|
Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 27, 2013 12:54:43 GMT -6
This is a naval history forum so here is some naval history about the Imperial Japanese Navy ship building. I am not going to delve into every ship but will just give some information about general practices and the Yamato's. Remember that I am not nor have I ever studied naval architecture, so be gentle. This is my first expedition into this dark area. I am going to focus on the Yamato class battleships. They were the biggest of the war, by far, and probably for the Japanese, the most expensive.
The Yamato was the first in the class, followed by Musashi, Shinano and a fourth hull never named and dismantled at 30% completion. Her steel was used to upgrade the Ise and Hyuga to carrier-battleships. Yamato was started in 1937 and completed on 16 December 1941 on which day she was commissioned. She was built at the Kure Navy Yard. She was 860 feet long overall and 838 feet at the waterline, 127 feet in the beam maximum and 121 feet at the waterline. She displaced 72,809 tons under full load and 69,100 tons during trials. Full load draft was 35.5 feet and 34 feet during trials. Speed was 27 knots designed and she had a range of stability of 72 degrees.
She and her sister were equipped with 18.1 inch triple turret mounted guns, the first large mounts ever designed and produced by the Japanese. The guns fired at a rate of 1.5 rounds per minute at full elevation. Maximum elevation as installed was 45 degrees with a range of 45,960 yards obtainable with a 3220 lb. shell. The loading angle was 3 degrees. The turret rangefinders were 49.2 feet across, with an elevation of +10 degrees. There was 100 rounds per gun. Design Practices As per the Naval Mission to Japan, a source used by Parshall and many others, Japanese design methods and practices were very similar to Britain and France along with other maritime nations. They were taught in those two countries in advanced design so that makes perfect sense. They were innovative but had one flaw, lack of attention to detail in fundamental design details. It is said that they failed to search for solutions to minor problems in a proper manner as per engineering. This failure left some problems remaining and these contributed to the loss of many ships including Yamato's. They also failed to develop sufficient testing data to troubleshoot the detailed problems they encountered. My guess is that their bushido code meant that the loss of the ship and the men was not a concern. Just my opinion.
History will be next, its short believe me. In the early portion of the war, the two battleships along with others sat in Hashirajima and Inland Sea. They were given the title by the Japanese airmen as "the Hashirajima Fleet" because of their inaction.
|
|
|
Post by RNRobert on Feb 5, 2014 10:28:12 GMT -6
The Yamato was also referred to in the IJN as the "Hotel Yamato," as she spent most of her time, swinging at her anchor while serving as a flagship.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 5, 2014 10:41:16 GMT -6
The Yamato was also referred to in the IJN as the "Hotel Yamato," as she spent most of her time, swinging at her anchor while serving as a flagship. There were some good operational reasons for leaving her swinging at anchor. Her and her sister were designed to fight the famous "decisive battle" near the Bonin's which never materialized. She was headed to Midway, to fight that battle but the defeat of the First Striking Fleet ended that operation prematurely. After that and the knowledge of how dangerous naval battles with carriers could be, they could not risk the only two battleships that could fight such an engagement with a modicum of success. She was too big to really be used at Guadalcanal unless deployed on the eastern side of the island outside the sound but again, with the US having air superiority over the immediate area and the two carrier battles she was not risked. Couple this with our submarine campaign and the IJN's steadily decreasing destroyer force to escort her along with carriers for air cover, I can understand not using them. Leyte seems to bear out that premise, IMHO.
|
|
|
Post by sirchaos on Feb 5, 2014 12:05:41 GMT -6
Makes you wonder how things might have gone, had the Japanese not built the Yamatos... what could a two pairs of Hiryu/Soryu clones and two or three dozen more destroyers have accomplished?
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 5, 2014 12:30:59 GMT -6
Makes you wonder how things might have gone, had the Japanese not built the Yamatos... what could a two pairs of Hiryu/Soryu clones and two or three dozen more destroyers have accomplished? It does make one consider the possibilities of building two or more Shokaku class carriers to provide the IJN with four Shokaku's, two Soryu class along with Akagi and Kaga. With an average of 70 aircraft per carrier approx., that would be 570 aircraft. If they had organized around four per carrier group, that would provide two full striking fleets not counting the Ryujo and Juno's. The latter were actually to slow but would have made good convoy escorts with destroyer escorts. Lot's of possibilities. Maybe we could discuss that point.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 5, 2014 14:18:54 GMT -6
Total hull and armor weight for a Yamato class was about 42,000 tons of steel and Armor. For a Shokaku, hull, deck and armor was about 17,000 tons. For the three Yamato's, you could have built about 8 to 10 Shokaku's. Problem would be manning and aircraft.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 6, 2014 18:34:40 GMT -6
One of the great unknowns of the war in in the Pacific is what-if the IJN had built more Shokaku class carriers instead of the Yamato class battleships. The questions become: could they have built additional Shokaku's? Did they have the foresight to be able to convince the government of this. For the first question, the answer is yes; they could have built more in the period after 1936 had they focused their shipbuilding efforts on those additional carriers. For the second, the answer is maybe. While the decisive battle doctrine was still strong, it was apparent to both the US and Imperial Japanese navies, that air power was a wave of the future. In that period, both navies decided the size of the air wing was absolutely critical. Initially large numbers of smaller carriers with smaller air wings were the style, but as the interwar period progress and both table games and actual exercises were conducted, it was determined that a smaller number of larger carriers carrying upwards of 70 aircraft was better. The Shokaku's were a reflection of the evolution from smaller deck carriers to larger deck carriers.
The Shokaku's were a post naval arms limitation treaty carrier. They were designed to provide air cover for the Yamato's. They carried an aircraft complement of 72 with 24 spares. Their hull armor was designed to withstand 8 inch shells from 12,000 yards or an 800 KG bomb dropped from a high level bomber. Both survived almost the longest during the war, which was a testament to their design and capability. I am certain that luck was involved also.
So, we get to the first question of whether the IJN could have built more Shokaku's provided the Navy General Staff felt it necessary instead of Yamato's. For the three highest steel users for the Shokaku's; hull, decks and armor, we have a steel requirement of 17,613 tons. There are many other steel users, but these are the ones that are the most important. The Yamato's could yield steel from two main areas; hull and armor. We could include the guns, which were 16.9 percent of the total weight of the ship, which would have yielded 70,752 tons of various steel types. There were three of them, so that's about 210,000 tons of steel; quite a sum.
On the surface of it, we could say that based on these figures, the Japanese could have built 11 Shokaku's. Would they have built 11 Shokaku's? No, because they have to built aircraft, escorts, and train pilots. Eleven Shokaku's would be over 1056 aircraft just for those 11 ships, not to mention Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu and Ryujo, just to name a few. The total would be about 1300 aircraft. There are alternative building plans, of course. They could opt to build two more Soryu class ships, then built four Shokaku's including the two they actually built. This gives them Akagi, Kaga, four Soryu's, four Shokaku's, which provides for two four ship striking fleets with two ships in refit and drydock. The Circle Three plan, which was the plan that called for the construction of the two Shokaku's, two Yamato's and sixty-four other warships did in fact add 827 more planes and increased the shipbourne aircraft by well over 1000 aircraft. There were upgrades to the Mogami's, refitting of the Kongo's and rearming of the Hiei.
So what is the end game here. If the 3rd Naval Armaments Supplements program had not contained requirements for the Yamato's, we would have probably seen at least four more Shokaku's and no more. They might have opted for two more, then decided to pursue the Taiho class carriers. My guess is that some of that steel would have gone into upgraded Nagato class battleships with 16 inch guns, better engines and more AAA. There would have been more destroyers, light cruisers, and combat support ships along with repair ships etc.
The problem with this counterfactual historical analysis is that it requires a fundamental change in the doctrine of the Imperial Japanese Navy. This kind of fundamental change was not easy for the IJN. It wasn't until the loss of the four carriers at Midway coupled with the damage to Shokaku and decimation of the Zuikaku's air wing did it finally become reality to the IJN that the days of the massive dreadnought in a battle line were probably over. For a nation with restricted raw materials and industrial capability, changing their construction plans was difficult. Especially when the war starts and now many of your best shipyards are now doing repair for battle damage and not building new ships. This is the trade off when you are in that situation. Its interesting to speculate on how to improve the ship production for the IJN, but all in all, unless the doctrine changed rapidly before the war, say around 1937, I don't see this scenario ever coming to pass.
Update: One issue that I should touch on and that affects the carrier deployment is the question of air crews. The Japanese in the pre-war period, focused on a few well trained crews but at the start of the war, they stripped the experienced crews, and sent them to the front lines. This worked great for the combat areas, but over time this neglected the pilot training so that as the experienced crews were lost due to combat, fewer experienced were available. More carriers produced prior to the war, would exacerbate this problem.
|
|
|
Post by sirchaos on Feb 7, 2014 5:46:54 GMT -6
The IJN had already stepped away from the "classic" Decisive Battle doctrine, in that they incorporated torpedo platforms (cruisers, destroyers, submarines, naval bombers) into the plan to whittle down the enemy battle line before the battle even started.
Surely, then, it wouldn´t be too far-fetched to speculate that they might have stepped even further from the Decisive Battle doctrine, away from the battleship and towards the carrier as the centre of the fleet.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 7, 2014 10:59:37 GMT -6
The IJN had already stepped away from the "classic" Decisive Battle doctrine, in that they incorporated torpedo platforms (cruisers, destroyers, submarines, naval bombers) into the plan to whittle down the enemy battle line before the battle even started. Surely, then, it wouldn´t be too far-fetched to speculate that they might have stepped even further from the Decisive Battle doctrine, away from the battleship and towards the carrier as the center of the fleet. The Japanese strategy was based on the idea that the treaties of 1922 and 1930 had placed Japan in a position of weakness by almost 3:1. This is based on the concept established at the time of the square of the ratio established by the treaties. The 5:3 ratio, placed Japan at a 25:9 deficit. However, if they could get a 10:7 ratio, then they would have a chance, since that equates to 100:49. It was always reasoned that any US force would lose one-tenth of it effectiveness for every thousand miles it advanced so, a decisive battle around the Marianna's gave Japanese a chance. The Japanese realized that if they could established a force of carriers, cruisers, destroyers submarines to attack the US Fleet as it came across, at night, with long range torpedoes, they could improve their odds. In the final battle, the quality of the ships and training of the Japanese fleet would prevail over the US fleet hence the building of the Yamato's and the Shokaku's. The Japanese defensive attrition strategy in no way, should be considered a movement away from the decisive battle doctrine, just preliminary operations to give the IJN a better chance of winning that battle. When Japan broke away from the treaties, it started a naval building race that the Japanese could never win. Our hypothetical change to their building program would not alter their decisive battle strategy, it would be an admission that naval air power could offset the lack of forces better than massive battleships.
By 1937, the USN had moved away from the concept of the thrusters, to an adoption of the cautionaries in the execution of War Plan Orange. The Philippines were going to have to stand on their own for awhile, since the priority was now Europe and the Pacific would have to wait for almost a year before aggressive offensive operations would start. When this change occurred, it eliminated almost any possibility of a decisive battle near the Bonin's. It moved that battle almost 2500 miles to the east near the Mandates. Now the IJN was in serious trouble because the island bases were not improved and their fleet's ships did not have the range. Now an adjustment to all ships, both built and under construction had to take place. This fact makes the possibility of elimination of the massive Yamato's a more enticing prospect, if the Naval General Staff could have understood that, but they did not. Had they simply reallocated resources from the Yamato's to smaller, faster battleships that could protect the carriers and invest in better carriers, they might have had a better chance in the war that was coming.
Just a note: If you wish to pursue this Japanese naval strategy, its proper name was Interceptive operations or Yogeki sakusen.
|
|
|
Post by RNRobert on Feb 9, 2014 9:33:21 GMT -6
They could also have used some of steel to build a flock of escorts to protect their vulnerable supply lines, but such a thought didn't occur to the Japanese until it was far too late.
|
|
|
Post by RNRobert on Feb 9, 2014 9:40:44 GMT -6
The Yamato was also referred to in the IJN as the "Hotel Yamato," as she spent most of her time, swinging at her anchor while serving as a flagship. There were some good operational reasons for leaving her swinging at anchor. Her and her sister were designed to fight the famous "decisive battle" near the Bonin's which never materialized. She was headed to Midway, to fight that battle but the defeat of the First Striking Fleet ended that operation prematurely. After that and the knowledge of how dangerous naval battles with carriers could be, they could not risk the only two battleships that could fight such an engagement with a modicum of success. She was too big to really be used at Guadalcanal unless deployed on the eastern side of the island outside the sound but again, with the US having air superiority over the immediate area and the two carrier battles she was not risked. Couple this with our submarine campaign and the IJN's steadily decreasing destroyer force to escort her along with carriers for air cover, I can understand not using them. Leyte seems to bear out that premise, IMHO. Combinedfleet.com has an interesting essay on why it was not feasible to use the Yamato in the Solomons campaign: www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 9, 2014 12:31:38 GMT -6
There were some good operational reasons for leaving her swinging at anchor. Her and her sister were designed to fight the famous "decisive battle" near the Bonin's which never materialized. She was headed to Midway, to fight that battle but the defeat of the First Striking Fleet ended that operation prematurely. After that and the knowledge of how dangerous naval battles with carriers could be, they could not risk the only two battleships that could fight such an engagement with a modicum of success. She was too big to really be used at Guadalcanal unless deployed on the eastern side of the island outside the sound but again, with the US having air superiority over the immediate area and the two carrier battles she was not risked. Couple this with our submarine campaign and the IJN's steadily decreasing destroyer force to escort her along with carriers for air cover, I can understand not using them. Leyte seems to bear out that premise, IMHO. Combinedfleet.com has an interesting essay on why it was not feasible to use the Yamato in the Solomons campaign: www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htmI have that article and he has some points. After the Midway Operation, which used one full years worth of fuel, the IJN had to start conserving. Our submarine campaign was not totally effective but it was ramping up. The lack of fuel could have been an important factor. However, there is usually more than one reason for the method of conducting an operation. I believe the faith in the decisive battle was still strong in the IJN, so expending these super-BB's in a simple defensive campaign for an island that was not entirely necessary, was probably more important.
Another reason that I haven't seen articulated is ammunition specifically common type 0 HE. Each gun had about 180 rounds stored in the handling rooms, with another 100 per gun stowed in the turret. What is unknown, is how much was stored at Truk for replacement and how much overall was available. I don't know the ratio of AP to HE? We would have to know how much of the 300 rounds was actually AP. Something to consider.
Another possibility, more romantic than anything else, is the attachment to the name "Yamato". According to one source, it is Japan's oldest poetic name and is the name for a province in Southern Honshu. This could be another reason for them to keep it close. I noticed that they exchanged Yamato for Musashi, at Truk once she was built. At Leyte, when she was under air attack, they turned her around when she was almost on top of the landing area and her final end came in what I would term "a ceremonial banzai charge", which would be the chosen end for such a warrior. Just my opinion, of course.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 9, 2014 16:22:25 GMT -6
Here is something I don't think anyone has considered about the Yamato's participating in bombardment missions at Guadalcanal. According to Japanese records, the approximate life of the guns was 200-250 rounds. I wonder if anyone was concerned that the use of guns for this purpose would shorten the life for the decisive battle.
|
|
|
Post by RNRobert on Feb 9, 2014 16:31:10 GMT -6
I would posit that the Guadalcanal campaign was the "decisive battle" of the Pacific War, although the Japanese didn't realize it. The IJN, despite losing four flattops Midway, still was a formidable force. The USN was still recouping from Pearl Harbor. We only had four operational carriers in the Pacific at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign, and of these, Wasp and Hornet would be sunk, Saratoga would be damaged and take no further part in the campaign, leaving only Enterprise available by the end of the year, and herself in a damaged state. On the other hand, the Japanese frittered away what was left of their carrier aviators, a loss from which they never recovered. Both sides suffered heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers as a result of the night actions in the waters of the Solomons (and the Japanese lost two of their older battleships to boot). However, the US was able to make good their losses, and the Japanese were not, which meant that the tide swung inexorably in favor of the US.
|
|
|
Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 9, 2014 16:43:07 GMT -6
I would posit that the Guadalcanal campaign was the "decisive battle" of the Pacific War, although the Japanese didn't realize it. The IJN, despite losing four flattops Midway, still was a formidable force. The USN was still recouping from Pearl Harbor. We only had four operational carriers in the Pacific at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign, and of these, Wasp and Hornet would be sunk, Saratoga would be damaged and take no further part in the campaign, leaving only Enterprise available by the end of the year, and herself in a damaged state. On the other hand, the Japanese frittered away what was left of their carrier aviators, a loss from which they never recovered. Both sides suffered heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers as a result of the night actions in the waters of the Solomons (and the Japanese lost two of their older battleships to boot). However, the US was able to make good their losses, and the Japanese were not, which meant that the tide swung inexorably in favor of the US. I cannot disagree with you. It was the decisive operation of the Pacific War.... and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that. Unfortunately decisive operations and battles are not recognized until the history is written. For the Japanese, it did not seem to be the decisive battle.
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
|
|