Post by vonfriedman on Jun 9, 2021 8:58:54 GMT -6
We are able to publish a letter that the Secretary of the Navy recently sent to the President of the United States
Secretary of the Navy
Washington DC
December 7th, 1Q46
Subject: Resignation
Mr. President!
in 1Q20 you appointed me Secretary of the Navy. In turn, I appointed Admiral Coontz Chief of Naval Operations. He had a good record, was well-bearing and also a hard worker. I have often found his advice on how to manage the Navy, and above all on shipbuilding, useful.
We had inherited a diverse collection of slow dreadnoughts, a myriad of light cruisers of disparate types and - very unique for an ocean-going Navy like ours - various short-range battle cruisers. This latter thing was suspicious. I asked a brilliant young officer (a certain Nimitz) to get to the bottom of the matter. He discovered that the data of various fuel tanks had been wiped out of the ship's files, as those tanks were secretly used for the transport of contraband alcohol during Prohibition. We got rid of the culprits with brisk methods and restored the range of our battle cruisers, also correcting the necessary files.
In the following years, as you, Mr. President, know, there were some colonial crises with France, resolved in our favor thanks to our Navy. Thus we acquired control on the Antilles, Tunisia, Senegal, Diego Suarez, some Pacific archipelagos and also various bases in Vietnam (I fear that we will have to regret this last thing in the future).
During peace time, with Coontz we dedicated ourselves to that extensive program, based mainly on fast battle cruisers and aircraft carriers, which was almost over when the diplomatic world crisis precipitated.
You, Mr. President, will also recall that towards the end of the 1Q30s we advocated for an alliance with Great Britain, after Adenoid Hynkel took power in Germany. That alleged "Great Dictator" in fact represented a danger for us too. After some hesitation on their part, we were able to secure the neutrality of France and Italy. Japan, too, despite various "finger strokes" taken in China and the Pacific, remained more likely to do business with us than to ally with Germany.
Our situation seemed excellent. However, we had no knowledge of the secret pact that Hynkel had made with that other dictator, whom our Italian friends call Baffone (Big mustache). Suddenly we thus found ourselves at war with Germany and USSR.
The conspiracy that later eliminated Baffone in Russia was certainly facilitated by some of our naval victories. Once peace with USSR was reached (in the process we acquired control on Kamchatka), the situation we had been tending to from the beginning was restored. Thanks to the numerous bases in Britain, Coontz and I were confident that we could soon carry out a powerful naval offensive against the Germans in the North Sea and achieve a quick victory.
How disappointed we must have been!
In years of conflict, there was only one occasion when our fleet and the British one clashed with the German fleet in the North Sea. In that month of August the weather had been almost uninterruptedly splendid and we had the utmost confidence in the aircraft of our Carrier Force. Instead, we had to sail on that very day when the weather was so bad that the flight decks were swept by the waves, preventing our planes from taking off, while German pilots easily took off from their land bases. Unfortunately, we were not allowed to deploy some of our well trained torpedo and dive bomber squadrons to British airbases and, in truth, the famous RAF didn't really shine on that occasion. What took place was a kind of repetition of the Battle of Jutland, with almost equal losses (we lost USS Minnesota) and strategic situation unchanged.
There was no second chance. Indeed, we often had to decline the invitation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (a bunch of idiots) to send our precious ships into the Baltic Sea without air cover, for the sole purpose of carrying out coastal raids.
Meanwhile, submarine warfare was raging. We managed to place practically all of our destroyers in trade protection duties, in addition to the numerous corvettes, but despite everything there was a painful trickle of losses. Nonetheless our advantage was growing. We had sunk as many as twenty German heavy cruisers (their famous "pocket battleships") by losing only a handful of light cruisers. Furthermore, the effects of the naval blockade were being felt more and more strongly by our enemy.
But, at the first signs of unrest by part of our people, the politicians in Washington convinced you, Mr. President, to end the war. Hynkel was still in place.
The latter fact outrages not only Admiral Coontz and me, but above all the many brave sailors and aviators who fought in this war.
For this reason I have decided to present my formal resignation with this letter.
Respectfully yours
(Signature)