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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 23, 2021 17:07:14 GMT -6
That's interesting! It makes sense too; this is not far off from the time period where the Navy barely did any tests of the new Mk14 torpedo in large part to save money. If couldn't find the money to do a couple of live-fire torpedo tests, steaming around all of those battleships for exercises would have been ever worse for the budget! To add another anecdote to consider as far as theatre-level fuel reserves are concerned, over the summer I read the book Neptune's Inferno about US naval operations during the Guadalcanal campaign, which US fuel reserves had a significant impact on. Or more specifically, the logistical systems in place to distribute fuel. Due to the requirements for tanker assets in other theaters, the Navy was limited in how much fuel it could transport to the Guadalcanal theater, and thus could only provide enough fuel for its carriers or its old battleships, but not both. Obviously, given how the war had progressed to that point, which to prioritize wasn't a particularly difficult choice to make. The newer US fast battleships (such as the Washington and the South Dakota) were significantly more fuel efficient than their predecessors, and those saw action, originally as carrier escorts and later in an anti-surface role in the Second Battle of Guadalcanal after many of the US cruisers were damaged in other surface engagements. But the Pacific Fleet's old battleships sat out the campaign, not because they were obsolete, but because of limited US fuel supplies in theatre. Here is a link that explains well, the US tanker situation - www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/GSBO/index.htmlHere is a link about the Sumatran Oil Facilities www.combinedfleet.com/SumatraOil.htmHere is a PDF on the Japanese oil situation at Guadalcanal - Oil and Japanese Strategy in the Solomons_ ....pdf (515.98 KB)
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stww2
New Member
Posts: 38
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Post by stww2 on Oct 23, 2021 19:48:44 GMT -6
Thanks for the links! Added to my reading list.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 24, 2021 9:45:15 GMT -6
Thanks for the links! Added to my reading list. If I seem to be focusing on the Pacific, its because this is the theatre of operation that had both a lack of available oil in the area and lack of transportation. This is especially true of the Japanese. Now, in Europe, there was plenty of transportation in the likes of railroads and roads, but the only real oil supply was in Rumania. Of course, with the beginning of the Allied strategic bombing campaign, both from England and North Africa, Ploesti did come under attack along with the infrastructure to move the oil to Germany. histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/eco/raw/oil/w2ero-ger.html
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 24, 2021 13:32:29 GMT -6
Just some interesting facts about U-boats and the US Navy lack of oil. After the declaration of war by Hitler, From 13-23 January 1942, Operation Roll of the Drums by the U-boats sank 25 ships, of which 70 percent were tankers accounting for 130,000 barrels of oil. Had this rate continued, the Allies would have lost half of their tanker fleet in one year. Eventually, U-boats sank 391 ships in the Western Atlantic, of which 141 were tankers. One quarter of the US tanker fleet was sunk in 1942. Petroleum shipped from the Gulf Coast to the East coast ports dropped four fold from January 1942 until it began to climb back in mid-1943. This action in the east coast reduced the oil available to the Pacific Fleet. The Pacific Fleet was not prepared its logistics support system for this problem. It was difficult to bring oil from the West coast to Hawaii. The problem was so bad, that oil from the unsalvageable battleships had to be used. This lack of tankers really concerned the Pacific Fleet for its operations in the South Pacific, i. e. Guadalcanal. Remember that all the oil sources in the South Pacific had been lost due to the Japanese Southern Operation. Another issue is the Pacific Fleets move toward carriers instead of battleships. There were still seven battleships along the West Coast. These ships were loaded with fuel, food and ammunition to provide these supplies to the South Pacific. The battleships available were slow and used a lot of fuel, so they were not used. After Midway, the US was able to establish fuel and support depots in Tonga and New Caledonia but these two locations were over 1300 and 500 miles from Guadalcanal. This may explain the term used for Operation Watchtower, Operation Shoestring. Source: Oil Logistics in the Pacific War in and After Pearl Harbor by Major Patrick H. Donovan Note: here is a link that explains one of the solutions to the tanker problem. aoghs.org/petroleum-in-war/oil-pipelines-big-inch/
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2021 10:49:49 GMT -6
One more issue in this vane, is that most ships during peacetime do not have full loads of ammunition on board. During the Ethiopian crises of 1935, the British Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria only had enough ammunition for 15 minutes. I am certain that other nations, at peace and not preparing for war, were in the same position. Something to consider in the game or at least it should be.
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Post by nimrod on Oct 25, 2021 11:29:37 GMT -6
That's interesting! It makes sense too; this is not far off from the time period where the Navy barely did any tests of the new Mk14 torpedo in large part to save money. If couldn't find the money to do a couple of live-fire torpedo tests, steaming around all of those battleships for exercises would have been ever worse for the budget! On this note, I would love to see fleet exercises have an impact on equipment failures (poor torps, poor FC / rangefinders, etc.) that are discovered in wartime.
Having a chance to detect them during and then fix them post fleet exercise would add some additional purpose to the exercises.
Like wise the exercises probably should aid in research point accumulation in fleet tactics, but a case could be made for ship-born aircraft operations as well.
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Post by wlbjork on Oct 25, 2021 12:49:08 GMT -6
One more issue in this vane, is that most ships during peacetime do not have full loads of ammunition on board. During the Ethiopian crises of 1935, the British Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria only had enough ammunition for 15 minutes. I am certain that other nations, at peace and not preparing for war, were in the same position. Something to consider in the game or at least it should be. I consider all this to be a part of the reduced peacetime costs of fleet maintenance. Crews are 10-20% smaller, ammunition supply is reduced and fewer activities that burn fuel are performed.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2021 12:53:16 GMT -6
One more issue in this vane, is that most ships during peacetime do not have full loads of ammunition on board. During the Ethiopian crises of 1935, the British Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria only had enough ammunition for 15 minutes. I am certain that other nations, at peace and not preparing for war, were in the same position. Something to consider in the game or at least it should be. I consider all this to be a part of the reduced peacetime costs of fleet maintenance. Crews are 10-20% smaller, ammunition supply is reduced and fewer activities that burn fuel are performed. Yes, it should be considered a reduced peacetime cost. However, there should be adequate stores at the main base sites to load up attack transports and supply vessels including tankers. Even cocooned aircraft have to be considered as necessary. www.airplaneboneyards.com/post-wwii-long-term-aircraft-storage-sites.htmAircraft flight times are important, they have to have O level, I level and depot level maintenance after so many hours of flight. In combat, those times come pretty fast.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2021 15:31:01 GMT -6
Something else to consider is that carrier aircraft traditionally have had higher in-commission rates than land based for obvious reasons. Hellcats had a rate as high as 98 percent over a four to six month period.
The average for Army, Navy and Marine land based aircraft was about 75 percent to 80 percent operational. Now an aircraft that is more sophisticated can be as low as 35-40 percent.
The P-38 had a problem with the Allison engines and was saddled with two. Even the Curtis propellers were not trusted. The aircraft had numerous maintenance issues in New Guinea.
So, be wise in the characteristics for your aircraft. The more sophisticated it is, the higher the maintenance but I don't think or at least I haven't seen anything in the game that addresses that. I probably missed it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 25, 2021 17:24:00 GMT -6
This is an interesting table about endurance.
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Post by Emma on Oct 27, 2021 16:53:12 GMT -6
One more issue in this vane, is that most ships during peacetime do not have full loads of ammunition on board. During the Ethiopian crises of 1935, the British Mediterranean fleet at Alexandria only had enough ammunition for 15 minutes. I am certain that other nations, at peace and not preparing for war, were in the same position. Something to consider in the game or at least it should be. I consider all this to be a part of the reduced peacetime costs of fleet maintenance. Crews are 10-20% smaller, ammunition supply is reduced and fewer activities that burn fuel are performed. This is a wonderful idea. I hope the devs see this: instead of having Active Fleet, Reserve, and Mothball as the only three statuses in the game. Having a "Peace Time" option that is somewhat in-between Active Fleet and Reserve would be fabulous. Peace Time can be 80% of the maintenance cost, 50% of ammo, and normal crew competency. These are just ideas, the real numbers and percentages should be decided at the developers' discretion of course.
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Post by aeson on Oct 27, 2021 17:17:45 GMT -6
Peacetime active fleet upkeep is already less than wartime active fleet upkeep; if I recall correctly, normalizing to peacetime active fleet upkeep in home waters, MB is 0.2, RF is o.5, AF or FS in home waters in peacetime is 1, AF or FS overseas in peacetime is 1.2, and wartime any active status is 1.5.
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Post by gurudennis on Oct 27, 2021 18:26:54 GMT -6
As it stands right now, Reserve simply simulates a lower standard of peacetime readiness, should you choose to use it. The "All Reserve" button kind of gives away the intent behind this mechanic (i.e. it is expected to be used wholesale). This is a bit odd and gamey. If it was up to me, I'd do the following instead:
1. Have a doctrine that causes all ships in peacetime to cost even less to maintain but either a) ships can randomly become "damaged" at the start of a war for a month or two, or b) their crew quality suffers. 2. Make Reserve status unavailable in peacetime. 3. Make Reserve status have a new meaning in wartime, specifically a ship on Reserve retains its active level of training and readiness but is prohibited from taking an active part in any operations.
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Post by aeson on Oct 27, 2021 23:03:33 GMT -6
Ships in Reserve Fleet status are already supposed to be significantly less likely to turn up for engagements than ships in an active status and have a significant crew quality penalty in that their crew quality is reduced to fair very rapidly from any higher level. Is this not your experience, or do you just not have any ships in RF status in wartime?
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Post by nimrod on Oct 28, 2021 9:02:12 GMT -6
Peacetime active fleet upkeep is already less than wartime active fleet upkeep; if I recall correctly, normalizing to peacetime active fleet upkeep in home waters, MB is 0.2, RF is o.5, AF or FS in home waters in peacetime is 1, AF or FS overseas in peacetime is 1.2, and wartime any active status is 1.5. Those numbers look about correct to me - foreign deployment in wartime looks to be missing though, and I believe it is different than the simple 1.5 AF wartime. I personally think the current expense setup is rather to very good.
To put the request a different way. I would like a less abstracted method of supply... Something with more meat behind it - like theater level supply; fleet trains, torpedo & missile stocks for ships (like we have for AC production and AC torpdeo stocks on carriers), fuel stocks - where we could cut back on missiles, torpedoes, fuel, shells in a tertiary theater to cut back on expenses while stockpiling in a different theater.
Reserve fleet likewise seems to work as designed for me. I put a lot of my capital ships on RF during wartime after a decisive battle or two and I usually come out of a war with large stockpiles of funds. I'm not sure I've ever seen a RF ship get into a battle, might have been a CL or two, but I don't think so...
RF in peacetime seems to simulate lack of training and maneuvers, which is pretty typical of navies through 1939. The cold war saw the advent of standing active fleets on a wartime footing... Shell and powder cost is generally pretty low through the 1950's. Fuel, food, torpedoes and missiles are where the main costs are for expendables. Most nations with overseas empires would keep pretty good stockpiles of ammo at different ports. The main reason for not having ammo on a ship was to reduce the chance of damage to the shells that could then sink or damage the ship (USS Maine, USS Serpens, USS Mount Hood) rather than to save money. A ship deployed away from its home base would be using more fuel than at its home port and while ammo on board might be low, its fuel and food stores would generally be well stocked... So things as they stand look roughly correct to me from an abstract expense standpoint - would like to see much higher costs when ships exceed basing for the sea-zone to mimic a lack of stockpiles / attempts at buying from foreign powers in the area in additional to crew quality degradation.
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