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Post by vonfriedman on Jul 1, 2016 1:59:39 GMT -6
For the above discussions, see: NWS Steam and Iron discussions. Subjects: read first SAI AAR (started by cv60) and then: Jutland AAR (started by julianbarker). While playing at SAI I also found useful the DDs as scouts, when the weather is good. Another case of error in scouting took place after the bombardment of Genoa on February 1941 (Operation Grog), when the Italian cruisers sighted a convoy of transport ships of Vichy France and initially reported that they were British warships. I do not know yet RTW, however that game interests me.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jul 10, 2016 5:38:03 GMT -6
If you examine the records and maps, you can see that Beatty was fortunate that he saw the German Battle Fleet on his port bow and not his starboard. This was Hipper's fault. Had Hipper led Beatty to the east, then Scheer could have headed west and caught Beatty between the two forces. From the above map it seems that Scheer - unlike Jellicoe - had not any HSF own cruiser responsible for scouting in advance of the HSF. In this case he would have shared with Hipper the responsibility of the uncorrect positioning of the HSF with respect to the oncoming Beatty's ships. Is it correct? I am not sure, since I have not found any other map about this particular phase of the Jutland battle.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 10, 2016 7:03:03 GMT -6
If you examine the records and maps, you can see that Beatty was fortunate that he saw the German Battle Fleet on his port bow and not his starboard. This was Hipper's fault. Had Hipper led Beatty to the east, then Scheer could have headed west and caught Beatty between the two forces. From the above map it seems that Scheer - unlike Jellicoe - had not any HSF own cruiser responsible for scouting in advance of the HSF. In this case he would have shared with Hipper the responsibility of the uncorrect positioning of the HSF with respect to the oncoming Beatty's ships. Is it correct? I am not sure, since I have not found any other map about this particular phase of the Jutland battle. In answer to your question, Scheer had four flotilla's of torpedo-boat's with about 24 torpedo-boat's sailing.(torpedo-boats were destroyers) These were assigned to the Battleships. The Battlecruiser force had three flotilla's consisting of about 27 ships. So the answer is that Scheer did have torpedo-boats and light cruisers(three in the II Scouting Group) assigned to the Battlecruiser Force(Hipper). The Battleship Force had four light cruisers in the IV Scouting Group assigned to it. Here is a link to the Order of Battle for Jutland - Both Fleets www.gwpda.org/naval/jutob.htmHere is a link to the Track Charts for the Battle of Jutland, some are in German as they appear to be the original charts. www.jutland1916.com/maps/
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 10, 2016 10:37:35 GMT -6
The German light cruisers of Scouting division II were spread out in an arc, about 20 miles from Scouting Division 1(Battlecruisers Lutzow, Derflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von Der Tann) with Elbing along with B109 and B110 to the NW, Pillow along with B97, B98, B112 to the NNW, Frankfurt about 350 degrees with half of 12th flotilla, Wiesbaden and G41 with the other half of 11th Flotilla to the NE and Regensburg with G101, 102, 103 and 104 to the east. \ First contact was by Elbing and two destroyers who sighted Galatea to the west, and then made smoke. This was at 2:15 to 2:30 PM. The other scouts were notified, they all turned to the west along with Scouting Division 1. This was simultaneous to Beatty's turn to the SSE. This occurred at 2:30-2:45.
Hope this helps to clarify the initial contacts.
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Post by vonfriedman on Jul 11, 2016 0:49:55 GMT -6
Thanks for the references, really very interesting. I noticed in the German map from 5.30 to 5.48 pm (German time), that the IV Scouting Group was at the tail end of the long HSF battle line. Perhaps Scheer could have used one of his many DD flotillas to establish a reconnaissance also at the head of his battle line.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 11, 2016 7:06:32 GMT -6
Thanks for the references, really very interesting. I noticed in the German map from 5.30 to 5.48 pm (German time), that the IV Scouting Group was at the tail end of the long HSF battle line. Perhaps Scheer could have used one of his many DD flotillas to establish a reconnaissance also at the head of his battle line. This references are interesting. BTW Elbing and her destroyers sighted Galatea to the west, not the east. Sorry. I think it is obvious, that if Hipper and his scouting division had turned east and kept Beatty to the west, Scheer following could have turned west and caught them in a vice accomplishing their mission to destroy or severely weaken part of the Grand Fleet.
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Post by julianbarker on Jul 14, 2016 14:26:17 GMT -6
One question I have is "what reports did U-boats make on other days about BB activity?" The reports on the morning of 31 May mean nothing if they reported the same on the 30th, the 29th etc.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 14, 2016 15:52:05 GMT -6
One question I have is "what reports did U-boats make on other days about BB activity?" The reports on the morning of 31 May mean nothing if they reported the same on the 30th, the 29th etc. The submarines for the operation, did not put to sea to carry out the first part of the plan until 15 May and could only stay at sea until 1 June. While transiting to their assigned stations at sea, submarine will not transmit any signals until sighting a ship. The submarines were ordered to attack British forces off of British bases. The planned use of airships were supposed to provide the HSF with protection against surprise; weather changed that and the airships couldn't fly. Both Jellicoe and Scheer knew that 16 submarines were in the North Sea. Now based on the few submarine reports, Scheer actually had no information about the movements of the British Forces. After 5:30 AM on May 31st when scheer had sailed, then the first submarine report came in from U-32 70 miles off Rosyth. That would be Beatty. That same submarine reported an intercepted message that said that 2 battleships and groups of DD's had left Scapa Flow. The second report is from U-66. " Here is what Scheer states in his account published after the war: Dated 31 May, 1916 Personally I believe that Scheer had enough information to alter his operational plans and tactics. It appears that he did not make any major changes to the position of his forces, course and speed or battle tactics to be used. I believe this was a mistake.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 15, 2016 11:24:51 GMT -6
One issue that we must consider when determining why the German U-boats were not effective as scouts, is the height of conning tower. On average, the conning towers were about 4.6 meters in height which gives you a range to the horizon of about 7 miles depending on the weather. Now, if you were sited near Rosyth or Scapa Flow, it might be pretty dangerous during daylight hours to be on the surface. However, that is the best scouting range because if you submerge, your periscope is only going to be about 1 or 2 feet above the water. This will give you a sighting range of about 1.7 miles, at best. Even if the scope is a little higher, its only about 2 miles. Now this is the North Sea, it has high waves and lousy weather, so based on this information, the U-boats probably did the best that they could and that is why Scheer was relying on the Zeppelin's for scouting. The problem for Scheer is that the Kaiser and the General Staff were probably pushing him to do something with the fleet. It is 1916 and the Western and Eastern fronts are in trouble. We can't separate naval warfare from the whole issue of strategy. The land campaign, economics in the country etc. all play a part; not necessarily well covered in the game due to complexities but a problem none the less.
Another important issue is wireless telegraphy. During this time period, the WT was low frequency. It would have long range by bouncing off of the Ionosphere. Hence, anyone could triangulate and determine the position of the transmitter. They might not be able to read it, but if it were an ASW destroyer or gunboat, it would immediately head toward that unknown source. The U boat commanders usually sailed away from the sighting location, then transmitted the information which might delay the message for hours. U-32 one of submarines that radioed a location of the British fleet had a surface speed of around 16.7 knots however they might need range so they would sail at 8 knots to gain that extra range. Who know how far that you might want to get, before transmitting that information? This is predicated on whether you are forced to submerge, in which case, all bets are off. Submerged you can only do about 9.7 knots and that would consume fuel. So, it is a complex issue.
Scheer needed more submarines deployed. What he had did not all receive the message about the commencement of the operation and possibly some were deployed in other locations down the coast of England for trade warfare. All in all, more submarines would not have guaranteed Scheer accurate knowledge of the deployment of the Battle cruiser force or the main fleet.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 20, 2016 9:47:55 GMT -6
Just some more thoughts on Jutland, in regards to flash fires which apparently is a issue with RTW. In my studies of Jutland and pre-WW1 ship design, the designers developed the battle cruiser design so that if it was outgunned, it would have the speed to run away. To gain that added speed advantage required less weight, bigger engines and higher length to beam. Unfortunately, the designers have no control over how the Captain and the fleet commander uses the ships. Aggressiveness in war is a positive when tempered by a good thought process and an assessment of risk versus reward. The fact that Beatty made the comment "I think there is something wrong with out bloody ships today" leads me to believe that he had no idea about how the ships were designed and why. Beatty in the run to the south, got hit 44 times and only registered 11. Obviously he did not consider the armor of his battle cruisers in this aggressive action. His orders were to scout and report the enemy fleet and then turn and get back into alignment on the flanks, like cavalry of main portion of the fleet.
Another issue is the flash fire which destroyed three British battle cruisers and almost lost the British Lion. According to acknowledged experts like Bill Jurens, there was nothing different in the basic chemistry of the cordite, it was in the human handling of the cordite that propagated the fires. Again, we know the armor was thin, for a reason. However it was human intervention that essentially contributed to the fires and loss of the ships.
As usual, it basically comes down to poor human intervention. The armor was thin, to gain the speed necessary for its mission provided the human did not extend the mission and risk the ship. It was human intervention that caused the poor cordite handling procedures, which when followed did save Lion. All the failures that have been documented about the action and loss of the ships center on the failure of human intervention to follow their own proscribed procedures for the handling of the ships in action and the cordite on board the ships. The other inadequacies like the fire control issues, would not have contributed, had the original concept of when outgunned, run away. Unfortunately for many in the British Navy, Nelson was looking over their shoulder. It had been about 100 years since Nelson's victory at Trafalgar, and old ideas die hard.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 20, 2016 11:40:46 GMT -6
How to win at Jutland. Well, probably there are many ways to win at Jutland tactically. We are assuming the British lost by the destruction of three capital ships and some cruisers. They repelled the German High Seas Fleet and made it head back to base. That was a victory, both tactically and strategically. However, most experts agree that the British lost the initial contact action and it was a draw after that, at least that's the way I see it.
Here are personal views. First, the battle cruisers and the 5th battleship squadron should not have been the scouting force. These ships were never intended to encounter accurate heavy shellfire. They were anti-trade warfare vessels. It is obvious that Fisher, the force behind these ships, did not convey to the senior commanders what the ships were intended for and when to use them. They decided, to define the roles themselves. Again, human intervention has played a part. By 1912, according to Andrew Gordon, there were enough battlecruisers to form a squadron and the new role of pushing the reconnaissance ahead of the battlefleet was devised. With wireless telegraphy and the 4 to 5 knot speed advantage, these were the perfect scouts..... provided the enemy did not develop and deploy similar ships. Of course, the HSF did just that, they developed their own battlecruisers and they were designed to deal with the heavy caliber guns of the British battlecruisers. Apparently, the British Royal Navy was not able to assess these developments fast enough and continued to believe that "their speed is their protection". Unfortunately, Jutland proved they were not.
Another area of doctrine that was their use as a fast wing of the battle fleet after their scouting was completed. In other words, they were to be used as a part of the battle fleet. This was an operational role for ships that had no business being in the battleline facing heavy gunned and heavily armored battleships. Again, the lack of armor was lost in the new doctrine, which was institutionalized by Sir David Beatty. This new operational use flew in the face of the designers design criteria.
How to win at Jutland? Well, don't put the battle cruisers in the scouting force. Use the Queen Elisabeth class of battleships which were fast enough and strong enough for the expressed purpose. Don't put the battle cruisers on the flanks of the fleet. It might have been better to have send them to the Harwich force under Commodore Roger Keyes. This force was to work with the Dover Patrol to escort ships sailing between the Thames and the Netherlands along with supporting the battle fleet when it was in the area. My guess is they were very well suited for such a mission and would never have met any German ship that their speed and firepower could not deal with.
Of course, enforcing the cordite handling procedures goes without saying. Strict discipline in this area should have been the word and attempting fire as many shells as possible which caused the procedure handling problems, should have been eliminated. Human intervention again causes the problems.
There have been many books on the problems at Jutland but it is my belief that the issues can be resolved down to the two I have presented.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 20, 2016 13:47:02 GMT -6
As with most battles and operations, mistakes will be made, losses incurred. So it was with Jutland. Was it possible to fix some of these human errors and possibly improve the results for the British Navy? Yes, and the Admiralty had already planned to disband the battlecruiser squadron and the ships would be distributed in pairs to four squadrons of the most modern light cruisers. They would have returned to basic reconnaissance for which they were designed. The war interrupted this change but I believe that they still could have accomplished this.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 23, 2016 14:10:03 GMT -6
One interesting aspect of the naval treaties and the battleship is that the treaties were built on the concept of the battleship still being the main strategic system of its day. It wasn't, unknown to everyone, even before WW1. The even more interesting idea is that the treaties were based on the doctrine advocated by Alfred Thayer Mahan, that of battleship supremacy. However, Mahan's doctrine actually was never adopted by the US Navy, it was by the British, and Japanese along with many others, but our Navy did not actually agree with all his doctrinal issues.
There was more to the Naval Treaties. The demilitarization of the western Pacific, the assurance that Japan would curtail its ambitions on the mainland of China. The treaties were really designed to improve maritime communications and reduce the ability to attack maritime communications. However, without submarine restrictions and light attack ships, the whole concept was meaningless as they found out. The treaties were a failure as we know but for other political reasons. How does this affect Jutland? Jutland itself is not affected, but the results did affect how fleet admirals viewed their big ships with big guns. Jutland, indecisive as it was, seemed to fly in the face of everything that Mahan had stated about battleships and the decisive battle. It was guerre de course and blockades where the power of a navy could best be used and the submarine proved to be the best ship for trade interdiction and blockade. This was proven, more or less in WW1 by the Germans. How interesting it is, that the factor that made the battle indecisive, was Jellicoe's fear of the torpedo, a main weapon of the submarine and light forces.
So, how do you win at Jutland. Well, in my opinion, you don't, not the way Mahan envisioned it. I believe that not fighting the battle, probably would have had the same affect that fighting it did. Even with a crossing of the T by Jellicoe and no torpedoes being fired with a full battle turn away, it would have been irrelevant. I think that Scheer and Jellicoe both understood that from the beginning and so did Churchill. In my opinion, with Jutland died the doctrine of decisive battle proposed by Mahan. The IJN were the only ones who hadn't got the message, because of Tsushima and because that was the only way for them to have a chance to defeat the US and gain supremacy in the Pacific.
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Post by director on Jul 25, 2016 10:54:36 GMT -6
In order to have a victory at Jutland you need to have both fleets decide to slug it out. With dreadnought battleships moving at 20+ knots and less-than-optimal visibility in the North Sea, the battle-lines could pretty much disengage at will.
The one way to force the enemy to fight was to place yourself across the course to his home base. These ships went through enormous amounts of coal every hour and could not remain at sea for long periods, especially if operating at high speed. Jellicoe was able to pull this off and placed his fleet across the German path to Wilhelmshaven, but this was nullified when bad communications let the Germans cross his rear and escape.
So: critical events that could have led to a fight to the death. 1) Britain is not able to decode German naval messages; the entire British fleet is not at sea when the Germans sortie. This opens the chance that the High Seas Fleet can fall on an exposed portion of the British fleet and dispose of it. 2) Jellicoe doesn't get the deployment of his fleet exactly perfect (in fact, his deployment was perfect in time and direction and could not have been improved). 3) After the clash of the battlecruisers and the destruction of three British BCs, Scheer decides to slug it out instead of reversing course to retreat. 4) Jellicoe is able to get across the German path home and to remain there, forcing the High Seas Fleet to fight its way past him or die
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 25, 2016 13:24:47 GMT -6
In order to have a victory at Jutland you need to have both fleets decide to slug it out. With dreadnought battleships moving at 20+ knots and less-than-optimal visibility in the North Sea, the battle-lines could pretty much disengage at will. The one way to force the enemy to fight was to place yourself across the course to his home base. These ships went through enormous amounts of coal every hour and could not remain at sea for long periods, especially if operating at high speed. Jellicoe was able to pull this off and placed his fleet across the German path to Wilhelmshaven, but this was nullified when bad communications let the Germans cross his rear and escape. So: critical events that could have led to a fight to the death. 1) Britain is not able to decode German naval messages; the entire British fleet is not at sea when the Germans sortie. This opens the chance that the High Seas Fleet can fall on an exposed portion of the British fleet and dispose of it. 2) Jellicoe doesn't get the deployment of his fleet exactly perfect (in fact, his deployment was perfect in time and direction and could not have been improved). 3) After the clash of the battlecruisers and the destruction of three British BCs, Scheer decides to slug it out instead of reversing course to retreat. 4) Jellicoe is able to get across the German path home and to remain there, forcing the High Seas Fleet to fight its way past him or die I agree that technology and conditions had changed. Without sails, a fleet could easily turn away and run refusing combat. Unless your fleet is faster, combat may not occur. It is partially true that if Jellicoe could have placed the Grand Fleet between the HSF and Wilhelmshaven, they might have had a chance to getting a fleet engagement. But only a slight chance, because of weather conditions, poor ship to ship communications and night time. 1. If Room 40 had not warned Jellicoe, Beatty would not have been at sea. Scheer was attempting to bombard Sunderland with cruisers, but lay in wait near Dogger Bank. Weather eliminated the airships, so he went to Skagerrak. Without Room 40 nothing would have happened and the HSF would have simply returned home. 2. I don't think we can estimate how well the battle might have developed if Jellicoe had gotten his deployment correct, it wasn't perfect. 3. Scheer was never going to go slugging it out without knowing where the main battle force was located and with Beatty turning a 180 degree, and racing north, he would always suspect a trap. 4. Well, it sounds nice on paper or in a game, but with the closing light, weather and other factors, Jellicoe might still never have gotten a chance at the HSF.
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