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Post by firefox178 on Mar 8, 2017 8:35:45 GMT -6
I have another question. What were the necessary tactics and technology to counter an enemy fleet, that decided to use either the cover of night or poor weather to close the range on an aircraft carrier? As shown in the sinking of HMS Glorious, if a battleship or battle-cruiser can somehow sneak up and get close, the carrier is pretty much screwed.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 8, 2017 10:04:55 GMT -6
I have another question. What were the necessary tactics and technology to counter an enemy fleet, that decided to use either the cover of night or poor weather to close the range on an aircraft carrier? As shown in the sinking of HMS Glorious, if a battleship or battle-cruiser can somehow sneak up and get close, the carrier is pretty much screwed. The scenario that you have described can be prevented by two procedures. First, the carrier and support ships can send out scout aircraft before dawn, in two hundred mile pie sectors covering the possible estimated enemy position. That is usually 180 degrees, but could be more. If the pie shaped sectors are say 30 degrees then I will need about six aircraft. Usually you would send up ten to provide better coverage. Our carriers had dedicated scout bomber squadrons, VS squadrons whose primary mission was scouting. They were SBD dive bombers carrying the standard 500 lbs. bombs. The IJN did not have that kind of squadron and had to rely on scout aircraft from cruisers and battleships. If you have land based or tender based seaplanes, they can usually do six hundred mile sectors. This is what we had on Florida Island at Tulagi and Espiritu Santo, and New Caledonia. Depending on weather conditions, you would fly about 5000 feet because if you fly higher you cannot get a good spot on any surface ship. Again, ceiling makes a difference. At 5000 feet, the horizon is about 86.6 miles. At 10000 feet, it is 122.5 miles. The best scouting procedure is a two plane search. One bird leaves before sunrise to arrive at the maximum observation range at dawn, another leaves one hour later. The Japanese did not perform a two plane search at Midway and paid a dear price for their mistake. This procedure should give you about ten hours of warning about any battle force headed in your direction. Most carriers can do about 30 knots, while most battleships cannot go faster than about 25 knots. Once spotted, the enemy force now has to realize that it has been detected. If the carrier cannot launch a strike, then it can turn away from the enemy force, accelerate to max speed until dawn the next day, re-launch their scouts and now turn about and attack. The second procedure is to close up the formation at dark, bringing in the escorts, battleships and cruisers, this gives you a more compact force. If you have air search radar, it can determine te distance and course of an enemy fleet but its range to horizon is limited by the height of the antenna, ground clutter and other factors. For an antenna height of 80 feet and a target height of 80 feet, the range in nautical miles is 39.891 feet so the higher the antenna, the longer the range. How ever, sea clutter and land forms can clutter a radar. This is what happened at Savo Island, the island cluttered the radar on the USS Blue. There were other factors. The key as you might expect is good radio intelligence on board the carrier to detect any transmissions from the enemy fleet, good scouting and proper night time procedures. There were two factors that decided HMS Glorious fate: lack of adequate escorts and lack of aerial reconnaissance and intelligence about enemy surface formations. You cannot operate like that.
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Post by firefox178 on Mar 8, 2017 12:45:37 GMT -6
Thanks for the excellent explanation. That estimated ten hour advantage really does render any surprise attack by a surface fleet practically impossible. The only way I could see to somewhat counter these procedures involves a series of highly situational requirements. First, have a strong enough air force to launch attacks with the goal of constant harassment of the scouting aircraft. This should at the very least, lessen the coverage and hopefully decrease the amount of time of warning. Second, the area of operations is somewhat congested. By this I mean that there are landmasses near the area that will block or at the very least hinder the movement of ships. The idea being to herd the enemy to the landmass and thus prevent their escape. Third, have a powerful enough fleet that whatever resistance the enemy has could simply be overwhelmed. Fourth, have some very secure communications.
However, even with these requirements, it is not a guarantee that the attack could succeed. There are very possible counters to my requirements. For my first requirement, my air force fails to stop the scouting force from spotting and warning the fleet. Or that the admiral orders the fleet to stop and do a temporary retreat on the grounds of strong enemy aircraft presence. Either scenario automatically renders my planned sneak attack useless. For the second requirement, this relies pretty much on the area involved and the ability of my ships to catch up to the carriers. Meaning my fleet needs fast battleships capable of at least 30 knots to be able to trap the carriers. Of course, this relies on me being able to somehow out position my enemy into being trapped. And for the third requirement, being able to amass a strong enough force to overwhelm the other warships involved is a tall proposition. If I can't have such a strategic advantage of outnumbering or outclassing the ships protecting the carriers, then I would have to heavily rely on some very good tactics. And even in this scenario, it would still favor the carrier fleet since it is me who has to race against the clock, otherwise my fleet is dead come morning. There is also the fact that nothing is really stopping the carriers from fleeing while the battleships, cruisers and destroyers from doing a fighting retreat or holding a rear guard action. If this happens, it would put more strain on me to somehow sink the the guarding ships while making sure of having a fresh force quick enough to go after the carriers. And finally for the fourth requirement, the enemy code breakers crack my code. And there are plenty of historical examples to support this happening.
I just now realized how much initiative the carrier fleet has over my hypothetical fleet. It is almost insurmountable really since my tactics really on EVERYTHING working PERFECTLY. Murphy is going to have a field day with me. Maybe I should be less ambitious and just target weaker targets like convoys. Less protection and easier target to overwhelm quickly. Thanks again for giving me very detailed information on this. It helps me theory craft better.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 8, 2017 14:11:48 GMT -6
Thanks for the excellent explanation. That estimated ten hour advantage really does render any surprise attack by a surface fleet practically impossible. The only way I could see to somewhat counter these procedures involves a series of highly situational requirements. First, have a strong enough air force to launch attacks with the goal of constant harassment of the scouting aircraft. This should at the very least, lessen the coverage and hopefully decrease the amount of time of warning. Second, the area of operations is somewhat congested. By this I mean that there are landmasses near the area that will block or at the very least hinder the movement of ships. The idea being to herd the enemy to the landmass and thus prevent their escape. Third, have a powerful enough fleet that whatever resistance the enemy has could simply be overwhelmed. Fourth, have some very secure communications. However, even with these requirements, it is not a guarantee that the attack could succeed. There are very possible counters to my requirements. For my first requirement, my air force fails to stop the scouting force from spotting and warning the fleet. Or that the admiral orders the fleet to stop and do a temporary retreat on the grounds of strong enemy aircraft presence. Either scenario automatically renders my planned sneak attack useless. For the second requirement, this relies pretty much on the area involved and the ability of my ships to catch up to the carriers. Meaning my fleet needs fast battleships capable of at least 30 knots to be able to trap the carriers. Of course, this relies on me being able to somehow out position my enemy into being trapped. And for the third requirement, being able to amass a strong enough force to overwhelm the other warships involved is a tall proposition. If I can't have such a strategic advantage of outnumbering or outclassing the ships protecting the carriers, then I would have to heavily rely on some very good tactics. And even in this scenario, it would still favor the carrier fleet since it is me who has to race against the clock, otherwise my fleet is dead come morning. There is also the fact that nothing is really stopping the carriers from fleeing while the battleships, cruisers and destroyers from doing a fighting retreat or holding a rear guard action. If this happens, it would put more strain on me to somehow sink the the guarding ships while making sure of having a fresh force quick enough to go after the carriers. And finally for the fourth requirement, the enemy code breakers crack my code. And there are plenty of historical examples to support this happening. I just now realized how much initiative the carrier fleet has over my hypothetical fleet. It is almost insurmountable really since my tactics really on EVERYTHING working PERFECTLY. Murphy is going to have a field day with me. Maybe I should be less ambitious and just target weaker targets like convoys. Less protection and easier target to overwhelm quickly. Thanks again for giving me very detailed information on this. It helps me theory craft better. Carrier forces have areas that they must stay away from: Littoral zones and enclosed seas. Both restrict their maneuvering and place them in close proximity to land based air forces. Carrier forces generally can accept or refuse combat at their choosing and they can't be herded into dangerous situation. Now having said that, due to strategic requirements British and one US carrier did move into the Mediterranean which is one of those enclosed seas, but that was to provide air cover for the invasion forces and reequip Malta. The British lost Ark Royal and Eagle in the Mediterranean. Your assessment is essentially correct that the carrier forces have the initiative almost all the time. One way of combating carriers is to attack their supply lines. Prioritize on tankers and repair ships, also tenders for flying boats. These are essential for carrier forces. In WW2, it has been proven that the side that detects the other side first and strikes, generally wins the battles. Always keep that in mind. I am happy to have helped you, I am always available.
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Post by firefox178 on Mar 9, 2017 0:19:12 GMT -6
Thanks for the additional input. That information about enclosed seas really works only for Austria-Hungary and Italy in-game. For every body else, well they are out of luck. As for targeting the aircraft carriers supply line, the best ships for the job would be submarines using wolf pack tactics. And to support them maybe a fast acting force composed mainly of destroyers and cruisers operating at night, with maybe a fast battleship thrown in for good measure. This force main job is to be the distraction or scare away the escorts guarding the tankers, while the u-boats go in for the kill. Kinda like what happened to Convoy PQ 17. The main caveats for these tactics is that there is the risk from the carrier fleet that these ships are supporting, as well as how well protected the convoy is in general. The tankers and repair ships could be protected by obsolete or slow battleships, as well as a reinforced number of escorts. And finally, their is the fact that the enemy could simply position the ships to be nearer the main fleet at night for mutual protection and better security. They would then separate near dawn to avoid the risk of the tankers and repair ships being damaged while in combat. This simple procedure wouldn't affect the main fleet much after all, since the carriers aren't going to be operating much at night anyway
Thanks for taking the time and effort to give me answers as well as insights into this topic.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 9, 2017 8:58:58 GMT -6
Thanks for the additional input. That information about enclosed seas really works only for Austria-Hungary and Italy in-game. For every body else, well they are out of luck. As for targeting the aircraft carriers supply line, the best ships for the job would be submarines using wolf pack tactics. And to support them maybe a fast acting force composed mainly of destroyers and cruisers operating at night, with maybe a fast battleship thrown in for good measure. This force main job is to be the distraction or scare away the escorts guarding the tankers, while the u-boats go in for the kill. Kinda like what happened to Convoy PQ 17. The main caveats for these tactics is that there is the risk from the carrier fleet that these ships are supporting, as well as how well protected the convoy is in general. The tankers and repair ships could be protected by obsolete or slow battleships, as well as a reinforced number of escorts. And finally, their is the fact that the enemy could simply position the ships to be nearer the main fleet at night for mutual protection and better security. They would then separate near dawn to avoid the risk of the tankers and repair ships being damaged while in combat. This simple procedure wouldn't affect the main fleet much after all, since the carriers aren't going to be operating much at night anyway Thanks for taking the time and effort to give me answers as well as insights into this topic. There are some other areas that can be considered littoral zones, restricted passages and enclosed seas in the game. The Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, East China Sea, South China Sea and most of Southeast Asia are considered as poor areas for carrier forces. The Coral Sea is dangerous to carrier forces as the Japanese found out. The North Sea, Baltic areas in the North. The Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea both have this characteristic. As to the supply lines, submarines are the best choice but carrier forces can perform hit and run raids on forward supply bases and repair facilities to damage them. Anyway, you seem to have the idea. Good luck. Come back anytime if you think of something.
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Post by firefox178 on Mar 9, 2017 12:02:37 GMT -6
My idea has at its premise that the enemy fleet has more carriers than me. My idea is to use mainly island air bases as a trap for a carrier force. The idea being that I would create a defensive line using mutually supporting air bases that would have heavily protected convoys to supply them. Their air forces would be mainly fighters to create air superiority on the island, with limited torpedo and dive bombers to attack any SMALL fleets and convoys in the area. I would supplement these bases with some destroyers and light cruisers. They would also help in harassing any fleets that come to close. This would create a fortified position that enemy must take if they want to attack my convoy routes or advance into my territory. If need be I would shorten my security area to only protect convoy routes or areas of truly strategic importance. And not what the Japanese did of overextending themselves. And once a carrier strike force comes to take these islands, I will wait for some time and let the defending air force bleed the carrier air groups. Then I will strike with my own fleets. Said fleets would be composed of two main groups. A fleet centered around carriers and a fast strike force composed of my fastest battleships and their escorts. My fleets would exploit the fact that they could approach by using the protective umbrella that the island bases provide. And since the enemy has been sortieing their aircraft for some time, I would already have a general idea of where their carriers are. Between the losses already incurred as well as the exhaustion from the operation, my own carrier air groups would have an edge when they attack. Bonus points if I hit them while their bombers are refueling or that they have already taken off to commence their next bombing run. Their is also the fact that the surface ships would have used their ammunition as well as being tired from doing shore bombardments. And while my carriers have launched their attack, I would order my battleships with their escorts to close with the enemy to try to trap or at the very least inflict further damage to the carrier fleet. They would also give me more options. The enemy could stand and fight to allow the transports as well as their supply train the chance to escape. Or the fleet could leg it, abandoning any ship that is too slow to escape. This would of course mean the loss of the transport fleet and their supply ships, as well as any ship too damaged during my air strike.
The beauty of my idea is that while I based it on island bases would be the best to use, the strategy could easily be modified to be used on coasts. My fleets would have a harder time in positioning themselves for an ambush since I would be hindered by being only able to safely approach from the sides hugging the coasts. Attacking from the rear invites too much risk of being spotted, as well as being removed from the protective umbrella of the land based aircraft. On the other hand I would be able to have a more secure supply line since I would not need to use convoys to ferry supplies. Not to mention, to no longer being limited by the size or geography of the island to expand my airfields and hence the number of planes I could station.
The flaws that I could see in my strategy are as follows. First, is that I would need to heavily reinforce said island bases. I may even be limited by the number of aircraft I could station on the island, due to the geographic constraints impose by said islands. And said reinforcing and construction rely on time and resources that I may not have. Granted, I could start the build up during peace time. But it also could be disrupted should a new area be made a strategically important one. Second, I would be heavily constricted since my strategy relies on being on the defensive. It would also tie up important resources that I cannot use for other operations. And finally, on a strategic sense enemy could simply refuse to attack until they have such an overwhelming advantage that I could not possibly beat them even if my ambush was successful.
While typing this strategy, I remembered something mentioned in another forum. Mainly that land-based aircraft are more powerful than carrier-based ones. By this I mean that carrier based fighters and bombers were limited in their capacity in comparison to their land-based counter parts. Said limitations were the result of compromises resulting from the limitations imposed by the aircraft carriers. Was their any bases for this claim?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 9, 2017 14:26:32 GMT -6
My idea has at its premise that the enemy fleet has more carriers than me. My idea is to use mainly island air bases as a trap for a carrier force. The idea being that I would create a defensive line using mutually supporting air bases that would have heavily protected convoys to supply them. Their air forces would be mainly fighters to create air superiority on the island, with limited torpedo and dive bombers to attack any SMALL fleets and convoys in the area. I would supplement these bases with some destroyers and light cruisers. They would also help in harassing any fleets that come to close. This would create a fortified position that enemy must take if they want to attack my convoy routes or advance into my territory. If need be I would shorten my security area to only protect convoy routes or areas of truly strategic importance. And not what the Japanese did of overextending themselves. And once a carrier strike force comes to take these islands, I will wait for some time and let the defending air force bleed the carrier air groups. Then I will strike with my own fleets. Said fleets would be composed of two main groups. A fleet centered around carriers and a fast strike force composed of my fastest battleships and their escorts. My fleets would exploit the fact that they could approach by using the protective umbrella that the island bases provide. And since the enemy has been sortieing their aircraft for some time, I would already have a general idea of where their carriers are. Between the losses already incurred as well as the exhaustion from the operation, my own carrier air groups would have an edge when they attack. Bonus points if I hit them while their bombers are refueling or that they have already taken off to commence their next bombing run. Their is also the fact that the surface ships would have used their ammunition as well as being tired from doing shore bombardments. And while my carriers have launched their attack, I would order my battleships with their escorts to close with the enemy to try to trap or at the very least inflict further damage to the carrier fleet. They would also give me more options. The enemy could stand and fight to allow the transports as well as their supply train the chance to escape. Or the fleet could leg it, abandoning any ship that is too slow to escape. This would of course mean the loss of the transport fleet and their supply ships, as well as any ship too damaged during my air strike. The beauty of my idea is that while I based it on island bases would be the best to use, the strategy could easily be modified to be used on coasts. My fleets would have a harder time in positioning themselves for an ambush since I would be hindered by being only able to safely approach from the sides hugging the coasts. Attacking from the rear invites too much risk of being spotted, as well as being removed from the protective umbrella of the land based aircraft. On the other hand I would be able to have a more secure supply line since I would not need to use convoys to ferry supplies. Not to mention, to no longer being limited by the size or geography of the island to expand my airfields and hence the number of planes I could station. The flaws that I could see in my strategy are as follows. First, is that I would need to heavily reinforce said island bases. I may even be limited by the number of aircraft I could station on the island, due to the geographic constraints impose by said islands. And said reinforcing and construction rely on time and resources that I may not have. Granted, I could start the build up during peace time. But it also could be disrupted should a new area be made a strategically important one. Second, I would be heavily constricted since my strategy relies on being on the defensive. It would also tie up important resources that I cannot use for other operations. And finally, on a strategic sense enemy could simply refuse to attack until they have such an overwhelming advantage that I could not possibly beat them even if my ambush was successful. While typing this strategy, I remembered something mentioned in another forum. Mainly that land-based aircraft are more powerful than carrier-based ones. By this I mean that carrier based fighters and bombers were limited in their capacity in comparison to their land-based counter parts. Said limitations were the result of compromises resulting from the limitations imposed by the aircraft carriers. Was their any bases for this claim? In answer to your question, it is true that land based aircraft could carry more fuel and ordnance than carrier based aircraft but their bases have to be protected by AAW and fighters. Now, could carrier based aircraft be based on land bases? Absolutely, after my Dad's carrier was torpedoed after Eastern Solomon's, the air wing and maintenance were eventually transferred to Guadalcanal to support the Marines. The Japanese Naval Air Force was an organization of naval aircraft strictly based on land, they were not, to my knowledge trained to land on carriers. In the Mediterranean German Stuka's, Dorniers, Heinkel's and JU-88's were based on land and had good fuel and ordnance loads. Something that isn't mentioned much is bring back weight. That term simply means how much of the original ordnance an aircraft can bring back to the carrier if the target is not located or has been struck hard. In WW2, that weight was almost nothing, rarely did a carrier aircraft try to land with ordnance. If it could not be jettison's, it was landed in the water and the pilot picked up by the destroyers assigned to cover recovery and launch of carrier aircraft. For examples, you can review the air operations out of Port Moresby and Darwin where B-25's, B-26's, P-38's, B-17's and B-24's conducted low level raids on shipping from Rabaul to New Guinea. The first two aircraft actually developed skip bombing by flying about 50-100 feet off of the deck then releasing their bombs to watch them bounce into the sides of the escorts and transports. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea provided a complete destruction of a convoy. The Japanese did exactly the same thing with their Nell and Betty bombers. It was torpedo carrying Nell's that sank POW and Repulse off of Malaya. In their interceptive operational plan, this kind of air operation was to be the norm against the US fleet sailing across the Pacific for the decisive battle off of the Bonin Islands. The Mossies' did the same thing in the Med and North Sea, as did the same type of US bombers available. The point being, it was a normal air operation and land based bombers can carry more ordnance and farther. As to your plan, remember to maintain the objective of the operation, that is vital. Don't be lured away from it. Keep in mind that no plan survives contact with the enemy and the enemy has a say in your plans. Land bases need to be built quickly and equipped for maintenance and logistical support. Don't be deceived that once hit, runways can't be repaired quickly. They certainly can be, and faster than you can believe. You don't have to destroy a base, just isolate it, and then keep bombing it. You also don't have to sink every ship, just mission kill them to save effort. Ensure that when you pick a base, that it has a good well protected harbor. Check out the available flat land around the island if the game allows it, which I doubt. Another strategy is to develop a base near the opponents supply lines and use it to decoy his fleet then with your fleet to attack him when he attempts to attack it. We used this conops to lure the IJN carriers to attack Midway, while we were waiting to the NE and then pounced. Results: four fleet carriers and one heavy cruiser lost along with ground crews and pilots. Examples of isolation of bases are Truk and Rabaul, Marianas and Iwo Jima. Good luck. Have you played War in the Pacific, Admirals Edition?
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Post by firefox178 on Mar 10, 2017 8:00:59 GMT -6
Thanks for both the historical and life lessons. It really a gives a deeper understanding to these discussions. And I completely forgot about the tactic of isolating bases. The only way I could see to prevent my bases from being isolated is to modify my plan and instead of trying to sink the carrier fleet or launch an attack, I should first prioritize air supremacy or at least air superiority in the bases I control. Maybe a fleet centered around 5-7 escort carriers or 4 light carriers, with carrier air groups composed completely of fighter planes. I would leave to the island bases to supply the torpedo and dive bombers to attack any shipping in the area. This way I could easily reinforce any bases that is about to be isolated. This carrier fleet is meant to add their carrier air groups to the defense of the island. With this carrier fleet, any air attack coming from the enemy base would be outnumbered by the defending aircraft. I am exploiting the fact that an island base could only support a limited amount of aircraft, where as my fleet would be a lot easier to reinforce. I am hoping to create a scenario which forces the enemy to come to me, rather than the other way around. The defending fleet as well as the island base will be used as a bait. Hence, why I selected to use escort and light carriers. Because should the worst happen, they would be taking the brunt of the fighting and not my harder to build and replace carriers. If/when the enemy fleet take the bait, I would counter with my carrier fleet. Taking an island base however is another matter. My plan of attack would differ slightly depending on the objectives. If I am taking the island for the airfields available to it, I would launch a series of air raids both land and carrier based to not only isolate the base, but also other areas that could launch supporting forces for the base. I would order my forces to not spare the airfields. I could repair/replace the damage I would cause. I would also use submarines to harass/scout out the area to be invaded. The subs would provide the info for important details like the landing sites and others. Of course, my air forces would contribute to the scouting as well. Once, I am sure that I have suppressed the enemy air force, then I would launch a naval invasion. My battleships would support this with a naval bombardment. Then the landings begin supported by light and escort carriers only. My main carrier force would not participate in the invasion itself, but would rather serve as a look out/security for any possible counter-attacks. Especially, if I know that enemy fleets, regardless of size, are operating near the area. Between the battleships and the assigned carriers, the invasion force should have an advantage. Should the base I am attacking also have a port that I would be using, I would do the same assault plan but, with the caveat that the port facility be spared as much damage as possible. Any ship in the port would be attacked until they are rendered inoperable.
My plans have the advantage that since it is a step-by-step rather than an all out assault from the get go, I could change them should new developments occur. For example, the enemy seeing what I am doing, decides to massively reinforce his base with more aircraft as well as a powerful fleet. If the fleet is too strong for my fleet carriers to handle, then I would abort the planned invasion. Because, even if I succeed in taking the island, with the enemy fleet presence I can't reinforce/resupply my forces on it. I would instead prioritize the enemy fleet's destruction or neutralization. How I would do this depends on the specifics of this scenario.
And as for the game, I haven't played it. I'll try to get it if I can. Based on the reviews I have read, it is quite good.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 10, 2017 10:02:08 GMT -6
Thanks for both the historical and life lessons. It really a gives a deeper understanding to these discussions. And I completely forgot about the tactic of isolating bases. The only way I could see to prevent my bases from being isolated is to modify my plan and instead of trying to sink the carrier fleet or launch an attack, I should first prioritize air supremacy or at least air superiority in the bases I control. Maybe a fleet centered around 5-7 escort carriers or 4 light carriers, with carrier air groups composed completely of fighter planes. I would leave to the island bases to supply the torpedo and dive bombers to attack any shipping in the area. This way I could easily reinforce any bases that is about to be isolated. This carrier fleet is meant to add their carrier air groups to the defense of the island. With this carrier fleet, any air attack coming from the enemy base would be outnumbered by the defending aircraft. I am exploiting the fact that an island base could only support a limited amount of aircraft, where as my fleet would be a lot easier to reinforce. I am hoping to create a scenario which forces the enemy to come to me, rather than the other way around. The defending fleet as well as the island base will be used as a bait. Hence, why I selected to use escort and light carriers. Because should the worst happen, they would be taking the brunt of the fighting and not my harder to build and replace carriers. If/when the enemy fleet take the bait, I would counter with my carrier fleet. Taking an island base however is another matter. My plan of attack would differ slightly depending on the objectives. If I am taking the island for the airfields available to it, I would launch a series of air raids both land and carrier based to not only isolate the base, but also other areas that could launch supporting forces for the base. I would order my forces to not spare the airfields. I could repair/replace the damage I would cause. I would also use submarines to harass/scout out the area to be invaded. The subs would provide the info for important details like the landing sites and others. Of course, my air forces would contribute to the scouting as well. Once, I am sure that I have suppressed the enemy air force, then I would launch a naval invasion. My battleships would support this with a naval bombardment. Then the landings begin supported by light and escort carriers only. My main carrier force would not participate in the invasion itself, but would rather serve as a look out/security for any possible counter-attacks. Especially, if I know that enemy fleets, regardless of size, are operating near the area. Between the battleships and the assigned carriers, the invasion force should have an advantage. Should the base I am attacking also have a port that I would be using, I would do the same assault plan but, with the caveat that the port facility be spared as much damage as possible. Any ship in the port would be attacked until they are rendered inoperable. My plans have the advantage that since it is a step-by-step rather than an all out assault from the get go, I could change them should new developments occur. For example, the enemy seeing what I am doing, decides to massively reinforce his base with more aircraft as well as a powerful fleet. If the fleet is too strong for my fleet carriers to handle, then I would abort the planned invasion. Because, even if I succeed in taking the island, with the enemy fleet presence I can't reinforce/resupply my forces on it. I would instead prioritize the enemy fleet's destruction or neutralization. How I would do this depends on the specifics of this scenario. And as for the game, I haven't played it. I'll try to get it if I can. Based on the reviews I have read, it is quite good. After reviewing your plan, prioritize initially on equipping the air base with proper support and a dedicated air wing . This is the critical phase. Do not forget to develop land and sea based radar. Radar on islands is critical for air defense since it takes time to man and launch the defending fighters and give them enough time to climb up to patrol altitudes. Remember that these are propeller driven aircraft until later in the game, which means they will take up five to ten minutes to climb to 10-15000 feet for patrol altitudes. Air superiority over the island, is absolutely necessary. Keep in mind that carrier air wings should stay on the carriers unless the ship is damaged, then off load and send the carrier back to repair. You can off load on a temporary basis when you have the need for extra air support, but it should be temporary. Remember to develop long range scouting aircraft and deploy them. The geographical area that you might be fighting in, is vitally important. AH and Italy don't need really long range aircraft to do scouting. In fact, neither needs aircraft carriers in my opinion. The US, Britain and Japan are the only nations that are maritime and need long range aircraft along with carriers. However, this is a game, not reality. Keep this in mind, that the crucial ingredients in carrier warfare is scouting effectiveness and net striking power. Net striking power is the raw numbers of bombers and fighter escorts reduced by the active and passive defense of the carrier formation. A balance between offensive and defensive power for carriers is important. At the beginning of WW2, the ratio of fighters was 25% for the US, in 1944, it was 65%. At the Marianas, we deployed 470 fighters, which was more fighters than the entire IJN carrier fleet had in total number of aircraft. Carrier tactical doctrine had changed due to circumstances. If you want more on this subject, I can put together some important tactical lessons derived from my books and present it.
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Post by firefox178 on Mar 10, 2017 21:48:12 GMT -6
Wow really!? Thanks, I would really appreciate those lessons. And thanks for reminding me about radar. I was so focused on getting the necessary forces in place that I completely forgot about the essential support system and networks. And also the proper doctrine and procedures. Kinda what happened to the Italians during World War 2. They had the necessary equipment, but lacked the needed operational cohesion to used them effectively. Which gave me a question to ask.
For example in a scenario where an admiral feels that the planes under his disposal is insufficient to achieve his objective, but knows that a nearby airfield has the necessary planes. How would he able to integrate or request those forces for his use. Would he need to talk to the base commander's superior or can he request support from the base commander directly. As an additional complication to the scenario stated above, what if the need for those land based planes was urgent? Say an imminent attack that he has just learned about. Or in another case, what if the admiral had the need but is not urgent. Say he plans for a future air strike but his carriers lack the forces needed. As such he wants to request that the airplanes in an airbase near the area of operation be used in said strike. How would he go about coordinatinating such a force? Who would be the commanding officer in both scenarios. Would one of them be subordinate to the other or both of them can command as they see fit?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 10, 2017 22:26:34 GMT -6
Wow really!? Thanks, I would really appreciate those lessons. And thanks for reminding me about radar. I was so focused on getting the necessary forces in place that I completely forgot about the essential support system and networks. And also the proper doctrine and procedures. Kinda what happened to the Italians during World War 2. They had the necessary equipment, but lacked the needed operational cohesion to used them effectively. Which gave me a question to ask. For example in a scenario where an admiral feels that the planes under his disposal is insufficient to achieve his objective, but knows that a nearby airfield has the necessary planes. How would he able to integrate or request those forces for his use. Would he need to talk to the base commander's superior or can he request support from the base commander directly. As an additional complication to the scenario stated above, what if the need for those land based planes was urgent? Say an imminent attack that he has just learned about. Or in another case, what if the admiral had the need but is not urgent. Say he plans for a future air strike but his carriers lack the forces needed. As such he wants to request that the airplanes in an airbase near the area of operation be used in said strike. How would he go about coordinatinating such a force? Who would be the commanding officer in both scenarios. Would one of them be subordinate to the other or both of them can command as they see fit? In the situation that you have described, there would be an overall operational commander. He would have the ultimate responsibility for the forces assigned to him to accomplish his mission and objectives. However, he might not have authority over the task force commander, who would make decisions based on security and the safety of his ships. This was the decision made by Fletcher in the days following the invasion of Guadalcanal. Fletcher informed the Operation Watchtower commander that his ships were low on fuel and he had to leave the area. This happened before the airfield was operational and it did cause much grief. Many say that this action caused the Savo Island disaster. This is a much discussed issue. As the war progressed, this problem was resolved and all forces worked to together to ensure the success of the operation. The operational commander could contact the naval force commander in command of all naval forces in the area, not just the task force commander and request his assistance in the matter you have presented. You might have a base commander but there might be an overall air wing commander whom he would have to discuss the matter with and present his intelligence information and plan. Most likely the air wing commander, would be under his command, it depends on the command structure. It's difficult to really say how that would work out. Unfortunately, Operation Watchtower was our first invasion using Naval and Marine forces together and they had some command and doctrinal problems. Luckily the IJN and IJA had even worse problems. Our commanders were far more flexible, which is vital. Simply put, the overall operational commander would have the authority to use any and all resources at his command. The naval commander would have the option, of course, to do what was necessary to protect his force. But would have to justify his course of action. We don't babysit on weekends, so I can spend some time researching and providing some lessons learned, as the military calls it. I will do my best and if I don't cover something, just ask.
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Post by firefox178 on Mar 11, 2017 10:42:21 GMT -6
Thanks for taking the time to make the lessons. And I wonder how the game would simulate having an overall operational commander. Guess will just have to wait and see.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 11, 2017 12:13:40 GMT -6
Thanks for taking the time to make the lessons. And I wonder how the game would simulate having an overall operational commander. Guess will just have to wait and see. No thanks are necessary, it's a labor of love for me. What I write will be from actual combat events and actions and how applicable to the game is anyone's guess but that's how simulations work. The US Navy conducted live free-wheeling fleet problems from around 1921 to 1940. They helped develop combat aircraft, techniques, carrier doctrine and island invasion strategies but war is the ultimate trainer.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 12, 2017 9:33:30 GMT -6
Lesson's Learned
Introduction
This is my first attempt at developing my own ideas about the lesson's learned in carrier operations in WWII. The lesson's I am going to present might not have any bearing on RTW-2, they are just the items that I feel were learned in conflict in the Pacific.
In the beginning.... carriers were not supposed replace battleships, just support them and attrite enemy forces so the decisive battle could be won. History tells us that Taranto and Pearl Harbor showed everyone, that the long range striking power of the carrier was a force to be reckoned with. The world never looked back. The carrier is a fragile instrument of war, as evidenced by the many times carriers were mission killed by bombs on their flight deck as the Japanese found out at Coral Sea. They are simply trucks, their combat power is in their air wings. The type of aircraft, composition of the air wing and air doctrine are the absolutely critical element in carrier warfare. Carrier design is important to the successful execution of carrier operations. This leads me to the first lesson.
Lesson 1. The successful carriers were built with standard lifts, traverse arresting hooks and crash barriers. Hangers were to perform maintenance, not stowage or arming. The task of stowage and arming was better conducted on the deck. Hence, the idea of the deck park. We found that we could refuel, rearm and warmup faster and hence launch quicker than either the British or the Japanese. This paid dividends in all the four initial carrier battles of the Pacific war. Open hangers allowed for engine testing and in case of fire, other ships could come along side and provide hoses to help fight the fires. US carriers were not perfect at the beginning of the war, but the Essex class which had been designed and building begun before the war, proved to be highly successful. Eventually armored flight decks were the norm but that still did not stop heavy armor piercing bombs. Of course, flight deck catapults are a must, and this permitted a larger deck park and hence a larger air wing. This leads us to the next lesson.
Lesson 2. The second lesson is that air wings get depleted quickly due to combat and non-combat losses. A search plane is launched and due to malfunction or pilot error, never returns. It happened many times. Many times one aircraft launches but cannot stay in the air and dives into the water, another loss. This is why a sizeable air wing is important. There are generally no replacements for the lost aircraft except what the carrier can bring with it.
Aircraft are grouped in two's called elements. Two, two plane elements are a section and four sections to a squadron. Each section is given a color. This means that the average squadron should be sixteen aircraft but with two aircraft as spares, we arrive at eighteen aircraft assigned to the squadron.
The types of aircraft are now the question. The standard was fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers. As I have said, scouting effectiveness was critical in the War in the Pacific and should be a priority. But also remember the there must be a balance between offensive and defensive. This simply means that you might want to put more than one squadron of fighters on board the ship. Two squadrons would be 36 fighters. To accomplish scouting, the US Navy provided two squadrons of dive bombers, a VB and a VSB. The latter was the scouting force for the carrier and it proved to be effective and a distinct advantage. This now puts us at 72 aircraft. Lastly, one squadron of torpedo bombers which can also be level bombers as well. We are now at 90 aircraft. This composition is variable. You could just provide one squadron of dive bombers with six additional aircraft giving you 24 dive bombers.
As I have said, scouting effectiveness and net combat power are the two keys to carrier aviation. Before you decide to deploy just fighters on smaller carriers, while the attack aircraft are deployed on another, remember that ships cost money to build and maintain, and protection is more difficult for two ships, than one. It might be better to build one larger, faster carrier with a deck park, and catapults than two smaller. Coordinating launches between two carriers during combat action can be difficult, even with TBS installed on the ships. You can augment the scouting force with light observation planes from battleships. These aircraft generally have a limited range and little defense strength so their losses can be heavy. If you can, use land based patrol aircraft to supplement scouting when possible.
I am going to stop here, and present another installment. I want you to examine what I have written and give me some suggestions as to the direction you want me to go.
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