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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 14, 2021 12:40:34 GMT -6
Naval warfare in "The Great War" was really centered around blockade and trade protection. The British executed a blockade from a remote location namely Scapa Flow and it was highly successful as the German people would attest to. Trade protection was an issue for the British because of the use of the new submarine technology and the British fleet was not prepared for it. Over time it developed convoys, hydrophones, depth charges and the use of floatplanes from their transports. All these over time did reduce the impact of the U-boats, but initially it did affect the British people. The war had four major naval battles, but they really did not affect the war despite what historians say. Jutland was a strategic victory for the British but I believe it was a tactical defeat and it forced the British fleet to rethink its strategy, tactics and how it built its ships. For the German's, they should have built just a coastal navy and spent more of the funds on the German Army. Submarines were far more valuable than their battleships. For all the naval powers in the war, the fleets cost them exorbitant amounts of money, which probably was not very valuable in the first place. I think this idea of a waste of money was realized in the Washington and London Naval Treaties, which we could say was an outgrowth of "The Great War". From the little that, for now, I have managed to know about the Baltic Project supported by Admiral Fisher (but of even more distant origins) it seems that it was a kind of last resort, in case the remote blockade strategy would turn out to be ineffective. According to Lambert www.youtube.com/watch?v=KjVUV82EAAAthe project involved the landing of 5-6 British divisions on the island of Sjaelland, where Copenhagen is located, and from that base proceed to blockade the German Baltic ports and to stop the traffic of food, ferrous material and mechanical components coming from Sweden to Germany (in 1913 SKF already manufactured 1.3 million ball bearings per year). In short, the main objective would not have been to land an army corps (I suppose mainly Russian) 100 miles from Berlin, as it is commonly read. I am eager to know more details about that project of which, however, I cannot imagine its practical execution (least of all its success), also given the importance of the attitude of Denmark and Sweden. I am currently watching that video and I have another by Lambert in my Watch later list. I have always liked Andrew Lambert. I am not certain that the project to land in the Baltic was a good choice. I am afraid that intelligence about the area and the Baltic was not very effective, like Gallipoli. I will do more research later in the day. This Baltic Invasion was product of Jackie fisher and Sir Henry Wilson. They were advocates of amphibious warfare as related by Sir Julian Corbett. Fisher's spot was a fourteen mile stretch of Sandy Beach on the Pomeranian Coast about 100 miles from Berlin. The question is how could 120,000 British troops have a success against the German Landsturm of 850,000 men organized for home defense. Now maybe they were the best troops but they could dig good trenches and put up some stout resistance. The efficient German railways could be counted on to provide a rapid concentration of forces including heavy guns. The Generals of the British army could see no real valuable objectives in this operation. One of the keys for Fisher in this Baltic operation was the building of a Siege Fleet of warships. These ships would not have great speed but heavy guns and armor. Sound familiar, yep he was building a fleet of coastal warships. Here is one of them. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Marshal_Ney. There was actually two plans for amphibious invasion; one to attack and invade Belgium, occupy Bruges and Ostend to prevent the German usage with torpedo boats and submarines. There would be another in the Baltic to draw the German troops and do the same function with Kiel Canal. There was to be two Siege Fleets. Now, if we compare this strategic naval plan to the US plan in the Pacific during WW2, you can see some real similarities. We used rebuilt older battleships to bombard Japanese held islands. We used minesweepers and many other kinds of ships that had been planned by Fisher for the WW1 British Siege Fleet. The man who stopped this idea was Winston Churchill, the same man who conducted the attempt move through the Dardanelles and the invasion of Gallipoli. We all know how that turned out. Here is a map of the Pomeranian Coast.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 15, 2021 7:17:03 GMT -6
I don't mean to pursue this strategic operation but here is the list of ships, that Lord Fisher when he was appointed First Sea Lord requested. I have highlighted the interesting ones that would appear to be for Siege Operations. The Zeebrugge Operation as it was called in 1914 was turned down for the Dardanelles. The Zeebrugge Raid was reinstated and executed on 23 April 1918. It was not the intended invasion just an attempt to block the Belgian Port of Bruges-Zeebrugge. Also here is a link to Lord Fisher's memoirs online. www.naval-history.net/WW1Book-Adm_Fisher-Memories.htm#c4
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 15, 2021 10:17:18 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 15, 2021 19:23:05 GMT -6
Another very good source of naval operation in WW1 by the British is a set of four books written by Sir Julian S. Corbett titled Naval Operations volumes 1-4. You can find it on Internet Archive.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 16, 2021 2:06:49 GMT -6
While, from the readings I did also thanks to your advice, it is perfectly clear to me the aspects related to the "matériel" (monitors, shallow draft cruisers, etc.), the ways Fisher and his followers thought in order to pass through the Danish straits remains obscure. Perhaps, more than a Baltic project we can speak of a Baltic mirage.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2021 8:10:36 GMT -6
While, from the readings I did also thanks to your advice, it is perfectly clear to me the aspects related to the "matériel" (monitors, shallow draft cruisers, etc.), the ways Fisher and his followers thought in order to pass through the Danish straits remains obscure. Perhaps, more than a Baltic project we can speak of a Baltic mirage. Myth? I don't think so, it was just advanced thinking because the US Marines were always enthusiastic about the possibilities of amphibious warfare. As early as 1900 the General Board was considering advanced bases in the Pacific and in 1920 the US Marines were given the mission. They had to deal with the disaster at Gallipoli. It took them another decade to perfect the concept. So, I don't think it was a myth. Only the location was bad, IMHO. Here are some quotes from Arthur Marder's From Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Volume 1 that provides some history. "The Fisher-Wilson school of thought believed in amphibious warfare, that is, in joint naval and military operations designed to create a major diversion by throwing all or part of the B.E.F. ashore at some point on the German coast, near the heart of the enemy’s power, or on the flank and rear of the main body of the enemy. Fisher’s choice spot was fourteen miles of sandy beach on the Pomeranian coast, ninety miles from Berlin, ‘impossible of defense’ against the devastating fire-power of the British Fleet. He also envisaged joint operations for the seizure of a base for British torpedo and submarine craft on the enemy’s coast–on Schleswig-Holstein, for example. Corbett’s thinking had unquestionably influenced him. Corbett, then a lecturer in history at the Royal Naval War College, had written, in The Successors of Drake (1900) : ‘We speak glibly of “sea power", and forget that its true value lies in its influence on the operation of armies.’ Captain A. C. Dewar has observed: ‘Any attempt to land and maintain a large force in the Baltic or Bight must have involved the blocking or blockade of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. How on earth or sea this was to be effected, neither Lord Fisher nor anyone else has ever ventured to ex-plain.’ Another line of criticism stresses the narrow entrances to the Baltic, which could easily be mined. Are these strictures sound? Yes and no is the answer. The subject will receive a fuller treatment when we consider Fisher’s strategic ideas in the first year of the war." It seems doubtful if 120,000 troops, if they made a successful descent on the Baltic coast, would contain so many as 400,000 German regular troops and Landwehr, and relieve the French of that amount of pressure. The Germans have about 850,000 organized Landsturm for home defense, and although these troops would not be of the highest class or possess much manoeuvring power they should be able to offer a stolid resistance to the advance of an army of inferior numerical strength. The railways lend themselves to rapid concentration. . . . The generals continued to think that the idea of a Baltic diversion had nothing to commend it from a military point of view. No important objective was vulnerable to a joint attack, and the British Army was too small to be able to occupy a large portion of the German army detailed for the defense of the German Baltic coast. Such an operation ‘could produce no decisive military effect; while in the meantime the decisive battles of the land campaign might have been lost for lack of our support and assistance. Direct support to the French army affords a better prospect of useful result.’ Marder, Arthur. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Volume I: The Road to War 1904-1914 . Seaforth Publishing. Kindle Edition.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2021 10:42:52 GMT -6
I just bought a kindle book by Arthur J. Marder titled From the Dardanelles to Oran: Studies of the Royal Navy in War and Peace 1915-1940. It was only $2.99. I am hoping for more information about the Baltic. Stay tuned.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 16, 2021 12:45:26 GMT -6
The advantages of amphibious warfare are evident when you can choose where to strike, leaving the opponent with the difficult task of parrying the blow everywhere, or when you are able to assemble an overwhelming force. In any case a clear dominance over the sea is needed. During WW1 in the Baltic or on the German North Sea coast none of these conditions were present. Regarding the Baltic there was the added problem of being able to sail freely and safely through the Danish straits (e.g. by securing in advance the alliance of the Danes). About these aspects I found some information on a recent book from S.T.Grimes, although somewhat biased in favour of Royal Navy "planners": books.google.it/books/about/Strategy_and_War_Planning_in_the_British.html?id=JTFz-Vjdr8QC&redir_esc=y
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 16, 2021 16:07:17 GMT -6
The naval bombardment of the outer defenses of the Dardanelles by the battle cruiser Inflexible on 3 November 1914 did scant damage, but it prompted the Turks immediately to accelerate their program for strengthening the coast defenses of the Straits by multiplying the gun defenses, laying additional minefields, adding searchlights, and so forth.
The second basic error was the conception that slow minesweeping trawlers could clear a passage up to and through the Narrows to enable the fleet to reach the Marmora.
As I begun to read through this book, I see that the Fleet Air Arm spotting using seaplanes and land planes was not really developed. It was founded in around 1912-1914 as the Royal Naval Air Service. Based on this lack of planning and testing, their spotting for land targets was almost non-existent and this really affected the Dardanelles operation. Had the shore batteries covering the mine fields been destroyed as they should have been, the mine sweepers might have had a chance.
Now, if we accept this information, how would this have affected the Baltic Operation. It was in narrow straits and covered by mines and German guns. It seems to me, that this would have had a very negative effect on the success of the plan. As to the Ostend-Bruges operation, it might not have been so negative as it was not as narrow and it could have been more successful with the limited spotting. Just my thoughts.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 17, 2021 10:47:49 GMT -6
We've all heard the famous saying "Hindsight is the clearest vision in the world". I believe that the historian's criticism of the Baltic operation which never occurred, the Zeebrugge Operation and of course, the Dardanelles/Gallipoli operations are founded on their comparison with the successful WW2 amphibious operations. However we must remember the few that were unsuccessful like the first attempt to invade Wake Island by the Japanese, Anzio wasn't entirely successful, the German Crete seaborne invasion wasn't entirely successful and cost the airborne troops many casualties that they never recovered from, there was the Soviet Amphibious land in the Black Sea in 1943 which was contained and the beachhead was crushed, the Battle of the points where the Japanese landing force was entirely wiped out, Dieppe Raid and even the Port Moresby along with Midway were failed amphibious operations. Now, we could argue as to whether they were all failed but they did, historians agree.
Now examining the WW1 amphibious operations, we see the failure of the Queen Elisabeth to destroy the mobile and fixed guns along the Dardanelles. That would have allowed the minesweepers a chance to clear the mines. The minesweepers were North Atlantic trawlers with one officer and a couple of enlisted. These boats were manned by civilians who had no training in this except the knowledge of how to drag a net to move the mines to shallow water and then blow them up with a rifle. Mines of this type were new, having been developed in the very late 19th century and only one war that they had been used in, the Russo-Japanese War which was on over five years earlier. There was not enough time to develop and test anti-mine operations.
Spotting for the battleships was still in its early stages and was not effective. The best gun directors were not yet installed on many of the dreadnoughts. Again, no time focus and perfect the firing of these guns against land based targets nor did they have the proper ammunition to blow up concrete bunkers. Again, the navies had no time to develop spotting from seaplanes or land based aircraft along with training the pilots.
There were other new inventions like wireless, high explosive ammunition etc. But no one took these serious in training nor War Colleges. These are just some of issues I recognize. Were those operations strategically important? Many army generals of the British Army did not believe those operations were worth the effort. But those officers were from the 19th century military operations, their view was limited by the times that they had fought in. There was no cohesion between the armies and their navies.
Based upon all this information, I believe that we should take a step back and re-assess the concepts behind those possible operations and the unsuccessful ones.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 18, 2021 7:25:25 GMT -6
It is certainly difficult to be completely objective in evaluating the facts of the past. Anyway, trying to recreate the first day of the Pomeranian landing on SAI, I speculated that Britain should get both free passage and a good base on a Danish island in advance, where to concentrate the landing craft. Since the landing zone is less than 200 miles from the Kiel base, the British decide to protect the landing convoys and the Siege Fleet with the bulk of the Grand Fleet coming from the Kattegat on D-Day. In turn, the Hochseeflotte, after having concentrated in Kiel through the canal of the same name, decides to face the battle, if only for political reasons, taking into account the losses that UBoote and mines can inflict on the British in those restricted and mostly shallow waters. If the simulation works, I will show an outcome as soon as possible on the SAI thread.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 21, 2021 18:37:20 GMT -6
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 23, 2021 4:26:29 GMT -6
Interesting reading. From my "SAI battles" I am led to believe that Jellicoe did well in turning away from the torpedoes. Among other things, given the time of day and the worsened visibility, it is unlikely that the Grand Fleet would have been able to obtain decisive results on May 31st. Having let the enemy escape in the night between May 31st and June 1st seems to me more worthy of criticism. After all, Jutland is marked by the outcome of the first phase, where with an appropriate deployment of the 5th Battle Sqn and, above all, a more prudent management of the cordite charges, the result of the Dogger Bank battle would probably have been repeated. Regarding the remaining part of the paper, it seems particularly sensible to me the comparison between Jellicoe, struggling with new threats continually created by technical progress, and the British admirals of the sailing age, who operated in a climate of relative stagnation of technical progress. Thinking about the problem that the USN admirals of today would face in the deplorable event of an air / amphibious attack on Taiwan, it seems to me that they are in even worse shape than Jellicoe.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 23, 2021 10:56:33 GMT -6
Interesting reading. From my "SAI battles" I am led to believe that Jellicoe did well in turning away from the torpedoes. Among other things, given the time of day and the worsened visibility, it is unlikely that the Grand Fleet would have been able to obtain decisive results on May 31st. Having let the enemy escape in the night between May 31st and June 1st seems to me more worthy of criticism. After all, Jutland is marked by the outcome of the first phase, where with an appropriate deployment of the 5th Battle Sqn and, above all, a more prudent management of the cordite charges, the result of the Dogger Bank battle would probably have been repeated. Regarding the remaining part of the paper, it seems particularly sensible to me the comparison between Jellicoe, struggling with new threats continually created by technical progress, and the British admirals of the sailing age, who operated in a climate of relative stagnation of technical progress. Thinking about the problem that the USN admirals of today would face in the deplorable event of an air / amphibious attack on Taiwan, it seems to me that they are in even worse shape than Jellicoe. I agree, Jellicoe probably was one of the few admirals that understood that with the technological innovations, battle tactics had changed. He also probably understood that the survival of his fleet was paramount to the British trade that kept the nation alive. In one of the documentaries I just watched, a female engineer counted the watertight compartments between Seydlitz and Invincible. The German ship had 18, the British ship had 17. No difference. It was not architecture that caused the loss, it was the handling procedures caused by Beatty ordered higher fire rates and doors down below left open. When the turret was hit, the flash went down the ammunition hauler into the cordite room and Poof, say goodbye. It was Beatty's fault, not Jellicoe's.
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Post by antonin on Oct 23, 2021 20:20:00 GMT -6
A conversation with my great grandfather in the late 1960s or early 70s probably started my lifelong interest in history. He served in World War I. I'm not sure what he did--the army was of course segregated then, and he was African-American--but he did serve in France. He told me that the ship taking his unit to Europe (a former German passenger liner that had been confiscated by the US) was chased by a German U-boat that in recent years I have come to believe was SM U-90 under Kptlt Walter Remy. Fortunately, my great grandfather's ship was not sunk, and fortunately, Remy's U-boat survived the war. I would love to someday go to Germany to share a beer or five with some of the descendants of SM U-90's crew.
Anyway, I remember being fascinated by that story. From then on I have been a U-boat nerd, though my interest is mainly in WW II U-boats.
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