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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 7, 2022 12:41:24 GMT -6
The purpose of this thread is to allow me to explain the immediate causes for the three events at the Battle of Jutland using a study guide that I have been reading about Analyzing Historical Events. It's a simple guide and I want to improve my skills. The three events at Jutland are the three explosions which destroyed the following ships: HMS Invincible, HMS Queen Mary and HMS Indefatigable. All three simple blew up taking most of their crews with them. There were, However, underlying causes, factors; trends and conditions which led to the reason for the explosions. I will present those also. I will not go into lots of details, there are plenty of books. My purpose to use the guide and explain the basic immediate and underlying causes. Nothing more.
On May 31st, 1916, at 2.32 pm Beatty had information about Hipper's Battle Fleet and order a course change from north to south-east and increased speed. He wanted to cut off this German force from its home base. This was the beginning of the engagement. At 2.43 the information from HMS Galatea was received about the presence of more German ships. The two force(Beatty and Hipper) sighted each other at 3.20 pm. Around 4 pm, HMS Indefatigable was hit and she exploded taking the whole crew with her.
At 4.26 pm HMS Queen Mary was struck by a salvo from Derfflinger on her forward deck. There was a massive explosion, and she sank. There were only 18 survivors.
At 6.30 pm after Beatty had turned north to drag Hipper and Scheer into the guns of the Grand Fleet, HMS Invincible, in combat with Derfflinger, was struck gun shells and exploded. Admiral Hood and his staff all perished but there were six survivors.
There are the events. The immediate cause was determined to be ammunition handling. The Admiralty after the battle and when Jellicoe was promoted to First Sea lord, wrote a document detailing the failure of the ammunition handling which had not followed safety procedures. The ammunition handling was changed, prior to the battle, to increase the rate of fire. However, Jellicoe would not sign the document and stated in writing that he did not agree with the conclusions. This started the controversy over the last of the three ships and the reason.
We know from accounts of the battle and the expeditions that have dived on the wrecks, that the flash doors were open on the turrets allowing flash to travel down the barbettes and between turrets on the ammunition passages into the ammunition lockers. This has been confirmed.
Now, we know the immediate cause but now let's explore the underlying causes and factors. These are not in any order of importance.
First underlying cause is battle tactics. Beatty was known to be aggressive and Nelsonian. He believed in turning toward your opponent and engaging him. This might have worked well for Nelson at Trafalgar but not in the age of battleships. Beatty's orders were to find the German fleet then turn north and lead them to the Grand fleet. His battlecruisers were not designed to take on other battle cruisers or battleships. He waited too long to make the move.
Signaling was a factor. When Beatty turned east, his ships were not looking into a misty, foggy and smoking area. This prevented signals using flags from reaching the 5th Battle Squadron which could have hit the German battlecruisers with heavier guns and might have prevent the losses. But they could not see the flags and by the time they did, they were now almost ten miles away. This weather also prevented the optical range finders from being able to get a good fix on the azimuth and range to the enemy targets. This forced Beatty to close with the German ships and now they fired first, with their better fire control systems. The Dreyer system on British ships was not that good and this gave the Germans an advantage.
The cordite that the British used was very volatile and stored in cloth bags not metal containers like the Germans. This allowed the flash fires to ignite the powder and blow the ships up. The Admiralty was aware of this issue but had no fixed the problem. This was another underlying factor.
One last cause was the lack of training by Beatty's fleet. It had no time to practice gunnery at Rosyth, where they were ported. This meant that their firing was very inaccurate and wasted a lot of ammunition also giving the Germans a chance to fire more shells and with more accuracy.
In summary, while we know from accounts, the Admiralty and expeditions that the ammunition handling was the immediate cause, there were underlying causes that contributed to this failure. In many cases, had any one of these underlying causes not occurred or have been different, the disaster for these three ships might never occurred.
As an aside, there were accusations that the British ships were not as well designed as the Germans. Well, this has been seen to be rubbish. Derfflinger had 18 watertight bulkheads to prevent sinking, Queen Mary had 17 watertight bulkheads. It appears that both ships were built equally well built although the German ships had heavier armor but were slower. The Queen Mary had 13.5-inch guns while Derfflinger had 12-inch guns. It seems that it all evened out.
Update: In Marder's book about Jutland, he quotes a statement by Jellicoe after the battle.
With an enemy in sight, and that enemy recognised as in strength . . . and the strongest portion of his force ... 5 miles away, it was obviously wise to at once concentrate his force, especially as the 5th Battle Squadron was some 3-4 knots slower than the battle-cruisers and the strongest portion of his force ... it was quite impossible at this distance for a flag signal to be distinguished, and as the battle-cruisers were probably making a good deal of smoke ... it was also not possible to distinguish their movements. The signal should of course have been made by searchlight or wireless or both. At 2.39 (Galatea’s time), 2.35 (Iron Duke and Lion time) . . . the Galatea reported sighting a large amount of smoke as though from a fleet, bearing ENE. Here at any rate was a most strong and obvious reason for concentration, and moreover time to admit of concentration, since Beatty in his dispatch remarks that the enemy could not possibly round the Horn Reef without being brought to action.
Marder, Arthur J. From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: Volume III Jutland and After May to December 1916: 3 (From the Dreadnought to the Scapa Flow) . Naval Institute Press. Kindle Edition.
I left out one important aspect of this simple analysis: consequences
For the British, the strategic situation stayed the same, she still controlled the sea lanes in most of the world. For the Germans, it was a realization that they could not take control of the sea lanes from the British, so they decided to adopt submarine warfare. This operation was partially successful and did limit supplies heading to England until the advent of convoys and ASW ships and technology. Jutland was the last great battle and it really, IMHO, proved nothing.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 8, 2022 7:10:18 GMT -6
I've been considering using this simple analytic procedure to analyze The Battle of Midway. It is far more complex so it might take a while, but I will present some initial thoughts today. Maybe some of you can help with ideas and thoughts.
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Post by vonfriedman on Oct 25, 2022 11:50:33 GMT -6
Broadly I agree with you. Even if Beatty had not been a "Nelsonian" (he stopped being so when it was his turn to command the Grand Fleet), one could not expect that with a 6-5 force ratio he would not have thrown himself at chasing Hipper, as he did at Dogger Bank, with some success and even greater expectations of success (albeit exaggerated ones).
About the explosions of the three BCs I think, with Norman Friedman, that the main causes were the "suicide magazine practices" of the British BCs.
Looking forward to reading about Midway.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 31, 2022 16:22:38 GMT -6
Midway and Tsu-Shima Before 1914, A. T. Mahan's principle of the "decisive battle" ruled the navies of the world. It definitely ruled the IJN. It was called, Kantai Kessen, and was their decisive battle doctrine. They had translated Mahan's book and provided it to students at their Naval College at Eta Jima. This is very important. It's one thing to read a book about decisive battles, it's another to actually fight one. The IJN did this on 27-28 May 1905 at the Tsu-Shima Straits where they destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet. This and other economic and political factors essentially ended the war. However, this battle fit their idea of the "big-battle "concept that all of the world's navies loved. It was to provide as one author states: the linchpin of their strategy in the interwar period prior to WW2. This big-battle idea was what drove the IJN in 1942-1944. The wars with China and Russia confirmed their ideas and these ideas or strategic patterns ruled the Japanese strategic doctrine up to the Pacific War. Tsu-Shima was the climax of a war at sea and this is the pattern they pursued in the Pacific War. The Southern Operation against Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, New Britain and the Philippines only reinforced this notion. By April 1942 this operation had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams of the IJN; four months, not their estimated six months. So now they had to develop a second phase. The army turned down going west into the Indian Ocean and south to invade Australia, however they did sign an agreement to invade the Solomon's and Port Moresby. This essentially means that the IJN could only go east: either to Midway or Fiji/Samoa. The latter to stop our supplies from reaching Australia which they understood would be the launching point for any operation to take back the SW Asian area. So, Operation Mo, the invasion of Port Moresby was planned and attempted. This operation resulted in the mauling of the two newest fleet carriers in the IJN and the loss of a small carrier. The operation was postponed. We lost Lexington. The IJN had failed to focus on the objective and commit all their forces, namely all six carriers. Now simultaneous to the Southern Operation, Yamamoto had realized that to win the war, he had to destroy our carriers. These were missed at Pearl Harbor. Well, the idea is to attack something the enemy has to defend and fight the decisive battle. This was Midway, and on January 25, 1942, the idea was sent to the Combined Fleet planners for creation. Note: the planners and others on his staff were not happy with this plan. We all know that the Japanese launched the operation with only four carriers and lost all four plus one heavy cruiser. It was the decisive battle and they had lost it. They now knew how the Russian's felt after Tsu-Shima. But we can see how the famous Battle of Tsu-Shima had shaped the thinking of the Japanese nation and more importantly the IJN. They would withhold their main fleet, then conduct an operation that would result in the decisive battle which they expected to win, and the opponent would quit. However, they had failed to follow one of Mahan's principles: never break up your fleet, keep together. They had also not looked at geography. This was not a position 178 miles from Hiroshima, the naval base for the fleet. But Tsu-Shima and their decisive battle during the Sino-Japanese war had shaped their naval strategy. This was the cardinal mistake of Operation Mi. This battle was not in the Yellow Sea against an opponent who was more worried about losing the fight at home than losing the battle. It well over 2583 miles from Tokyo, against a Navy that had broken their JN-25 codes and was prepared. But even then, tactical errors by both sides, caused the battle to be a "darn close-run thing". Sources: The Shattered Sword If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War Empires in the Balance Mahan on Naval Warfare en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kantai_Kessen
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 3, 2022 12:46:43 GMT -6
Apparently, on January 7,1941 Admiral Yamamoto sent a paper to Naval Minister Koshiro Oikawa expressing his concern about the decisive battle strategy. He noted that "in past war games of such decisive battles the navy never achieved a convincing victory, and that these war games were usually suspended when it appeared that Japanese forces would be gradually whittled away. This paper clearly questioned the widely held belief that repeating Tsu-shima was the path to victory. Seems that his belief must have changed since he definitely went against his pre-war belief or questioning of the doctrine advocated by the IJN. My question is whether he was questioning the strategy or how the war games were conducted? My belief is that after having gone to school in the US, traveled in the states and worked in the Japanese embassy, he realized that we were not Czarist Russia or the Chinese empire. Both of these empires, at the time of the wars with Japan were teetering on the brink of falling apart. We were not in that position and our production capability was far greater than those nations and so was our resolve. This may have provoked this paper and his beliefs. I know that the Japanese were going to execute an interceptive operation based on our War Plan Orange. They had a copy of that plan however that plan, as written was never executed. This resulted in a disagreement between the Imperial Naval minister and the Combined Fleet under Yamamoto. This might explain this. The reference is contained in this PDF - digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3664&context=nwc-review
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2022 11:29:54 GMT -6
MIDWAY - AN UNSINKABLE AIRCRAFT CARRIER?
The traditional view of the carrier forces we had at Midway was three fleet carriers and one "unsinkable aircraft carrier". But was the island really unsinkable. Yes, technically, it was unsinkable, but the carrier had one big advantage. The carrier could maneuver and change its position easily, Midway could not. It was fixed. Now the Japanese did bomb the island and the failure to really do damage caused the timing of the carrier attacks on our ships changed. This change led to our catching their carriers fully loaded with aircraft and the rest is history. However, were our land-based aircraft really effective? Bombers had a lot of trouble hitting ships that are maneuvering so how effective was this "unsinkable aircraft carrier"
It is true that if the land-based or carrier-based aircraft hit a carrier, they can do enough damage to eliminate this carrier from continuing air operations. Land-based airfields can be heavily damage, along with hangars and storage facilities to the extent that they are no longer effective. This would happen many times in the Pacific War.
Now, if you are concerned about a land base, why not just skirt the island by a couple of hundred miles to stay out of range of their attack aircraft. This might be better than losing the use of a carrier because of the island aircraft.
This idea isn't considered very much by most books on the Midway battle, but it might be important.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 6, 2022 12:12:27 GMT -6
So, let's explore an alternate historical challenge that might have affected the Midway Operation. WHAT IF THE IJN HAD NOT ATTACKED PEARL HARBOR? How long would it have taken for Roosevelt to convince the government to declare war? Would the extended time, have given the Japanese time to finish the Southern Operation and possibly have instituted their interception operation as originally planned. nws-online.proboards.com/thread/714/imperial-japanese-concept-interceptive-operations
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Post by vonfriedman on Nov 7, 2022 5:06:18 GMT -6
Apparently, on January 7,1941 Admiral Yamamoto sent a paper to Naval Minister Koshiro Oikawa expressing his concern about the decisive battle strategy. He noted that "in past war games of such decisive battles the navy never achieved a convincing victory, and that these war games were usually suspended when it appeared that Japanese forces would be gradually whittled away. This paper clearly questioned the widely held belief that repeating Tsu-shima was the path to victory. Seems that his belief must have changed since he definitely went against his pre-war belief or questioning of the doctrine advocated by the IJN. It is difficult for me to understand why, having as a doctrine that of the decisive battle, which requires the concentration of one's forces, the Japanese made so many diversions in WW2, dispersing their forces. In the Sino-Japanese and Russian-Japanese wars the Japanese had respected the principle of concentration of forces. Perhaps in those wars the theater of operations was easier to manage than in WW2. Even more incomprehensible, to me, is the absence of the Zuikaku aircraft carrier at Midway. Among other things, the Japanese had several excellent naval pilots (Sakai, Nishizawa, to name but two), that could have been better exploited aboard that aircraft carrier.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 7, 2022 9:38:43 GMT -6
Apparently, on January 7,1941 Admiral Yamamoto sent a paper to Naval Minister Koshiro Oikawa expressing his concern about the decisive battle strategy. He noted that "in past war games of such decisive battles the navy never achieved a convincing victory, and that these war games were usually suspended when it appeared that Japanese forces would be gradually whittled away. This paper clearly questioned the widely held belief that repeating Tsu-shima was the path to victory. Seems that his belief must have changed since he definitely went against his pre-war belief or questioning of the doctrine advocated by the IJN. It is difficult for me to understand why, having as a doctrine that of the decisive battle, which requires the concentration of one's forces, the Japanese made so many diversions in WW2, dispersing their forces. In the Sino-Japanese and Russian-Japanese wars the Japanese had respected the principle of concentration of forces. Perhaps in those wars the theater of operations was easier to manage than in WW2. Even more incomprehensible, to me, is the absence of the Zuikaku aircraft carrier at Midway. Among other things, the Japanese had several excellent naval pilots (Sakai, Nishizawa, to name but two), that could have been better exploited aboard that aircraft carrier. First, the IJN could have moved aircraft and crews from Shokaku and other smaller carriers to Zuikaku to get ready for Operation MI. The problem is that this was not standard Japanese procedure, they were never very flexible in their procedures from my observation. Most books agree that this movement of aircraft could have given her one more fleet carrier. As to the first mistake, they should have provided all six fleet carriers to Operation MO. They probably would have sunk Yorktown and Lexington. Enterprise and Hornet were returning from the Doolittle Raid and were rerouted to Coral Sea, the First Striking Fleet might have had a chance to nail them. Again, "don't divide your fleet " is what Mahan had stated. Now, is it possible that because that statement was made when battleships were the primary capital ship, and now the fleet carrier whose aircraft had a range of 150-200 miles and the carriers could make a speed of 31-32 knots might have made a difference. I will research in my books, give me some time. Do your own research, and let's compare results. However, didn't the US Navy essentially do the same thing. We sent Enterprise and Hornet to Tokyo for the Doolittle Raid, and Yorktown and Lexington to the Coral Sea. What's the difference? Thanks for joining me in this thread, we don't have to focus on just Midway.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 7, 2022 13:28:14 GMT -6
One more thought on the diffusion of the Fleet by the Japanese is that prior to Coral Sea and Midway, they had separated their fleet with success, so this lulled them into a false sense of security. However, at those two battles their aircraft and pilots were mauled then annihilated. Victory disease, maybe? Separation of their fleet had been successful, why not continue. The problem was, in their initial operations, they were facing a very poor collection of Allied ships, not what they would face later. What do you think?
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Post by dorn on Nov 8, 2022 1:00:29 GMT -6
I would say, you take minimal force to do the job. This is main force behind splitting forces as you can do more things at a time. However it brings risk if your opponent counter you with concentration of forces. To prevent opponent to do it, you need threats so severe that will not allow your opponent to merge several forces into one.
If we look how RN deploy their forces we can see that the threats in Atlantic and the Mediterranean (east and west separetely) force RN to split main forces between 3 main ports - Scapa Flow, Gibraltar, Alexandria. The first RN concentrated her fleet (still only part) in Indian Ocean in 1942.
And I think same apply in the Pacific. But before one side get overwhelming advantage splitting forces is great risk as Japanese found over Midway. The second thing is intelligence and range as this can allow some certainty that part of your force is not jeopardize. But you can be wrong (again Japan and Midway). Ultimately, risk seems low but if it happens it can have catastrophic consequences and that is what happen to IJN. For IJN we can see now it was wrong strategy, but at that time it seems that IJN did not see any risk.
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Post by vonfriedman on Nov 8, 2022 3:01:35 GMT -6
A factor that presumably influenced Japanese decisions was that of oil consumption with respect to reserves and import possibilities. This certainly happened in the Mediterranean. Somewhere I read that the Royal Navy's monthly oil consumption was completely out of proportion to that of the Regia Marina. In August 1943 the Italian reserves were so low (in his diaries the foreign minister wrote: "two battleships with empty tanks") that the Regia Marina could only operate with cruisers against the Pedestal convoy. Their overly cautious behavior (the airforce failing to provide the necessary protection) added insult to injury and the remains of the Pedestal convoy thus reached Malta.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 8, 2022 11:31:58 GMT -6
Here is a link to an interesting article about oil logistics in the Pacific. faculty.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/INTA4803TP/Articles/Oil%20Logistics%20in%20the%20Pacific%20War=Donovan.pdfAnother interesting thing for the Japanese was that oil around the world is different, chemically. The oil in Borneo was high in sulfur and had to be refined to be used properly. If used raw, it could ruin the engines. The Dutch wrecked the refineries in Borneo, so the Japanese had to transport the oil to Japan. This put the limited number of oil tankers at risk to our submarines. Eventually, they moved the fleet to Singapore and just sailed from there to Borneo and refueled. However, it was raw oil and sulfur ruined the engines.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 8, 2022 14:54:17 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Nov 9, 2022 8:40:36 GMT -6
Why Attack Pearl Harbor?
We all know the standard answer to this question, but I have an idea. I haven't been able to research the facts that might support it, but here goes.
Yamamoto did not want a war with the US. He had lived in the US and knew what we were capable of. I believe he also liked our society and how it operated. I need facts to substantiate that. So why conduct a surprise attack on Pearl knowing fully, that it would cause us to come after the Japanese and not quit till we had destroyed their fleet and country.
Well, what if this is exactly what he wanted. Maybe he could see that the military government under Army control and his disagreements with the Naval Ministry were sending his country in the wrong direction. He wanted to stop this, get rid of the government and create a democracy where people had more rights and power. He wanted a government run by politicians who wanted the people to be happy and have many things they did not have due to the military taking all the money.
I have a new book about Yamamoto by Mark Stille and other books, I will get busy today and see if there are any indications that that idea is where he was headed.
Stille says that it was a" myth of his reputation as a brilliant and invincible admiral. ...His signal victory at Pearl Harbor has since been recognized as an act of great strategic folly. " Yup, I believe that it was, and it was intended to be a "great folly." He wanted a war with the US, knowing that the Japanese could not win such a war especially after a surprise attack.
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