‘Tis to Glory We Steer! (A Great Britain AAR)

[cormallen]

Excellent stuff! Loving the historical designs. Big fan of the early years game and the more diverse design approaches pre ww1-ish and spend a frankly ludicrous account of time in my games manually tuning design techs and modding the "data" file to encourage more variety and "historical" national designs. One day I'll feel happy enough with the results to try an AAR of my own but can only dream it'll be up to the quality of this (and others)!

[oldpop2000]

Moved to its own thread

[aeson]

Oct 24, 2020 12:48:51 GMT -6 babylon218 said:

Also, we're getting close to Dreadnoughts now.  If I can get more than 2 main battery turrets (I can't remember what the tech's called) I think I may be able to lay the first one down before 1905 is out.

The technologies you're looking for are 3 Centerline Turrets (c.1903, allows up to three main battery turrets on the centerline), Main Battery Wing Turrets (c.1904, allows wing turrets with heavy guns), 4 Centerline Turrets (c.1906, allows up to four main battery turrets on the centerline), or 5+ Centerline Turrets (c.1908, allows up to seven main battery turrets on the centerline). There is a chance to skip some of these, so you're not guaranteed to develop them in that order, and developing a later N Centerline Turrets technology automatically grants you the earlier ones.

I'm a bit surprised you took Midway; between the North American East Coast, the Caribbean, the North American West Coast, and Southeast Asia you're not exactly hurting for areas where you can fight the USN, and I don't think it's close enough to Hawaii or the Marshall Islands to be used as a staging ground to invade either of them even with fully-developed invasion technology. Still, I suppose at 0 points taking it doesn't cost you anything in either reparations or station tonnage requirements.

[babylon218]

Oct 24, 2020 18:52:56 GMT -6 aeson said:

Oct 24, 2020 12:48:51 GMT -6 babylon218 said:

Also, we're getting close to Dreadnoughts now.  If I can get more than 2 main battery turrets (I can't remember what the tech's called) I think I may be able to lay the first one down before 1905 is out.

The technologies you're looking for are 3 Centerline Turrets (c.1903, allows up to three main battery turrets on the centerline), Main Battery Wing Turrets (c.1904, allows wing turrets with heavy guns), 4 Centerline Turrets (c.1906, allows up to four main battery turrets on the centerline), or 5+ Centerline Turrets (c.1908, allows up to seven main battery turrets on the centerline). There is a chance to skip some of these, so you're not guaranteed to develop them in that order, and developing a later N Centerline Turrets technology automatically grants you the earlier ones.

I'm a bit surprised you took Midway; between the North American East Coast, the Caribbean, the North American West Coast, and Southeast Asia you're not exactly hurting for areas where you can fight the USN, and I don't think it's close enough to Hawaii or the Marshall Islands to be used as a staging ground to invade either of them even with fully-developed invasion technology. Still, I suppose at 0 points taking it doesn't cost you anything in either reparations or station tonnage requirements.

Yeah, it was pretty much just because Midway didn't cost anything and nothing else gave me any real advantage.  Also, I took Midway mainly just to get some basing capacity in the mid-Pacific.  While the US are the only ones who share that zone, it's close to a lot of other sea zones I share with France.

It's not that useful, I agree, but eh, didn't cost me anything. 

[aeson]

Oct 25, 2020 3:20:15 GMT -6 babylon218 said:

While the US are the only ones who share that zone, it's close to a lot of other sea zones I share with France.

The Marshall Islands are in the Central Pacific sea zone and are controlled by Germany on the 1900 start, so if they still hold them Germany is also there, but I would say it's unlikely that they're going to put many ships into the region.

[babylon218]

Road to ‘Dreadnought’: 1905-1907

The now-Viscount Allington, 1st Viscount Harwich, oversaw a series of reforms in the administration of the Navy. Many of these changes had been slated for 1904 but were delayed by the Anglo-American War. The first, and least substantive change, was the restyling of the Naval Lords to Sea Lords, making Admiral Allington the First Sea Lord. The most substantive reform, however, was the Strategic Naval Review (1905).



In large part, the Review was a summary of the lessons learned in wartime: the discarding of anti-torpedo boat guns below 3in bore diameter, the adoption of Dreyer central firing, the need for massed batteries of uniform calibre to assist rangefinding, and the need to improve commerce protection. The Review also found that in most respects the 12in gun was superior to the 13.5in gun, and in several respects equivalent to the 14in gun then entering service.



The report did offer geopolitical considerations, also. It re-affirmed the need for several foreign station fleets first identified in 1900, but altered the balance of forces somewhat:

• The North Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets would need four battleships each, preferably of uniform gun calibre. It was also advised that each fleet should be assigned a sufficient number of cruisers to pursue enemy commerce raiders in wartime and scout for the fleet: three for the Mediterranean; and five for the North Atlantic, which was to be based from the Caribbean from then on and operate on the Eastern Seaboard for Canadian defence if necessary.

• The Far Eastern Fleet would need two battleships and five cruisers.

• The Home Fleet would need to number no fewer than eight battleships.



The Home Fleet’s requirements were greatly more complicated than those of the ‘foreign’ fleets. As well as needing eight battleships at a minimum, two-to-three cruisers were also desired for commerce protection, with two armoured cruisers for scouting duties and four protected cruisers for screening duties and as destroyer ‘flotilla leaders’.



The overly heavy focus on cruisers was justified by the First Sea Lord as:

“Wartime experience has shown that cruisers will be paramount in modern conflicts. Our battleships, despite inferior numbers, were capable of matching and defeating the American Fleet at sea and denying control of the seas to our enemy. Meanwhile, our cruisers were able to impose a commerce blockade on the United States’ east coast ports. It was that commercial blockade which won the conflict. There was no ‘decisive battle’. A strong battlefleet must therefore be aimed at denying sea control to the enemy whilst our cruisers starve him and force his capitulation.”



The overall construction programme was therefore identified as a need for eighteen battleships and twenty-two cruisers of all types. The cruiser requirements were separated into four categories:

• Station Cruiser: An Armoured Cruiser to lead the commerce protection and scouting efforts of the foreign fleets. Three required.

• Scout Cruiser: An Armoured Cruiser dedicated to fleet scouting duties in Home Waters. Two required.

• Flotilla Leader: A Protected Cruiser designed to lead Destroyer Flotillas in Home Waters for screening or sweeping purposes. Four required.

• General Purpose Cruiser: A Protected Cruiser to perform a range of foreign service and commerce protection roles as part of the designated fleets and foreign stations. The ‘Phoenix-Class’ would form the basis for this type. Thirteen required.



There were differences in the Admiralty over the split between Scout and Station armoured cruisers, especially given the navy had something of an embarrassment of riches for modern armoured cruisers as it was, each perfectly capable of filling either role. Attention thus focused on the Protected Cruisers. Initial plans were put in place for two flotilla leaders. These were to be armed with a larger battery of 4.7in guns for operations against enemy light forces and, as they would be operating with the destroyers, a need was identified for a speed of at least 25kn. This would evolve into the ‘Abercrombie-Class’, or ‘A-Class’ Flotilla Leader.



The General-Purpose Cruiser (also referred to as the General Service Cruiser) would, as already mentioned, follow the path already laid down by the Phoenix-Class, with the Phoenix-Class being retroactively placed in this category. However, with the advent of steam turbines, it was desired to use the new technology to increase the top speed. The result was the ‘Endymion-Class’. The new turbines afforded a top speed of 24kn with more reliable machinery than on the previous cruisers as well as a return to larger coal bunkers for long-range independent operations. Two additional 6in guns were fitted for a total of eight and a broadside of five. Armour was slightly reduced, but as cruisers with even weaker armour had stood up well under fire during the war, this was not considered an issue. The gunshields were removed from the 4in guns and their number reduced from ten to two. Showing the emphasis placed on endurance and independent operation, the ships would receive a third fire control position. Remarkably, this design came out only slightly more expensive than the Phoenix-Class at 1,000 tons more displacement.



It was also desired to equip each foreign fleet with at least one flotilla of destroyers containing eight-to-twelve destroyers each. The Ness-Class had been intended for this role, but with the advent of turbine propulsion, the ‘Ghurka-Class’ was developed. Speed was increased to 28kn, but in other respects the ships were identical to their predecessors. The first four Ghurka’s were ordered in February 1905. Developments in submarines also saw the fitting of dive planes around this time.


Above: British Ghurka-Class Destroyer

In March, ‘HMS Endymion’ and ‘HMS Abercrombie’ were laid down. The decision was also made, observing the development of submarines by other powers, to order the construction of two such vessels for the Royal Navy: ‘HMS E-1’ and ‘HMS E-2’.


Above: British Endymion-Class 'General Service' Protected Cruiser.
Below: British Abercrombie-Class 'Flotilla Leader' Protected Cruiser.


By the end of the month, ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’ returned from their fire control upgrades, followed by ‘Renown’ and ‘Empress of India’ in April.



‘HMS Eclipse’ also emerged from her reconstruction in April, though her utility in this configuration was now in some doubt. She would be placed into the Reserve Fleet while a decision was made on what to do with her.



May saw the Russian battleship ‘Imperator Aleksandr I’ finally enter service. Armed with four 12in guns and sixteen 7in guns, these were clearly a response to the Majestics and woefully under-powered compared against the Resolution-Class. In fact, there had been no progress at all by any of Britain’s rivals towards answering the Resolutions. ‘Camperdown’ and ‘Ramillies’ were brought in for their refits in June.



Meanwhile, the new Second Sea Lord, John ‘Jackie’ Arbuthnot Fisher, began sending repeated design sketches to Allington for an ‘all big-gun battleship’ with a uniform-calibre main battery. Allington responded to these sketches with the following memo:



“The designs which you have prepared for me with regards to ‘HMS Untakeable’ are of great interest. However, I do not believe our technology is yet at the stage for such a vessel to be viable. Nonetheless, keep me apprised of developments. You have my permission to form a committee to investigate this concept.



P.S. Please stop shouting at my Private Secretary. Yes, I am getting these memos.”



September 1905 saw ‘HMS King Edward VII’ arrive with the Fleet. Still one of the most powerful battleships afloat, she would represent the pinnacle of ‘ironclad’ battleship design.



‘Ramillies’ and ‘Camperdown’ returned from their refits the same month, alongside the newly-commissioned Ghurka-Class destroyers.



The remaining three ‘Abercrombie-Class’ flotilla leaders were laid down in October: ‘Active’, ‘Aurora’, and ‘Agamemnon’. ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’ were sent to the Mediterranean Fleet to take over from ‘Centurion’ and ‘Repulse’, which were in turn sent to form the Far Eastern Fleet in Singapore. Towards the end of the month, the DNC informed the Admiralty that his department had developed new methods of underwater protection to cope with torpedo strikes while a vessel was underway. Anticipating another barrage of design memorandums from Fisher, Allington pre-empted him by authorising the inclusion of the system in the ‘Untakeable’ design studies. There was speculation, particularly from critics of the so-called ‘Fish Pond’, that the design committee was simply Allington’s attempt to keep Fisher ‘out of the way’, though this seems to have been apocryphal.



In December 1905, the spirit of goodwill and technical cooperation which began in 1904 was formalised by the Allington-Tirpitz Agreement, which saw British and German Companies encouraged by their respective navies to correspond and share technical developments. Shortly thereafter, four more Ghurka-Class destroyers are ordered.



‘HMS Severn’ was ordered in January 1906 as the second ship of the Endymion-Class.



In March, another flurry of memos were sent from Fisher’s office, this time giving ‘Untakeable’ a superfiring gun turret aft. An amused Allington reportedly turned to his Private Secretary and said:

“Oh dear, Robert. I think soon I should have to let Jackie build his ship or he shall have a stroke!”



In April, the ‘Phoenix’ and ‘Pallas’ commissioned, with ‘Calypso’ following in May.



In June, two more ‘Endymions’ were laid down as ‘HMS Cambrian’ and ‘HMS Leander’, followed by four more ‘Ghurkas’ in July as the previous four complete.



Also in July, there were developments in submarines which allowed them to operate out of harbours and into coastal waters.



‘HMS Abercrombie’ entered service in September 1906. Unfortunately, her turbine equipment proved somewhat underpowered and she could only maintain 24kn on sea trials, not the 25kn which she was designed for. With it now too late to fix the issue in the follow-up ships, construction was suspended while efforts were made to fix the issue in ‘Abercrombie’.



‘HMS Endymion’, on the other hand, commissioned much more smoothly and began her training cruise.



The same month saw the development of the new BL 6in Mk.VI gun, which had a barrel length of 45-calibres giving far better performance compared to the preceding models.



In October, the possibility was investigated of rebuilding the ‘Abercrombie’ with an up-rated power plant to allow her to make her design speed of 25kn. However, it was found that such a rebuild would involve almost as much cost as building a whole new ship and take more than half as long. It was also found that a new ship on the same displacement could make 26kn for little increase in cost on the same displacement. With tensions, and thus the need for the destroyer leaders, low, the revised design was authorised as the ‘B-Class’ and Allington convinced the Board to condone the scrapping of the remaining ‘A-Class’ ships on the stocks. ‘Abercrombie’, however, would complete training and be placed into reserve.



By the end of October, the ‘Redoubtable’ arrived, giving the Royal Navy a full Battle Squadron of 14in gun ships.



In November, the four ships of the ‘B-Class’ were laid down: ‘Battle’, ‘Badger’, ‘Beacon’, and ‘Bellona’. It was also planned to lay down another ‘Endymion’, but this was postponed while modifications were made using newer, more efficient turbine equipment and the newer 6in gun.



In December 1906, ‘HMS Persian’ was laid down – the first of a series of modified Endymion-Class vessels. Differences were minimal, with the only visual indicator that a vessel was a ‘Persian’ sub-class and not an ‘Endymion’ being that the gunshields were reinstated on the 4in guns.



February 1907 saw design work begin on the ‘Second Ghurka’ flotilla design, which would become the ‘Foxhound-Class’. Like the ‘Persian-Class’, these were simply improved versions of the Ghurka-Class, using more efficient turbines to allow an expansion of shell provisions. The first four ships would be laid down in March.



March also saw Liberal Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman argue for the laying down of three more battleships. Allington had deliberately held off on more battleships while more design work was carried out on the ‘Untakeable’, but with the other powers starting to catch up, Allington acceded to the Prime Minister’s request.



However, with the ‘Untakeable’ studies still not at a point where a satisfactory vessel could be laid down, the three new battleships would have to be based on the conventional paradigm. As Britain currently had six 12in battleships, and this armament had proven most satisfactory, the new vessels would be based on the Majestic-Class, while incorporating improvements made in the Resolution- and King Edward VII-Classes. The ships, named ‘Royal Oak’, ‘Revenge’, and ‘Barfleur’, would be laid down in June.



As if by fate, just as the ‘Royal Oak-Class’ were being ordered, Fisher sent another ‘Untakeable’ sketch, utilising four centreline turrets. It is said the wailing of Admiral Allington could be heard from the Royal Naval College at Osborne, across the Solent.



Design work was ordered on the new battleship in July, with an armament of ten 12in guns, an armoured belt 11in thick, cruiser-grade speed of 21kn, and displacing 25,000tons. It was a ship with no equal, which was a culmination of the various developments in naval technology since Allington took control of the Admiralty in 1899, and it was given a name to suit: ‘Dreadnought’.

---

So, a long post this time.  I really wanted to get a dreadnought designed this 'chapter'.  Otherwise, pretty cruiser-heavy.  My 5in guns have equivalent range to the new 6in guns, but poorer penetration.  That being said, they're also designed to fight with the fleet against lighter vessels, so that's not really an issue.  Most protected cruisers only have 2in of armour, and the 5in guns can manage that well-enough.  The 4in can't.  Also, it helps make the flotilla leaders that much more cheaper, so frankly I can afford to lose a couple.  Man did 'Abercrombie' coming out slow annoy me, though.  "Goddammit, Jack!  You had one job!  ONE!  JOB!"  

EDIT: Screenshots added!

[babylon218]

Dreadnought, the Battlecruiser, and ‘Fisher’s War’.

‘HMS Severn’ arrived with the fleet before the end of July. Despite the fact designs were currently being drawn for a ship which would render them obsolescent, the cabinet commended the Admiralty for the construction of the ‘Royal Oaks’. Meanwhile, experience with ‘Endymion’ and ‘Severn’ allowed Pembroke Docks to shorten the construction of ‘HMS Leander’ by approximately one month.



In September, several machinery manufacturers, including Parsons, were able to produce working and reliable oil-fired boilers. Despite Britain having relatively ready access to oil, Allington held off adopting the technology for a time while studies were done to determine its effectiveness. Designs also emerged from the DNC for three-gun turrets, but these were similarly put aside for the time being, not least of all because of concerns a three-gun turret would be too heavy for its bearings and the machinery to allow it to turn. The first of the ‘Foxhounds’ joined the fleet.



In November 1907, ‘HMS Dreadnought’ was laid down. Her construction would be accelerated to delay the ability of other powers to respond to her, and in order to finance her construction the construction of ‘HMS Revenge’ and ‘HMS Barfleur’ had to be suspended, in part because it was decided to use their 12in guns to speed up ‘Dreadnought’s’ fitting-out. By the end of the month, ‘HMS Leander’ had joined the fleet.



Above: British Battleship HMS Dreadnought.


However, little was it known at the time, the British had already lost the race to build the first all-big-gun battleship, as just as the first plates for ‘Dreadnought’ were cast, the ‘USS North Dakota’ slipped into the Hampton Roads. Displacing 20,000 tons, she carried ten 12in guns (although in a less efficient configuration) and fourteen 4in guns. An 8.5in belt protected her citadel and her machinery could propel her to 21kn. While the British had lost the race to build ‘Dreadnought’ before anyone else, they were at least certain their vessel was superior to its American rival.





In December, several Sheffield steel mills approached the First Sea Lord in private, proposing that the Navy push for more battleships like ‘Dreadnought’, which would clearly require the purchase of a great deal more steel, in return for them offering comparatively good rates for the steel ordered. Allington was insulted at the blatant attempt to bribe the Navy into helping boost the steel industry and rejected the offer as ‘the most blatant and audacious attempt at political corruption I have ever known!’





With Britain having lost the race for the first all-big-gun battleship, and a second North Dakota-Class on the stocks in the US, Allington started pushing for resources to catch up. He argued successfully to suspend construction of ‘Royal Oak’ and cancel ‘Barfleur’ entirely, as the Admiralty hadn’t wanted to build ‘Barfleur’ in the first place and felt she was surplus to requirements. ‘HMS Bellerophon’ was thus laid down in December, along with the second Persian-Class cruiser ‘Pearl’, just as ‘Cambrian’ left the yard at Chatham for her first training cruise.



The timing of ‘Bellerophon’ commencing construction proved fortuitous, as word then arrived that Germany had begun construction of their own ‘North Dakota/Dreadnought’ type, the ‘SMS Hannover’.



In January 1908, ‘Endymion’ and ‘Severn’ were dispatched on their first overseas deployments, replacing the older Leander-Class ‘Champion’ and ‘Curacao’, which were summoned back to Britain for scrapping. The month also saw Admiral Allington become ‘almost feverish’ about the development of more dreadnoughts, though thus far only the US and Germany had laid down any such vessels. No doubt feeling political pressure to claw back Britain’s pre-eminent position among the naval powers, he ordered the pre-dreadnought battleships of the Home Fleet placed into reserve and scrapped the Orlando-Class cruisers ‘Orlando’ and ‘Europa’ to build up funds. ‘Pelorus’ and the Phoenix-Class vessels were to be kept at home to maintain cruiser numbers pending the arrival of the B-Class, upon which they would replace the ‘Comus’, ‘Astraea’, ‘Pandora’, and ‘Arethusa’ on foreign stations.



One fortunate side effect, both of Allington’s so-called ‘Dreadnought Fever’ and of the emergence of the type more broadly, was that it solved the question which had been dividing the Navy since 1905: whether or not to merge the ‘Scout Cruiser’ and ‘Station Cruiser’ roles. Fisher had been bombarding the Admiralty with the concept of a ‘Dreadnought Armoured Cruiser’ for some time by this point, and a consensus was built that four or five of these would be sufficient to meet the terms of the 1905 Strategic Naval Review, and could fill the role of both station cruiser and battleship – a battle-cruiser – thus representing a substantial saving. Design work commenced on a battlecruiser before January ended.



In February, designs were drawn up for a large 900-ton destroyer which would become the ‘Scorpion-Class’. These ships would carry five 4in guns; two side-by-side on the fo’c’sle as bow ‘chasers’, and three mounted centreline behind the bridge, the aft pilot house and on the quarterdeck (allowing the aft pilot house gun to fire over it). They would also mount four torpedo tubes: two on either beam.



March saw the French lay down two dreadnoughts to differing designs, ‘Richelieu’ and ‘Colbert’, with the US laying down the ‘USS Connecticut’ to a new design. It was also discovered that the Imperial German Navy had pre-empted the Admiralty with regards to the Battlecruiser, as ‘SMS Vonn Der Tann’ was already under construction.
  The first 'Scorpions' were laid down.




In April 1908, a disarmament conference at The Hague, pressed for by Campbell-Bannerman’s government prior to the his retirement on health ground, to put controls on the naval arms race ended without agreement. ‘HMS Battle’ commissioned, becoming the first of her class to do so, as the other three ships had all suffered some form of delay due to resources being diverted to ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Bellerophon’.






Around the same time, Vickers announced they had designed an improved 12in gun – the 45-calibre Mk.X, just in time for the Dreadnoughts to not receive them.



There were also developments in ship design, with the DNC doing an end-run around Fisher, who by now was vocally criticising the First Sea Lord, to show Allington a design sketch for a General Service cruiser with an armoured belt – a ‘light’ armoured cruiser. Although the navy was by now involved in a very public scandal matched only by the allegations in the press that the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth, had leaked design drawings of ‘Dreadnought’ to Germany through private correspondence with the Kaiser, Allington was able to authorise the development of what would become the ‘Town-Class’ before May 1908.





The scandal mentioned above resulted from an article published on 14 April 1908 in ‘The Times’. The article was written by Jackie Fisher and lambasted Admiral Allington’s handling of the Navy since 1905. Accusing Allington of having ‘delayed’ the laying down of ‘Dreadnought’ until it was too late, he also condemned the Allington-Tirpitz Agreement of 1906 and railed against the design of ‘HMS Indefatigable’, which hadn’t been laid down at that time, or even officially ordered as such. Fisher claimed the First Sea Lord had “frustrated the design process at every stage”, by demanding armour be increased and insisting on the fitting of an all-centreline armament with aft superfiring turret, arguing that the insistence on such an arrangement increased displacement and thus cost considerably. This very public outburst was the culmination of various disagreements between the First and Second Sea Lords, once allies, which had been building since the ‘USS North Dakota’ was launched. Fisher’s critics used the opportunity to argue for ‘clearing the pond’, while Allington’s Private Secretary wrote a counter-article for ‘The Times’ accusing Fisher of “bringing the navy into chaos”, pointing out that the Admiralty had agreed to increase the armour on the ‘Indefatigable’ as a whole because they were intended to fill the Fleet Scout role and so would come under fire. It was also pointed out that other nations would no doubt build battlecruisers to respond (and in fact, ‘Von der Tann’ had already been laid down before the final design was approved) and so the British ships would likely come under the fire of similar guns to their own.
  The dispute was referred to in the press and the navy as 'Fisher's War'.



Above: British 'Battlecruiser' HMS Indefatigable, whose construction would prompt 'Fisher's War'.

The embarrassing and disgraceful row which had engulfed the navy would destroy both Fisher and Allington. As the new Prime Minister Herbert Asquith replaced Lord Tweedmouth with Reginald McKenna, the new First Lord was tasked with bringing the situation in the Admiralty under control. Though he sympathised with Allington’s position, he informed Allington in confidence that:

“It is clear to both Cabinet and the Public that the differences which have been allowed to persist between Fisher and yourself cannot be resolved while the two of you retain your present positions, neither will it be settled if either of you should emerge the victor.”



Allington, understanding McKenna’s message, offered his resignation. In his memoirs, he would record:

“I did all I could do in practical terms to maintain the Navy’s position. I defended it at every turn. Fisher’s proposals were impractical, even by the opinions of his own subordinates, until 1907. However, matters of Naval Administration were my purview, and in truth I should have seen the situation developing between Jackie and myself far sooner than April 1908. The fault for the resulting conflict, which tore apart the Navy I so adored, is entirely mine. I allowed the situation to spiral out of control.”



Fisher would not go so quietly. After being curtly told he would not take Allington’s post, he proposed instead Admiral Arthur Wilson, who had commanded the North Atlantic Fleet in the Anglo-American War and was a supporter of Fisher. After McKenna refused to allow Fisher to dictate who should replace the First Sea Lord, especially after how publicly he’d brought the navy into disgrace, Fisher stated that he would resign if anyone but Wilson got the job, not trusting who he saw as the alternatives. McKenna immediately, “it is accepted.” Fisher would continue to attack the management of the navy for the first few months of McKenna’s term as First Lord, but the matter was solved with the departures of both Allington and Fisher.



Initially, it was expected that Charles Beresford for succeed Allington as First Sea Lord. However, regardless of the fact he was the Conservative MP for Woolwich until 1903, he had had a long-running feud with Fisher and had recently been involved in a spat with Admiral Percy Scott which indicated a sudden change in personality to one which McKenna referred to as ‘tempestuous’. Ultimately, the position of First Sea Lord would be granted to Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, who had been credited with the success of the North Atlantic Fleet at the Battles of Fundy Bay. Upon hearing the news of Bridgeman’s appointment, Allington sent the following telegraph to his old office at the Admiralty, for Bridgeman to receive upon assuming the position.



“To: Sir Francis Bridgeman, First Sea Lord

Am deeply gratified to hear you have been appointed in my stead. I hope I have left the office in good state for you, as I know that I have left it in the most capable hands.
Yours Faithfully,

                               George Allington, RN”

---

This is not the end.  This is not even the beginning...of the end.  But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.  
So, by my reckoning the Americans must have started building 'North Dakota' in 1905, two years before I got the technology that actually allowed me to build a battleship with more than two twin turrets (I tried immediately after getting main wing turrets and it wouldn't give me the option, and again when I got superimposed x turret, ditto.)

Poor Allington.  I was always planning on retiring him before 1910, but with losing the Dreadnought race (albeit in a good position to catch up) and having already placed Fisher as Second Sea Lord, I just couldn't see Fisher letting that stand, especially with Allington and the Admiralty butchering his precious battlecruisers (I even deliberately refused to accept 'Invincible', 'Indomitable', or even 'Inflexible' as a name, considering the three ships so-named were, in order, vinced, dominated, and flexed.   )  Such a public feud, as most of Fisher's feuds were, was only going to end one way.

[babylon218]

Also, sneak peak...

[aeson]

Oct 25, 2020 15:39:06 GMT -6 babylon218 said:

So, by my reckoning the Americans must have started building 'North Dakota' in 1905, two years before I got the technology that actually allowed me to build a battleship with more than two twin turrets (I tried immediately after getting main wing turrets and it wouldn't give me the option, and again when I got superimposed x turret, ditto.)

Main Battery Wing Turrets allows you to build ships with twin turrets in wing positions, but if I recall correctly you need a 16,000t or larger hull to support heavy wing guns in twin turrets. Also, if you're just opening the design screen, setting the gun caliber, and pressing the 'add turrets' button to check what you can put on the ship, be aware that there is a size below which wing turrets will not be offered for guns larger than 6", with exactly what that size is depending on the gun caliber, so if you haven't changed the design displacement from the default 5,000 tons or whatever then it can look like you don't have the option to build ships using them.

As to X turret, you need at least one of the N Centerline Turrets technologies before any of the superfiring turrets can be used.

[babylon218]

Oct 25, 2020 18:14:13 GMT -6 aeson said:

Oct 25, 2020 15:39:06 GMT -6 babylon218 said:

So, by my reckoning the Americans must have started building 'North Dakota' in 1905, two years before I got the technology that actually allowed me to build a battleship with more than two twin turrets (I tried immediately after getting main wing turrets and it wouldn't give me the option, and again when I got superimposed x turret, ditto.)

Main Battery Wing Turrets allows you to build ships with twin turrets in wing positions, but if I recall correctly you need a 16,000t or larger hull to support heavy wing guns in twin turrets. Also, if you're just opening the design screen, setting the gun caliber, and pressing the 'add turrets' button to check what you can put on the ship, be aware that there is a size below which wing turrets will not be offered for guns larger than 6", with exactly what that size is depending on the gun caliber, so if you haven't changed the design displacement from the default 5,000 tons or whatever then it can look like you don't have the option to build ships using them.

As to X turret, you need at least one of the N Centerline Turrets technologies before any of the superfiring turrets can be used.

Ah, that would explain it.  I should have figured really, since I'd tried to put chasers on a 600t hull previously and couldn't with any gun above 2", so I figured that was based on displacement and I'd be able to do it when I got 900t destroyers.  Just didn't make the connection.  Although both times I tried I was hitting auto-design with BB selected.

[babylon218]

‘The August Crisis’

Bridgeman assumed the Office of First Sea Lord at a moment of transition, with ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Bellerophon’ twenty months from commissioning and ‘Indefatigable’ over two years away, while the pre-dreadnought battleships ‘HMS Royal Oak’ and ‘HMS Revenge’ had been suspended early in construction to finance them. Meanwhile, the four ‘Flotilla Leaders’ of the B-Class were entering service, with ‘Battle’ having commissioned the previous April, and ‘HMS Persian’ of the Persian-sub-class of the Endymion-Class due to launch in July.



Bridgeman had, essentially, been thrust into the job as there were few other suitable candidates, seeing as how the Royal Navy had been torn in two by ‘Fisher’s War’ as it was known, and Bridgeman was at least seen as a safe pair of hands. While Allington endorsed Bridgeman’s appointment privately, he deliberately avoiding making any public statements regarding the new First Sea Lord in order to avoid inflicting any controversy on the war hero. The two were not in complete agreement on naval policy, however.



Bridgeman had been Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet before his appointment as First Sea Lord and had previously been Second-in-Command of both the North Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. It was his detachment of the former which fought the two battles of Fundy Bay. It was this experience he would draw on in the Strategic Naval Review (1908).



Although the previous review had only been conducted three years earlier, it was believed the strategic situation had sufficiently changed since 1905 to justify another assessment. One of the findings was that Britain could not hope to maintain a two-power standard in dreadnoughts without sacrificing in other essential areas. The United States and France were building two dreadnoughts to Britain’s three (questionably, counting ‘Indefatigable’), meaning with the ‘USS North Dakota’ the two would have a combined strength of five dreadnoughts to Britain’s three. It was accepted that Britain could build up to four dreadnoughts at a time without unduly sacrificing construction in other areas, and indeed if all resources then available were directed to dreadnought construction, the funds could be found to build five dreadnoughts at a time, though the review was keen to stress that this was not an ideal course of action.



The Review instead recommended Britain focus on building enough Dreadnoughts to match the largest other power at the time, plus an additional battle squadron in reserve. As of this time, that meant Britain would need to rapidly outbuild the United States, taking the road of building four dreadnoughts at a time.



Meanwhile, the Review took issue with the previous administration’s decision to attempt to replace all protected cruisers with ‘General Service’ and ‘Flotilla Leader’ types. The report pointed out that many of the older cruisers which Allington had sought to replace still had a clear purpose and were not yet ‘categorically obsolete’. The Review categorised existing cruisers into three roles: Fleet Cruiser (a merging of 1905’s station and scout cruisers); General Service Cruiser; and Flotilla Leader. It also sought to categorise the legacy cruisers into these categories, where appropriate.



The Cressy, Hogue, and Drake-Class armoured cruisers were categorised as fleet cruisers, with that classification to be reassessed if and when Battlecruisers became more prevalent. The Astraea and Eclipse-Classes were categorised as general service cruisers (albeit of the ‘second class’, solely because they were considered too slow if they ever had to engage modern surface raiders).



The Review also took the step of laying out exactly what was needed to protect Britain’s imperial interests. To do this, it separated the world into fifteen ‘operational areas’, of which nine required an active Royal Navy presence: the Mediterranean, West Africa, Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, North American East Coast, North American West Coast, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific. The Mediterranean would need, in the Review’s estimation, one battlecruiser, one general service cruiser, and a ‘colonial sloop’. The West Africa Station would need one cruiser and one sloop. The North American East Coast, Indian Ocean, South Africa Station, and East Indies Station would need one battlecruiser each, or one of the Centurions and a fleet armoured cruiser. The Caribbean and the Australia Station would need one fleet cruiser or two general service cruisers each. Northeast Asia would need one general service cruiser and two sloops. Finally, British Columbia would also need one general service cruiser and a sloop. In all, Britain would need five-to-eight general service cruisers, two-to-five battlecruisers, and five colonial sloops to cover foreign commitments, not including the designated fleets. In fact, the vessels already on foreign stations exceeded this, with it being judged that around 40,000 tons of shipping could be removed from the Foreign Stations, representing a significant saving in maintenance. As such, the following classes were singled out for immediate disposal, rather than Allington’s policy of replacement:

• The Leander-Class

• The Orlando-Class

• The Centurion-Class



The replacement program would continue as new ships came online, but the change in focus to providing for the colonial requirements rather than replacing the foreign station vessels like-for-like would take a great burden of the naval budget and allow the navy to turn more towards the fleet.



The disposals commenced before the end of May, with the ‘HMS Niobe’ being expended for gunnery practice, yielding interesting data regarding the use of high explosive shells.



As Bridgeman’s reforms took effect, May also saw the B-Class cruisers ‘Bellona’ and ‘Badger’ joined the fleet. ‘Beacon’ was delayed launching by a shortage of 4in guns, which were diverted to the Dreadnought programme.



June would see the decision made to cancel the remaining two Royal Oak-Class battleships, on the basis that even with construction suspended they were still taking up resources to maintain (to say nothing of the dockyard space), and they would be obsolete before they were even finished. The resources would be better used to continue building dreadnoughts. ‘HMS Persian’ joined the fleet, but ‘Beacon’ was still waiting for her gun armament.



Meanwhile, July would see Bridgeman act on the last design Admiral Allington had authorised before being forced out in May: The ‘Town-Class’ of Light Cruisers.



The Town-Class were based on the preceding Persian Sub-Class of the Endymions, but were fitted with an armoured belt 2.5in thick and mounted a modified armament of seven 6in guns, with one gun each on the fo’c’sle and quarterdeck, two guns abreast the fore-funnel, two guns abreast the aft pilot house, and the last gun atop the superstructure just abaft of the aft pilot house to fire over the quarterdeck gun. A secondary armament of ten 4in guns was also fitted, though these were once again on unshielded mounts. The ships would make 25kn and were explicitly designed for commerce protection and independent operations. They were also designed to be a more-efficient option for colonial stations, although Bridgeman’s reforms would see this role postponed for the ships. In July, ‘HMS Bristol’ was laid down as the first of the Town-Class, setting the blueprint for future cruiser design in the Royal Navy. ‘Beacon’ finally commissioned before the end of July, just as the class-leader ‘HMS Battle’ completed her working up.




Above: British Town-Class Light Cruiser HMS Bristol.

In August, the Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. shipyard at Elswick offered a deal to build another Town-Class cruiser, two months quicker than the Royal Dockyard at Pembroke, for 10% less in total cost. The offer was accepted, with the ‘HMS Newcastle’ being laid down on 10 August. Part of the reasoning for the decision was that delays were being suffered by all the Royal Dockyards as the Navy’s own procurement system struggled to cope with the pace of building. This was not helped by the decision to lay down a modified Dreadnought-Class with the new 12in gun, ‘HMS Temeraire’, in September.



British naval shipbuilding was bottlenecked. The accelerated construction of two dreadnoughts at once was taking resources faster than they could be acquired, forcing materials for other aspects of the naval programme to be cannibalised to meet the schedule. The ‘schedule’ was to catch up with American dreadnought construction as rapidly as possible. However, it was observed that the present projections indicated both ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Bellerophon’ would be completed in 1910, whether they were rushed or not. Meanwhile, the United States would only complete one battleship that year – ‘USS Minnesota’. Meanwhile, America would finish three dreadnoughts in 1911 compared to two British ships. Since accelerating construction of the first two ships had little bearing on hulls-per-year in service, and it was argued it was costing the navy more to keep virtually-completed hulls in drydocks because materials were being siphoned for the battleships, it was decided to stop expediting the construction of the first two dreadnoughts in order to ensure the rest of the programme completed on-time.



In January 1909, the first four ‘Scorpion-Class’ destroyers arrived, after several delays. Meanwhile, tensions with Germany were deteriorating as the Allington-Tirpitz Agreement broke down with Allington’s departure, culminating in the German Naval Law of 1909 in February. This would in turn prompt the laying down of ‘HMS Superb’ as the fourth British dreadnought.



In April, Russian diplomats approached the British Government with the proposal of a security arrangement. With tensions rising across the world for the second time in a decade, Bridgeman advised the government that, instead of tying Britain’s foreign policy to Russia, which could have the effect of provoking Germany or Russia’s traditional ally France, the Russian invitation should be expanded to the entire European Congress to resolve outstanding issues. Meanwhile, Vickers reveal an improved model of the BL 14in gun, increasing the barrel length to 45-calibres.





April would also see the Admiralty conduct a rationalisation of coastal defences, with several coastal batteries being considered too poorly armed or in locations where they would serve little purpose. Two 4in batteries in Britain would be disbanded, along with the New Providence 6in battery and Nigeria 6in battery. The 9in battery in Malta would also be replaced by a 6in battery to save costs, as the threat from Italy was not seen as being as great as it seemed during the Mediterranean Crisis.



In May, the DNC notified the Admiralty that his department was preparing several design studies which mounted more than five gun turrets on the centreline. This development was pursued with great interest, but construction of further dreadnoughts would have to wait until 1910.





July saw the American dreadnought ‘Minnesota’ commission, one year earlier than expected. The design was more heavily armoured than ‘North Dakota’ and incorporated a superfiring aft turret arrangement in place of the deck-level pair on her predecessor. Otherwise, there was little difference save for an 800 ton increase in displacement and an increase from 4in secondaries to 6in secondaries. In August, ‘HMS Pearl’ commissioned.



Above: US dreadnought battleship USS Minnesota.

January 1910 would see the ‘HMS Newcastle’ be the first of the Town-Class into active service. ‘HMS Dreadnought’ also joined the fleet. On speed trials, she managed to exceed her design speed of 21kn and maintain a speed of 22kn, a good omen for the future. Meanwhile, the DNC informs the Admiralty that his department has developed a method to reinforce a ship’s forward hull to support a superfiring ‘B’ turret. This was nicely timed, as it came when design work was to begin on the next pair of dreadnoughts for the navy.





In February, Asquith’s government was looking to cut naval expenditure to finance social reforms. Bridgeman railed against the idea, with the support of McKenna, as it would prevent the navy from building enough dreadnoughts to maintain Britain’s position as the naval superpower.





March saw ‘Bristol’ and ‘Bellerophon’ enter service.



In April, Asquith’s government pushed through social reforms at the expense of the Naval Budget, although Bridgeman and McKenna were able to get the cuts watered down somewhat. At the end of the month, the Admiralty was able to purchase the Italian 340mm gun, which was of far superior quality to the British 13.5in then in service.





In June 1910, the ‘Vanguard-Class’ battleships ‘HMS Vanguard’ and ‘HMS St. Vincent’ were laid down. They featured a more efficient arrangement of the main armament, with all guns mounted on the centreline in superfiring pairs of twin turrets fore and aft and a fifth turret amidships.




Above: British dreadnought battleship HMS Vanguard.

August 1910. Tensions between Britain and Germany were at vapour point. The British King Edward VII died in May, being succeeded by his son George, who would take the throne as King George V. George V and the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, despite being cousins, did not have a good relationship. What was worse was by this point figures in the German Army were calling for war with France or Russia, and Tirpitz was advising the Kaiser that Germany would have no better opportunity to fight Britain at sea, as Germany’s shipbuilding industry could not compete with the British for long.



Convinced war with Germany was imminent, Bridgeman called a meeting of the Board of Admiralty to determine how the navy should prepare. First Lord McKenna complained that it would be proper to conduct the discussion before the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), but as the meeting solely concerned the nation’s defence at sea Bridgeman argued it was not a matter for army coordination. He did agree, however, to a meeting a few days later of the CID to discuss possible use of the Army to invade German colonies if war did break out.



Germany was building a large number of destroyers: not enough to match Britain’s destroyer force, but certainly enough to be a concern. Another concern was that Germany had twelve U-boats – submarines – compared to Britain which had four, as the development programme initiated by Allington had fizzled out during the Dreadnought race. The potential of the submarine to threaten the fleet or British merchant shipping was not lost on the Board, and plans were devised to commission a number of sloops to support the fleet and merchant ships against the submarine fleet. This was made more dubious in concept by the decision that these ships should also serve as the future colonial sloops and as fleet minelayer-sweepers.

[babylon218]

The Anglo-German Naval War.

By the end of August, the ‘HMS Indefatigable’ commissioned into the navy, Britain’s first battlecruiser.



September saw the German Empire issue an ultimatum to Britain, demanding naval equity by treaty and several British colonies. The ultimatum was dismissed by foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey on the CID’s recommendation. Grey would note, “This ultimatum is not only entirely without merit; it appears deliberately designed to be rejected. It is not a message sent as the last resort to avoid war, but to start one.”




Indeed, start a war it did. By the beginning of September 1910, the Battle Squadrons of the Home Fleet were slipping anchor to their war stations and telegrams were sent across the world notifying the overseas stations to be on alert for German commerce raiders. On 2 September, 1910, the cable ship ‘HMTS Alert’ was sortied into the English Channel to cut the German oceanic telegraph cables, forcing any German intercontinental diplomatic or military messages to use foreign cables – cables which almost all eventually ran through Britain.





On 14 September, a British force led by ‘HMS Good Hope’ and ‘HMS Drake’ penetrated the Heligoland Bight to bombard an ammunition depot near Tönder. Despite attempts by the ‘SMS Von der Tann’ to interfere, the 1st Battle Squadron consisting of ‘Bellerophon’, ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Resolution’ assigned to cover the operation were able to drive the German Battlecruiser away and engaged in a gunnery battle with the ‘Von der Tann’, the German Dreadnought ‘SMS Hannover’, and the predreadnought ‘SMS Brandenburg’ while ‘Good Hope’s’ force engaged the ammunition dump and its two associated 6in gun batteries. The armoured cruisers showed appalling accuracy, especially compared to the B-Class flotilla leaders accompanying them, expending almost all their ammunition and taking moderate (though largely ineffective) fire in return. Nevertheless, the depot was finally destroyed by 2100Z under night bombardment, and the British force withdrew without incident. During the Heligoland Raid, a German patrol boat and merchant were sunk, though the Tönder batteries succeeded in sinking the destroyer ‘HMS Rattlesnake’. The action would be proclaimed by the British press ‘The Battle of Helgoland Bight’.



October would see planning begin for the class of dreadnought to succeed the Vanguard-Class once the Temeraire-Class completed construction. The new vessel would use the ‘Vanguard’s’ all-centreline turret layout, but replace the 12in Mk.X gun with the new 13.5in Mk.V gun. This, combined with the necessary increase in armour to fight at medium range, necessitated an increase in displacement to 29,000 tons. Some thought had been given to placing six of the guns in two triple turrets at deck level to remove the need for ‘Q’ turret, but it was found this did not allow a sufficient reduction in displacement to noticeably reduce cost. A nine-gun design with three triple turrets was possible to fit on a hull only 500 tons larger than ‘Vanguard’, but this was also rejected as it was feared the turrets would be prone to jamming in battle situations. Thus, the design detailed above would commence detailed development work for laying down later that year as ‘HMS King George V’, after the new King. They were seen as a massive improvement on the ‘Dreadnought’ designs preceding them and represented as big a displacement increase from ‘Dreadnought’ as ‘Dreadnought’ had to preceding battleships. Thus, it is little wonder the press took to dubbing the new ship a ‘super-dreadnought’.



7 October 1910. The battleships ‘Bellerophon’, ‘Redoubtable’, and ‘King Edward VII’ were sortied with attendant destroyers to escort a merchant convoy travelling through the North Sea towards the Denmark Strait. At 0750Z (0850 local), ‘King Edward VII’ sighted an unknown vessel approaching the convoy from due South. The battleships began accelerating to 18kn and moved to investigate.





The ship was identified as a German small cruiser and ‘Bellerophon’s’ guns spoke at 0757Z.





Three additional ships were sighted to the South-West in line astern. Vice Admiral Sir George Callaghan, Second-in-Command, Home Fleet, had already assumed the cruiser was a scout for a larger force and concluded the column of three ships was an enemy battle squadron, turning his squadron West to intercept. In short order, the new arrivals were identified as ‘SMS Hannover’, a Brandenburg-Class pre-dreadnought, and a Mecklenburg-Class pre-dreadnought.





0831Z. ‘Bellerophon’ showed superb accuracy (or superb luck) as her first salvo against ‘Hannover’ scored a hit.




Above: A good omen, as Bellerophon's first shells find their target.


Above: SMS Hannover, dreadnought battleship of the Imperial German Navy.
Below: SMS Brandenburg, pre-dreadnought battleship of the Imperial German Navy.


Above: German Mecklenburg-Class Pre-Dreadnought Battleship.

0847Z. With neither side scoring any noticeably damaging hits thus far, Callaghan began closing to 10,000 yards, knowing that at that range his older 12in guns and the 14in guns on his pre-dreadnoughts could theoretically penetrate the belt armour of the German battleships. However, the range may also allow the larger 34cm rifle on the German dreadnought to penetrate his armour, as it was not yet known what the quality of the German gun was.





0858Z. Having closed the range, ‘Bellerophon’ began scoring repeated hits on ‘Hannover’. However, the Germans now also found the range, and the starboard gun turret ‘G’ took a 13in shell, though damage appeared minimal and the guns continued to fire.


0905Z. Under withering fire, the German battleships turned away. Callaghan considered pursuit but decided against it as at Fundy Bay US vessels turned away several times only to turn back once the British made to pursue. Furthermore, his first responsibility was to protect the convoy.





0913Z. Callaghan’s caution proved prudent, as ‘Hannover’ was not in fact leading the German fleet into a withdrawal, but moving to the rear of the German formation due to damage. ‘Bellerophon’ and ‘Redoubtable’ now concentrated fire on the Brandenburg-Class battleship while ‘King Edward VII’ continued to trade body blows with the enemy Mecklenburg-Class. The disengagement by ‘Hannover’ has given Callaghan vital minutes to cause unmolested damage to the German line.





0922Z. The Mecklenburg-Class now broke line, turning to port under the British guns. The British were slowly overhauling the German Fleet and Callaghan hoisted flags to tell his ships to ‘cross enemy T’.



0931Z. The signal was hauled down – the sign to the following ships to execute the order. One by one, ‘Redoubtable’ and ‘King Edward VII’ followed ‘Bellerophon’ in a turn to the west, cutting across the reforming German line at a range of less than 5000 yards. The Germans were forced to turn away, with Callaghan allowing the range to open back to 10,000 yards before turning to keep with the enemy.





1007Z. The enemy Brandenburg-Class was on fire and slowing. The enemy force once again tried to turn away, Callaghan hoisting flags to turn to port simultaneously. The signal was executed at 1010Z.




Above: SMS Brandenburg burning under British fire as the German battleships attempt to withdraw.

1021Z. The Brandenburg-Class was being overhauled, the German destroyers and cruisers trying to screen it with smoke.



1026Z. With his ships approaching torpedo range, Callaghan ordered his force back into line astern to pass the German battleship at a safe distance.



Above: Bellerophon and King Edward VII mercilessly bombard Brandenburg.


1050Z. The Brandenburg had stopped dead in the water. Callaghan’s escorting destroyers turned in for a screening attack against a German V1-Class destroyer which had fallen behind due to damage and was dangerously close to the battleships.



1109Z. The Germans were in full retreat. Callaghan decided not to pursue and instead directed his destroyers to sink the enemy Brandenburg-Class with torpedoes while his battleships disengaged to the north to guard the convoy.


1136Z. ‘Wolverine’ and ‘Viking’ launched a torpedo each at the Brandenburg-Class, scoring two hits. Satisfied the enemy battleship will definitely sink, the destroyers returned to Callaghan’s Battle Squadron.





1303Z. Satisfied he is not being re-engaged, Callaghan returned south to rescue survivors from the German battleship, with ‘HMS Basilisk’ pulling fourteen men from the water. The torpedo attack was evidently so effective that there was no time for any more of the crew to abandon ship before she rolled over from the torpedo hits.





The action at Fladen Ground was a clear victory for the Royal Navy. Beyond successfully sinking one of Germany’s more powerful pre-dreadnoughts, the British ships had consistently dealt more damage to the Germans than the Germans could return. Bellerophon had scored hits with 3.5% of her shells, compared to ‘SMS Hannover’ with 1.3%. ‘King Edward VII’ and the sunken German Battleship later identified as the ‘SMS Brandenburg’ herself also impressed, with hit ratios of 3% each. The British ships had all exhausted more than half their shell supply, however.





On the 3 November, after refusing several potential fleet actions with the British fleet, German cruisers were spotted by ‘HMS Badger’, leading the 2nd and 4th Destroyer Squadrons in screening ‘HMS Good Hope’ and ‘HMS Drake’. A Friedrich Carl-Class Armoured Cruiser was encountered around 0700, screened by four destroyers and a Hela-Class Protected Cruiser.



Due to wear on ‘Drake’s’ engines, an extended chase south through the German Bight had to be called off. However, the protected cruiser ‘SMS Nymphe’ was caught between ‘Good Hope’s’ squadron and the 1st and 9th Cruiser Squadrons led by ‘HMS Pearl’ and ‘HMS Bristol’ respectively. Cornered, the ‘Nymphe’ was quickly reduced to a burning wreck by the seven British cruisers before being torpedoed by ‘HMS Nautilus’. In the night action which followed off the East Frisian Islands, two German destroyers were also sunk.



‘Temeraire’ joined the fleet in December, alongside five of the emergency programme corvettes. Germany called for peace, but with Britain in control of the North Sea, the terms were to be dictated by London. Negotiations were fruitless and war continued into 1911.





On New Years’ Day, 1911, a confused night action in the Western Approaches saw the German Armoured Cruiser ‘SMS Fürst Bismarck’ torpedoed. However, so confused was the action neither side was able to determine what damage was done, with the British believing they had torpedoed ‘SMS Von Der Tann’ instead. Both German ships limped safely back to port. The German cruiser ‘SMS Gazelle’ was sighted raiding British merchant shipping off the American East Coast, and the Admiralty dispatched ‘HMS Bristol’ to hunt her down.
  Germany had survived under blockade long enough to see out 1910, but could she really stand another year?

[babylon218]

Hunting Gazelles.

The 31 January saw another raid into the Heligoland Bight, this time led by ‘Indefatigable’. At 0950Z, the ‘HMS Good Hope’ engaged a German Armoured Cruiser of the Friedrich Carl-Class, with ‘Indefatigable’ closing to assist at 26kn.



1019Z. ‘Indefatigable’ was engaged by a second armoured cruiser.



1054Z. ‘Von der Tann’ emerged from the south. The Second Battle of Helgoland Bight had begun in earnest.



1123Z. ‘Von der Tann’ had rushed into ‘Indefatigable’, allowing the British ship to effortlessly cross the German ‘Tee’, from where she could fire her full eight-gun broadside against which the German ship could reply with only two. Even ‘HMS Newcastle’ was engaging the Battlecruiser at this point.



1141Z. ‘Indefatigable’ was hit at the conning tower, disabling the command crew and leaving the ship out of control for several minutes.





1224Z. ‘Von der Tann’s’ rudder jammed. As the German battlecruiser turns uncontrollably to starboard, the British destroyers moved in. Unfortunately, control was restored before the British ships could launch torpedoes.



1254Z. Despite the failed initial attack, the ensuing melee between the two fleets saw a British torpedo slam into ‘Von der Tann’s’ side.



1346Z. ‘Indefatigable’ is hit by a German torpedo. With fulfilling the bombardment mission no longer viable, the British force began to disengage.



1418Z. Despite a valiant effort by her crew, the heavy seas proved too much and ‘Indefatigable’ was abandoned with heavy flooding.



The Second Battle of Helgoland Bight was a major defeat for the Royal Navy. Though three German destroyers were sunk in exchange, the bombardment mission was abandoned, and the British lost a battlecruiser to a hit which should not have proved fatal. The inquiry into ‘Indefatigable’s’ loss would find fault with her underwater protection and censure the Captain for taking his force into such close action with the enemy when ‘Von der Tann’ had just taken torpedo hits from his own destroyers.



After the battle, the final three emergency programme corvettes entered the navy.



February 1911 would see the laying down of ‘HMS King George V’, expected to complete in 1913.



Above: British 'superdreadnought' HMS King George V.


On the 18 February, ‘HMS Amphion’ intercepted the ‘SMS Gazelle’ approximately 90nm East of Albemarle Sound on the coast of North Carolina. By 1547Z, after several hours of pursuit, ‘Amphion’ brought ‘Gazelle’ to battle as the German raider’s engines began to give out due to several long-range 4.7in hits amidships.





The battle was fierce, with ‘Gazelle’ reducing ‘Amphion’ to 6kn under a hail of 6in fire before one of ‘Amphion’s’ 4.7in guns struck ‘Gazelle’ below the forward 6in gun position, penetrating the German ship’s armour and exploding inside the forward ready-use magazine. Captain Ballantine Allington, brother of the former First Sea Lord, would recall:

“A great gout of flame belched through her deck, throwing the forward gun at least 200 feet clear of the vessel. After a moment, we all heard what we could only describe as a deep thunderclap, which seemed to last forever. We could no longer see the ‘Gazelle’ through the smoke, except the faintest glimmer of flame shooting outwards through her sides as her forecastle parted from her. Then silence…followed by screams and calls for help. It was not glorious – it was slaughter.”




Above: German Protected Cruiser SMS Gazelle.

Fortunately, ‘Amphion’s’ battle damage was repairable at sea and she was ready for action again the following week. With ‘Gazelle’ neutralised, the ‘Bristol’ was diverted to hunt down the ‘SMS Hela’ in the Caribbean.



On 21 March, the ‘HMS Beagle’ led her destroyer flotilla in a sweep of the Heligoland Bight when, at 1715Z, they encountered German forces headed South for Heligoland itself: three S22-Class destroyers. The action continued into the night, resulting in a close-range melee in the dark. The British destroyers chased two German destroyers in the dark all the way to Heligoland before having to break off due to the Heligoland minefields. Overall, however, the Germans dealt more damage to the British force than vice versa and ‘Beagle’ was forced to lead her flotilla back to Grimsby at 10kn.



Also in March, the DNC had drawn up plans for efficient turreted secondary guns on dreadnought-style ships, furthermore training exercises by the Home Fleet had allowed Callaghan to drill his ships in cruising in columns.






Another action on 14 April ended even worse for the British, with three ships being sunk to only one German ship.



In May, the German revolutionary Albrecht Donau was living in exile in Britain. It was suggested that Donau could be smuggled into Germany via the Netherlands, but Bridgeman cautioned against this by saying, “there is no telling where the fires of revolution may spread once lit. Keep him in chains!”





On 8 May, the Home Fleet conducted a sweep in force of the Heligoland Bight, with the ‘HMS Bellerophon’, ‘Dreadnought’, and ‘Temeraire’ leading alongside the 6th Battle Squadron. This was motivated in large part by a growing frustration within the Admiralty over the repeated destroyer losses in the area. At 1448Z, as the British fleet passed the East Frisian Islands, the cruiser ‘HMS Newcastle’ sighted a German merchantman headed for Emden, being escorted by a Brockeswalde-Class gunboat.



More German merchant shipping was sighted as the fleet got closer to East Frisia. Aside from several gunboats, there was little German Naval activity.



That lasted until 1722Z, when ‘HMS Drake’ sighted a large number of German warships coming out of the Bight, signalling the flagship via wireless, “the enemy is in sight”.



1930Z. The two battlelines engage directly in the dusk at a range of 13,000 yards.



Sporadic fighting continued into the night between both sides’ light forces until 2258Z, when the German battleline and British battleline blundered into one another in the dark. ‘Bellerophon’ took several torpedo hits and was abandoned at 2321Z.



At the end of the battle, the British fleet came out somewhat worse than their German counterparts. A German pre-dreadnought had been sunk, but so had ‘Bellerophon’. Four British destroyers were sunk for the same number of German ships.

[babylon218]

Okay, so something of an update.

So, as you can see, the quality of the last post was a bit less than the previous posts. I've been having a rough time lately, and RtW2's RNG just started dunking on me to the point where I actually rage-quit - something I usually never do. I'm taking a bit of a break from this campaign, playing a couple other saves or just different games.

Also, I have lines to write:

"I will not try to prosecute night actions without the training...
I will not try to prosecute night actions without the training...
I will not try to prosecute night actions without the training..."

[babylon218]

From Severus to Spartacus.

June 1911 would see Bridgeman issue an order mandating that “capital ships should not attempt to prosecute battle in visibility below 10,000 yards”. This was a response to the loss of both ‘Indefatigable’ and ‘Bellerophon’, which were both lost in night actions or poor visibility to torpedo attack. He also ordered ‘Renown’ and ‘Empress of India’ to be demobilised, in part to save funds (of which the Navy had less than six months’ remaining) and in part because they were surplus to the needed number of battleships to contain Germany ahead of Operation: Severus.



‘Royal Sovereign’, ‘Benbow’, ‘Collingwood’, ‘Anson’, and ‘Hogue’ were being assembled at Port Edward in British Weihaiwei to seize the German holdings in the Far East, starting with Tsingtau (Qingdao) in the neighbouring Kiautschou Bay, before moving to Australia to do the same against the Bismarck Archipelago.



The purpose of Operation: Severus was to reduce the overseas basing capabilities of the Imperial German Navy and thus allow British forces to be concentrated in a handful of areas.



On 26 June, ‘HMS Good Hope’ and ‘HMS Drake’ were dispatched to patrol the Wash off the East Anglian coast after reports a German cruiser had put to sea for bombardment operations near Gt. Yarmouth. Off Cromer, on 27 June at 0416Z, the cruisers received reports of a large German force just North-East of them. While the reported figure of four dreadnoughts, a battlecruiser, and a destroyer was dismissed as erroneous (on the grounds that Germany didn’t have four dreadnoughts), they changed course to investigate all the same.



0420Z. The corvette ‘HMS Baron Blantyre’ signalled the ‘Good Hope’ via ‘HMS Newcastle’: “Have enemy in sight. One large battleship or cruiser, one escort. 30nm east of Cromer.” With the enemy location in hand, the ‘Good Hope’ accelerated to full speed and closed to engage.



In the next ten minutes, the ‘Baron Blantyre’ updated its report to two armoured cruisers and five destroyers.



0447Z. With the British squadron racing south to meet them, the German cruisers turned away from ‘Baron Blantyre’ and moved to disengage. The chase was on.



At 0645Z, having chased the German cruisers into the Southern Bight between Gt. Yarmouth and the Dutch coast, ‘HMS Good Hope’ opened fire on the rear German cruiser.



Unfortunately, the chase east had not been kind to the two British Cruisers and their machinery began to give out, with ‘Drake’ reduced to 18kn and ‘Good Hope’ 20kt, slowing to 18kt so ‘Drake’ could keep up. Knowing his ship, ‘HMS Newcastle’ had a much better hope of catching the German ships, Captain Tyrwhitt requested permission to break away from the Armoured cruisers and attempt to flank the Germans with ‘Newcastle’ and his destroyers, bringing them back to the struggling ships. This permission was granted at 0745Z.



What followed was a lengthy skirmish between ‘Newcastle’ and the German destroyer screen across the Broad Fourteens as the British light cruiser began to overhaul the German armoured cruisers. It was noted aboard ‘Good Hope’ that even if Tyrwhitt couldn’t force the Germans to turn back, he was blocking them against the Dutch coast. One way or another, the Germans had to turn and fight.





By 1030Z Tyrwhitt was almost out of sight of ‘Good Hope’ and taking fire. Two German destroyers had fallen behind and virtually trampled by the British screen.





At 1128Z, with the Germans approaching Emden and ‘Newcastle’ now struggling to keep pace due to battle damage, Tyrwhitt turned back to rejoin the British armoured cruisers. Unfortunately, the ‘Good Hope’ and ‘Drake’ were still unable to make any speed over 18kt and the German squadron had slipped past the Hook of Holland before the armoured cruisers could bring their guns to bear.



The British Cruisers, unable to catch the Germans before they could make port, turned away as they approached the German coast.



Although seen as a missed opportunity, the action was a tactical victory for the British. The Germans had been unable to bombard the British coast and they had lost one destroyer with a second heavily damaged. Captain Tyrwhitt was praised for his gallant attempt to engage the German armoured cruisers and would be promoted soon after to Commodore of the Harwich Force, placing him in the front line for all future North Sea engagements.



The action had also been a trial by fire of the Town-Class cruisers. ‘Newcastle’ had held up surprisingly well under sustained fire from German 8in and 6in guns, taking eleven shells in all before breaking off.





Above: HMS Newcastle, circa 1911.


On 20 July, 1st Destroyer Flotilla conducted a sweep of the Heligoland Bight. At 0216 a squadron of German Destroyers were sighted. Over the course of the morning, the British destroyers sank two German destroyers for one British before having to break off the action close to Heligoland.



Later in the month, ‘Superb’ commissioned. It was decided to rush her into active service rather than allow the crew to complete their working up as ‘Temeraire’ was under repair due to mine damage.



In August, ‘HMS Marlborough’ was laid down as the sister ship to ‘HMS King George V’. Meanwhile, ‘HMS Good Hope’ intercepted and sank ‘SMS Prinz Heinrich’ attempting to run the blockade on the 21st.



September saw Operation Severus go into action, with five British battleships escorting British troops from Port Edward to Tsingtao. The lone German gunboat in the area could do nothing to intervene. On 24 September, while patrolling off Madagascar, ‘HMS Ariadne’ intercepted ‘SMS Victoria Louise’, but quickly lost her in the fog.



In October, the ‘Howe’ and ‘Majestic’ were sent from supporting the Tsingtao invasion to assist in the invasion of the Bismarck Archipelago.



On 26 December, the ‘HMS Diadem’ intercepted the ‘SMS Friedrich Carl’ and sank her in a long battle which dragged into the night. Both ships had to abandon the action with heavy damage, but while ‘Diadem’ limped back to New Providence, the ‘Friedrich Carl’ succumbed to her wounds and sank in the night.



Another belated Christmas gift to the Royal Navy was the news on 27 December of the surrender of Tsingtao, depriving the German raiders of any fuelling bases in Northeast Asia.



Late in January 1912, ‘HMS Astraea’ was investigating a freighter off Cape Verde when the freighter suddenly hoisted the German Naval Ensign and identified herself as the ‘SMS Carsten’, a converted merchant raider. Despite getting some crippling early hits on ‘Astraea’, the ‘Carsten’ was no match for the British cruiser’s guns and sank.



In February, another German attempt at negotiating was made, but again fell through due to mutually unacceptable demands.





On 28 April, ‘Good Hope’ led another intervention against a German naval bombardment along the Norfolk Coast. At 1617Z, the German force is sighted, led by ‘SMS Vonn der Tann’. Tyrwhitt, in command of the force this time round, signalled his ships to “‘Avenge ‘Indefatigable’.”



An early hit caused ‘Vonn der Tann’ to slow markedly, so even the obsolescent ‘Good Hope’ and ‘Drake’ were overhauling her while her destroyer screen was mangled by British local superiority. After a while however, ‘Vonn der Tann’ repaired her damage and began to pull away. Tyrwhitt ordered his flotillas forward, the B-Class cruisers leading the charge. ‘Battle’ got heavily damaged but alongside ‘Beacon’ managed to force ‘Vonn der Tann’ to re-engage the ‘Good Hope’, which put her under heavy fire. Unfortunately, the damage was once again rectified, and ‘Vonn der Tann’ once again pulled away. This time, the B-Class ships were unable to run her down before nightfall.



The end of April saw British troops land on the Bismarck Archipelago and attention turning towards German East Africa.



May saw construction begin on airship bases at Grimsby and Rosyth, aimed at providing reconnaissance for the fleet over the North Sea. It also saw the introduction of the ‘Admiralty Fire Control Table’, designed under Frederic Dreyer to centrally direct all main battery guns. Finally, following a three-week siege, the capital of German New Guinea, Simpsonhafen (modern-day Rabaul) surrendered to the British forces. The ‘SMS Hansa’, which had been operating in the area against British shipping, was forced to scuttle as her machinery wore out. Rumours reach London of mutiny among German sailors in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel.





On 25 June, British destroyers once again tangled with German destroyers, this time off Terschelling. This time, the British lost two destroyers for three German ones. The following day, news arrived that British troops had invaded German East Africa.



In August, the ‘SMS Freya’ was interned by the French in West Africa with a lack of fuel following a battle with ‘HMS Arethusa’ off Cape Verde, the old third-class cruiser giving a good account of herself and limping home despite heavy damage.



On 14 October, ‘Good Hope’ led a large coastal raid against a German fuel depot near Tönder. Once again, Tyrwhitt came up against ‘Vonn der Tann’ and moved in for the attack. At 1030Z, the ‘Vonn der Tann’ withdrew and Tyrwhitt, unable to give chase in the older cruisers, turned back towards his actual objective.



At 1328Z, the ‘Good Hope’ struck a mine and began to sink, having already taken heavy damage below the waterline from a German 11in shore battery, making the shore battery ironically much more damaging to the British forces than ‘Vonn der Tann’ had been. ‘Badger’ also struck a mine but managed to limp home. It was an embarrassing defeat for the Royal Navy and would effectively end British operations in the Bight.



On 29 October, shots were fired in Wilhelmshaven as sailors from the High Seas Fleet clashed with army troops during a mutiny. Violence spread throughout the city, with sailors joining local protestors angered by a lack of food and poor living conditions inflicted by the British blockade. The riots in Wilhelmshaven were the opening salvo of the German Revolution. Within days, Kaiser Wilhelm II had fled by rail to the Netherlands as the army quickly lost control of the situation in the major cities. With the Imperial Government effectively defunct, the Spartacist Movement led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg siezed the Riechstag and proclaimed the Federal Socialist Republic of Germany (SBRD) on the promise of ‘Peace and Bread’.





The Treaty of Shotley, signed in November, would see Germany stripped of all her colonies and forced to pay harsh reparations to Britain. It came just as ‘HMS St. Vincent’ joined the fleet.





In post-war reductions, several of the older Armoured and Third-Class Cruisers were scrapped, along with ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’, in order to pay the navy’s expenses incurred immediately post-treaty. ‘Vanguard’ joined the fleet the same month. Meanwhile, design work began on the next two dreadnoughts to follow the King George V-Class, the first of which would be laid down in April as ‘HMS Iron Duke’. There were some changes, namely deleting ‘Q’ turret and up gunning ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets to three guns instead of two, removing the weight of the midships magazine and turret armour and allowing the belt armour to be increased from 12in to 13in. They would be the first British battleships to receive Directors at the design stage, while the two ‘Vanguards’ were adapted during construction.



Above: British Dreadnought Battleship HMS Iron Duke.


In May 1913, the second ‘Iron Duke’ was laid down as ‘HMS Howe’, replacing the withdrawn pre-dreadnought.



In July, ‘HMS King George V’ joined the fleet and began working up. During her sea trials, she proved capable of 22kt.



October would see the keel-laying of ‘HMS Birmingham’, the first of the ‘Improved’ Town-Class, with ten 6in guns for a broadside of six guns.



Above: British Town-Class Light Cruiser HMS Birmingham.