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Post by director on Aug 1, 2018 5:02:47 GMT -6
aeson - now that you say that, I'm sure you're right. One of the 'little oddities' of WW2. I suppose the Japanese kept careful watch on the traffic - it's a short path from Alaska to the home islands. axe99 - I've been up-and-down with insomnia (Heh, see what I did there?) myself, which makes my brain fuzzy. If you feel like doing some research, then by all means... 'On Ships Contested' sounds like a pirate movie LOL. Or maybe a Bollywood 'Life of Nelson'. Heh. I do know the original CVEs were bigger and faster than normal merchant ships, being fleet tankers or being built for that purpose. Follow-on classes were smaller, slower and based off a more standard merchant hull. Henry Kaiser pioneered a lot of revolutionary shipbuilding ideas - I think it was his prototyping of the 'make components everywhere and assemble them here' concept that led to it being done for many classes of ship and warship. I know they built subs that way in the US and in Germany, so there's no way Kaiser's people invented the concept. A lot of CVEs were purposed for aircraft transport across the Pacific, some were used for U-boat hunting in the Atlantic. The bigger originals (Sangamon class) were preferred for invasion coverage because of their longer decks and larger air groups. I suspect there's a 'modern day' version of the CVE do-able by deploying a drone maintenance-and-command package onto a merchant ship, preferably with something like an extended helicopter deck or pad. Drones aren't as capable as piloted planes in air combat, but they have a lot of uses. Heck, some of the big tankers could probably handle airliners if a flight deck was installed (on the tanker, not the airliner LOL). (Just kidding - not a serious idea).
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Post by Airy W on Aug 1, 2018 8:10:38 GMT -6
I know they built subs that way in the US and in Germany, so there's no way Kaiser's people invented the concept. Weren't the Germans new to the practice in 1943? The results would seem to imply that... I suspect no admiral was willing to openly say the Navy couldn't get to the Philippines in less than three years - political suicide. Well MacArthur showed up and immediately said the islands weren't fortified well enough so I dont think it was impossible to deliver bad news. If the brass had arrived at that conclusion about a year earlier, I think it's likely the Philippines would have never fallen. The Philippine division was the only regular division and even it was underequipped. If the US had put three properly equipped divisions there and backed them up with a few hundred fighter aircraft, I doubt the Japanese would have been capable of dislodging them ever, the American could have raised new Philippine regiments faster then the Japanese could have shipped in troops. The Japanese carrier force was cutting edge in 1942 but their Army was poorly equipped, their rapid success was due to facing opposition that was even less well equipped and disorganized to boot. And going by the table of troops towards the bottom of the page I dont think the Japanese could have thrown much more at the Philippines then they actually did. Any significantly larger force would need to come by giving up the invasion of Singapore and if they do that it means that the Commonwealth has freedom of movement and troops ready to launch a counter-offensive aimed at the Dutch east indies, at the very least severely disrupting oil production.
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Post by director on Aug 1, 2018 10:50:37 GMT -6
MacArthur was a PR genius unto himself, retired from the army and with no further career to protect (as far as he knew).
I do agree that providing funding and equipment to the Philippines would have allowed them to build a capable army, and a better army and fighter cover would have slowed the Japanese down. But without naval superiority, the US could not have kept the supplies (like aviation gasoline and munitions) flowing into the war zone. I think naval superiority would be necessary to save the Philippines - the Japanese could just keep pouring in troops without it. The initial Japanese force was probably about as big as they could land, but with successes in Singapore and Java, additional troops would have been available at need. Or troops could have been pulled from China, perhaps? Recruiting new Philippine regiments would depend on arms and materiel supplied from the US - not doable from local resources.
Just my opinion, but I think victory in the Philippines would go to whoever could satisfy the material requirements of modern war, and that would depend on naval superiority. As I see it, if the US fleet surges to the Philippines it gets sunk, and if it doesn't arrive in three months, the Philippines fall.
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Post by tbr on Aug 1, 2018 10:53:17 GMT -6
Project Arapaho respective SCADS
(scroll half a page up)
I suspect there's a 'modern day' version of the CVE do-able by deploying a drone maintenance-and-command package onto a merchant ship, preferably with something like an extended helicopter deck or pad. Drones aren't as capable as piloted planes in air combat, but they have a lot of uses. Heck, some of the big tankers could probably handle airliners if a flight deck was installed (on the tanker, not the airliner LOL). (Just kidding - not a serious idea).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 1, 2018 11:00:27 GMT -6
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Post by dorn on Aug 1, 2018 14:30:40 GMT -6
Only problem is CV-4 USS Ranger was over 700 feet long. Lets also not forget CV-7 USS Wasp. She was 688 feet long at the waterline. Displaced 14,900 tons standard. Had a speed of 29.5 knots and could carry up to 100 aircraft using the deck park doctrine. Aircraft capacity is all about hanger size and deck park size. A perfect example is the previously mentioned Ryujo. She only displaced 8000 tons standard and yet could carry around 50 aircraft. She had a large hanger and flight deck for a ship of that displacement. The cost was she was top heavy and thus not very stable. USS Wasp has operational aircraft about 80. She was built with a lot of "flaws" as displacement was limit. She still has nice punch but she has practically no defenses at all. No torpedo protection, no armor so any hit could be fatal.
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Post by dorn on Aug 1, 2018 14:48:46 GMT -6
A more balanced comparison would the 114,000 standard tons (numbers quickly ripped of Navypedia) of CV/CVL displacement commissioned by the UK in that period, with the 89,925 tons of CV/CVL commissioned by the US. The main point of the example was to underline that the RN wasn't "not air minded relative to other navies" (although I'm not arguing it was as air-minded as the IJN - no-one was prior to Pearl Harbor) - and for this it's useful to also look at the standard tons of BB commissioned by the UK (183,635) and USA (226,828), which gives a ratio of CV:BB tonnage commissioned over the period of 0.62 for the UK and 0.40 for the US. Now, I'm _not_ suggesting the US didn't have a strong focus on its airpower (it did, and even before WW2 started some (not the majority at this stage, but someone at least rear admiral rank - I can look up if necessary) in the USN had made the assessment that with enough carriers, they could be the main strike weapon of the fleet (but enough carriers weren't yet available, so it was (accurate) theorycrafting)). More that the emphasis on CVs in the UK build programs provides fairly strong circumstantial evidence that the RN wasn't "cold" on aircraft carriers. I agree the timelines are relatively arbitrary (and that Boyd, strictly speaking, messed up, as the reconstructed Glorious was completed in 1930 - but I've left her out as well from the above numbers, as if she's included without Lexington or Saratoga then it's getting very apples vs oranges) - but 1931-1942 includes almost all interwar CV (and BB) build programs that were 'pre-war' (strictly speaking, two Lions and one Implacable were laid down pre-war, and as you point out the first Essex _just_ makes 1942, but these aren't really 'pre-war' build plans). Once the Essexes/Iowas/Implacables come into the picture, any kind of analysis gets all sorts of wobbly due to the impact of wartime needs on various build programs. I think it's about as good a 'rough judge' of prewar build priorities as available, although may well be wrong . That doesn't take away from Director and Oldpop (and many others' ) points that the RAF having control of FAA aircraft procument until the late 1930s didn't play merry havoc with their aircraft development at the worst possible time - it did, and it meant those flight decks were operating from a fair disadvantage, particularly once the '1940 generation' carrier aircraft came into service, with the UK having to 'make do' with late 1930s dive bomber and torpedo bomber designs, and making a bad call with the Fulmar in terms of what they wanted in a carrier fighter. I can see usually something which Navy was more carrier based before WW2 and that IJN was most and RN was least from navies which use carriers extensively. However I think this evaluation is working between IJN and USN as both navies have similar tasks in Pacifics however it is not case of RN. Main tasks for RN was to defend their transport routes and support army around the globe with bases almost everywhere to support, replenish their ships. This is completely different tasks from IJN and USN as their main tasks were strikes on enemy fleet, land installation etc. As you can see there is main difference, both IJN and USN is focused on attack, destroying enemy navy, enemy land installations, support invasions etc. However RN focus on defense, cover their supply lines, convoys, military supplies etc. Their main task was not to destroy but safely get convoys through enemy waters. For that purpose the strike power is not essential however defense against ships and airpower is essential. And you can see it through the war where IJN and USN were best at offence, RN was quite weaker, later remedy that issue and getting reasonable offensive power. RN was best at defense, IJN was weak never able get reasonable defense, USN was initially weak, with a lot of resource they get much better but never close RN capabilities by similar size of force. This is something need to recognize. So if you evaluate all these power based on strike capabilities the RN carriers could not be winners and as considered as worse (this is not completely true with HMS Indomitable and Implacable class). But the strike power is not the most important thing needed from carriers for Royal Navy. Related to aircrafts you can compare which aircraft posses RN in September 1939 and which one had IJN and USN. Eg. well known "Zero" would be not operational almost year from that date.
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Post by dorn on Aug 1, 2018 14:56:54 GMT -6
I find it strange how the British were in the position where the chief threat was submarines but they didn't build a large arsenal of sloops to protect against that threat. They didn't even keep around the sloops that they had. Look at how many of these they got rid of in the 20s for example: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anchusa-class_sloopThese ships might not have been much to look at but they could make 16 knots and travel long distances which were the only two real requirements for anti-submarine warfare. They could have been retrofitted with radar and newer anti-submarine weapons. When WWII broke out the British started building new corvettes which were no doubt much more efficient but weren't any faster. The build time for escorts is always the chief problem. If they had just kept these ships around "mothballed" to be reactivated in an emergency they could have filled that gap. Heck, it wouldn't even be that hard to keep them in active service as training ships. Whalers of about that size could operate with a crew of about 30. If they had 200 such ships and only sailed them each two months a year that's fewer sailors on duty then a single capital ship on foreign station. Or imagine them as fast transports. If they could carry 100 men for an ocean crossing but only need a crew of 30 a fleet of 200 of those vessels could deliver an entire infantry division and ~10,000 tons of supplies. That strikes me as something that would have been quite useful. I am not sure of this. For example RN get 1000 tonners from USN and they thought about them quite badly unsuitable for convoy defense at all. I do not expect that this types of sloops could be useful. However we can look at bigger picture at 20s. No threats and especially no submarine threats so why have large force of anti-submarine weapons? Especially if these kind of weapons could be built much more quickly than battleships, carriers, cruisers. For North Atlantic you need seaworthy boat it is not Mediterranean or Pacific.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 1, 2018 16:07:04 GMT -6
I find it strange how the British were in the position where the chief threat was submarines but they didn't build a large arsenal of sloops to protect against that threat. They didn't even keep around the sloops that they had. Look at how many of these they got rid of in the 20s for example: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anchusa-class_sloopThese ships might not have been much to look at but they could make 16 knots and travel long distances which were the only two real requirements for anti-submarine warfare. They could have been retrofitted with radar and newer anti-submarine weapons. When WWII broke out the British started building new corvettes which were no doubt much more efficient but weren't any faster. The build time for escorts is always the chief problem. If they had just kept these ships around "mothballed" to be reactivated in an emergency they could have filled that gap. Heck, it wouldn't even be that hard to keep them in active service as training ships. Whalers of about that size could operate with a crew of about 30. If they had 200 such ships and only sailed them each two months a year that's fewer sailors on duty then a single capital ship on foreign station. Or imagine them as fast transports. If they could carry 100 men for an ocean crossing but only need a crew of 30 a fleet of 200 of those vessels could deliver an entire infantry division and ~10,000 tons of supplies. That strikes me as something that would have been quite useful. I am not sure of this. For example RN get 1000 tonners from USN and they thought about them quite badly unsuitable for convoy defense at all. I do not expect that this types of sloops could be useful. However we can look at bigger picture at 20s. No threats and especially no submarine threats so why have large force of anti-submarine weapons? Especially if these kind of weapons could be built much more quickly than battleships, carriers, cruisers. For North Atlantic you need seaworthy boat it is not Mediterranean or Pacific. www.navsource.org/Naval/deal.htmHere is a list of the four-stackers transferred to Great Britain. They were top heavy and rolled badly. This made gunnery difficult but this was true of most tin cans, they had high length to beam ratios, and low freeboards so they did roll. The solution for the 50 odd ships was to remove three of the four 4 inch guns and one of the torpedo tubes. This allow for more storage of depth charges and hedgehog rounds. With these modifications, they were reasonable safe at sea.
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Post by axe99 on Aug 1, 2018 16:18:32 GMT -6
Oh Macarthur! While the more I read about King the more he makes sense in the context (even if I probably wouldn't have him around for dinner as a person), the more I read about Macarthur the less his star shines. Unless one was rating his ability to blame others for his mistakes and take credit for others' successes. He did have some wins, but unless PR was the criterion, it's difficult to judge him well. As for CVEs (and 'military types - which were DEs, CVEs and landing craft/ships of various types), by August 1944 they occupied 103 of the Maritime Commissions (MCs) 251 building berths, and formed 24 per cent of the total production of that year in displacement tons. This was all a bit odd, as the Maritime Commission, by definition, was non-naval, but it was wartime and they'd had huge success with their multiple production approach for liberty ships (and shifting a yard that had shifted to military types to Navy control was deemed unnecessary administrative hassle, given the pressure of the time). The MCs escort carrier work start with the conversion of a C3 cargo ship in Mar-Jun 1941, with eight conversions completed in 1942-1943. However, it was their purpose-built CVEs, based on the C3 hull where possible, that the big numbers came from - although the navy did take over a Seattle-Tacoma yard producing CVEs. However, the Navy weren't fans of Kaiser, so left his yards (which built 50 CVEs) under MC control. Thus, the entire Casablance class of CVEs was built by Kaiser under MC control at his Vancouver yard (and quite quickly too, particularly the later vessels), and reciprocating steam engines (albeit of a modern type - some kind of "Skinner uniflow" malarkey with five cylinders, that I know nothing about). These ships contrasted with the turbine-driven tanker conversions of the Sangamon class or the turbine-driven 'built from scratch' ships of the Bogue (at the Seattle-Tacoma yard mentioned above) Commencement Bay class (built by Todd Pacific, which I think was also originally a MC yard). The Commencement Bay class were based on a tanker design (their origins were in the Sangamon class). Oddly enough, the class with the reciprocating steam engines was faster than any of the turbine-driven classes mentioned above. So all based on mercantile hulls, and it looks like the vast majority were built in yards that began building MC ships - but I'd need to confirm this for Todd-Pacific, that's based on a rough guess. As for a Bollywood take on Nelson's life, lololol . Hope the insomnia settles down as soon as possible . I can see usually something which Navy was more carrier based before WW2 and that IJN was most and RN was least from navies which use carriers extensively. However I think this evaluation is working between IJN and USN as both navies have similar tasks in Pacifics however it is not case of RN. Main tasks for RN was to defend their transport routes and support army around the globe with bases almost everywhere to support, replenish their ships. This is completely different tasks from IJN and USN as their main tasks were strikes on enemy fleet, land installation etc. As you can see there is main difference, both IJN and USN is focused on attack, destroying enemy navy, enemy land installations, support invasions etc. However RN focus on defense, cover their supply lines, convoys, military supplies etc. Their main task was not to destroy but safely get convoys through enemy waters. For that purpose the strike power is not essential however defense against ships and airpower is essential. And you can see it through the war where IJN and USN were best at offence, RN was quite weaker, later remedy that issue and getting reasonable offensive power. RN was best at defense, IJN was weak never able get reasonable defense, USN was initially weak, with a lot of resource they get much better but never close RN capabilities by similar size of force. This is something need to recognize. So if you evaluate all these power based on strike capabilities the RN carriers could not be winners and as considered as worse (this is not completely true with HMS Indomitable and Implacable class). But the strike power is not the most important thing needed from carriers for Royal Navy. Related to aircrafts you can compare which aircraft posses RN in September 1939 and which one had IJN and USN. Eg. well known "Zero" would be not operational almost year from that date. I was just talking about the RN not being anti-carrier, I don't want to go anywhere near the "which navy was more carrier-minded" question, that's a thread that'd never end . Iirc, by 1939 the RN's carrier aircraft were still broadly ballpark, but they were behind the curve on their replacements, which bit them hard when the Zero/F4F/SBD became the main strike weapons (well, until they could get sufficient US aircraft).
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 1, 2018 16:58:06 GMT -6
Here are some ideas for the game in regards to destroyers. At the beginning century, into the 1930's, destroyers were still considered torpedo boats. Yes, they were adapted to escorting convoys, but their design was still based on torpedo boat tactics. This will require high speed, lots of torpedoes and many gun. To gain that high speed of around 35 to 37 knots, you need a high length to beam, somewhere in the nature of 9-10. You also need high pressure boilers, steam turbines, and dual propellers. You will also use a low freeboard to lower the center of gravity for the torpedo tubes and guns along with the bridge structure. The low freeboard makes the ship wet and forces it to have a fast roll rate. For a torpedo boat, that is ok, it doesn't matter if it rolls because once the torpedo is launched, it is on its own. This design criteria is not good for escorts. Escorts do not need heavy torpedo tube launchers but do need guns with High angles of fire. They also need depth charges and later, hedgehogs. Speed is important but it doesn't have to be 37 knots, it can be lower and this can give the ship a longer endurance which is important for escorts. To gain a lower roll rate and better living conditions, you can built it with a higher freeboard and wider beam. All these changes make for a much better escort. This latter configuration was not really important until 1937 and later, this is when the destroyer design changes were beginning to change.
If you go to wiki and search for Fletchers and Wilkes, you will see that the Fletcher's had torpedo tubes on them, but you also see that they were longer, wider and had a deeper draft and that made them better open sea boats. They were built as escorts primarily, not torpedo boats like the Wilkes class. The Fletcher's also had the advantage of super heated boilers and better steam turbines which gave them more power. But their primary purpose was escorting the task forces whether they were carrier or battleships.
I don't know how the game will handle this and whether we will be able to perform the same design changes as they actually did, it would be interesting.
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Post by aeson on Aug 1, 2018 17:13:44 GMT -6
HMS Rodney was a very unsatisfactory aircraft carrier. It could only carry two float planes, and couldn't easily recover them while under way or in rough seas. Therefore, the similarly-large Essex and Implacable must not be very good aircraft carriers, either.
Ships of similar displacement or dimension designed for different purposes do different things. One proving unsatisfactory in a given role does not provide any significant information as to whether the other will prove satisfactory in the same role unless you take the time to understand why the one proved unsatisfactory and then determine whether the same things which made the one unsatisfactory are true of the other.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 1, 2018 17:17:44 GMT -6
HMS Rodney was a very unsatisfactory aircraft carrier. It could only carry two float planes, and couldn't easily recover them while under way or in rough seas. Therefore, the similarly-large Essex and Implacable must not be very good aircraft carriers, either.
Ships of similar displacement or dimension designed for different purposes do different things. One proving unsatisfactory in a given role does not provide any significant information as to whether the other will prove satisfactory in the same role unless you take the time to understand why the one proved unsatisfactory and then determine whether the same things which made the one unsatisfactory are true of the other.
HMS Rodney was a Nelson class battleship, did you mean another ship? Just asking.
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Post by Noname117 on Aug 1, 2018 17:51:48 GMT -6
HMS Rodney was a very unsatisfactory aircraft carrier. It could only carry two float planes, and couldn't easily recover them while under way or in rough seas. Therefore, the similarly-large Essex and Implacable must not be very good aircraft carriers, either.
Ships of similar displacement or dimension designed for different purposes do different things. One proving unsatisfactory in a given role does not provide any significant information as to whether the other will prove satisfactory in the same role unless you take the time to understand why the one proved unsatisfactory and then determine whether the same things which made the one unsatisfactory are true of the other.
HMS Rodney was a Nelson class battleship, did you mean another ship? Just asking. I'm pretty certain he's comparing the battleship to aircraft carriers to emphasize his point. That saying that all fleet aircraft carriers are bad because the battleship Rodney was bad at being an aircraft carrier is like saying that because the 1000 tonner destroyers of the US navy were inadequate convoy defense ships that sloops of similar size would be as well.
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Post by aeson on Aug 1, 2018 18:35:32 GMT -6
Noname117 is correct.
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