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Post by babylon218 on Feb 22, 2021 6:29:52 GMT -6
The Carrier Trials, 1924
August saw ‘HMS Hermes’ commence her sea trials, taking on an air wing of eight Hawker Harts and twelve Supermarine Swordfish. Meanwhile, the murder of a Turkish official by Greek nationalists in Istanbul set tensions surging across the continent.
In October, a revolution in the Dominican Republic brought an anti-US regime into power, which quickly requested protection from the British government. This request was rejected, with the Foreign Office and the Admiralty agreeing that there was little point antagonising the United States over such a strategically insignificant matter. Defending European colonies from American expansionism was one thing, deliberately intervening in the affairs of a Caribbean state for geopolitical advantage was another.
‘Stoke’ and ‘Nelson’ joined the navy that month, with ‘Stoke’ proving to be the last of the Town-Class cruisers, as technological developments had left the original design of 1910 far behind. Work thus began on the next generation of British cruiser at the same time as work resumed on ‘HMS New Zealand’.
In November, the Air Ministry approved the procurement of the Gloster Goblin to replace the Westland Walrus as the primary Floatplane Scout of the Royal Navy, with a range 128 nautical miles and a max speed of 98 knots. Meanwhile, after over a decade of faithful service, ‘HMS Dreadnought’ was sent to the breakers. The preceding months had been eventful for the old warhorse, with her being reactivated to enforce the security patrols around Ireland. Across the Solent from her final berth, ‘HMS Indefatigable’ was fitting out ready for sea trials the following Spring.
January 1924 begin with the laying down of ‘HMS Emerald’, the first of the new ‘E-Class’ light cruisers intended to continue on from the Towns. These cruisers featured the latest ‘all-or-nothing’ armour configuration, which was arranged in a ‘box’ around the shell rooms, providing 3 inches of protection abreast the magazines and shell hoists and 1.5 inches around the machinery spaces. Countering the light protection around the boiler rooms was a decision to divide the ship’s machinery into two ‘units’, with half the ships boilers followed by half the ship’s turbines, then the second half of the boilers and so forth. In this way, it was hoped that even if a shell did penetrate into the machinery spaces, only half of the power plant would be disabled, leaving the ship still able to manoeuvre, albeit at a reduced rate. This gave the ship two funnels separated by the floatplane facilities, intended to offer some reconnaissance for the overseas cruiser squadrons. The machinery was designed to deliver a speed of 30kn, and thirty mines were carried, with a pair of mine rails to the stern. The six torpedo tubes were retained from the ‘Stoke’, and the entire main battery of six inch guns were mounted on the centreline – a significant achievement, although in practice this arrangement proved cramped and interfered with efficiency in gunnery trials.
British Light Cruiser 'HMS Emerald'.
February saw ‘HMS Indefatigable’ commence sea trials.
March 1924 would see the first of the so-called ‘Carrier Trials’, a series of mock battles which would see the ‘Hermes’ and a modest escort squadron attempt to locate and attack an ‘enemy’ battle fleet at sea. The exercise was scheduled for 15 March.
Swordfish from ‘Hermes’ reported contact with the ‘enemy’ off Lorient at 0738Z, having apparently encountered ‘HMS Warspite’ and ‘HMS Indefatigable’ alongside one of their attendant flotilla leaders. Six Swordfish were readied for a sortie with torpedo planes. Then, Scout #4 radioed in with a sighting report of four battleships at 0740Z around 30 miles further north, the sighting being made at 0720Z but delayed in receipt due to radio problems on the aircraft. Further sighting reports were made, with Captain Arthur Stopford ultimately determining to dispatch the Swordfish to a position roughly in the centre of the large circle described by the sightings. The pilots were specifically instructed before launch to target the ‘enemy’ battle line. Take-off took place at 0831Z, ‘Hermes’ turning into the wind. After forming up around the carrier, the six-strong flight turned West-Southwest to begin the hunt for their prey.
‘Hermes’ received a wireless message from the attack force at 1011Z: “Enemy in sight.” The first attack was made with four of the six planes against the enemy formation at 1015Z, with two battlecruisers attempting to ‘repel’ the attackers with their AAA to little effect. The remaining two planes followed close behind. One torpedo was confirmed to hit the ‘Indefatigable’, the dummy warhead leaking a red dye into the water on impact to signal the event. The carrier force turned to the Northwest to rendezvous with the Swordfish while ‘Queen Amelie’ prepared to launch floatplanes to monitor the opposing force and report on any damage.
1139Z. ‘HMS Danae’, leading one of ‘Hermes’ escorting Destroyer flotillas, signals the dreaded ‘Enemy in sight’. Stopford ordered the squadron to immediately turn north, but ‘Hermes’ was in the process of recovering her Swordfish. To make matters worse, it quickly became clear that the ‘enemy’ was in fact ‘HMS Nelson’ leading three other battleships and closing rapidly. Ordering his destroyers to attack, Stopford turned north and accelerated to ‘Hermes’ top speed of 28kn. The destroyers made good the attack, scoring one ‘hit’ on the ‘Collingwood’, while two Walrus floatplanes scrambled off ‘Queen Amelie’ scored a single 250lb bomb hit on ‘Anson’. The exercise ended at nightfall with no further action.
Log Record from 'HMS Collingwood' detailing simulated damage.
Log Record from 'HMS Indefatigable' detailing simulated damage.
Log Record from 'HMS Anson' detailing simulated damage.
Annotated tactical chart summarising the 1924 Carrier Trials.
All in all, the first ‘Carrier Trial’ had not been a tremendous success. Of all the hits achieved in the operation, one torpedo had been launched by the ‘Wear’, and the sole bomb hit of the encounter had been achieved by one of Queen Amelie’s floatplanes, though the bomb had ‘hit’ in such a way that light flooding would have surely resulted, it was not, ultimately, serious. The sole air attack by the Swordfish which successfully ‘hit’ ‘Indefatigable’ was likewise not crippling, though the judges determined this likely reflected her advanced underwater protection system compared to ‘Collingwood’, which had reported heavy flooding from the destroyer attack.
In his report on the mock engagement, Stopford recorded the following:
The lacklustre performance of our aviation arm can be best attributed to: a lack of sufficient reconnaissance aircraft; poor bomb yields; and a need for additional training. The last of these is simple enough and will come with time. As for the first two, these will require direct affirmative action from the Admiralty. First, regarding reconnaissance: it is not that the task force lacked sufficient aircraft to locate the enemy, but this purpose occupied almost half of ‘Hermes’ allocation of torpedo planes, leaving only six available to act on the intelligence gathered by the scouts. Making matters worse, by the time the strike force returned to ‘Hermes’ they were required to immediately launch again to replace the returning scouts, meaning that even as ‘Nelson’ and her force came into view, ‘Hermes’ lacked any aircraft with which to mount a defence. The use of ‘Queen Amelie’ to lead scouting efforts would help address this, but it is my view that twelve torpedo aircraft is entirely too small a force if our intent is to launch meaningful attacks from our carriers. Our pilots would no doubt have scored more serious hits against ‘Indefatigable’ had the battlecruiser’s fire been split between even ten aircraft as opposed to only six, and a second torpedo hit may have been sufficient to inflict crippling damage. Attached to this is the fact that, naturally, with more aircraft, we can launch more attacks. Additional hangar space must therefore be a central consideration for future vessels of this type, and we might also contemplate integrating seaplane carriers like ‘Queen Amelie’ into our operational doctrine. As for bomb loads, 250lbs may be sufficient against destroyers or cruisers, but are wholly inadequate against warships of capital class. This should factor into aircraft procurement in future.
However, the exercise also made clear existing AAA outfits were utterly useless against air attack. This was softened only by the fact that the attacks which had been made proved so ineffective.
Despite the lacklustre results of the first Carrier Trials, press reports that British torpedo planes had ‘successfully’ attacked a mock battle squadron with torpedoes, crippling one, reached Germany. In response, fearing Swordfish raids on Wilhelmshaven, the BVM ordered its forces to a heightened state of alert. This was met, in May, with a surprise budget increase for the Royal Navy to counter the ‘aggressive’ moves across the North Sea. This came just in time for the laying down of the ‘Eagle’, a second carrier to a revised ‘Hermes’ design. Displacement was increased to 13,500 tons, facilitating a larger air group of thirty aircraft (to consist of ten Harts and twenty Swordfish). There was also a slight adjustment in the design of the superstructure, with a walkway placed alongside the conning tower one deck down to ease passage between the fore and aft halves of the ship around the smokestack. There was also an increase in the AA armament, with the new design consisting of twelve 2pdr ‘pom-poms’ and twenty-one 20mm Oerlikon AA cannons. Otherwise, little changed between the two ships.
British Aircraft Carrier 'HMS Eagle'.
The same month, the second ‘E-Class’ cruiser was ordered as ‘HMS Enterprise’. This was, again, a slightly revised design. Issues with the cramped main battery had been foreseen, and so ‘L’ gun was to be omitted from ‘Enterprise’, the space being used to add additional accommodation for marines and supplies, a facility which had been neglected on ‘Emerald’. Otherwise, again, little changed from the previous ship.
British Light Cruiser 'HMS Enterprise'.
June saw Admiral Jellicoe, answering a question from the Daily Mail regarding the international situation, remark that “of all our European neighbours, the Spartacist government in Germany is by far the most menacing.”
Meanwhile, the Royal Air Force accepted the Bolton Paul Barracuda as its new Flying Boat for the Coastal Command. Though the slowest of all the offerings, it offered an incredible range of 314 nautical miles unloaded and 162 nautical miles carrying a single 500lb bomb. At the same time, Supermarine responded to the Carrier Trials with the Swordfish Mk.II, utilising a more fuel-efficient engine to achieve a range of 225 miles unloaded and 127 miles fully-laden, an improvement of more than 20 miles! This achievement was all the more impressive for the fact that Supermarine had managed to reinforce the airframe to improve robustness and at the same time allow it to carry an increased bomb load of 300-2000lbs!
In response to the rising German threat, Jellicoe ordered that two new submarines should be laid down every month for the next eighteen months, bringing the Submarine Arm up to 46 boats by the end of 1925.
August saw ‘Warspite’ brought into dock to have her AAA suite augmented with the heavier 2pdr pom-poms and 20mm Oerlikons, while the old battlecruiser ‘Inflexible’ was laid up for conversion into a large aircraft carrier. The work would see all her 12-inch guns removed, her casemates plated over, and her machinery completely replaced. The new powerplant would allow her to make 28kn, while her magazine spaces were replaced with aircraft hangars sufficient for thirty aircraft. This was less than was ideal, but was made necessary as several Admiralty figures demanded, against Tyrwhitt’s objections, that the ship should still be armed with at least eight 8-inch guns, especially in light of how ‘Hermes’ had nearly been ran down in the Trials. Her flight deck tapered slightly more aggressively than on ‘Hermes’ and ‘Eagle’, partly due to the flight deck being built atop an existing structure and partly because it had been noted that Hermes’ deck had an unfortunate tendency to become wet in rough seas, and it was hoped a ‘squarer’ bow would help keep the deck above water.
Having apparently not taken the hint two years earlier, Fareham demanded the laying down of nine new cruisers in November. This was perfectly timed, as Jellicoe was worried the Navy might actually maintain a surplus that year! Jellicoe eventually managed to beat the number down to six, with exactly six additional E-Class being laid down. (Elephant, Echo, Exeter, Euphrates, Endeavour, and Ensemble.)
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Post by babylon218 on Feb 22, 2021 5:52:30 GMT -6
RE: the Alaska/BC debate, I feel it's worth noting that at no stage did the Imperial German Navy refer to their battlecruisers as such, but as Large Cruisers (Grosser Kreuzers), which reflected the fact that doctrinally these ships were follow-ons from Germany's armoured cruisers - oriented to battlefleet scouting duties first and foremost. Nevertheless, we still refer to them as battlecruisers in the English-speaking world. Just because a ship isn't called a Battlecruiser doesn't necessarily mean it isn't one (and vice versa).
Ironically enough, the very reason Drachinifel cites for why he doesn't view the Alaskas as battlecruisers is the very reason I do see them as such. Ultimately, if we view the Invincible-Class as battlecruisers, then by the same yardstick so are the Alaskas, in my opinion. They were heavily-armed cruisers intended to hunt enemy and completely outmatch other cruisers - they were both intended as 'cruiser-killers'. One could see the Alaskas, Scharnhorsts (despite their official and intended role as battleships), etc. as a resurgence of the battlecruiser starting from the same place as Invincible: a heavily-armed cruiser to sink any other cruisers.
(Un)fortunately, we don't really know how the Scharnhorst twins would have been used if the Kriegsmarine had developed a real battlefleet. It seems probable that either they or the Deutschlands would have been used as advanced surface scouts for the Bismarck and H-Class battleships, but ultimately we never found out because Germany threw all their battleships into the metalgrinder piecemeal, allowing the British to destroy them in detail.
Much is made of the loss of Hood to Bismarck, but let's consider that for the loss of four German battleships over the course of the war (Bismarck, Scharnhorst, Tirpitz, and Gneisenau), Britain lost the HMS Hood. That's, honestly, a pretty good trade. Had all four German battleships sortied out in unison, British losses to direct surface action could have been a lot steeper. Fortunately, that never happened. /tangent
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Post by babylon218 on Feb 22, 2021 5:05:28 GMT -6
Really excited for this. One thing I'm curious about though, with regard to late game. If the guided missile system is being expanded, that would seem to remove (as far as I can tell, anyway) the main obstacle to playing beyond the 1950s. If this is the case, might it be feasible to add a start date for 1940 or 1950 to let those players who want to get straight to playing with missiles do so, even if it means a relatively short campaign?
Also, with angled flight decks being properly integrated, can we assume that some autogenerated superstructure designs are going to be introduced (e.g. Kitty Hawk, Victorious/Hermes rebuilds, CVA, etc.)?
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Post by babylon218 on Feb 21, 2021 14:00:48 GMT -6
Battleships off Belfast
The ‘Irish Question’ had permeated British politics since the mid-Nineteenth Century, with Irish nationalism surging in the wake of the Great Famine of 1849-52. For the past fifteen years, various British Governments had attempted to resolve the toxic and highly-charged issue of Irish Home Rule. While Home Rule had been passed by the Liberal Parliament in 1913, the following Conservative Unionist governments had stonewalled and ultimately killed the process. This did not stop agitations both in Ireland and at home, however. It was perhaps inevitable, then, when in September 1922 an armed unit of the so-called Ulster Defence Force (UDF) clashed with members of Sinn Fein and the insurgent Irish Republican Army outside Londonderry’s St. Columb’s Cathedral. And orgy of violence and pogroms between both Catholic and Protestant communities ensued across Ulster, quickly spreading to the rest of Eastern Ireland.
The Irish Ministry attempted to control the situation, with army units being mobilised to put down the violence, but had the exact opposite effect when the colonel of the 2nd Enniskillen Rifles ordered his troops not to fire on Unionist paramilitaries, while at the same time instructing a second platoon of his men to open fire on marching Catholic protesters on Carlisle Road, killing eighteen Irish, including three women and four students. The Carlisle Road Massacre, as it became known, caused an already volatile situation to erupt into all-out rebellion, forcing the Admiralty to activate the battleships ‘Temeraire’, ‘Superb’, ‘Vanguard’, and ‘St. Vincent’ along with several cruisers and destroyers to help quell the revolt.
Meanwhile, someone had got it into Lord Fareham’s head that, despite having two battleships and two battlecruisers already under construction, the navy clearly needed two more. The result was the laying down of ‘Australia’ and ‘New Zealand’, representing those dominion’s contribution to the Imperial Naval Plan – on the grounds that if the Government dared try to inflict cuts on the Navy, it would do so it the risk of scrapping two ships intended for the Dominions. The Admiralty also gave the greenlight to Vickers to enter into a technological exchange with Bethlehem Steelworks in the USA.
December 1922 saw war on the horizon between Greece and Turkey. In response to murmurings in the press that various shipyards and weapons foundries were gearing up to sell to either side, the Government declared an arms embargo against both countries, citing the historic Neutrality Proclamation of Queen Victoria. As a result, Vickers were ordered to suspend construction of two battleships then destined for both countries.
December also saw a series of moves by the Admiralty to prevent any potential French intervention in Ireland, with the establishment of the Channel and Western Approaches Command, consisting of several Motor Torpedo Boat squadrons. The Royal Air Force also began construction of a new airfield near Belfast for bringing in supplies, as well as expansions of the Channel and East Anglian airfields.
January 1923 began with the Air Ministry and Fleet Air Arm approving the full development of the Supermarine Swordfish torpedo bomber, with a top speed 105 knots, range with full torpedo load of 106 nautical miles (188 miles unencumbered) and a single rifle-calibre machine gun attached to the navigator position for defence. It could carry one torpedo or a single bomb of between 250lbs and 1600lbs. The acceptance of the Swordfish was marred, however, by the discovery that Lord William Forbes-Sempill had leaked key information about the preparations for the new aircraft for carrier operations to the Imperial Japanese Navy without prior authorisation. To make matters worse, the affair leaked to the Press, forcing the government to publicly admonish Sempill and recall him from Japan, frustrating the Japanese.
In February, ‘HMS Rodney’ began sea trials. Meanwhile, the DNC advised that his department was confident it could support superelevated forward guns on future cruisers, and Vickers unveiled a larger bore-size 40mm anti-aircraft cannon, the 2pdr ‘pom-pom’. Fighting continued in Derry, Belfast, and Dublin.
March saw the ordering of a fifth ‘Warspite-Class’ battlecruiser, in response to an intransigent Fareham who insisted on maintaining the pace of construction following the completion of ‘Rodney’. However, Jellicoe advised the builders not to rush to order the necessary components, as a new design of Battleship was then under development. As such, the new hull was never named, only receiving the designation ‘Battlecruiser E’. Unfortunately, this attempted subterfuge came to the attention of Lord Fareham, creating something of a rift between himself and Jellicoe. Nevertheless, Jellicoe was able to make the case for not proceeding with the vessel, and pointed out the Navy only had sufficient funds for three months at most at the current rate of construction, convincing Fareham to authorise the suspension of ‘Australia’ and ‘New Zealand’ and the cancellation of ‘Battlecruiser E’. Helping Jellicoe’s argument was the fact that ‘Nelson’ and ‘Warspite’ were due to commence sea trials in the next six months, at which time construction of the remaining battlecruisers could proceed.
May 1923 was a month of frenzy in Whitehall, as the Admiralty codebreaking team in Room 40 intercepted German radio signals indicating U-Boat movements in the Irish Sea. Suspicions that the German Spartacists were smuggling arms to the Irish Republican Army were apparently confirmed when a telegram between Berlin and Dublin was intercepted arranging a ‘dead-drop’ near Cork. The message had been sent via the German Embassy in Stockholm, but the Spartacists had apparently failed to take into account that all telegraph cables to Ireland passed through British stations, with a German-speaking GPO clerk noticing the message and passing it on to the Foreign Office. Anti-submarine patrols were stepped up between Continental Europe and Ireland.
June saw the majority of the Irish Republican Army surrender to British authorities, following bombing raids on Republican strongholds in County Connacht and an offer of clemency to any surviving rebels who handed in their weapons. Support had fallen away from the Republicans after the Spartacist connection was exposed and the supply of arms curtailed, with various allegations of Marxist sympathies amongst the rebel leadership. Helping matters was an undertaking by the government (under pressure in Parliament following an economic downturn to resolve the crisis) to re-examine the Home Rule issue. This was potentially toxic to the Conservative Party, much of which was made up of Irish Unionists, but this was tempered by the pragmatic observation that the Unionist side hadn’t come out of the insurrection looking particularly good itself: incidents such as the razing of Catholic churches and a particularly notorious case of several hundred Catholic women and children being locked in a church in County Antrim while unionist militants set it alight had done more than their fair share to turn public opinion into sympathy for the Irish Nationalist cause.
Reflecting on the previous ten months, Jellicoe observed:
"We owe much to the German communists. Thanks to their ill-fated support for the Republicans, our coastal defences are much-improved, with new airfields across the south coast, torpedo-armed motor launches organised in Dover, Cork, and Harwich, and two brand new 4.5-inch coastal gun batteries protecting Ireland from any further foreign interlopers. Furthermore, it was thanks to the Spartacists’ truly woeful radio discipline and failure to appreciate our position at the heart of the global telegraph network which allowed us to expose their involvement and instigate the collapse of the rebellion. Not since the days of Napoleon has an attempt to incite domestic unrest by a foreign power against this country backfired so spectacularly as the Spartacist Gunrunning this past year. Chancellor Thalmann should receive the George Cross for his efforts!"
A George Cross for Chancellor Ernst Thalmann was, unsurprisingly, not forthcoming. And as the July sun shone upon the Solent, crowds gathered along the Gosport Esplanade, cheering the sounding of foghorns as the ‘HMS Warspite’ headed out into the English Channel for sea trials. At the same time as ‘Warspite’ slipped into the Solent, steel was laid in No.1 Basin for the Battleship ‘HMS Trafalgar’.
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Post by babylon218 on Feb 21, 2021 13:55:22 GMT -6
Warspite
In September, the design of the BL 6-inch Mk.XXII naval gun was approved. A higher-velocity development on the previous 6-inch gun, the Mk.XXII was 50 calibres long and enjoyed greater range than its predecessor, as well as superior armour penetration.
October saw an improved 16-inch gun developed – fortuitous as it would turn out, as attention had turned towards weapons of this calibre to arm the new class of battlecruisers in development. Three of the ‘Wear-Class’ destroyers would also commission into the navy that month, just as the DNC had completed draft drawings for a quadruple torpedo mount.
In December, the D-Class cruiser ‘HMS Dauntless’ entered service. Royal Ordnance also reported they had further developed the 16-inch gun, offering a 50-calibre weapon believed to be years ahead of the main capital armaments of other nations. Jellicoe, somewhat frustrated by the prospect of another delay to the 1920 Battlecruiser being laid down, nevertheless consented to Admiral Tyrwhitt’s wish to integrate the new gun into the ship’s design.
Meanwhile, Tyrwhitt presented several sketch designs for the potential conversion of existing warships into aircraft carriers, generally consisting of the removal of all upper works and heavy armament and in their place building up a single hangar deck with a flat flying-off deck above it, in various configurations.
February 1921 finally saw the commencement on work for the first of the new battlecruisers: ‘HMS Warspite’. Over the previous autumn and winter, design work had centred around two main design proposals, codenamed ‘A’ and ‘B’. Each proposal went through three iterations, until it was realised that design ‘B’ had sufficient reserve displacement to potentially mount six 16-inch guns. At this point, work began on adapting design ‘B’ to accept the weapon, culminating in design E3. E3 mounted six BL 16-inch 50-calibre guns in three twin turrets, arranged as a superfiring pair forward and a single turret aft, with twelve high-angle QF 4-inch guns in 1.5-inch shielded mounts, and twenty-six Vickers 20mm ‘pom-pom’ anti-aircraft cannon. The design had a top speed of 29kn, with an inclined belt 12.5-inches thick, a deck 4-inches thick, 14-inch turret faces, and a relatively light 8.5-inches of armour protecting the Conning Tower. The entire design displaced 36,000 tons.
British Battlecruiser 'HMS Warspite'.
The name of the lead ship, ‘Warspite’, was chosen as part of a theme around old Razee frigates, with one forebearer of the name being built as a 74-gun Third Rate Ship-of-the-Line in 1907 before being Razeed down to a 50-gun frigate in 1840. As razees were principly battleships cut down for high speed, the theme seemed appropriate to the navy for battlecruisers, and the name ‘Warspite’ certainly evoked the deterrent effect the ship was intended to have as an overseas flagship.
By this point, it had emerged that the United States Navy’s new Delaware-Class dreadnoughts had returned to a 14-inch main battery, but also that Germany and France were both building new battleships and battlecruisers of approximately 35,000 tons. In light of this, it was questioned whether the programme to build four Admiral-Class battleships should continue, or if ‘HMS Rodney’ should instead by cancelled and a new class of 16-inch battleships be laid down in her stead. This question would be held off, while late in February the ‘HMS Dragon’ left Birkenhead for sea trials.
April saw ten of the ‘Gala-Class’ escort destroyers commission into the fleet.
With ‘Anson’ due to complete in June and the 1920 emergency programme winding down, it was decided to press ahead with the fourth and final of the Admirals, ‘HMS Nelson’, in May. The same month, ‘HMS Delhi’ completed sea trials, as did three of the ‘Greltoria-Class’ sloops, which were placed straight into ordinary.
In July, Italian authorities seized Manwel Cassar, a Maltese man whom the Italian government accused of spying on the Italian naval base at Taranto for the British Government. The British government denied all knowledge of Cassar and accused the Italian government of persecuting the man in furtherance of Italian claims on Malta. However, records in the National Archives have made clear that Cassar was in fact known to the Admiralty as early as 1919, with Cassar’s passage to Italy being arranged as part of the staff associated with the Royal Navy’s attaché to the British Embassy in Rome. Little record exists for Cassar’s purpose in Italy, but various investigations by both journalists and historians since indicate he was probably sent by the British Naval Attaché to report on Italian port arrangements as part of a general intelligence effort investigating the naval developments of the other Great Powers. Regardless, the Italian Government were not cowed by the outcry in the British Press and from the Foreign Office, with a Court imprisoning Cassar for twenty-five years for espionage. Later that month, ‘HMS Nottingham’ joined the fleet, with ‘HMS Portsmouth’ following in July.
August would see the laying down of the ‘HMS Indefatigable’, the second of the ‘Warspite-Class’, timed to coincide with the completion of ‘HMS Collingwood’.
1921 would close out with the ‘Bradford’, ‘Kingston-Upon-Hull’, ‘Nottingham’, and ‘Portsmouth’, departing Britain for their deployment as the Central Pacific Squadron, based out of Midway Island. To bolster the British position at Midway, construction also commenced on a Naval Air Station on the island, as well as the erection of a 6-inch coastal battery.
Meanwhile, with it being determined that Britain now had excess tonnage on foreign stations by a considerable margin, the ‘Ariadne’ and the ‘Sutlej’ were recalled for decommissioning.
1922 began with the Air Ministry calling for a new fighter design, emphasising speed and offensive firepower. Meanwhile, the Admiralty were beginning to draw up plans for a dedicated aircraft carrier based on Admiral Tyrwhitt’s advice.
In February 1922, the Naval Attaché to Rome managed to smuggle detailed sketches – no one appears to have asked where from – of the new Italian ‘Conte di Cavour-Class’ battleships. These battleships were to be armed with twelve 355mm (equivalent to 14 inches) guns in four triple turrets, with a top speed of 24kn and a displacement of 27,900 tons. While the speed was of concern, the Admiralty did not regard the class as a serious threat to the Royal Navy’s pre-eminence.
Italian Battleship 'Conte di Cavour'.
In March, the ‘HMS Hermes’ was laid down, marking the second purpose-built aircraft carrier to be laid down anywhere in the world (the US Navy had recently laid down the ‘USS Charger’, and France was in the process of converting the new Heavy Cruiser ‘Gloire’ to a carrier, representing the only two other aircraft carriers then known to exist). With a single flight deck conforming to the shape of the bow, an elevator fore and aft, and eight 4.5-inch dual purpose guns mounted on sponsons just below the flight deck alongside thirty ‘pom-poms’, the ‘Hermes’ would have a top speed of 28kn and a hangar capable of storing up to twenty aircraft.
British Aircraft Carrier 'HMS Hermes'.
In April, First Lord Fareham consulted the Admiralty on whether the Navy was prepared for war with France following the passage of the French Naval Law. Jellicoe assured Fareham that the Navy was more than capable of handling any French threat which might arise. Meanwhile, steel was laid for the next Town-Class cruiser, ‘HMS Stoke’. ‘Stoke’ was built to yet another revised design, with a top speed of 29kn to match the Warspite-Class battlecruisers, fourteen pom-poms, and all the 4.5-inch guns replaced with dual-purpose mounts, as well as replacing the 6-inch guns with the new Mark XXII 50-calibre weapon. The torpedo armament was also augmented, adding two additional torpedo tubes, one per launcher. All this required an increase in displacement to 7,200 tons.
June saw the Hawker company win the Air Ministry contract for a new fighter to replace the Hurricane Mk.II, with the new aircraft capable of 140 knots and a maximum endurance of just over 100 nautical miles. The new aircraft was named the Hawker Hart. Almost immediately, the Air Ministry implemented a request by the Fleet Air Arm for a new Torpedo Bomber to replace the Bristol Spitfire.
July saw trouble in the Virgin Islands, as protests over mismanagement by the Danish governor combined with a fishing dispute between American and Danish fishermen to create a potentially volatile situation. Despite requests for British intervention, as had occurred 18 years earlier, the Admiralty advised the Foreign Office to make no commitments to the Danish authorities unless US interference seemed likely. Meanwhile, Tyrwhitt notified Jellicoe that experiments had successfully been conducted launching aircraft off of warships using catapults, with ‘HMS Queen Amelie’ being brought in to Harwich to receive the necessary equipment in August, replacing her aft 4.5-inch gun with a swivel-mounted catapult and regunning the remaining positions with the newest designs in dual-purpose mounts. The opportunity was also used to add sixteen pom-poms.
**** Oh boy, is the next chapter something.
Initially, I was absolutely convinced going with 6 16in guns on Warspite was a mistake, then I get two 'improved' 16in gun events in the space of six months! It's a sign, I tell you! RTW wants my battlecruisers to be armed with 16in guns!
Also, really happy with how the top-down profile of 'Hermes' came out. I've always been intrigued by the early British carriers where the flight deck tapered off with the bow of the ship, even though it wasn't a good idea as far as keeping the deck dry went. Twenty aircraft arguably isn't a lot, but I justify it as being Britain's first foray into carriers, with the next ships being based on the lessons of this one (much like how Hermes was based on the lessons learned from Beatty's abominations, I mean Glorious, Furious, and Courageous. )
Also, the German's finished the first of their new battlecruisers in 1922:
That's a pretty eerily-similar match to the Warspites. Glad I went with that design now. One saving grace I suppose is that it's slower and its belt armour is pretty thin. Oh, and the complete lack of any meaningful AAA, instead making do with what Drachinifel would call 'an aircraft notification system'. I feel like they'd be better off giving the gunnery director officer a flyswatter!
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Post by babylon218 on Feb 18, 2021 7:49:46 GMT -6
The Following is an excerpt from official records - appendices 1a-1d to Admiralty Minutes 20 August 1920:
Appendix 1a:
Further to the design studies considered by the Admiralty on 16 August, further refinements have been made on Proposals A2 and B2 for the Battlecruiser 1920. In consideration was a desire to improve the main belt and deck protection and increase magazine capacity. The DNC has considered reducing the calibre of the main armament to accommodate more guns and reduce the overall cost and displacement, but this has proven impractical. The DNC and Third Naval Lord have expressed their view that the Battlecruiser 1920 proposal requires a ship with such versatility that it cannot be met in a single well-rounded, low-cost design. Sacrifices have to be made in the design somewhere, though careful consideration has yielded the improved designs detailed in Appendices B and C to this document.
Appendix 1b: Battlecruiser 1920-B3:
Cost and displacement savings were made to Design B2 by removing the gunshields for the 4" secondary battery and reducing the battery by two guns, as well as reducing the armour of the Conning Tower from 14" to 10". This has allowed an expansion in magazine size to accommodate 115 rounds per gun and increase the main deck protection to 4" thick. This provides the design with invulnerability against 14" shells at a range of 13,000 to 23,000 yards. The total cost of the design has been only marginally-reduced, however. The DNC notes that it is feasible to reduce the gun calibre of this design to 13" and fit an additional gun in B Turret without any increase in cost and the option to reduce the displacement by several hundred tons, and can produce detailed drawings of this option should the Board desire.
Appendix 1c: Battlecruiser 1920-A3
Due to the difficulties experienced in attaining the desired improvements in protection with design B3, Design team A was authorised to prepare a third iteration of their proposal. Reducing the fuel bunkers, removing secondary gunshields, and reducing the thickness of the Conning Tower armour yielded sufficient savings to increase deck armour to 4" and increase the ammunition spaces to carry a load of 125 shells per gun. This is only marginally more expensive than the Admiral-Class Battleships currently under construction, and carries the maximum possible anti-aircraft battery for a ship of this size. However, it has only two-thirds the firepower of B3 and sacrifices turret roof protection.
Appendix 1d: Comments by the First Sea Lord The First Sea Lord appreciates that at only 12.5" of belt armour, the proposed designs are hardly suitable for the line of battle. However, that is not their purpose. The purpose of the Battlecruisers is to provide capital ship support to our security squadrons overseas and to scout ahead of the Grand Fleet. If the Battlecruisers encounter an opposing force of equal or superior strength, their aim should be to draw the enemy into range of the main battle line, not engage directly. While this is an ideal, the above designs appear to have the protection necessary to maintain a safe distance from such an enemy force.
I also wish to remind the Board that as light as this protection scheme may seem, it is still an inch-and-a-half greater on the main belt than the battlecruisers (exempting the Japanese Kurama-Class) of every other Great Power and is in fact equal or superior to the latest generation of German, American, and Italian Dreadnought battleships.
___ Also, on a slightly more relevant note, I can't increase the armour or drop the speed any further without them being classified fast battleships. I'm definitely going to keep Design B around for that purpose, since heavy scouts aren't a bad thing, but there's not really much I can do to the battlecruiser designs at this stage.
So, I'm a bit torn. A3 definitely offers better value for money, but B3 is clearly the better warship. I'm sorely tempted to accept the lighter 13" gun and go for more guns and accept that this design is going to effectively be a cruiser-killer and not much else - at least unless I can fit 15" or 16" twins later (which would fit on the hull, and I do have Q -1 16" guns available). That has its own downsides as well - in particular, locking the design down as an overseas flagship over a battle scout. It would be able to form a homogenous unit with HMS Indomitable however...
Thoughts?
(Oh, I've also checked the exact wording in the manual RE: splinter protection. It's at least 2" to protect entirely against splinters, but any armour below 2" does still have an effect, just proportional to the armour thickness. That's good to know. )
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Post by babylon218 on Feb 17, 2021 17:02:15 GMT -6
Alas, I regret not getting back to this. I was having some personal issues I needed to take care of. I'm still on the same version of the game, so maybe I'll carry this forward to 1925-30 and tie things off.
Responding to design comments, I broadly agree that B2 is the better design of the two 'finalised' designs. What I'm considering to address the concerns raised is to reduce speed to 28kn, and reduce the Conning Tower armour to free up displacement for the main belt and deck so I can potentially bring those up to 13" and 4". I will also consider reducing the secondary battery either to unarmoured mounts (last I checked 2" was the minimum necessary for splinter protection?) or ten guns, then using any remaining tonnage (increasing displacement to 36,000t if necessary) to get an extra 10-15 rounds of ammunition per gun before fitting out the AA suite.
Thinking about it, the armour concerns are very logical in context, as while I've been able to "make do" with limited armour protection on BCs in most games (I usually keep my BCs at long range, fighting on the periphery of the battle to pin the enemy in place), both my BC losses in this game were sustained in close-range poor-visibility actions, where my usual cautious approach wasn't practical. If I'd considered upping the armour on those designs, at least one of those ships might have been saved.
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 11, 2020 8:50:58 GMT -6
The following is an excerpt from the official Admiralty Records: appendices 1a through 1g from the Admiralty Minutes 16 August 1920:
Appendix 1a: Objectives for Battle Cruiser 1920. The purpose of this document is to determine the precise purpose and design priorities for the Battle Cruiser Class which is to be laid down by the end of this year. To date, the Navy's stance regarding this type of vessel has been inconsistent, deeming them necessary, but at the same time deprioritising this type to the extent that both 'Inflexible' and 'Indomitable' being delayed such that 'Inflexible' did not enter service with the Royal Navy until four years after her keel was laid. The result is that both our existing Battle Cruisers are separated in design terms by almost half a decade of technical and doctrinal advance, utilise different calibres of guns, and operate at two different design speeds. By contrast, the three Battle Cruisers of the French Navy are all of the same design, capable of operating as a single battle unit or independently with ease. Similarly, while the German BVM has thus far built single-ship Battle Cruiser classes, with incremental speed improvements, those that we have accurate intelligence on are both of a uniform-calibre main armament. Consequently, it is the Admiralty's opinion that the 1920 Battle Cruiser should serve as a blueprint for all further ships of this type for the foreseeable future.
Roles must be carefully considered in designing such vessels. It is expected that these Battle Cruisers will not only serve as fleet scouts in war, but also as the Flagships of the overseas cruiser squadrons, with particular emphasis on the Mediterranean and East Indies fleets, which will serve not only as trade protection forces but also as the first line of Imperial defence against any aggressors in those regions, such as Japan, France, or Italy. With the move away from the Allingtonian doctrine of fielding several battlefleets across the world for imperial security, these battlecruisers need not possess the same colonial enforcement capabilities as their predecessors. They must have firepower and protection sufficient to engage other vessels of their type as fleet scouts, but also possess speed necessary to operate as a cruiser leader. The dominions of Australia and New Zealand have both expressed interest in operating such a vessel for the overseas squadrons, and so thought should be given to their requirements.
Appendix 1b: Design A1.
Design BC1920-A1 (hereafter simply 'A1') is based upon the lines of HMS Indomitable, with the 13.5" rifles substituted for larger 14" weapons and the 4" battery replaced by more modern high-angle derivatives. Speed and armour has been improved, as has underwater protection.
Appendix 1c: Design B1.
B1 is the first of several 'blank slate' designs. Using a 3, 2, 3 gun arrangement with 14" guns for a total of eight, the design is heavily-armoured by virtue of initially being used as a design study for 16" guns. It lacks long range, but features a top speed of 30kt, ideal for fleet scouting duties. The projected costs are high, however, around 25% greater than an Admiral-Class Battleship.
Appendix 1d: Design C1.
C1 reduces the armament of B1 to six 14" guns and so can reduce displacement to provide a design much cheaper to build than B1 but maintain equal speed and protection.
Appendix 1e: Design D1.
D1 is an abortive design study into using 15" guns instead of 14" weapons. Included here for completeness, the design offers superior weight-of-broadside to C1, but the ballistic qualities of the weapon are substantially worse in all other regards to the 14" gun.
Appendix 1f: Design A2
Proceeding on from the first four designs, A2 revised the hull design of A1 somewhat and removed many of the colonial enforcement provisions to optimise the displacement and construction costs. At this stage, the team behind Design C1 were making similar efficiencies in their design C2, and so the two teams were merged.
Appendix 1g: Design B2.
Similar efficiency drives were made in Design B2, with the design accepting a one knot drop in design speed and a less-reliable engine design to reduce displacement to 35,500tons with commensurate savings in cost.
So, the purpose of this post is to get feedback on the design process. Feel free to RP a bit if you so desire, but in particular I'd like suggestions on which design between A and B to develop further and what, if any, changes need to be made. Note, I have not paid much attention to the AA armament on these designs, so don't take too much notice of those numbers.
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 10, 2020 9:07:34 GMT -6
Imperial Naval Plan, 1916:
‘Indomitable’ joined the Fleet in September 1916, followed by ‘Dreadnought’s’ return to service following modernisation in October.
In November, the fourth Revenge-Class battleship, ‘Renown’, was laid down just as ‘Revenge’ herself and ‘HMS Manchester’ were commissioned.
In December, another eight ‘Doon-Class’ destroyers were laid down, with a further four following in January 1917.
In March, ‘HMS Sheffield’ joined the fleet, freeing up funds for another four ‘Doons’ to be laid down in April, plus four more in anticipation of the first squadron’s completion in the next few months.
The decision had, by this point, been made to allow one flotilla of ‘Doons’ to strengthen the destroyer force and then use successive flotillas to replace the long-suffering ‘Derwents’.
In November 1917, another flotilla of twelve ‘Doons’ were laid down. Partly this was because several British shipyards had proven exceptionally good at completely the ships ahead of schedule, even though the DNC was of the opinion that larger destroyers could be of greater benefit.
Around the same time, the Royal Navy scrapped the old Resolution-Class pre-dreadnoughts. Once a paradigm shift in pre-dreadnought construction, they were now hopelessly obsolete.
February 1918 saw the completion of the second ‘Doon’ flotilla and the scrapping of twelve of the worn-out ‘Derwents’.
With the destroyer ‘crisis’ in hand, and affairs at the Admiralty beginning to stabilise, Jellicoe could turn his attention to more long-term naval matters. Over the past decade, the face of naval warfare had changed drastically. The Towns were a start, but much of Britain’s cruiser fleet was still obsolete, especially among the armoured cruisers. In the Anglo-French war especially, the British had no real means of hunting down French commerce raiders. As such, Jellicoe developed the ‘Imperial Naval Plan’. This was a far less comprehensive scheme than the Strategic Reviews of Allington and Bridgeman, intended to be flexible. It proposed the formation of four cruiser ‘Flying Squadrons’ prepositioned around the world to respond to and intercept enemy commerce raiders in the event of war, without tying down heavy fleet assets. Jellicoe identified four sea zones which were crucial to protecting world trade: the Mediterranean; the Central Pacific; the Caribbean; and the East Indies. As such, the Plan advocated establishing ‘principle bases’ at Malta, Midway Atoll, Singapore, and Jamaica. These would serve as the headquarters and primary dock facilities for the squadron. It was also proposed the Australia and New Zealand might contribute more directly to the East Indies and Central Pacific squadrons.
The Plan advised assigning no fewer than four light cruisers to each squadron – a somewhat tall order as the navy was still trying to replace the ageing third-class Victorian cruisers. Nevertheless, the recommendation was taken on board.
In the aftermath of the Plan’s publication, the cruisers ‘Leeds’, ‘Curacao’ and ‘Conquest’ were laid down, the two C-Class ships destined to replace older third-class protected cruisers while ‘Leeds’ would join the rest of the ‘Birmingham’ sub-class as the Caribbean Squadron upon completion.
In April 1918, ‘Royal Sovereign’ joined the fleet.
In May, with ‘Leeds’ building attention turned to addressing the issue suffered during the Battle of La Rochelle where ‘Liverpool’ was being caught by French battle cruisers, with the third ‘Town-Class’ sub-class entering the design phase. Meanwhile, two more C-Class cruisers were ordered as ‘Cleopatra’ and ‘Champion’.
In June, the Navy took delivery of ‘Royal Oak’.
In August, the first pair of the new Towns were laid down; ‘HMS Bradford’ and ‘HMS Kingston-upon-Hull’, the more-common name ‘Hull’ apparently being considered too common for the Admiralty. Design work also began on a new class of battleship in response to the US ‘Delaware-Class’. The preceding ‘Oklahoma-Class’ had been armed with ten 15in guns. However, the British Admiralty were not satisfied with the performance of the British equivalent and so decided the new battleship should simply mount more 14in guns – twelve in four three-gun turrets. Thought had been given to increasing the design speed to 23kt, but this was resisted as it would noticeably increase costs and Jellicoe argued that such an ‘intermediate-speed’ battleship would only be superseded in short order by even faster battleships as technology progressed.
Above: US Arizona-Class Battleship. Below: British Town-Class Cruiser HMS Bradford.
In November, the third Doon flotilla finally finished, and design work began on their successors, as well as new flotilla leaders. The B-Class, though they had given sterling service and exceeded expectations, were becoming worn out and were now too slow to keep pace with the destroyers they were supposed to operate with.
December saw the laying down of ‘HMS Anson’, a battleship of 35,000 tons displacement armed with twelve 14in guns, and the first four ‘Kale-Class’ destroyers. Displacing 1,300 tons each, these destroyers fitted four 4in guns, with one gun mounted atop the superstructure to fire over the rear gun, and six torpedo tubes in two triple launchers. They also received expanded capacity for depth charges and mine rails. These were the first ‘flush-deck’ destroyers in the Royal Navy, and concerns were raised regarding their sea-worthiness, but it was considered necessary for the superfiring arrangement to be attainable with six torpedoes on such a small hull. The torpedo tubes were recessed under a superstructure ‘bridge’ amidships.
Above: British Battleship HMS Anson. Below: British 'flush-deck' destroyer 'HMS Kale'.
January 1919 saw ‘HMS Danae’ laid down – the first of the D-Class flotilla leaders. Displacing 5,500 tons, the Danaes were effectively a new design over the B-Class. They carried eight 5in guns, with four mounted along the centreline and two mounted side-by-side on the fo’c’sle. Aft there was a superfiring arrangement where ‘X’ gun fired over ‘Y’ gun on the quarterdeck using a separate platform from the superstructure. This decision was somewhat criticised, but for the moment would stand.
Above: British Flotilla Leader HMS Danae.
Towards the end of January, a spy managed to acquire drawings for the French cruiser ‘Dupetit-Thouars’ of the ‘Gloire-Class’. Displacing 17,100 tons, the ‘Dupetit-Thouars’ was armed with eight 254mm guns in four two-gun turrets. This combined with her competitive top speed led to the ships being described as ‘small battle cruisers’, ‘intermediate cruisers’, or ‘heavy cruisers’.
Above: French Cruiser Dupetit-Thouars.
In March, the ‘HMS Collingwood’ was laid down on the same lines as ‘Anson’. Internally, they became known as the ‘Admiral-Class’. ‘HMS Renown’ joined the Fleet.
In August, Jellicoe won political support to finally build up the submarine arm. The Navy were still using the surviving two experimental submarines ordered under Allington almost a decade earlier. With the construction programme for surface ships proceeding smoothly, Jellicoe convinced the Admiralty and Cabinet to sanction the building of eight medium range submarines for fleet scouting purposes as a start.
May saw a contest to develop a ‘torpedo-carrying bomber’ for the Navy won by the Bristol Spitfire, as attention turned towards the development of aircraft carrying warships.
In June, ‘HMS Curacoa’ joined the fleet. Meanwhile, Third Sea Lord Tyrwhitt informed Jellicoe that the DNC was preparing drawings for destroyers with specially-superimposed guns, rather than the work-around used on the ‘flush-deckers’. The main change was to use ‘blast-screens’ projecting forward of the upper guns to protect the lower gun crews from the muzzle blast.
July saw ‘HMS Conquest’ and ‘HMS Leeds’ join the fleet. The first four ships of the ‘Wear-Class’ were laid down. These were based upon the improved destroyers advocated by Tyrwhitt and returned to a raised fo’c’sle. ‘Dauntless’ was also laid down as the second D-Class flotilla leader.
Above: British destroyer HMS Wear.
In September, Vickers received government approval to purchase a license to build the US Navy 4”/50 gun, which showed superior ballistics to the British weapon. Meanwhile, ‘HMS Champion’ joined the fleet.
In October, Birkenhead’s Cammell Laird shipyard offered to build a third D-Class cruiser with a very competitive bid. As such, ‘HMS Dragon’ was laid down on 14 October. Meanwhile, ‘Curacao’ completed training and was deployed to replace ‘HMS Amphion’, which was then struck from the Navy list. Meanwhile, ‘Cleopatra’ was commissioned.
In November, ‘Manchester’, ‘Sheffield’, ‘Liverpool’ and ‘Leeds’ were dispatched to form the Caribbean squadron at Jamaica. ‘HMS Delhi’ was laid down alongside four more ‘Wears’.
December 1919 saw the development of the first ‘high angle’ 3in and 4in gun mountings for anti-aircraft use. While the threat posed by aircraft was still largely theoretical, the advent of anti-aircraft weaponry was something of a priority in the Royal Navy at this time. The same month, ‘HMS Argonaut’ was retired.
The new year saw the laying down of ‘HMS Nottingham’ and ‘HMS Portsmouth’ to the ‘Bradford’ sub-class. ‘Bradford’ herself was delivered to the Navy the next month, followed by ‘Kingston-upon-Hull’ in March.
In April, ‘HMS King Edward VII’ and ‘HMS Redoubtable’ were scrapped, leaving the Japanese battleship ‘Asahi’ the last pre-dreadnought battleship in naval service. Meanwhile, ‘Champion’ and ‘Cleopatra’ replaced ‘Cressy’ on foreign stations.
In June, the Admiralty endorsed a proposal by Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon to seek a non-aggression treaty with the Russian Empire, to deter any aggression by Spartacist Germany or a revanchist France. Unfortunately, the talks ultimately amounted to nothing, but word of the discussions leaked to Berlin and tensions flared between the Communist state and Britain.
An emergency meeting at the Admiralty argued for an emergency building programme to prepare Britain for war with the Spartacists. While the German Bundesvolksmarine (BVM or Federal People’s Navy) was markedly inferior in surface ships of all types except battle cruisers, they had built up a frighteningly powerful U-boat force. The decision was thus made to build a force of ‘convoy sloops’ to escort British merchants against submarine attack. A new run of destroyers optimised for construction speed and fleet anti-submarine screening was also authorised.
In July, ‘HMS Danae’ entered service, and the first steel was laid for the first flotilla of ‘Gala-Class’ destroyers and twelve ‘Greltoria-Class’ convoy sloops. The two classes were optimised for ease of construction and cost-efficiency in anti-submarine warfare, though the ‘Galas’ were still built with a recognition that they would need to be capable of frontline combat as well.
Above: British Gala-Class Destroyer. Below: British Greltoria-Class Convoy Sloop.
To free up funds, and because almost every ship included was worn out by ten-to-twenty years of service, all pre-1916 destroyers were scrapped in July. This still left a force of forty modern destroyers plus another twenty under construction.
The sudden escort programme apparently had a profound effect, as the Spartacist government’s rhetoric towards Britain suddenly softened in August. Also in August, the third ‘Admiral-Class’ Battleship was laid down; ‘HMS Rodney’. Work was also begun on the next Royal Navy Battlecruiser, though design talks would occupy all levels of the Admiralty as Summer turned to Autumn.
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 8, 2020 11:55:34 GMT -6
The ‘Long’ War
The first order of business was to modernise the first-generation dreadnoughts with up-to-date guns for ‘Dreadnought’ and director fire control in all three ships. This was possible because even taking all three of these ships in for reconstruction, Britain still outnumbered France in dreadnoughts two-to-one.
The French Battle Cruiser threat was far more palpable, however. ‘Inflexible’ was quickly recalled from the Mediterranean and the four Town-Class cruisers sent to replace her in colonial patrols. Meanwhile, construction began on an airship base at the Orwell Estuary near the Harwich base to provide full air reconnaissance over the English Channel.
On 16 March, just hours after the declaration of war, ‘HMS Boyne’ led a destroyer patrol of the Channel coast. At 0109Z, the flotilla made contact with two unidentified vessels in the fog. With the beam of ‘HMS Eden’s’ searchlight the French tricolour was made out and shots rang out. One of the French ships was an old Friedland-Class pre-dreadnought, escorted by a single Arquebuse-Class destroyer. In the fierce one-hour gunfight which ensued, the French battleship was able to sink both ‘Waveney’ and ‘Boyne’ in short order, with ‘Eden’s’ engines disabled before slipping away into the darkness. As the only ship remaining able to fight, ‘Afridi’ escorted ‘Eden’ back to harbour. Sadly, Eden’s bulkheads would rupture on her way back to port and she sank shortly after dawn, just miles from Plymouth. The escorting French destroyer did succumb to her own injuries however, and also sank. The loss was Britain’s however: in just an hour of battle, France had annihilated three of Britain’s only four truly modern destroyers. The chaos of the battle had prevented any concerted torpedo attack, with all four ships making attacks in turn which the French battleship could evade.
The action of 16 March would prompt a rapid shift in British naval construction. A crash destroyer building program was implemented, to provide a large number of destroyers with similar capabilities to the ‘Waveneys’ in a shorter timeframe for fewer resources. The capabilities could be implemented on a 700ton hull, though it would sacrifice range and reliability. Another design was also prepared to represent the long-term future Royal Navy destroyer, fitting an extra 4in gun on the same displacement by slightly reducing the size of each gun’s ammo complement. Construction work on ‘Royal Sovereign’ and ‘Royal Oak’ was suspended to free up funds for the programme.
Above: The 'Ettrick-Class' of War Emergency Programme destroyers.
On 25 April, the ‘HMS Liverpool’ swept the Western Approaches with the ‘Afridi’. At 1458Z, the two ships sighted a French ‘Bruix-Class’ armoured cruiser. Using her superior speed, ‘Liverpool’ manoeuvred to get in front of the enemy ship and allow ‘Afridi’ to launch torpedoes. There was a further point to this – ‘Liverpool’ could only penetrate the French ship’s armour at point blank range, while the French ship would need only to score a handful of hits with her 203mm weapons. Fortunately, she had only two such weapons, and by manoeuvring in front of her ‘Liverpool’ would only take fire from one of them, drastically lowering the risk of taking a hit.
Unfortunately, ‘Liverpool’ could not overhaul the French ship quickly enough, but ‘Afridi’ successfully charged the French ship and forced it to turn away. ‘Liverpool’ gave chase.
The fight devolved into a long-range gunnery duel as ‘Liverpool’ tried to keep outside the effect range of the French cruiser’s armament. Nightfall brought the action to an inconclusive conclusion.
In May, the ‘Ettrick-Class’ of war emergency program destroyers was laid down, with the first twelve ships expected to complete in nine months.
On 14 May, ‘HMS Inflexible’ led a raid on French shipping in the Bay of Biscay. At 0813Z, ‘Inflexible’s’ force sighted a French cruiser off La Rochelle. As the two forces continued to close, it became apparent ‘Inflexible’ had stumbled across all three French battle cruisers and the British Commander, Vice Admiral Doveton Sturdee, immediately ordered a turn away. Engaging in a battle with three-to-one odds, according to him, “is not gallantry, it is madness”.
Struggling to disengage, Sturdee ordered his flotillas to launch a torpedo attack to drive the French battlecruisers back at 0853Z.
The move worked, with the French battle cruisers turning away from a swarm of torpedoes, leaving Sturdee to deal with a loan merchant ship which had stumbled upon the action to the East.
Unfortunately, the French rallied and caught up with the rear of the British line, overhauling the ‘Liverpool’. In an effort to drive off the French once more, Sturdee turned back to face his pursuers at1009Z.
At 1342Z, after a long running battle, and with ‘Inflexible’ having seen off one French battle cruiser with gunfire, the British screen scored a torpedo hit against a second Battle cruiser, attributed to the ‘HMS Battle’. The French force disengaged, with Sturdee turning back to finish off the limping and crippled battle cruiser.
Above: HMS Battle earns her name.
1402Z. The third and only truly battle-worthy French battle cruiser turned back. Sturdee’s force was approaching exhaustion, with all his cruisers starting to lose speed with fouled grates and ‘Indefatigable’ herself reduced to 24kt by battle damage. Sturdee turned to his Flag Captain and remarked, “There’s only one thing for it, Robert. God Save the King!”
Above: Inflexible in close action.
After one final charge which successfully drove off the third French battlecruiser, the two fleets finally disengaged at 1451Z.
The Battle of La Rochelle was an unexpected victory for the British, as Sturdee successfully extracted the majority of his force from a situation where he seemed surely doomed. Furthermore, he seriously crippled one French battlecruiser and left two more needing various degrees of repair. However, this success was tempered by the fact that in order to achieve such results, Sturdee had sacrificed four of his destroyers, at a time when Britain’s destroyer force was already badly understrength.
June saw the French navy stay in port and refuse to engage the British fleet. With French pride wounded at La Rochelle and the Marine Nationale unable to break the British blockade, the French government sued for peace, resulting in the Treaty of Antwerp.
Bridgeman argued for a comparatively lenient treaty, believing that the heavy-handed treatment of Germany may have played a role in creating the tense atmosphere leading to war. Furthermore, the navy was in little position to prosecute a major campaign against French colonies if negotiations fell through, as they had the month previous. Thus, there would be no annexations, with the French government simply making symbolic and monetary concessions, with the intent being to allow France to save some face.
In the post-war reductions in July, all twelve ‘Ettrick-Class’ destroyers under construction were cancelled and four ‘Doon-Class’ destroyers, designed to replace the lost ‘Waveney-Class’ ships, were ordered.
Bridgeman came under heavy fire. The destroyer forces had been badly neglected before the war, with Britain having a total of thirteen destroyers available for fleet screening as well as general patrol duties by war’s end, against almost the same number of French equivalents. In private correspondence leaked to the press, Sturdee commented that, “one more battle like that, and the French could sail up the Thames with no opposition!”
This was not entirely Bridgeman’s fault. The destroyer fleet had been in a reasonable condition when he took office, but losses during the Anglo-German War had been high – too high – and there were other areas which had required his attention prior to 1916. Nevertheless, the Government was under pressure to replace him, his personal health was failing, and he’d used up the last of his personal influence by pressing for leniency for France – a decision which was not especially popular either publicly or in cabinet. In the weeks following the Treaty of Antwerp, Bridgeman carefully oversaw the demobilisation of the Home Fleet and then offered his resignation. The resignation was accepted by the incoming First Naval Lord Arthur Lee, Viscount Fareham, who allowed him the dignity of nominating his own successor.
Given his excellent service as Commander-in-Chief of the Harwich Force during the German war, one possibility which was raised was Rear Admiral Reginald Tyrwhitt. However, Tyrwhitt had yet to actually hold an Admiralty posting, though Fareham conceded his expertise with the light forces made him ideal to fix the destroyer ‘crisis’ and consented to his appointment as Third Sea Lord instead. Former Home Fleet C-in-C George Callaghan was another option, but he turned down the post, as he was nearing retirement in any case and wouldn’t be able to hold the position long. This left his successor, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. By disposition a cautious but eminently capable administrator and commander, Jellicoe seemed the ideal candidate to restore a sense of organisation and order to an Admiralty left ragged by two wars in five years.
As Jellicoe arrived to assume his new post, Bridgeman shook his hand and jested, “terribly sorry about the mess, John.”
So, that was a really short war. And yes, the Destroyer situation really was that bad. Jellicoe and Tyrwhitt have some work to do. The B-Class really are proving their worth. They're a touch slow now, with my new destroyers significantly faster than them but, more worryingly, even those French battlecruisers could have kept up with them. Annoyingly, 'Badger' was damaged during the Biscay raid, which I assume is why the battle generator put 'Abercrombie' in the fleet. Slightly annoying, given the reason I only built Abercrombie was because she was too slow, but nevermind. The Birminghams have impressed me though. 'Liverpool' getting scarred by that CA was pretty much what I expected to happen, but I was pleasantly surprised how well she weathered the beating and with how accurate her fire was at range. I think a few more of these are called for. But for the time being the destroyer situation needs addressing as a matter of priority.
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 8, 2020 7:00:34 GMT -6
The Years of Peace
While design work began on a new class of Battle Cruiser to follow ‘Inflexible’, Bridgeman finished evaluating the lessons of the Anglo-German War. The war had shown up worrying deficiencies in Britain’s destroyer force, namely the inability of British destroyers to hit their German counterparts. The issue was believed to be due to a relative lack in firepower, as the German ‘S-22-Class’ destroyer possessed three 10cm guns with no lower-calibre weapons. It was thought that the 2in and 3in secondary guns fitted to many British destroyers were interfering in shell spotting. A decision was made to rectify the situation in January 1914. Meanwhile, other lessons of war were considered: the war had not been won by a decisive battle, but through economic warfare. The battlefleet kept Germany contained while Britain’s cruisers strangled the German supply lines and captured Germany’s colonies, while simultaneously hunting German surface raiders. However, if the cruiser force was growing obsolete before the war, parts of it were now expressly geriatric. Work thus began on a series of smaller cruisers to replace the ageing fleet – ships which could be built more quickly and in larger numbers than the Towns. For the time being, these ships were referred to as the ‘C-Class’.
November saw the adoption in the Royal Navy of the ‘All or Nothing’ armour theory – the advances in armaments and armour piercing shells had left the thin end portions of armoured belts and decks virtually irrelevant. Instead, it was determined that by removing the extended belt and deck armour, it was possible to reinforce the armoured citadel and strengthen the watertight bulkheads at the fore and aft ends against flooding. This scheme would be worked into the ‘C-Class’ design.
In December 1913, ‘HMS Inflexible’ joined the fleet, followed by ‘HMS Marlborough’ in January 1914.
February saw the first ‘C-Class’ cruisers, ‘HMS Cordelia’ and ‘HMS Comus’ laid down, alongside the Town-Class ‘HMS Liverpool’.
Above: British Light Cruiser HMS Cordelia.
In March, a public subscription campaign collected a large sum of money to build a battleship. Fortunately, plans had already been made to follow up from the King George V-Class, with a larger ship utilising the ‘all-o-nothing’ armour scheme and 14in guns.
May saw construction work begin in ‘Queen Amelie’, a 2,000ton ship based on a freighter design to carry aeroplanes for reconnaissance purposes.
In June, work began on ‘HMS Revenge’, a battleship armed with ten 14in guns, a belt 14.5in thick and deck 2in thick, alongside ‘HMS Indomitable’ armed with six 13in guns with a top speed of 28kt. June also saw the disposal of the four ‘Royal Sovereign-Class’ pre-dreadnoughts, their cumbersome main battery and lack of speed now completely inadequate against the growing fleets of dreadnoughts.
Above: British Battleship HMS Revenge
Below: British Battle Cruiser HMS Totally-not-tempting-fate Indomitable.
In September, the designs of the ‘South Carolina-Class’ then under construction were leaked to the Admiralty. With an armament of four 14in guns in four two-gun turrets in superfiring pairs fore and aft, they were impressive ships, though a tad slow at 20kt and slightly less well-armoured than their British counterparts. Meanwhile, the British and Colonial Aeroplane Company (later known simply as ‘Bristol Aircraft’) won a contract with the Navy to provide floatplanes for the ‘Queen Amelie’.
Above: US Battleship USS South Carolina.
November saw British agents produce accurate statistics for the new Japanese ‘Kurama-Class’ Battlecruiser. This was a perplexing ship, armed with only four 12in guns and fourteen 6in guns, though featuring a competitive speed of 26kt and a strong armoured belt 11.5in thick.
Japanese 'Battle Cruiser' HIJMS Kurama.
Meanwhile, designs were finalised for an above-deck torpedo mount which could support three tubes on a single mount. Now the DNC was given permission to design a new destroyer to resolve the issues encountered during the war. The product of this development was the 900ton ‘Waveney-Class’, armed with three centreline-mounted 4in guns, with one positioned just abaft the forward superstructure as well as three torpedo tubes mounted in a single swivel launcher aft of the rear-most funnels. Four were laid down in January 1915.
British Destroyer HMS Waveney.
In February, the results of the 1915 General Election returned a victory to Andrew Bonar Law’s Conservative & Unionist Party. Bonar Law’s government immediately approached the navy with a proposal to raise the naval budget – a proposal which was accepted, but with the advisory from Bridgeman to take a page from Theodore Roosevelt’s book: “Carry a big stick if you must, but speak softly all the same.”
In April, the ‘HMS Birmingham’ commissioned, followed by the laying down of ‘HMS Manchester’. ‘HMS Queen Amelie’ entered service in May.
In June 1915, the Government approached the Navy for input on foreign policy due to international tensions. With the two main options for a prospective alliance being Italy and the United States, the navy advocated for diplomatic overtures towards the latter. These fail to yield results, unfortunately. Meanwhile, the three Endymion-Class cruisers were reactivated to take on foreign station duties, allowing the Astraea-Class to return for decommissioning. The same was done with ‘Inflexible’, replacing the ‘HMS Diadem’ and ‘HMS Spartiate’.
In July, ‘Cordelia’ and ‘Comus’ joined the fleet. On completing their crew training, both would be sent to foreign stations. Intelligence also materialised regarding the new French dreadnought ‘Ocean’, which was armed with ten 14in guns with two twin turrets mounted en echelon for cross-deck firing. This meant they would have highly restrictive firing arcs to achieve a full broadside. They were very well armoured, though, with a belt 14in thick.
Above: French Battleship Ocean.
August saw the laying down of the sixth Town-Class cruiser ‘HMS Sheffield’, in anticipation of ‘Liverpool’s’ completion the following month. Also laid down was the second ‘Revenge-Class’ battleship, to be named ‘HMS Royal Sovereign’.
September saw the scrapping of ‘Eclipse’ and ‘Pandora’, to be replaced by ‘Persian’ and ‘Pearl’. With ‘Iron Duke’ due to complete in October, followed by ‘Howe’ in November, a third ‘Revenge’ was laid down as ‘HMS Royal Oak’.
November, the two C-Class cruisers replaced ‘Phaeton’ and ‘Arethusa’ on foreign stations.
In January 1916, the remaining four Majestic-Class pre-dreadnought battleships were withdrawn, as the world’s navies continue to reduce their own pre-dreadnought fleets.
On 15 March 1916, Irish Secretary Sir Walter Long was riding in his motorcar to his office in Whitehall when a bottle was hurled from the pavement. Upon hitting the side of Long’s car, the bottle shattered. This would normally be considered just another rowdy attack on the aristocracy by the London mobs were it not for the bottle’s contents – gasoline. The bottle struck the body side next to the engine shroud, igniting the cloud of petrol released from the bottle and creating a massive fireball.
The driver was killed immediately. Long survived the initial attack but was badly burned and later died from his wounds. It was one of the worst anarchist attacks in Britain’s history and rocked British upper-class society to its core. The assassin was a Leonard Raine, an Irishman who had had connections to Sinn Fein. This was not a surprise, as Long had made mass arrests against the Irish nationalist movement since attaining the Irish Ministry in 1915. What was more concerning was that Raine had already been identified as a threat several years earlier, but absconded to France. He had re-entered the country under an assumed name with French passport. Were France trying to ignite tensions over Irish Home Rule by sponsoring the assassination of a British cabinet minister? This was the immediate conclusion drawn within the government, and an ultimatum was sent demanding France allow the Metropolitan Police to investigate any connections between Paris and Raine, while ethnic violence ensued in Soho against the French Huguenot community.
By the end of March, Britain and France were at war, bringing an end to the Years of Peace.
Well, that came out of the blue. Seriously getting fed up of all these wars, but I guess at least I'm not fighting them all at once. And anyway, I really shouldn't have too much trouble beating France. I outnumber their battlefleet 2-1. They have more Battlecruisers than me, but 'Indomitable' arrives in six months and none of their BCs are particularly frightening. Ocean is two years out and their existing two battleships appear to be glass cannons. Where I do need to worry though is their armoured cruiser fleet. They have 11 to my 9, and all of my CAs are on FS. As, for that matter, is my one active BC. I think I'd better send the Towns to FS so I can bring 'Inflexible' back home. The B-Class should be more than capable leading the screening forces.
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 5, 2020 7:49:45 GMT -6
From Severus to Spartacus.
June 1911 would see Bridgeman issue an order mandating that “capital ships should not attempt to prosecute battle in visibility below 10,000 yards”. This was a response to the loss of both ‘Indefatigable’ and ‘Bellerophon’, which were both lost in night actions or poor visibility to torpedo attack. He also ordered ‘Renown’ and ‘Empress of India’ to be demobilised, in part to save funds (of which the Navy had less than six months’ remaining) and in part because they were surplus to the needed number of battleships to contain Germany ahead of Operation: Severus.
‘Royal Sovereign’, ‘Benbow’, ‘Collingwood’, ‘Anson’, and ‘Hogue’ were being assembled at Port Edward in British Weihaiwei to seize the German holdings in the Far East, starting with Tsingtau (Qingdao) in the neighbouring Kiautschou Bay, before moving to Australia to do the same against the Bismarck Archipelago.
The purpose of Operation: Severus was to reduce the overseas basing capabilities of the Imperial German Navy and thus allow British forces to be concentrated in a handful of areas.
On 26 June, ‘HMS Good Hope’ and ‘HMS Drake’ were dispatched to patrol the Wash off the East Anglian coast after reports a German cruiser had put to sea for bombardment operations near Gt. Yarmouth. Off Cromer, on 27 June at 0416Z, the cruisers received reports of a large German force just North-East of them. While the reported figure of four dreadnoughts, a battlecruiser, and a destroyer was dismissed as erroneous (on the grounds that Germany didn’t have four dreadnoughts), they changed course to investigate all the same.
0420Z. The corvette ‘HMS Baron Blantyre’ signalled the ‘Good Hope’ via ‘HMS Newcastle’: “Have enemy in sight. One large battleship or cruiser, one escort. 30nm east of Cromer.” With the enemy location in hand, the ‘Good Hope’ accelerated to full speed and closed to engage.
In the next ten minutes, the ‘Baron Blantyre’ updated its report to two armoured cruisers and five destroyers.
0447Z. With the British squadron racing south to meet them, the German cruisers turned away from ‘Baron Blantyre’ and moved to disengage. The chase was on.
At 0645Z, having chased the German cruisers into the Southern Bight between Gt. Yarmouth and the Dutch coast, ‘HMS Good Hope’ opened fire on the rear German cruiser.
Unfortunately, the chase east had not been kind to the two British Cruisers and their machinery began to give out, with ‘Drake’ reduced to 18kn and ‘Good Hope’ 20kt, slowing to 18kt so ‘Drake’ could keep up. Knowing his ship, ‘HMS Newcastle’ had a much better hope of catching the German ships, Captain Tyrwhitt requested permission to break away from the Armoured cruisers and attempt to flank the Germans with ‘Newcastle’ and his destroyers, bringing them back to the struggling ships. This permission was granted at 0745Z.
What followed was a lengthy skirmish between ‘Newcastle’ and the German destroyer screen across the Broad Fourteens as the British light cruiser began to overhaul the German armoured cruisers. It was noted aboard ‘Good Hope’ that even if Tyrwhitt couldn’t force the Germans to turn back, he was blocking them against the Dutch coast. One way or another, the Germans had to turn and fight.
By 1030Z Tyrwhitt was almost out of sight of ‘Good Hope’ and taking fire. Two German destroyers had fallen behind and virtually trampled by the British screen.
At 1128Z, with the Germans approaching Emden and ‘Newcastle’ now struggling to keep pace due to battle damage, Tyrwhitt turned back to rejoin the British armoured cruisers. Unfortunately, the ‘Good Hope’ and ‘Drake’ were still unable to make any speed over 18kt and the German squadron had slipped past the Hook of Holland before the armoured cruisers could bring their guns to bear.
The British Cruisers, unable to catch the Germans before they could make port, turned away as they approached the German coast.
Although seen as a missed opportunity, the action was a tactical victory for the British. The Germans had been unable to bombard the British coast and they had lost one destroyer with a second heavily damaged. Captain Tyrwhitt was praised for his gallant attempt to engage the German armoured cruisers and would be promoted soon after to Commodore of the Harwich Force, placing him in the front line for all future North Sea engagements.
The action had also been a trial by fire of the Town-Class cruisers. ‘Newcastle’ had held up surprisingly well under sustained fire from German 8in and 6in guns, taking eleven shells in all before breaking off.
Above: HMS Newcastle, circa 1911.
On 20 July, 1st Destroyer Flotilla conducted a sweep of the Heligoland Bight. At 0216 a squadron of German Destroyers were sighted. Over the course of the morning, the British destroyers sank two German destroyers for one British before having to break off the action close to Heligoland.
Later in the month, ‘Superb’ commissioned. It was decided to rush her into active service rather than allow the crew to complete their working up as ‘Temeraire’ was under repair due to mine damage.
In August, ‘HMS Marlborough’ was laid down as the sister ship to ‘HMS King George V’. Meanwhile, ‘HMS Good Hope’ intercepted and sank ‘SMS Prinz Heinrich’ attempting to run the blockade on the 21st.
September saw Operation Severus go into action, with five British battleships escorting British troops from Port Edward to Tsingtao. The lone German gunboat in the area could do nothing to intervene. On 24 September, while patrolling off Madagascar, ‘HMS Ariadne’ intercepted ‘SMS Victoria Louise’, but quickly lost her in the fog.
In October, the ‘Howe’ and ‘Majestic’ were sent from supporting the Tsingtao invasion to assist in the invasion of the Bismarck Archipelago.
On 26 December, the ‘HMS Diadem’ intercepted the ‘SMS Friedrich Carl’ and sank her in a long battle which dragged into the night. Both ships had to abandon the action with heavy damage, but while ‘Diadem’ limped back to New Providence, the ‘Friedrich Carl’ succumbed to her wounds and sank in the night.
Another belated Christmas gift to the Royal Navy was the news on 27 December of the surrender of Tsingtao, depriving the German raiders of any fuelling bases in Northeast Asia.
Late in January 1912, ‘HMS Astraea’ was investigating a freighter off Cape Verde when the freighter suddenly hoisted the German Naval Ensign and identified herself as the ‘SMS Carsten’, a converted merchant raider. Despite getting some crippling early hits on ‘Astraea’, the ‘Carsten’ was no match for the British cruiser’s guns and sank.
In February, another German attempt at negotiating was made, but again fell through due to mutually unacceptable demands.
On 28 April, ‘Good Hope’ led another intervention against a German naval bombardment along the Norfolk Coast. At 1617Z, the German force is sighted, led by ‘SMS Vonn der Tann’. Tyrwhitt, in command of the force this time round, signalled his ships to “‘Avenge ‘Indefatigable’.”
An early hit caused ‘Vonn der Tann’ to slow markedly, so even the obsolescent ‘Good Hope’ and ‘Drake’ were overhauling her while her destroyer screen was mangled by British local superiority. After a while however, ‘Vonn der Tann’ repaired her damage and began to pull away. Tyrwhitt ordered his flotillas forward, the B-Class cruisers leading the charge. ‘Battle’ got heavily damaged but alongside ‘Beacon’ managed to force ‘Vonn der Tann’ to re-engage the ‘Good Hope’, which put her under heavy fire. Unfortunately, the damage was once again rectified, and ‘Vonn der Tann’ once again pulled away. This time, the B-Class ships were unable to run her down before nightfall.
The end of April saw British troops land on the Bismarck Archipelago and attention turning towards German East Africa.
May saw construction begin on airship bases at Grimsby and Rosyth, aimed at providing reconnaissance for the fleet over the North Sea. It also saw the introduction of the ‘Admiralty Fire Control Table’, designed under Frederic Dreyer to centrally direct all main battery guns. Finally, following a three-week siege, the capital of German New Guinea, Simpsonhafen (modern-day Rabaul) surrendered to the British forces. The ‘SMS Hansa’, which had been operating in the area against British shipping, was forced to scuttle as her machinery wore out. Rumours reach London of mutiny among German sailors in Wilhelmshaven and Kiel.
On 25 June, British destroyers once again tangled with German destroyers, this time off Terschelling. This time, the British lost two destroyers for three German ones. The following day, news arrived that British troops had invaded German East Africa.
In August, the ‘SMS Freya’ was interned by the French in West Africa with a lack of fuel following a battle with ‘HMS Arethusa’ off Cape Verde, the old third-class cruiser giving a good account of herself and limping home despite heavy damage.
On 14 October, ‘Good Hope’ led a large coastal raid against a German fuel depot near Tönder. Once again, Tyrwhitt came up against ‘Vonn der Tann’ and moved in for the attack. At 1030Z, the ‘Vonn der Tann’ withdrew and Tyrwhitt, unable to give chase in the older cruisers, turned back towards his actual objective.
At 1328Z, the ‘Good Hope’ struck a mine and began to sink, having already taken heavy damage below the waterline from a German 11in shore battery, making the shore battery ironically much more damaging to the British forces than ‘Vonn der Tann’ had been. ‘Badger’ also struck a mine but managed to limp home. It was an embarrassing defeat for the Royal Navy and would effectively end British operations in the Bight.
On 29 October, shots were fired in Wilhelmshaven as sailors from the High Seas Fleet clashed with army troops during a mutiny. Violence spread throughout the city, with sailors joining local protestors angered by a lack of food and poor living conditions inflicted by the British blockade. The riots in Wilhelmshaven were the opening salvo of the German Revolution. Within days, Kaiser Wilhelm II had fled by rail to the Netherlands as the army quickly lost control of the situation in the major cities. With the Imperial Government effectively defunct, the Spartacist Movement led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg siezed the Riechstag and proclaimed the Federal Socialist Republic of Germany (SBRD) on the promise of ‘Peace and Bread’.
The Treaty of Shotley, signed in November, would see Germany stripped of all her colonies and forced to pay harsh reparations to Britain. It came just as ‘HMS St. Vincent’ joined the fleet.
In post-war reductions, several of the older Armoured and Third-Class Cruisers were scrapped, along with ‘Majestic’ and ‘Howe’, in order to pay the navy’s expenses incurred immediately post-treaty. ‘Vanguard’ joined the fleet the same month. Meanwhile, design work began on the next two dreadnoughts to follow the King George V-Class, the first of which would be laid down in April as ‘HMS Iron Duke’. There were some changes, namely deleting ‘Q’ turret and up gunning ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets to three guns instead of two, removing the weight of the midships magazine and turret armour and allowing the belt armour to be increased from 12in to 13in. They would be the first British battleships to receive Directors at the design stage, while the two ‘Vanguards’ were adapted during construction.
Above: British Dreadnought Battleship HMS Iron Duke.
In May 1913, the second ‘Iron Duke’ was laid down as ‘HMS Howe’, replacing the withdrawn pre-dreadnought.
In July, ‘HMS King George V’ joined the fleet and began working up. During her sea trials, she proved capable of 22kt.
October would see the keel-laying of ‘HMS Birmingham’, the first of the ‘Improved’ Town-Class, with ten 6in guns for a broadside of six guns.
Above: British Town-Class Light Cruiser HMS Birmingham.
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 3, 2020 16:09:25 GMT -6
Okay, so something of an update. So, as you can see, the quality of the last post was a bit less than the previous posts. I've been having a rough time lately, and RtW2's RNG just started dunking on me to the point where I actually rage-quit - something I usually never do. I'm taking a bit of a break from this campaign, playing a couple other saves or just different games. Also, I have lines to write: "I will not try to prosecute night actions without the training... I will not try to prosecute night actions without the training... I will not try to prosecute night actions without the training..."
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Post by babylon218 on Nov 2, 2020 7:14:02 GMT -6
Hunting Gazelles.
The 31 January saw another raid into the Heligoland Bight, this time led by ‘Indefatigable’. At 0950Z, the ‘HMS Good Hope’ engaged a German Armoured Cruiser of the Friedrich Carl-Class, with ‘Indefatigable’ closing to assist at 26kn.
1019Z. ‘Indefatigable’ was engaged by a second armoured cruiser.
1054Z. ‘Von der Tann’ emerged from the south. The Second Battle of Helgoland Bight had begun in earnest.
1123Z. ‘Von der Tann’ had rushed into ‘Indefatigable’, allowing the British ship to effortlessly cross the German ‘Tee’, from where she could fire her full eight-gun broadside against which the German ship could reply with only two. Even ‘HMS Newcastle’ was engaging the Battlecruiser at this point.
1141Z. ‘Indefatigable’ was hit at the conning tower, disabling the command crew and leaving the ship out of control for several minutes.
1224Z. ‘Von der Tann’s’ rudder jammed. As the German battlecruiser turns uncontrollably to starboard, the British destroyers moved in. Unfortunately, control was restored before the British ships could launch torpedoes.
1254Z. Despite the failed initial attack, the ensuing melee between the two fleets saw a British torpedo slam into ‘Von der Tann’s’ side.
1346Z. ‘Indefatigable’ is hit by a German torpedo. With fulfilling the bombardment mission no longer viable, the British force began to disengage.
1418Z. Despite a valiant effort by her crew, the heavy seas proved too much and ‘Indefatigable’ was abandoned with heavy flooding.
The Second Battle of Helgoland Bight was a major defeat for the Royal Navy. Though three German destroyers were sunk in exchange, the bombardment mission was abandoned, and the British lost a battlecruiser to a hit which should not have proved fatal. The inquiry into ‘Indefatigable’s’ loss would find fault with her underwater protection and censure the Captain for taking his force into such close action with the enemy when ‘Von der Tann’ had just taken torpedo hits from his own destroyers.
After the battle, the final three emergency programme corvettes entered the navy.
February 1911 would see the laying down of ‘HMS King George V’, expected to complete in 1913.
Above: British 'superdreadnought' HMS King George V.
On the 18 February, ‘HMS Amphion’ intercepted the ‘SMS Gazelle’ approximately 90nm East of Albemarle Sound on the coast of North Carolina. By 1547Z, after several hours of pursuit, ‘Amphion’ brought ‘Gazelle’ to battle as the German raider’s engines began to give out due to several long-range 4.7in hits amidships.
The battle was fierce, with ‘Gazelle’ reducing ‘Amphion’ to 6kn under a hail of 6in fire before one of ‘Amphion’s’ 4.7in guns struck ‘Gazelle’ below the forward 6in gun position, penetrating the German ship’s armour and exploding inside the forward ready-use magazine. Captain Ballantine Allington, brother of the former First Sea Lord, would recall:
“A great gout of flame belched through her deck, throwing the forward gun at least 200 feet clear of the vessel. After a moment, we all heard what we could only describe as a deep thunderclap, which seemed to last forever. We could no longer see the ‘Gazelle’ through the smoke, except the faintest glimmer of flame shooting outwards through her sides as her forecastle parted from her. Then silence…followed by screams and calls for help. It was not glorious – it was slaughter.”
Above: German Protected Cruiser SMS Gazelle.
Fortunately, ‘Amphion’s’ battle damage was repairable at sea and she was ready for action again the following week. With ‘Gazelle’ neutralised, the ‘Bristol’ was diverted to hunt down the ‘SMS Hela’ in the Caribbean.
On 21 March, the ‘HMS Beagle’ led her destroyer flotilla in a sweep of the Heligoland Bight when, at 1715Z, they encountered German forces headed South for Heligoland itself: three S22-Class destroyers. The action continued into the night, resulting in a close-range melee in the dark. The British destroyers chased two German destroyers in the dark all the way to Heligoland before having to break off due to the Heligoland minefields. Overall, however, the Germans dealt more damage to the British force than vice versa and ‘Beagle’ was forced to lead her flotilla back to Grimsby at 10kn.
Also in March, the DNC had drawn up plans for efficient turreted secondary guns on dreadnought-style ships, furthermore training exercises by the Home Fleet had allowed Callaghan to drill his ships in cruising in columns.
Another action on 14 April ended even worse for the British, with three ships being sunk to only one German ship.
In May, the German revolutionary Albrecht Donau was living in exile in Britain. It was suggested that Donau could be smuggled into Germany via the Netherlands, but Bridgeman cautioned against this by saying, “there is no telling where the fires of revolution may spread once lit. Keep him in chains!”
On 8 May, the Home Fleet conducted a sweep in force of the Heligoland Bight, with the ‘HMS Bellerophon’, ‘Dreadnought’, and ‘Temeraire’ leading alongside the 6th Battle Squadron. This was motivated in large part by a growing frustration within the Admiralty over the repeated destroyer losses in the area. At 1448Z, as the British fleet passed the East Frisian Islands, the cruiser ‘HMS Newcastle’ sighted a German merchantman headed for Emden, being escorted by a Brockeswalde-Class gunboat.
More German merchant shipping was sighted as the fleet got closer to East Frisia. Aside from several gunboats, there was little German Naval activity.
That lasted until 1722Z, when ‘HMS Drake’ sighted a large number of German warships coming out of the Bight, signalling the flagship via wireless, “the enemy is in sight”.
1930Z. The two battlelines engage directly in the dusk at a range of 13,000 yards.
Sporadic fighting continued into the night between both sides’ light forces until 2258Z, when the German battleline and British battleline blundered into one another in the dark. ‘Bellerophon’ took several torpedo hits and was abandoned at 2321Z.
At the end of the battle, the British fleet came out somewhat worse than their German counterparts. A German pre-dreadnought had been sunk, but so had ‘Bellerophon’. Four British destroyers were sunk for the same number of German ships.
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Post by babylon218 on Oct 28, 2020 9:49:19 GMT -6
The Anglo-German Naval War.
By the end of August, the ‘HMS Indefatigable’ commissioned into the navy, Britain’s first battlecruiser.
September saw the German Empire issue an ultimatum to Britain, demanding naval equity by treaty and several British colonies. The ultimatum was dismissed by foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey on the CID’s recommendation. Grey would note, “This ultimatum is not only entirely without merit; it appears deliberately designed to be rejected. It is not a message sent as the last resort to avoid war, but to start one.”
Indeed, start a war it did. By the beginning of September 1910, the Battle Squadrons of the Home Fleet were slipping anchor to their war stations and telegrams were sent across the world notifying the overseas stations to be on alert for German commerce raiders. On 2 September, 1910, the cable ship ‘HMTS Alert’ was sortied into the English Channel to cut the German oceanic telegraph cables, forcing any German intercontinental diplomatic or military messages to use foreign cables – cables which almost all eventually ran through Britain.
On 14 September, a British force led by ‘HMS Good Hope’ and ‘HMS Drake’ penetrated the Heligoland Bight to bombard an ammunition depot near Tönder. Despite attempts by the ‘SMS Von der Tann’ to interfere, the 1st Battle Squadron consisting of ‘Bellerophon’, ‘Dreadnought’ and ‘Resolution’ assigned to cover the operation were able to drive the German Battlecruiser away and engaged in a gunnery battle with the ‘Von der Tann’, the German Dreadnought ‘SMS Hannover’, and the predreadnought ‘SMS Brandenburg’ while ‘Good Hope’s’ force engaged the ammunition dump and its two associated 6in gun batteries. The armoured cruisers showed appalling accuracy, especially compared to the B-Class flotilla leaders accompanying them, expending almost all their ammunition and taking moderate (though largely ineffective) fire in return. Nevertheless, the depot was finally destroyed by 2100Z under night bombardment, and the British force withdrew without incident. During the Heligoland Raid, a German patrol boat and merchant were sunk, though the Tönder batteries succeeded in sinking the destroyer ‘HMS Rattlesnake’. The action would be proclaimed by the British press ‘The Battle of Helgoland Bight’.
October would see planning begin for the class of dreadnought to succeed the Vanguard-Class once the Temeraire-Class completed construction. The new vessel would use the ‘Vanguard’s’ all-centreline turret layout, but replace the 12in Mk.X gun with the new 13.5in Mk.V gun. This, combined with the necessary increase in armour to fight at medium range, necessitated an increase in displacement to 29,000 tons. Some thought had been given to placing six of the guns in two triple turrets at deck level to remove the need for ‘Q’ turret, but it was found this did not allow a sufficient reduction in displacement to noticeably reduce cost. A nine-gun design with three triple turrets was possible to fit on a hull only 500 tons larger than ‘Vanguard’, but this was also rejected as it was feared the turrets would be prone to jamming in battle situations. Thus, the design detailed above would commence detailed development work for laying down later that year as ‘HMS King George V’, after the new King. They were seen as a massive improvement on the ‘Dreadnought’ designs preceding them and represented as big a displacement increase from ‘Dreadnought’ as ‘Dreadnought’ had to preceding battleships. Thus, it is little wonder the press took to dubbing the new ship a ‘super-dreadnought’.
7 October 1910. The battleships ‘Bellerophon’, ‘Redoubtable’, and ‘King Edward VII’ were sortied with attendant destroyers to escort a merchant convoy travelling through the North Sea towards the Denmark Strait. At 0750Z (0850 local), ‘King Edward VII’ sighted an unknown vessel approaching the convoy from due South. The battleships began accelerating to 18kn and moved to investigate.
The ship was identified as a German small cruiser and ‘Bellerophon’s’ guns spoke at 0757Z.
Three additional ships were sighted to the South-West in line astern. Vice Admiral Sir George Callaghan, Second-in-Command, Home Fleet, had already assumed the cruiser was a scout for a larger force and concluded the column of three ships was an enemy battle squadron, turning his squadron West to intercept. In short order, the new arrivals were identified as ‘SMS Hannover’, a Brandenburg-Class pre-dreadnought, and a Mecklenburg-Class pre-dreadnought.
0831Z. ‘Bellerophon’ showed superb accuracy (or superb luck) as her first salvo against ‘Hannover’ scored a hit.
Above: A good omen, as Bellerophon's first shells find their target.
Above: SMS Hannover, dreadnought battleship of the Imperial German Navy. Below: SMS Brandenburg, pre-dreadnought battleship of the Imperial German Navy.
Above: German Mecklenburg-Class Pre-Dreadnought Battleship.
0847Z. With neither side scoring any noticeably damaging hits thus far, Callaghan began closing to 10,000 yards, knowing that at that range his older 12in guns and the 14in guns on his pre-dreadnoughts could theoretically penetrate the belt armour of the German battleships. However, the range may also allow the larger 34cm rifle on the German dreadnought to penetrate his armour, as it was not yet known what the quality of the German gun was.
0858Z. Having closed the range, ‘Bellerophon’ began scoring repeated hits on ‘Hannover’. However, the Germans now also found the range, and the starboard gun turret ‘G’ took a 13in shell, though damage appeared minimal and the guns continued to fire.
0905Z. Under withering fire, the German battleships turned away. Callaghan considered pursuit but decided against it as at Fundy Bay US vessels turned away several times only to turn back once the British made to pursue. Furthermore, his first responsibility was to protect the convoy.
0913Z. Callaghan’s caution proved prudent, as ‘Hannover’ was not in fact leading the German fleet into a withdrawal, but moving to the rear of the German formation due to damage. ‘Bellerophon’ and ‘Redoubtable’ now concentrated fire on the Brandenburg-Class battleship while ‘King Edward VII’ continued to trade body blows with the enemy Mecklenburg-Class. The disengagement by ‘Hannover’ has given Callaghan vital minutes to cause unmolested damage to the German line.
0922Z. The Mecklenburg-Class now broke line, turning to port under the British guns. The British were slowly overhauling the German Fleet and Callaghan hoisted flags to tell his ships to ‘cross enemy T’.
0931Z. The signal was hauled down – the sign to the following ships to execute the order. One by one, ‘Redoubtable’ and ‘King Edward VII’ followed ‘Bellerophon’ in a turn to the west, cutting across the reforming German line at a range of less than 5000 yards. The Germans were forced to turn away, with Callaghan allowing the range to open back to 10,000 yards before turning to keep with the enemy.
1007Z. The enemy Brandenburg-Class was on fire and slowing. The enemy force once again tried to turn away, Callaghan hoisting flags to turn to port simultaneously. The signal was executed at 1010Z.
Above: SMS Brandenburg burning under British fire as the German battleships attempt to withdraw.
1021Z. The Brandenburg-Class was being overhauled, the German destroyers and cruisers trying to screen it with smoke.
1026Z. With his ships approaching torpedo range, Callaghan ordered his force back into line astern to pass the German battleship at a safe distance.
Above: Bellerophon and King Edward VII mercilessly bombard Brandenburg.
1050Z. The Brandenburg had stopped dead in the water. Callaghan’s escorting destroyers turned in for a screening attack against a German V1-Class destroyer which had fallen behind due to damage and was dangerously close to the battleships.
1109Z. The Germans were in full retreat. Callaghan decided not to pursue and instead directed his destroyers to sink the enemy Brandenburg-Class with torpedoes while his battleships disengaged to the north to guard the convoy.
1136Z. ‘Wolverine’ and ‘Viking’ launched a torpedo each at the Brandenburg-Class, scoring two hits. Satisfied the enemy battleship will definitely sink, the destroyers returned to Callaghan’s Battle Squadron.
1303Z. Satisfied he is not being re-engaged, Callaghan returned south to rescue survivors from the German battleship, with ‘HMS Basilisk’ pulling fourteen men from the water. The torpedo attack was evidently so effective that there was no time for any more of the crew to abandon ship before she rolled over from the torpedo hits.
The action at Fladen Ground was a clear victory for the Royal Navy. Beyond successfully sinking one of Germany’s more powerful pre-dreadnoughts, the British ships had consistently dealt more damage to the Germans than the Germans could return. Bellerophon had scored hits with 3.5% of her shells, compared to ‘SMS Hannover’ with 1.3%. ‘King Edward VII’ and the sunken German Battleship later identified as the ‘SMS Brandenburg’ herself also impressed, with hit ratios of 3% each. The British ships had all exhausted more than half their shell supply, however.
On the 3 November, after refusing several potential fleet actions with the British fleet, German cruisers were spotted by ‘HMS Badger’, leading the 2nd and 4th Destroyer Squadrons in screening ‘HMS Good Hope’ and ‘HMS Drake’. A Friedrich Carl-Class Armoured Cruiser was encountered around 0700, screened by four destroyers and a Hela-Class Protected Cruiser.
Due to wear on ‘Drake’s’ engines, an extended chase south through the German Bight had to be called off. However, the protected cruiser ‘SMS Nymphe’ was caught between ‘Good Hope’s’ squadron and the 1st and 9th Cruiser Squadrons led by ‘HMS Pearl’ and ‘HMS Bristol’ respectively. Cornered, the ‘Nymphe’ was quickly reduced to a burning wreck by the seven British cruisers before being torpedoed by ‘HMS Nautilus’. In the night action which followed off the East Frisian Islands, two German destroyers were also sunk.
‘Temeraire’ joined the fleet in December, alongside five of the emergency programme corvettes. Germany called for peace, but with Britain in control of the North Sea, the terms were to be dictated by London. Negotiations were fruitless and war continued into 1911.
On New Years’ Day, 1911, a confused night action in the Western Approaches saw the German Armoured Cruiser ‘SMS Fürst Bismarck’ torpedoed. However, so confused was the action neither side was able to determine what damage was done, with the British believing they had torpedoed ‘SMS Von Der Tann’ instead. Both German ships limped safely back to port. The German cruiser ‘SMS Gazelle’ was sighted raiding British merchant shipping off the American East Coast, and the Admiralty dispatched ‘HMS Bristol’ to hunt her down. Germany had survived under blockade long enough to see out 1910, but could she really stand another year?
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