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Post by director on Jul 25, 2017 19:24:07 GMT -6
Just something else to consider about the pre-war naval strategy. Naval spending over the centuries has hinged on economics. Specifically, the state of the economy in nations especially Great Britain. The adoption of steam propulsion, armour protection and the greater dimensions that iron or steel construction allowed, led to the growth in the cost of building warships. This increased size also cost the builders because their shipyards had to expand, and their surrounding industries had to increase in technological capability, training and infrastructure related to moving the larger pieces of ships, engines etc. to a key location for assembly. Here is an example: Warrior, an iron hulled armoured steam warship launched in 1860 cost 18 times more than a ship-of-line first rate wooden sailing ship. The HMS Nile, launched in 1888 cost twice as much as that of the warrior. Another issue that we don't consider is training which was far easier with sailing ships and simple muzzle loaders than the sophisticated breech loaders along with the steam generation and other advances. Now the average sailor had to be more educated in basics of math, and science along with his technological training to perform his mission. For the ship builders increased labor costs added to their rising cost of ship building and the lack of adequate labor force. None of these issues were a problem until other countries began to increase the size and advancements in their fleets. With the move to steam, no longer did the British sailor have the advantage in sailing, now all nations could develop sailing techniques equal to and exceeding the British. As one can see, this is a very complex subject and the question of how to win at Jutland is not easy to pin down. We like simple answer but generally the answers are complex. We have to be objective, not subjective in investigating the answers. There isn't one answer for both the tactical handling of the actions nor the overall strategy. These two features of the battle were based on all of the above and it had a decided effect on how the fleet commanders executed their missions. One of the consistent trends from Trafalgar to today has been the steady growth in size of major combatants. In part, I think that is because one of the easiest means of improving survivability is to increase tonnage, and of course in part because bigger ships are generally more capable and cheaper to operate than an equal-tonnage amount of smaller ships. The Royal Navy helped hold the battleship size nearly constant from Warrior to the pre-dreadnoughts - they grew from about 10,000 tons to about 15,000 - but even if the increases slowed they still grew. I'd like to both agree with your comment on training and carry it a step farther. A steam-and-iron navy could only be paid for and maintained by a society that had (or was acquiring) modern institutions of finance, industry and education. Without an industrial and financial base you cannot build or buy steam-and-iron ships, but without a literate, technically-centered officer corps you can't keep the ships running or get much out of them in wartime.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 25, 2017 20:25:39 GMT -6
Just something else to consider about the pre-war naval strategy. Naval spending over the centuries has hinged on economics. Specifically, the state of the economy in nations especially Great Britain. The adoption of steam propulsion, armour protection and the greater dimensions that iron or steel construction allowed, led to the growth in the cost of building warships. This increased size also cost the builders because their shipyards had to expand, and their surrounding industries had to increase in technological capability, training and infrastructure related to moving the larger pieces of ships, engines etc. to a key location for assembly. Here is an example: Warrior, an iron hulled armoured steam warship launched in 1860 cost 18 times more than a ship-of-line first rate wooden sailing ship. The HMS Nile, launched in 1888 cost twice as much as that of the warrior. Another issue that we don't consider is training which was far easier with sailing ships and simple muzzle loaders than the sophisticated breech loaders along with the steam generation and other advances. Now the average sailor had to be more educated in basics of math, and science along with his technological training to perform his mission. For the ship builders increased labor costs added to their rising cost of ship building and the lack of adequate labor force. None of these issues were a problem until other countries began to increase the size and advancements in their fleets. With the move to steam, no longer did the British sailor have the advantage in sailing, now all nations could develop sailing techniques equal to and exceeding the British. As one can see, this is a very complex subject and the question of how to win at Jutland is not easy to pin down. We like simple answer but generally the answers are complex. We have to be objective, not subjective in investigating the answers. There isn't one answer for both the tactical handling of the actions nor the overall strategy. These two features of the battle were based on all of the above and it had a decided effect on how the fleet commanders executed their missions. One of the consistent trends from Trafalgar to today has been the steady growth in size of major combatants. In part, I think that is because one of the easiest means of improving survivability is to increase tonnage, and of course in part because bigger ships are generally more capable and cheaper to operate than an equal-tonnage amount of smaller ships. The Royal Navy helped hold the battleship size nearly constant from Warrior to the pre-dreadnoughts - they grew from about 10,000 tons to about 15,000 - but even if the increases slowed they still grew. I'd like to both agree with your comment on training and carry it a step farther. A steam-and-iron navy could only be paid for and maintained by a society that had (or was acquiring) modern institutions of finance, industry and education. Without an industrial and financial base you cannot build or buy steam-and-iron ships, but without a literate, technically-centered officer corps you can't keep the ships running or get much out of them in wartime. On this forum, I've always emphasized geography; physical, economic, political and military now. If you study the British, you will see that their economic history really begins after the English Civil War and the development of the parliament. This wasn't an overnight success, but it did start a period of a stable government which would begin to move towards better economics and mercantilism. This is not the place for a long discussion. It was during this period from 1653-1658 that the first of the Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars started, and there were three. One by the aggressive foreign policy of Cromwell, and the other two by the Charles II and James. These were based on the idea that the Dutch had too much trade power and riches and the English wanted some of it. These three were the birthplace of the Royal Navy, not the defeat of the Spanish Armada. These wars were where the Parliament and the King worked to develop a permanent navy, not merchant ships quickly equipped with guns, and trading ship captain becoming admiral. It was in this period that much of the British Royal Navy's doctrine and tradition actually began. But it would not have happened without economics and politics plus the realization of the key geographic location of the British Isles. The study of Jutland and its results begins with this period in English history. I can provide at least two excellent books on British Naval History and the Anglo-Dutch Naval Wars.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Jul 25, 2017 20:32:09 GMT -6
An aside about Jutland. One always wonders why Scheer sailed into the jaws of the Grand Fleet. Did he not know they were there? He did receive three reports on the sailing of battleships, cruisers and destroyers from three submarines. However, he did not put them together as a single effort, but as a separate effort and this would be just what he wanted. He wanted to pickoff separate units over time and destroy the British Grand Fleet piece by piece. He had no idea that the whole Grand Fleet was out, his intel did not convey that to him. On the other hand, Room 40 had informed Jellicoe that the entire High Seas Fleet was out, so this was his chance. The first encounter with the battle line of Grand Fleet was easily handled, but then he turned and went right at them again. Apparently he want to cross Jellicoes T from the west, in other words sail past him as he sailed east. Did not work as we know.
I am currently reading a part of Scheer's post war memoirs which explains this in detail.
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