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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 12, 2017 14:55:49 GMT -6
Interesting stuff. What's the title/author? Sounds like something I might need to put on my reading list. :-) The Battle For The Maginot Line 1940 by Clayton Donnell
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Post by bramborough on Dec 12, 2017 15:15:08 GMT -6
Oh wow, that's a pretty recent release; just a few weeks, looks like. Just added to my amazon list. Thanks!
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Post by theexecuter on Dec 12, 2017 15:28:34 GMT -6
Assuming a fortification alone is sufficient defense is evidence of an amateur approach to military understanding.
Throughout the national age, fortifications have served as means to slow or deter an enemy from moving it's main force through an area, so that the mobile force of the defender can reposition to defeat the enemy.
Even France in the 1930s understood that the Maginot Line was only relevant if used in conjunction with it's Mobile force.
Fortification theory since at least the 17th century in the west has emphasized that fortification success can only be achieved with the assistance of a mobile force. The fortifications job is to delay or deflect...it is not to stop.
The Maginot Line fulfilled it's function. It forced the Germans to make their main attack through Luxembourg, just north of the line.
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Post by bramborough on Dec 12, 2017 16:00:05 GMT -6
Where did anyone state or imply such an assumption?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 12, 2017 17:28:12 GMT -6
The Maginot Line was designed and built to withstand a German attack for up to three weeks to permit French mobilization. It actually resisted for seven weeks even after the French forces collapsed and a surrender was negotiated. None of the major Maginot Line forts was captured by the Germans. However, the reason for their survival would seem evident. The German operational plan of mobile warfare and avoiding heavily defended areas, made the Maginot Line irrelevant in the campaign.
As to the barriers in the Low Countries, the low flat terrain made them traditionally susceptible to invasion. However, despite attempts to fortify their frontiers, the German method of warfare easily bypassed and overcame these fortifications. The Maginot line fortifications that were easily penetrated were the later additions through Luxembourg and Belgium borders specifically the area around the Meuse River, Sedan and Montmedy. It was in these areas where the German armored forces penetrated and got in behind the NW forts to destroy them, opening the door for the race to Calais.
It would appear that the French and Low Countries failed to appreciate through the interwar period, the advances of armored mobile warfare.
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Post by theexecuter on Dec 12, 2017 19:27:46 GMT -6
What? The French didn't appreciate mobile warfare?
The Allies had significant numerical advantage in vehicles (both quantity and quality) and were pursuing a strategy that assumed (and required) their force would be much MORE mobile than the German force.
In fact, it was the very speed of the Allied advance RELATIVE to Allied DECISIONMAKING that enabled an inferiorly equipped German army to trap the Allied mobile force away from it's supply and thereby negate the need to fight it in a fair fight.
The allies assumed Germany would fight logically, not try anything risky...would play the odds and take the advance through northern Belgium. That was the safe play (and was preferred by the German general staff). However, that way was acknowledged by all sides as most likely to result in an Allied victory...with the only question being how long and costly would that victory be.
Faced with certain defeat, the Fuhrer demanded higher risk strategies as a means of beating this inevitable defeat scenario. Thus, the 'Manstein' plan was adopted, as it relied on the Allies knowing that victory could be achieved on the Dyle (and it would have been) and thus would rush to it without regard to flank or supply line security.
The German plan further assumed that Allied communication and decision making would be so slow that the vulnerable spearheads of the main thrust wouldn't be recognized, attacked, and neutralized when moving through the road network bottleneck...which proved to be the case.
So, victory was achieved not but superiority of arms, or superiority of doctrine, or an overly defensively minded France (one could make a very good argument for French offensive ardor being a significant factor in their defeat!)...but by German mastery of staff work, and understanding of their foe...and the commitment and utilization of a high risk strategy that took advantage of their opponents weaknesses (inflexible battle plan because of the political need to 'save Belgium / Dutch...and a very slow decision making process).
France didn't lose because they we're 'fighting the last war'. They lost because their staff work was abysmally poor. IMO, the root cause of that was an over reliance on political matters over military matters.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 12, 2017 22:16:26 GMT -6
What? The French didn't appreciate mobile warfare? The Allies had significant numerical advantage in vehicles (both quantity and quality) and were pursuing a strategy that assumed (and required) their force would be much MORE mobile than the German force. In fact, it was the very speed of the Allied advance RELATIVE to Allied DECISIONMAKING that enabled an inferiorly equipped German army to trap the Allied mobile force away from it's supply and thereby negate the need to fight it in a fair fight. The allies assumed Germany would fight logically, not try anything risky...would play the odds and take the advance through northern Belgium. That was the safe play (and was preferred by the German general staff). However, that way was acknowledged by all sides as most likely to result in an Allied victory...with the only question being how long and costly would that victory be. Faced with certain defeat, the Fuhrer demanded higher risk strategies as a means of beating this inevitable defeat scenario. Thus, the 'Manstein' plan was adopted, as it relied on the Allies knowing that victory could be achieved on the Dyle (and it would have been) and thus would rush to it without regard to flank or supply line security. The German plan further assumed that Allied communication and decision making would be so slow that the vulnerable spearheads of the main thrust wouldn't be recognized, attacked, and neutralized when moving through the road network bottleneck...which proved to be the case. So, victory was achieved not but superiority of arms, or superiority of doctrine, or an overly defensively minded France (one could make a very good argument for French offensive ardor being a significant factor in their defeat!)...but by German mastery of staff work, and understanding of their foe...and the commitment and utilization of a high risk strategy that took advantage of their opponents weaknesses (inflexible battle plan because of the political need to 'save Belgium / Dutch...and a very slow decision making process). France didn't lose because they we're 'fighting the last war'. They lost because their staff work was abysmally poor. IMO, the root cause of that was an over reliance on political matters over military matters. What you have said is in fact true. The French methodical attack doctrine was always slow at moving intelligence and action reports up the line to the higher authorities and slower at getting the orders down to the lower level units. This was due to their emphasis on a methodical combat action plan whereas the German's pushed decision making down to the lower levels to maintain the speed of operations which the French could never cope with. I call it a lack of understanding of mobile warfare and an insistence on the slow moving infantry doctrine. French tanks were designed for that type of war and that's why they were deficient in radios and at least four man turrets. Most of their vehicles were slow moving, infantry speed. As I have read through French and German combat action reports, by the time orders came down to the units in the Meuse sector, the situation had always changed. The French just could not cope with the speed of the German forces. They were fighting at the speed of the last war, not mobile warfare as used by the German's. As to the emphasis on political matters over military, that is another complex subject.
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Post by vonfriedman on Dec 13, 2017 6:48:31 GMT -6
The quote that I have is from "The Battle for the Maginot Line 1940" and it states; "In 1940, the 88mm Flak Gun .... tore apart the reinforced concrete of the strongest construction materials every used by military engineers. The 88's high velocity anti-aircraft shells..... chipped away from close range at the concrete and the steel reinforcing rods, piece by piece, and tearing the thick steel walls of the observation cloches to shreds." It was not a one shot deal, it was a series of well aimed shots at the embrasures and port holes which tore the fortifications apart. Several years ago I went to Marckolsheim, on the Rhine, where the French had built a series of pillboxes (the real Maginot line lies further north). The pillbox that I visited had a steel turret. It was riddled with 88's hits. Moreover, further hits caused severe spalling of the concrete around a MG emplacement, which killed some of the brave defenders.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 13, 2017 9:26:10 GMT -6
The quote that I have is from "The Battle for the Maginot Line 1940" and it states; "In 1940, the 88mm Flak Gun .... tore apart the reinforced concrete of the strongest construction materials every used by military engineers. The 88's high velocity anti-aircraft shells..... chipped away from close range at the concrete and the steel reinforcing rods, piece by piece, and tearing the thick steel walls of the observation cloches to shreds." It was not a one shot deal, it was a series of well aimed shots at the embrasures and port holes which tore the fortifications apart. Several years ago I went to Marckolsheim, on the Rhine, where the French had built a series of pillboxes (the real Maginot line lies further north). The pillbox that I visited had a steel turret. It was riddled with 88's hits. Moreover, further hits caused severe spalling of the concrete around a MG emplacement, which killed some of the brave defenders. Great information, having seen the pillbox confirms my readings. Here is a History Channel Video on the Maginot Line - www.youtube.com/watch?v=DYMBMmueq0k
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Post by dorn on Dec 13, 2017 9:55:57 GMT -6
The quote that I have is from "The Battle for the Maginot Line 1940" and it states; "In 1940, the 88mm Flak Gun .... tore apart the reinforced concrete of the strongest construction materials every used by military engineers. The 88's high velocity anti-aircraft shells..... chipped away from close range at the concrete and the steel reinforcing rods, piece by piece, and tearing the thick steel walls of the observation cloches to shreds." It was not a one shot deal, it was a series of well aimed shots at the embrasures and port holes which tore the fortifications apart. Several years ago I went to Marckolsheim, on the Rhine, where the French had built a series of pillboxes (the real Maginot line lies further north). The pillbox that I visited had a steel turret. It was riddled with 88's hits. Moreover, further hits caused severe spalling of the concrete around a MG emplacement, which killed some of the brave defenders. How much width of armor is in steel turret on Maginote line? I have found that German Flak gun could penetrate around 100 mm of armor from 1 km. I have found that steel turrets on Czechoslovak heavy pillages were different quality from 150-300 mm of armor.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 13, 2017 11:20:31 GMT -6
Several years ago I went to Marckolsheim, on the Rhine, where the French had built a series of pillboxes (the real Maginot line lies further north). The pillbox that I visited had a steel turret. It was riddled with 88's hits. Moreover, further hits caused severe spalling of the concrete around a MG emplacement, which killed some of the brave defenders. How much width of armor is in steel turret on Maginote line? I have found that German Flak gun could penetrate around 100 mm of armor from 1 km. I have found that steel turrets on Czechoslovak heavy pillages were different quality from 150-300 mm of armor. The cloches on the roof of the pillboxes consisted of cast, armored steel 25-30cm thick. Here is a table for the actual concrete thickness of the forts and 88mm gun armor and concrete penetration tables. Keep in mind that when the Maginot line was built, the French had no information on the German 88mm Flak gun which is amazing, since it was designed and used in WW1. The assault on the Rhine sector was assisted by 88mm firing from 200 meters. Within 8-10 rounds, the 1.7m reinforced-concrete walls were penetrated. Total time required was 35 seconds. This information is from "The Maginot Line 1928-45(Fortress) By William Allcorn. The German 88mm gun armor and penetration table came from Tactical and Technical Trends dtd. Sept. 24,1942. It was from a captured German document. The angle of attack was 70 degrees and the armor rating was for a standard German specification. As you can see by the table, if the German gun crew could get within 250-500 yards, they could just pick away at the pillbox and penetrate it.
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Post by dorn on Dec 14, 2017 5:00:11 GMT -6
How much width of armor is in steel turret on Maginote line? I have found that German Flak gun could penetrate around 100 mm of armor from 1 km. I have found that steel turrets on Czechoslovak heavy pillages were different quality from 150-300 mm of armor. The cloches on the roof of the pillboxes consisted of cast, armored steel 25-30cm thick. Here is a table for the actual concrete thickness of the forts and 88mm gun armor and concrete penetration tables. Keep in mind that when the Maginot line was built, the French had no information on the German 88mm Flak gun which is amazing, since it was designed and used in WW1. The assault on the Rhine sector was assisted by 88mm firing from 200 meters. Within 8-10 rounds, the 1.7m reinforced-concrete walls were penetrated. Total time required was 35 seconds. This information is from "The Maginot Line 1928-45(Fortress) By William Allcorn. The German 88mm gun armor and penetration table came from Tactical and Technical Trends dtd. Sept. 24,1942. It was from a captured German document. The angle of attack was 70 degrees and the armor rating was for a standard German specification. As you can see by the table, if the German gun crew could get within 250-500 yards, they could just pick away at the pillbox and penetrate it. Thank you for the information. I would not how 88mm Flak would work against Czechoslovak fortifications as they cannot fire directly as the front side is covered by land itself. If somebody interested, there is interactive map of Czechoslovak fortifications. Czechoslovak border fortifications
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Post by oldpop2000 on Dec 14, 2017 9:24:20 GMT -6
The cloches on the roof of the pillboxes consisted of cast, armored steel 25-30cm thick. Here is a table for the actual concrete thickness of the forts and 88mm gun armor and concrete penetration tables. Keep in mind that when the Maginot line was built, the French had no information on the German 88mm Flak gun which is amazing, since it was designed and used in WW1. The assault on the Rhine sector was assisted by 88mm firing from 200 meters. Within 8-10 rounds, the 1.7m reinforced-concrete walls were penetrated. Total time required was 35 seconds. This information is from "The Maginot Line 1928-45(Fortress) By William Allcorn. The German 88mm gun armor and penetration table came from Tactical and Technical Trends dtd. Sept. 24,1942. It was from a captured German document. The angle of attack was 70 degrees and the armor rating was for a standard German specification. As you can see by the table, if the German gun crew could get within 250-500 yards, they could just pick away at the pillbox and penetrate it. Thank you for the information. I would not how 88mm Flak would work against Czechoslovak fortifications as they cannot fire directly as the front side is covered by land itself. If somebody interested, there is interactive map of Czechoslovak fortifications. Czechoslovak border fortificationsWe would need the specifications for the construction like type of concrete and reinforcement, armor thickness of turrets and embrasures etc. From looking at the map, an opponent would probably just move through gap at Bratislava or around through Ostrava but there is another gap, from Dresden but it is narrow but it is possible to use all three. Once behind the fortifications, they are useless. For the Maginot line, once Weygand had ordered a general withdrawal on 19 May, it removed the protection of forces from the north and by June 12 the Maginot Line had been ordered to be abandoned and sabotaged. This did not set well with the fortress troops who had been trained to fight in the line, not as regular infantry. They were also dismayed why they should abandon a French icon that had cost so much money and was still effective. This is the problem with fixed fortifications. Note: There are other ways to disable a fortress. For the Maginot Line the air vents were destroyed or sealed by the Germans which then suffocated the French troops. Fixed fortifications always had weak points that can be exploited. Update: I found a site that has information on the Czechoslovak Border Fortifications 1935-1938. Interesting that the Germans developed their special forces training using those bunkers for testing. www.fortif.net/files/overview.php
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Post by zardoz on Dec 15, 2017 2:44:13 GMT -6
When I served in the early 80ies in the Bundeswehr, the German army, I was a so called "Gruppenscharfschütze", i. e. from US view a designated marksman. I had a G3 rifle with sniperscope. And we had targets representing portholes of bunkers. It was not a problem to hit it from a distance of 300 m.
So ... there should be not a problem for 88 gunners also to hit portholes or the area around them assuming that they had better sightings on the gun than I on my rifle. And if they hit the porthole with fragment ammunition the effect inside should be terrible.
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Post by dorn on Dec 15, 2017 4:26:25 GMT -6
German general staff was feared of the defensive line of Czechoslovak border fortification. I found the additional information. It had different degrees from light pillages to heavy fortress. Type: top-front-wall with portholes-back 1: 100-120-80-80 2: 150-175-80a100-80 I: 150-175-100-100 II: 200-225-100-100 III: 250-275-125-125 IV: 350-350-125 to 150-150 Strength of concrete from 300 (light pillages built in 1936) to 400 (usually 450) kg/m2 . Type 1-2 was usually light pillages only. Some heavy pillages in difficult terrain were built in type 1-2, but usually with higher type. Light pillages usually (the ones without front portholes which were in 2nd or 3rd line) had front side covered up to 4 m of stone. you can find drawing of most typical light pillage here: vestinu.cz/?lehke-opevneni-noveho-typu,181 Sorry, direct link does not work. The front page is covered by land and stone to absorb direct hits. The front side is wider to cover sides that sides could be hit only in large angle.
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