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Post by RNRobert on Feb 10, 2014 17:25:50 GMT -6
I would posit that the Guadalcanal campaign was the "decisive battle" of the Pacific War, although the Japanese didn't realize it. The IJN, despite losing four flattops Midway, still was a formidable force. The USN was still recouping from Pearl Harbor. We only had four operational carriers in the Pacific at the beginning of the Guadalcanal campaign, and of these, Wasp and Hornet would be sunk, Saratoga would be damaged and take no further part in the campaign, leaving only Enterprise available by the end of the year, and herself in a damaged state. On the other hand, the Japanese frittered away what was left of their carrier aviators, a loss from which they never recovered. Both sides suffered heavy losses in cruisers and destroyers as a result of the night actions in the waters of the Solomons (and the Japanese lost two of their older battleships to boot). However, the US was able to make good their losses, and the Japanese were not, which meant that the tide swung inexorably in favor of the US. I cannot disagree with you. It was the decisive operation of the Pacific War.... and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that. Unfortunately decisive operations and battles are not recognized until the history is written. For the Japanese, it did not seem to be the decisive battle.
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
I have a book from 1943 titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team" and what I find interesting is that even though at this time carriers had proved their potential, the author still saw the battleship as the primary naval warship, and considered the cancellation of the Montana class to be a serious mistake.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2014 19:12:55 GMT -6
I cannot disagree with you. It was the decisive operation of the Pacific War.... and with the clarity of 20/20 hindsight we now know that. Unfortunately decisive operations and battles are not recognized until the history is written. For the Japanese, it did not seem to be the decisive battle.
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
I have a book from 1943 titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team" and what I find interesting is that even though at this time carriers had proved their potential, the author still saw the battleship as the primary naval warship, and considered the cancellation of the Montana class to be a serious mistake. Even at that late date, the battleship was still considered the queen of the fleet, remarkable isn't it. We can't blame the Japanese for Yamato, since we should have known better. The Montana's would have been worthless.
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Post by RNRobert on Feb 10, 2014 20:16:54 GMT -6
I have a book from 1943 titled "Our Navy, A Fighting Team" and what I find interesting is that even though at this time carriers had proved their potential, the author still saw the battleship as the primary naval warship, and considered the cancellation of the Montana class to be a serious mistake. Even at that late date, the battleship was still considered the queen of the fleet, remarkable isn't it. We can't blame the Japanese for Yamato, since we should have known better. The Montana's would have been worthless. At least we had to good sense not to build the Montanas...
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2014 20:39:53 GMT -6
Even at that late date, the battleship was still considered the queen of the fleet, remarkable isn't it. We can't blame the Japanese for Yamato, since we should have known better. The Montana's would have been worthless. At least we had to good sense not to build the Montanas... Partially true, we did build the Alaska class battle cruisers, and they were almost useless also.
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 10, 2014 21:03:02 GMT -6
The difference was that we had the resources for impractical things like the Alaska-class ... plus the world's largest carrier fleet, battleships that were much better balanced designs than the Yamato, buckets of escorts, enough submarines to choke the Japanese Empire, and a seemingly endless stream of transport ships. When you have plenty of resources and a large industrial base, a few boondoggles don't matter much against the overall output. The Alaska and Guam at least gave brief but effective service as carrier escorts and shore bombardment vessels, something Yamato and Musashi couldn't claim.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 10, 2014 21:26:03 GMT -6
The difference was that we had the resources for impractical things like the Alaska-class ... plus the world's largest carrier fleet, battleships that were much better balanced designs than the Yamato, buckets of escorts, enough submarines to choke the Japanese Empire, and a seemingly endless stream of transport ships. When you have plenty of resources and a large industrial base, a few boondoggles don't matter much against the overall output. The Alaska and Guam at least gave brief but effective service as carrier escorts and shore bombardment vessels, something Yamato and Musashi couldn't claim. I suppose that that is somewhat true, with our resources, a few mistakes are understandable. But that aside, consider this. What really caused the recognition by navies, that the battleship's reign over naval supremacy was over? What would cause you to recognize that naval supremacy in an area, or a region was based on the aircraft carrier? Well, a battle. A battle, a decisive battle that is won without the participation of battleships. The Battle of Midway is that decisive battle. It was the "revolution in military affairs" where the aircraft carrier supplanted the battleship as the final arbiter of naval supremacy. The question is whether Spruance, Fletcher and Nimitz, at that time, realized that they were "implementing a revolutionary change in the basic character of warfare." The decisive battle had been fought, the Japanese had lost and battleships never fired a shot, even the ones escorting the carriers. In fact, Yamamoto cancelled the operation, even though his battleships were untouched. That was the moment, on the bridge of the Yamato, when her and her sisters became irrelevant in naval supremacy; that precise moment.
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 10, 2014 22:54:28 GMT -6
True ... the one issue there is that most of the capital ships we're discussing were already well along the pipeline at the point of Midway. What ships were not were either cancelled (the Montanas) or converted into aircraft carriers (Shinano; also considered for the Alaskas and some of the Iowas but vetoed as it wouldn't put the ships in the water any faster than the Essex-class hulls). The time to make that decision where it really would have diverted resources away from battleship construction was in the 1930s, based on the results of the Fleet Problems.
As far as actual operational employment, the USN senior command (Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance) certainly got the message that the carrier was now the main striking power of the fleet. The battleships were still useful; they provided valuable AA support for the carriers and naval gunfire support for the landings. Also, given the threat of the IJN attempting to attack carriers with surface ships, having the big guns around was a decent safety blanket (Taffy 3 could certainly have used their services at Samar). However, they were not at the heart of the battle plans - the carriers were.
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Post by RNRobert on Feb 11, 2014 7:20:18 GMT -6
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
The problem with Taranto and Pearl Harbor is that both attacks were against moored targets (which are much easier to hit than ships that are underway), plus both attackers had the advantage of surprise (the Italians weren't expecting a night-time air raid, and the Pearl Harbor defenders were in peacetime mode). The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse showed that aircraft could sink battleships that were at sea and maneuvering at high speed (although the attack was carried out by land based bombers, and not carrier planes). I think the operation which showed the strength of the carrier was the battle of the Coral Sea, where the battle was waged by carrier planes, and the combatant warships never made direct contact.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 11, 2014 8:43:58 GMT -6
True ... the one issue there is that most of the capital ships we're discussing were already well along the pipeline at the point of Midway. What ships were not were either cancelled (the Montanas) or converted into aircraft carriers ( Shinano; also considered for the Alaskas and some of the Iowas but vetoed as it wouldn't put the ships in the water any faster than the Essex-class hulls). The time to make that decision where it really would have diverted resources away from battleship construction was in the 1930s, based on the results of the Fleet Problems. As far as actual operational employment, the USN senior command (Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance) certainly got the message that the carrier was now the main striking power of the fleet. The battleships were still useful; they provided valuable AA support for the carriers and naval gunfire support for the landings. Also, given the threat of the IJN attempting to attack carriers with surface ships, having the big guns around was a decent safety blanket (Taffy 3 could certainly have used their services at Samar). However, they were not at the heart of the battle plans - the carriers were. Carriers were certainly at the heart of Leyte Gulf operation, the IJN realized that when they used their remaining ships as bait, knowing how we would react. Halsey should have released a battleship division and sent it south when apprised of the exit from the San Bernardino Straits of the Japanese surface force. But that really does detract from the fact that the carriers were at the heart of all the actions, all participants knew it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 11, 2014 8:57:31 GMT -6
Update: After consideration, I wonder how we answer the question: "When did commanders realize the carrier was more important than the battleships". The standard answer is Pearl Harbor. That's silly, because Taranto should have been the convincing operation. The Fleet Problems conducted by the US and Japan along with other nations, the table top exercises; all of these games finally showed us how vulnerable surface ships actually were to a concentrated air attack. The real issue is that those were games, not necessarily accurate in their depiction of actual combat. It wasn't until Taranto, Pearl Harbor actually showed navies, what 21 inch torpedoes and 1000, 2000 lbs. AP bombs could do, that it was finally realized how dangerous carriers and their air wings actually were.
The problem with Taranto and Pearl Harbor is that both attacks were against moored targets (which are much easier to hit than ships that are underway), plus both attackers had the advantage of surprise (the Italians weren't expecting a night-time air raid, and the Pearl Harbor defenders were in peacetime mode). The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse showed that aircraft could sink battleships that were at sea and maneuvering at high speed (although the attack was carried out by land based bombers, and not carrier planes). I think the operation which showed the strength of the carrier was the battle of the Coral Sea, where the battle was waged by carrier planes, and the combatant warships never made direct contact. I would agree that ships moored in the harbor are usually easy targets, so that doesn't really proven anything about carriers being the decisive weapon. The losses off Malaysia, were a reality check because the USN during fleet exercises in the 1930's had initially kept the carriers close to the battle line to protect it, so it was realized during that time period how vulnerable battleships were to air attack. But that did not change the fact that most senior commanders considered the battle line as the final arbiter of the decisive battle. But Midway sealed their fate. That moment, on the bridge of the Yamato, when Yamamoto receives the message of the loss of the carriers, it was at that moment, the carrier supplanted the battleships. I am certain that the US commanders knew this, because they could have brought battleships with them and declined the offer because they would slow down the carrier task force. The term "decisive battle" has always been difficult to define and even harder to apply with any certainty, for a given battle or operation. However, in my view, when you terminate an operation, even though your main fleet is still untouched, invasion forces are nearing their destination but the carriers are gone, that means that they are the main arbiters of the decisive battle. That is my reasoning.
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 11, 2014 21:37:42 GMT -6
I may be jumping a bit ahead in the course of discussion, but the mention of Leyte brings up the Hashirajima fleet's one chance in a straight fight - Samar. Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna (backed by a strong force of cruisers and destroyers) caught a very weak group of surface escorts and their vulnerable CVE wards with their pants down ... and more or less they couldn't score hits until they got close enough that 5-inch gunfire from the DDs and DEs became a serious threat, let alone torpedoes. Granted, the Japanese lagged behind the US in terms of fire control and a 34-knot DD is a tougher target than a 27-knot BB - but it was still a pitiful showing, and one wonders how much effort they actually spent on realistic gunnery training during the nearly three years some of those ships sat around looking pretty. I'd be interested to know how well Kongo and Haruna scored in their gunnery as opposed to Yamato and Nagato; the Kongos at least saw some prior bombardment action at Guadalcanal. It makes me wonder what their chances would have been if Task Force 34 had been detached and been around to ruin Kurita's day, or even if they had plowed into Kinkaid's force.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 11, 2014 22:39:36 GMT -6
I may be jumping a bit ahead in the course of discussion, but the mention of Leyte brings up the Hashirajima fleet's one chance in a straight fight - Samar. Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna (backed by a strong force of cruisers and destroyers) caught a very weak group of surface escorts and their vulnerable CVE wards with their pants down ... and more or less they couldn't score hits until they got close enough that 5-inch gunfire from the DDs and DEs became a serious threat, let alone torpedoes. Granted, the Japanese lagged behind the US in terms of fire control and a 34-knot DD is a tougher target than a 27-knot BB - but it was still a pitiful showing, and one wonders how much effort they actually spent on realistic gunnery training during the nearly three years some of those ships sat around looking pretty. I'd be interested to know how well Kongo and Haruna scored in their gunnery as opposed to Yamato and Nagato; the Kongos at least saw some prior bombardment action at Guadalcanal. It makes me wonder what their chances would have been if Task Force 34 had been detached and been around to ruin Kurita's day, or even if they had plowed into Kinkaid's force. Kurita's force did sink one escort carrier and three destroyers while being set upon by carrier planes and destroyer torpedoes and guns. He lost three heavy cruisers..... and his nerve. It's been reported that after the air attacks In the San Bernardino Straits and the loss of Musashi, he was very shaken, how that affected gunnery, is someone else's guess. However, the AAR's from the participating US ships, like the USS Hoel do record amazement that they could sail to within 6000 yards, launch torpedoes and retreat, safely. Japanese gunnery, considering that they practiced before the Launching of Operation Go, was very poor. Japanese battleships were designed for long range gunnery against battleships, not small destroyers moving quickly, at close range. We can look at the action between Hiei and Kirishima at Guadalcanal against the USS Edsall. It appears that the fire control system was tailored for long range, slowly moving targets, not close range. This and other actions do explain their poor showing. My research this morning shows that the two battleships fired 1300 rounds at the Edsall and only registered two hits; that's poor shooting, in my book.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 12, 2014 14:07:12 GMT -6
I did some research about this issue of accuracy for the Japanese Navy. The information is from "Naval Firepower" by Norman Friedman, The Imperial Japanese Navy chapter, page 150 for reference.
Between 1930-1934 before modernization, average hit probabilities for a ten-gun cruiser was 11 to 12 percent at 10,936 yards, 6.7 percent at 16,404 yards and 3 percent at 21,872. After the modernization in 1940 accuracy was 15 percent at 10,935 yds., 10.2 % at 16,404 yds. and 6 % at 21,872 yds. According information presented on page 241, the destroyers and destroyer escorts at Samar chased splashes. This means that they maneuvered inside the spotting-correction loop of the Japanese fire-control systems. The system used might have been sluggish which means it took longer to correct for each salvo. Another factor not usually mentioned is the fact that the destroyers and destroyer escorts crossed the path of the Japanese battle force laying smoke screens which disrupted the optical sighting systems.
I will continue to research in the Naval Mission to Japan information about surface ship fire control systems. FYI
www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/USNAVY/USNTMJ%20Reports/USNTMJ_toc.htm
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Post by steel selachian on Feb 16, 2014 9:57:25 GMT -6
I may be jumping a bit ahead in the course of discussion, but the mention of Leyte brings up the Hashirajima fleet's one chance in a straight fight - Samar. Yamato, Nagato, Kongo, and Haruna (backed by a strong force of cruisers and destroyers) caught a very weak group of surface escorts and their vulnerable CVE wards with their pants down ... and more or less they couldn't score hits until they got close enough that 5-inch gunfire from the DDs and DEs became a serious threat, let alone torpedoes. Granted, the Japanese lagged behind the US in terms of fire control and a 34-knot DD is a tougher target than a 27-knot BB - but it was still a pitiful showing, and one wonders how much effort they actually spent on realistic gunnery training during the nearly three years some of those ships sat around looking pretty. I'd be interested to know how well Kongo and Haruna scored in their gunnery as opposed to Yamato and Nagato; the Kongos at least saw some prior bombardment action at Guadalcanal. It makes me wonder what their chances would have been if Task Force 34 had been detached and been around to ruin Kurita's day, or even if they had plowed into Kinkaid's force. Kurita's force did sink one escort carrier and three destroyers while being set upon by carrier planes and destroyer torpedoes and guns. He lost three heavy cruisers..... and his nerve. It's been reported that after the air attacks In the San Bernardino Straits and the loss of Musashi, he was very shaken, how that affected gunnery, is someone else's guess. However, the AAR's from the participating US ships, like the USS Hoel do record amazement that they could sail to within 6000 yards, launch torpedoes and retreat, safely. Japanese gunnery, considering that they practiced before the Launching of Operation Go, was very poor. Japanese battleships were designed for long range gunnery against battleships, not small destroyers moving quickly, at close range. We can look at the action between Hiei and Kirishima at Guadalcanal against the USS Edsall. It appears that the fire control system was tailored for long range, slowly moving targets, not close range. This and other actions do explain their poor showing. My research this morning shows that the two battleships fired 1300 rounds at the Edsall and only registered two hits; that's poor shooting, in my book. Their fire control systems were definitely intended to slug it out at range with other battleships, but I was wondering more about how much the Japanese crews trained while they were being held in reserve and what kind of targets they practiced on. The US battleship force drilled fairly extensively, I think.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Feb 16, 2014 10:47:16 GMT -6
Kurita's force did sink one escort carrier and three destroyers while being set upon by carrier planes and destroyer torpedoes and guns. He lost three heavy cruisers..... and his nerve. It's been reported that after the air attacks In the San Bernardino Straits and the loss of Musashi, he was very shaken, how that affected gunnery, is someone else's guess. However, the AAR's from the participating US ships, like the USS Hoel do record amazement that they could sail to within 6000 yards, launch torpedoes and retreat, safely. Japanese gunnery, considering that they practiced before the Launching of Operation Go, was very poor. Japanese battleships were designed for long range gunnery against battleships, not small destroyers moving quickly, at close range. We can look at the action between Hiei and Kirishima at Guadalcanal against the USS Edsall. It appears that the fire control system was tailored for long range, slowly moving targets, not close range. This and other actions do explain their poor showing. My research this morning shows that the two battleships fired 1300 rounds at the Edsall and only registered two hits; that's poor shooting, in my book. Their fire control systems were definitely intended to slug it out at range with other battleships, but I was wondering more about how much the Japanese crews trained while they were being held in reserve and what kind of targets they practiced on. The US battleship force drilled fairly extensively, I think. I will research that issue this evening or tomorrow. Grandma and I are babysitting for our granddaughter all day, takes both of us.
Update: Break time for Granddaughter. The problem during the war for ships that were already commission and at sea, was the lack of fuel for training and the lack of adequate supplies of training ammunition. Also, it really depended on where they were based, I don't think Truk was equipped for gunnery training and Yamato spend a lot of time in that hole. Based on this, I would say that their ability to hit a target, waned greatly as the war progressed since the Yamato and Musashi were hotels, rather than combat ships. The more you fight, the more you learned. They did not fight so all their experience was gunnery practice before the war.
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