My Thoughts on the Naval War in WW1 and the WW2 Pacific

[oldpop2000]

One thing that historians find out is that as time passes and the events of the past recede, the more the details also fade from our view and minds. This is what has happened in our perception of the naval war of WW1 and the War in the Pacific. The details are receding and the only information we have is from, diaries and logs etc.


For the World War, it is interesting that the German's had a specific plan, maybe not a plan so much as a faith in the British Naval offensive spirit. It became for the German's written in stone, that the British, on the first day of war would come steaming out of Scapa Flow and other bases and would attack the German Bight area because that is what it had one in the past, and because it was much stronger than the German fleet.


The German fleet was probably stunned and confused why the British had not done what their history had shown they would. The German's had fortified their North Sea Islands, demolished vast rows of houses on Cuxhaven, even a famous belfry was destroyed to prevent the British from using it as a navigation aid. The river mouths were mined deeply. Behind these barriers, lay the German High Seas fleet with guns loaded. I will come back to this issue but will give you a hint as to why this occurred. Think about Clausewitz and German land warfare.


Next entry will be about the War in the Pacific and the Japanese concepts and perceptions. 

[oldpop2000]

For Japan, her geography made her strategy different. She was a maritime power and had fought two wars with naval operations in both. She had participated in WW1 as one of the Allies. She had also managed to get a copy of War Plan Orange prior to WW1, and with her adherence to Mahan’s Naval strategy and tactics, had developed her tactics, strategy and built her ships around the decisive battle somewhere around the Bonin Islands after Interceptive Operations to attrite our fleet as it sailed from Pearl Harbor across the Pacific.

As with the German’s, the strategic plans did not come to reality. There were many reasons. The earthquakes of 1923 and 1925 which caused much damage and which affected the Japanese economy. The two treaties; Washington and London caused a rethinking between the three naval powers. The depression after the crash of 1929 and lastly, the Japanese movements into China which caused the US to embargo the exports of natural resources like oil, which the Japanese did not have. The US also froze their gold in the New York Federal Reserve.

For the Japanese, the immediate problem was gaining natural resources by heading south. She also had the issue of increased resistance in China which was also causing serious economic issues. Issues which were affecting naval construction and hence, their naval strategy. Another problem for Japan was that the US Navy had essentially changed its thoughts on through to the Philippines strategy in War Plan Orange. We now adopted a gradual, delayed island by island strategy which would not start until one year after the war began. These changes all forced the Imperial Japanese Navy to revise its strategy.

It's new strategy was the Southern Operation to take the Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Rabaul. This operation would gain the Japanese the necessary strategic areas with the natural resources necessary to continue the war. However, this also required the bulk of their fleet and this would mean they would be vulnerable to any movement westward by our fleet. So, the Pearl Harbor attack was developed. But this attack had is problems, both logistically and politically. Their first strategy was designed to take these areas but not provoke the US, hoping that our Congress and national isolationism would prevent a war, initially. But the new strategy did not accomplish this in fact it simply raised the bar, and now we were going fight them until the game was over. This not the Japanese strategy for success, and they knew that.

[oldpop2000]

For the German's, now they had a problem. Their pre-war strategy of a "fleet in being" was out the door. The British were not going to come to them, so they were going to have to perform operations that would provoke the Grand Fleet into engagements. So, they did and Helgoland Bight; Dogger Bank and of course, Jutland were the results. They attacked British ports on the SE coast to get the scouting force of the British Fleet to come out and allow High Seas fleet the opportunity to attrite them. As we know from the results, this strategy, while it did cost the British men and ships, never changed the strategic situation. So, the fleet retired to its ports and the whole issue came to an end.... but not quite. The German's realized that the best strategy was using U-boats to attack British convoys and blockade them. While this strategy did cause the British problems, it also provoked other nations like the US into action, and that was not the point of all this. So, the naval strategy went down the tubes and eventually so did the land strategy.

Point being, the enemy always has a say in your plans. And for the German's it really did. I don't know what Clausewitz would say about this, might be fun to get my book out and find out.

[oldpop2000]

Well, now for my thoughts. 20/20 hindsight is the greatest vision in the world. I have the historical results to use, they did not. But here is my perception. The German's were great land warriors, but apparently did not understand naval strategy and using Clausewitz was not a good solution. They should have studied Mahan, and the British naval strategy applying this information to their geographical situation. They should have studied naval history, and applied the lessons. They apparently did not. At least their strategy would have some reasonable chance for success which the Clausewitzian strategy did not. We can't say "well they should have used the U-boats" because no one knew at that time, how the submarine would affect the war strategy, again 20/20 hindsight. Tactically I think the German's knew how to fight a tactical naval battle and build good ships, but they lacked the overall strategic ideas as to what they wanted the High Seas Fleet to accomplish. Why did we build it? What are we going to use it for and do we really need it?

[oldpop2000]

We have admit that the initial strategic plans for Japan worked to perfection. But within a year, they did not get a victory but a series of defeats that handed strategic initiative over to the enemy. So, does this mean that it was a mistake. I beginning to realize that in the Japanese view, it was not. Based on the Japanese aggression and failure to agree to anything, they felt that this was the time to go to war. Because to them, their survival as a power in the east depended on it.

For Japanese, they did not have much time. They had to secure the resources that they needed and prepare a defensible perimeter for the empire. They knew that the US was building a two ocean navy. They knew we were moving the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor, they knew we were in discussions with Anglo-Dutch forces about joining together and they knew were were reinforcing the Philippines and Guam, along with Wake Island. They were running out of time, so they acted.

Now phase one was successful, they took the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, Rabaul, Borneo essentially the whole of the Southwest Pacific which isolated Australia and New Zealand. But here is where they went astray of their original plan. The started to discuss and institute a Phase two. This involved invading and occupying Port Moresby and moving down the Solomon's to occupy Florida Island and Guadalcanal. Eventually, the plan involved moving on New Caledonia and Espiritu Santo to cut off supplies to Australia. This is where the whole strategic plan failed. The IJA could not help the IJN because they were too deeply involved in China. The tried to invade Port Moresby and the Battle of Coral Sea stopped that action. Their first in a series failures.

Now they tried take Midway to get our fleet out of Hawaii, and as we all know that failed. They also tried to take the Aleutian's, and they did occupy two islands, but that operation was just nothing. This over extension, to gain control of an island they could not logistically support was the straw that broke the camel's back. After Midway they had lost four fleet carriers and one light carrier with two others still being repaired and the air wings rebuilt. But more importantly, they had used up one full year of fuel supplies and they only started the war with two years supply. These two actions removed any chance of building a perimeter to protect their gains. The strategy due to over extension had failed.

All in all, while the Japanese had gone to war with the nation that had the greatest industrial power in the world, they did succeed initially in their Phase one of the plan, but failed after that. Was it the famous "victory disease" many of their officers spoke of, possibly. We do know that overextension caused the eventual failure. Another item they failed to understand, was our willingness to use unrestricted submarine warfare. They were really surprised about that.

[oldpop2000]

I have been using a document written after WW1 by Vice Admiral Wolfgang Wegener of the German Navy. The title is the Naval Strategy of the World War. The document was written for the US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence. He is the German commander who basically says that the German Naval Strategy was based on sitting behind mines and shore guns, waiting for the British to come out. Again, based on Clausewitzian land strategy. This doctrine is essentially "A fleet-in-being". This concept of a fleet-in-being was for a numerically inferior force to remain in port where they would threaten to sortie against the enemy. Since they did not seek engagement, the effectiveness of the effort would depend upon the enemy's perception of their combat capability--they served more as a deterrent than a true fighting force. It was a doctrine that was used by the British in the 1690's during the War of the League of Augsburg against the French Fleet. However the Crown disagreed with the strategy and combined the Dutch and English fleets and fought the Battle off of Beachy Head, which they lost handily.

The German strategy, in fact, for an inferior fleet, makes sense. It is exactly why the British used it in 1690. In land warfare, inferior armies will do essentially the same thing so I would not say that the German's were totally wrong, simply that they probably should have just waited. The British people wanted a Trafalgar like battle and might have pushed the Crown into forcing the RN to move out and attack. Good virtual history to reproduce.

[talbot797]

Hi oldpop,

Interesting post! Curious about your naval strategy document. Does it say anything about technical advances influencing strategy? Thinking about how the situation had developed over the recent previous years with dreadnought development, increasing weight of broadside, fire control systems, etc. Even cordite was relatively new, just wondering if these made it into any form of strategic consideration...