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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 10, 2015 10:57:10 GMT -6
I was watching a program on the Smithsonian Channel on my Fire Stick, yesterday and it was titled "Day of the Kamikaze". It made the statement that it was the introduction of the kamikaze units into the later battles that forced the US to use the A-bomb. It also stated that the fanaticism during the Okinawa operations was also a convincing point.
Here are some things to consider. The Allied militaries had been experiencing fanaticism since the start of the war. Banzai charges had been a norm on Guadalcanal throughout its operational history. The same goes for New Guinea. The US Navy had experienced Japanese pilots crashing their planes into ships when they were hit and could not return to base, it even happened at Pearl Harbor when an element commander, who was hit crashed into a hanger on Ford Island. This sort of conduct was not entirely new. However, an operation specifically created and executed to conduct this kind of fanaticism was new. We got our first taste of it during the invasion of the Philippines in 1944. These kinds of operations ramped up as the Japanese fleet became decimated and all that was left were the land based squadrons on the home islands. It wasn't just naval aircraft squadrons that participated in this kind of operation, army aircraft also participated. By the time of the invasion of Okinawa, it was apparent to the Imperial Japanese high command, that we were not going to stop, and that the home islands were next on the hit parade.
It is my opinion, the Okinawa operation and its casualties, both Allied and Japanese, was the straw that broke the camel's back sort of speak. It was now apparent to the Allies that the Japanese people would go to their deaths to protect their country and that this would cause high Allied casualties and Japanese before it was over. The dropping of the Atomic Bomb was the simple solution. Overwhelming force, a force that says to the Japanese: " we don't have to invade, we will just annihilate you with nuclear power and end this" . In my opinion, it wasn't just the kamikaze attacks that created the environment for the dropping of the A-bombs, it was the totality, since the beginning of the war, of this fanatical way of fighting that caused the US to opt for the ultimate bombs.
There does not appear to be many on this forum that are interested in the War in the Pacific anymore. All things change, but I would like to hear opinions on what I have stated. Thanks.
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Post by williammiller on Dec 10, 2015 16:19:03 GMT -6
Dennis -
The book "Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B. Frank goes into significant depth on the factors affecting the decision making process concerning employment of atomic bombs during the conflict with Japan. It is IMHO one of the best sources ever on the subject, it clears up a lot of the old mis-conceptions and confronts the outright falsehoods that have been employed by those whom attempt to "re-write" certain aspects of our history. I highly recommend it, if you have not yet had a chance to read it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 10, 2015 18:30:02 GMT -6
Dennis - The book " Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire" by Richard B. Frank goes into significant depth on the factors affecting the decision making process concerning employment of atomic bombs during the conflict with Japan. It is IMHO one of the best sources ever on the subject, it clears up a lot of the old mis-conceptions and confronts the outright falsehoods that have been employed by those whom attempt to "re-write" certain aspects of our history. I highly recommend it, if you have not yet had a chance to read it. I have the book and have read it. I have always enjoyed Richard B. Frank's work.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 10, 2015 18:52:39 GMT -6
I thought I would add some more information that I have had about this issue. There were five reasons why the bomb was dropped:
1. End the war as soon as possible with the lowest possible cost 2. Justification for the cost of the Manhattan Project 3. Impress the Soviets 4. Lack of any incentives not to use the bomb 5. Response to Pearl Harbor: Truman stated "“When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast.”
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 10, 2015 19:42:34 GMT -6
I can't help but think of one particular pop-culture reference here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCbfMkh940QUrban fighting is bad enough without the issue of both soldiers and civilians flinging themselves at you at every turn. After Okinawa, US planners had to be sweating bullets at the thought of the meat-grinder that the Japanese Home Islands would be. Not that there was much reluctance about civilian casualties back then, but the thought that they would take part in a fanatical defense effort with no regard for their own lives probably made it an easier decision to order mass-casualty air raids on Japanese cities (including firebombing raids such as Operation Meetinghouse on March 9, 1945).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 10, 2015 20:40:14 GMT -6
I can't help but think of one particular pop-culture reference here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCbfMkh940QUrban fighting is bad enough without the issue of both soldiers and civilians flinging themselves at you at every turn. After Okinawa, US planners had to be sweating bullets at the thought of the meat-grinder that the Japanese Home Islands would be. Not that there was much reluctance about civilian casualties back then, but the thought that they would take part in a fanatical defense effort with no regard for their own lives probably made it an easier decision to order mass-casualty air raids on Japanese cities (including firebombing raids such as Operation Meetinghouse on March 9, 1945). I believe that the cost in lives especially after Allied soldiers had been in Japan fighting a brutal war, would have been overwhelming. The savagery would have rubbed off onto the Allied soldiers to the extent that they might just shoot first and pick the bodies out later. This would have exacerbated the issue by a wide margin. While 250,000 Japanese lives and many more after the war sounds terrible but the alternative was worse. The emperor probably realized this after Nagazaki and end of the war. Just to note, the two bombs used were the only two produced, I don't know how long it would have taken to create more bombs.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 11, 2015 21:25:25 GMT -6
I can't help but think of one particular pop-culture reference here: www.youtube.com/watch?v=aCbfMkh940QUrban fighting is bad enough without the issue of both soldiers and civilians flinging themselves at you at every turn. After Okinawa, US planners had to be sweating bullets at the thought of the meat-grinder that the Japanese Home Islands would be. Not that there was much reluctance about civilian casualties back then, but the thought that they would take part in a fanatical defense effort with no regard for their own lives probably made it an easier decision to order mass-casualty air raids on Japanese cities (including firebombing raids such as Operation Meetinghouse on March 9, 1945). I believe that the cost in lives especially after Allied soldiers had been in Japan fighting a brutal war, would have been overwhelming. The savagery would have rubbed off onto the Allied soldiers to the extent that they might just shoot first and pick the bodies out later. This would have exacerbated the issue by a wide margin. While 250,000 Japanese lives and many more after the war sounds terrible but the alternative was worse. The emperor probably realized this after Nagazaki and end of the war. Just to note, the two bombs used were the only two produced, I don't know how long it would have taken to create more bombs. A second "Fat Man" weapon (using the "demon core" that killed two scientists in separate criticality accidents; it was eventually used in the "Gilda" bomb in the Able test of Operation Crossroads) could have been ready as early as August 19, with three more available in September and another three in October. There was a debate on whether to use the bombs as they were ready, or store them up for tactical nuclear strikes in support of the invasion (note that nobody had any idea yet of the radiation hazards; it was advised that troops wait 48 hours before entering a nuked area). In the latter case, seven bombs would have been available on X-Day (November 1, 1945). Following the Hiroshima bombing on August 6, Japan's atomic scientists reported to the Japanese Cabinet and it was decided that the US could have at most one or two more bombs ready for use; Admiral Toyoda and the rest of the Cabinet decided that "there would be more destruction but the war would go on." This decision was picked up by Magic intercepts and probably factored into the decision to bomb Nagasaki and get the point across. Another note in my reading was that Operation Downfall, at least prior to the Japanese capitulation, was in a disorganized state. Due to how the Pacific War had been conducted there was not really a unified command structure (MacArthur was nominally in overall command, but only "if circumstances made it necessary"). The Navy preferred to force Japan to capitulate through a blockade and bombing effort, including the capture of airbases in China and Korea. Allied commanders were also still squabbling over the command, organization, and training of the proposed British/Australian/Canadian "Commonwealth Corps." As a final note, perhaps in a prelude to the Korean War MacArthur disputed intelligence information that showed the Japanese heavily reinforcing Kyushu with troops and aircraft, believing them to be overstimates. In fact Allied intelligence underestimated Japanese forces available to contest the invasion; MacArthur's staff was figuring on 300,000 opposing enemy troops, intelligence estimated 545,000, and there were actually over 916,000 Japanese troops on Kyushu. Nimitz and King, on the other hand, were apprehensive about the operation and if push came to shove they might have opposed the decision to invade.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 11, 2015 22:18:18 GMT -6
I did research the next bomb. It was in Utah according to Paul Tibbet. He was asked on the phone by Curtis Lemay if he had another bomb, he said yes, its in Utah. Lemay told him to get it out to Tinian but the war ended before it could arrive. The original documentation I have says that it would be dropped on the 19th of August. The documentation states that another was going to be available on the first part of September possibly a fourth in September in middle or latter part of the month. There was an estimate of three more in October. The total was three definite in September, possibly four; three more by the end of October for a total of seven. There is a discussion of tactical use during the landings on the Japanese mainland. They were contemplating using it behind the landing area to neutralize a road network possibly to neutralize a division or a communication center. Tokyo or Kobe were the next designated targets. Tokyo was considered a high value target that might be what was needed to convince the Imperial Japanese High Command and the Emperor to quit. www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/hiroshim.htmThe two bombs used at Operations Crossroads, the Bikini tests, were both MK 3A Fission bombs, the first dropped from a B-29 detonating at 520ft, the second was the same but suspended below an LST about 90 feet down. This was the worst of the two. It sank the Saratoga, Arkansas, Nagato. My father was at the tests and I have an original Operation Crossroads book signed by Admiral Blandy. My dad was one of the two boatman to take the officers and scientists into the lagoon after the two explosions. The VA tested and monitored his health for years afterward. Thanks for your interest and information. I hadn't done much research on this issue till now.
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Post by steel selachian on Dec 11, 2015 23:23:17 GMT -6
Operation Downfall is something of a frightening what-if for all the reasons we've stated; it would have made Okinawa look like a picnic by comparison. From what I've seen the oft-quoted casualty estimates were mostly for ground combat only; Nimitz may have been the only one who incorporated casualties on the naval vessels and transports conducting the invasion. Unlike Okinawa the Japanese were planning to concentrate their kamikaze attacks on loaded transports rather than warships; their hope was to take out 30-50% of the invasion force before it hit the beach. They had something on the order of 12,000 aircraft available, half of them kamikazes. Roughly 2,000 kamikazes were used at Okinawa; landings in Japan would have faced triple the numbers and the Japanese would have had the advantage of shorter transits and flying over terrain to reduce warning times.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 12, 2015 8:57:42 GMT -6
Operation Downfall is something of a frightening what-if for all the reasons we've stated; it would have made Okinawa look like a picnic by comparison. From what I've seen the oft-quoted casualty estimates were mostly for ground combat only; Nimitz may have been the only one who incorporated casualties on the naval vessels and transports conducting the invasion. Unlike Okinawa the Japanese were planning to concentrate their kamikaze attacks on loaded transports rather than warships; their hope was to take out 30-50% of the invasion force before it hit the beach. They had something on the order of 12,000 aircraft available, half of them kamikazes. Roughly 2,000 kamikazes were used at Okinawa; landings in Japan would have faced triple the numbers and the Japanese would have had the advantage of shorter transits and flying over terrain to reduce warning times. Operation Downfall would have been an operation like nothing most political and military leaders had seen in the war. It would not be anything like the maneuver warfare of France and Russia. The Leyte operation should have been a wakeup call to many, which it was. They were aware that casualty rates in the Pacific war had consistently outpaced estimates. Leyte was supposed to take four divisions and eight fighter and bomber groups being available within 45 days of the landings. It took nine division and twice as many days to get a fraction of the airpower necessary to continue. This for a group of islands we had occupied for forty years. 20/20 hindsight is the clearest vision in the world, and post war historical analysis claims that continued B-29 bombing including nukes, stronger blockades would have finished off the Japanese but no one has a good timeline for that effort. Operation Downfall would have caused millions of casualties and required us occupy the Japanese home islands for many years possibly fighting guerrilla type operations unless the Emperor could stop such actions and to force the Japanese people to accept defeat gracefully and rebuild. Which is what he did. I agree that had the Japanese military attacked the transports instead of the warships, thing would have gotten sticky, at best.
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Post by RNRobert on Dec 30, 2015 6:53:27 GMT -6
I think that in the end, the A-bombs were the most merciful way to end the war. If we had had to invade, the casualties on both sides would have been appalling (I recall reading somewhere that the civilian casualties at Okinawa were equal to US and Japanese combatant casualties combined), and that even if we had just continued a naval and air blockade of the Japanese home islands, more Japanese would have died of disease and starvation than were lost in the A-bomb attacks before they surrendered.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 30, 2015 16:50:40 GMT -6
I think that in the end, the A-bombs were the most merciful way to end the war. If we had had to invade, the casualties on both sides would have been appalling (I recall reading somewhere that the civilian casualties at Okinawa were equal to US and Japanese combatant casualties combined), and that even if we had just continued a naval and air blockade of the Japanese home islands, more Japanese would have died of disease and starvation than were lost in the A-bomb attacks before they surrendered. The story behind the decision to drop the bombs is very interesting. At the time of the Okinawa landings, there were Swedes who were trying to end the war in the Pacific through various channels. These were not pursued because the Japanese felt they needed a more substantial go between. There were two peace efforts through Switzerland. Both involved Allen Dulles, an OSS officer in Europe. These attempts were not received well by the Japanese high command. While all these backroom attempts to end the war were going on, LeMay was destroying Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe and Tokyo-Yokohama. Tokyo had already had 34.2 square miles incinerated in four fire raids. On May 23rd, another raid wasted the area along the west side of Tokyo harbor. Pilots were instructed to avoid the Palace because the Emperor was considered an asset later. That seems very smart indeed. This raid destroyed another 16.8 square miles of Tokyo and did hit some of the Palace. Four nights later LeMay hit Yokohama and 85% of the metropolitan area was destroyed. The final decision to drop the bomb was made based on the concept of saving both Allied and Japanese lives in the hope that the Emperor would finally end it all because the Supreme Command on June 6th issue the statement that the war would be prosecuted to the end. I believe that it was always a foregone conclusion that we would use the bombs.
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Post by director on Jan 25, 2016 9:28:06 GMT -6
My father was a part of General Kruger's Sixth Army and would have been a part of the Kyushu and Tokyo invasions. He always told me that the Army felt it had complete information on Japanese strength and deployments. We now know that was wrong by a factor of at least two... and what the Army actually knew was enough to make everyone but the most senior officers doubt the wisdom of going ahead.
Without a Japanese offer, Kyushu would likely have been invaded, and the Allies probably had enough strength to succeed. But the casualties would have made Okinawa's look small, and the bomb-and-blockade side would, I think, have prevailed. Certainly we know that military disasters in the Pacific and China coupled with the incendiary bombing and food shortages were making the Japanese population think of the situation as hopeless. We'll never know if they would have taken up spears and charged the beachheads - but we can imagine how shattered the men would have been who had to machine-gun them down.
The A-bomb (coupled with the incendiary bombing) was the kindest way to try to save lives on both sides. It says a lot about the insular, delusional thinking of the Japanese military that they would take on the Allies in the first place. It says more that some tried to overthrow the Emperor when he ordered them to stand down and save the nation from eradication.
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Post by wa1971 on May 14, 2022 2:27:59 GMT -6
Did Kamikaze force the use of the A-Bomb ?
In my view the simple answer is no.
The Total War premise is a circular argument , and usually winds up to be a self - fulfilling prophecy.
I might add that in my view " mission creep " is practically baked into the Total War premise.
I don't suppose the term , " Total War " existed in Sun Tzu's time , but certainly while he agrees of course that the intention of war is to win , he never the less repeatedly warns in his book that backing the enemy into a corner , by itself , is a bad move that tends to result in bad outcomes.
Even if the enemy never had any attention of resorting to the most extreme measures , I reckon it is a very good bet that once the enemy realizes you have adopted the Total War premise , it is practically a given that he will resort to the most extreme measures to avoid the consequences implicit in such a premise.
I'm not so sure I want to go so far as to say that once the Total War premise is adopted , atrocity is virtually a given.
But I certainly am comfortable in saying that the adoption of the Total War premise is certainly no aid to sober circumspection or restraint.
WHY NOT a conditional peace ?
Whatever else may be true, even if hypothetically the opponent remains on their best behavior and acts like perfect Angels , once the Total War premise is adopted , the almost certain answer to , " Why not a conditional peace ? " is going to be ,
No.
No.
No.
And Hell no.
If you could make such a bet at the casino , I certainly would , and would bet the farm , too.
Anyway , why not a conditional peace ?
The Japanese air force and navy have virtually been destroyed , and its economy is in a shambles. So it is a reasonable bet that Japan will not have the ability to wage aggressive war for ten or fifteen years at a minimum.
At this point , not only is the West Coast or Hawaii not in any real danger , but I rather doubt Guam is either.
Well , given a conditional peace , what is to prevent Japan from opting for a round two in ten or fifteen years ?
-- Like Germany did after the conditional peace of WW I ?
In that case I would reply that it seems that even historians and other observers who are anything but partial to Germany , never the less typically agree that the " conditional " Peace of Versailles was egregiously and humiliatingly punitive.
Again , observers who are apparently no fans of the Nazis , or of Germans in general , never the less not uncommonly themselves venture that peace amounted to asking for a quite negative reaction.
I might finally say that is an un - falsifiable " What if ".
It Could be so.
It could not be so.
But in the category of , " It could not be so " , it HAS happened , and HAS happened in MANY cases , that after a serious beating nations have opted out of aggressive war.
Sweden , for example , once had ambitious militaristic and imperialistic ambitions , but after some significant losses , took another look at militarism and imperialism and decided it wasn't for them , and it didn't take a total war or regime change to bring about that outcome.
Never mind imperialism or militarism , some Spaniards apparently sincerely felt that Cuba was practically a home province of old Spain . But after the catastrophic defeats of the Spanish American War ... well , Spain would let this fundamental and indivisible chunk of old Spain go , whether they would like to or no , and if a specific date could be given for the end of the Spanish Empire , it would be 1898.
But no march on Madrid proved necessary.
In other cases , like the Korean or Vietnam Wars , while the result of conditional peaces or inclusive wars has not been friendship or pacificity on the part of the opponent , the result of conditional peaces or inclusive wars has not been the end of the world either.
It seems to me that the Total War premise has more of the emotional and the egotistical in it , than the genuinely realistic or practical in it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on May 14, 2022 9:59:31 GMT -6
Historians love to use simple terms to explain the events of the past. They use the term "total war" this way: A war that is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, or the objectives pursued, especially one in which the laws of war are disregarded. By the 18th century, this explanation was considered a separate class of warfare. This method is typical of historical scholars. It's just a term to define a different kind of warfare.
As to the use of the A-bombs. As the war moved along in the Pacific and the Japanese strategy and tactics were observed, it was realized that they were fighting in the Bushido style warfare, like Samurai always did. It was a fight to the end, nothing more, nothing less. So, how do you convince an opponent that fights to end like the Japanese? Well, you use overwhelming force like night bombings with hundreds of bombers and fire-bombs; eventually, nuclear weapons. It's that better than losing 500,000 men. invading their lands and killing millions of their people plus destroying their nation. So, according to historical documents that is why the decision was made. It's one thing to explode a nuclear weapon on a deserted area of land like Alamogordo, New Mexico, it's another to drop it on a large, fully occupied city and show the results to the world. It can be far more convincing, trust me.
Those are my interpretation of Total War.
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