/organisation.asp
Let's see how their data stands up. I agree with their conclusions. In my opinion, the Chinese Naval forces have a long way to go and possibly economic conditions are deteriorating in the country as their growth in GDP has substantially decreased. This may put pressure on the government for less spending, in the area of the military. Natural disasters are highly probably in this county in the form of floods and earthquakes especially in the south western regions. The rise of the Indian Navy and a possible coalition of other First Island Countries could make hinder her progress.
We need to be careful of Taiwan pronouncements about Chinese invasion capability by 2020. It's an attempt to influence our geostrategic deployments and economic policy. I am not certain that Taiwan is defendable over time or even worth it. It could be another Vietnam and I don't subscribe to that idea at all. The Taiwanese may need to change their attitude to allow coexistence with the Chinese. They are already taking such steps. Diplomacy is more capable than military force for China.
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Post by steel selachian on Nov 20, 2013 19:14:34 GMT -6
I doubt invading Taiwan is on the PRC's military agenda; their main concern is neutralizing it as an offensive threat which they have largely succeeded in doing. They might make noise about a forced reunification from time to time, but I see that as largely political red meat (much like Arab countries rail against Israel) - something to keep the populace and troops fired up. The PRC's leadership knows that while they might be able to wipe out Taiwan's navy and air force and bomb the crap out of the island, they don't have the amphibious/airlift assets or expertise to take it. The Taiwanese have had since 1949 to plan for that instance and I imagine an opposed landing would be a real bear. On top of that you have even money odds it would provoke a US response. Too much risk for settling a score with Chiang Kai-Shek's corpse.
The Spratlys on the other hand could conceivably be taken without firing a shot, the primary regional opposition would be a very anemic Philippine navy and marine presence, and there's far more to gain in terms of resources and added security for trading routes through the South China Sea. I suspect that if the PLAN is trending towards an aggressive move it will occur there, and not at Taiwan.
As a side question, do we know how much influence Soviet naval doctrine from the Cold War has on the PLAN's officer training and CONOPS?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 20, 2013 20:38:56 GMT -6
Well, the sea is the same everywhere, so there is going to be commonality but geography and geopolitics can change the nature of the quest for maritime power. China is a continental power like Russia. However, she is not in the heartland, like Russia. Russia attempted to command all the seas around the heartland and the Eurasian continent but China's designs are only concerned with the east and south Asian. They are a simple anti-assess and area denial force, as we have stated in this thread. She is not attempting to subvert the nations in the world and is not exporting her political system. China is a rimland power, as Nicolas Spykman has stated. She will focus on the areas bordering her country and is not attempting to project power to anywhere else. At least, not yet.
All of this means that while the ships that she buys and produces might be Soviet based designs, they are equipped, maintained and will be used in an entirely different manner than the Soviet navy.
As to the Spratley's, they are astride a strategic waterway to the Indian Ocean which is the route for most of China's oil tankers, plus it does have oil of its own. I am not certain the Chinese and the Filipino's are ready to duke it out over these isles and shoals. I mean the highest point is 4 meters, 4. That is 13.4 feet. Their biggest claim to fame is fish and guano. So, Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines, China and Taiwan are going to fight over guano. Won't they be surprised if there actually isn't much oil and gas, well with guano around, I guess gas has to be present. I mean, "C'mon, Man".
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