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Post by generalvikus on Oct 29, 2018 23:44:52 GMT -6
I'd be a bit leery of citing the length of time over which the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships remained front-line units as evidence of the quality of the design, if only because there are a number of factors - the First World War and its economic costs, the 1922 Treaty of Washington and the 1930 Treaty of London, the Great Depression, political opposition to continued high naval expenditures, probably others - which could be argued to have artificially lengthened the span of time over which the Queen Elizabeth-class battleships remained front-line units. I think the point is that, considering how old they were during the Second World War, those of us who advocate for the design believe they performed well in combat, perhaps better than ships of a similar age. As for the intensity of action - I do not necessarily think that it is the only practical evidence of a ship's worthiness; the point that was made about the Kongos operating with the Combined Fleet, for example, is certainly a valid one. My only suggestion was that when judging the quality of a design, we should ignore its performance of tasks which a good, bad or mediocre design would have performed about as well; tasks like escorting convoys (without incident) or bombarding shore targets. That is, of course, with the exception of ships which were somehow particularly good at these roles, and especially with ships that were specialised for them. So the point that I think was made about the American 8 inch cruisers being better for shore bombardment that the 6 inch cruisers was a valid one, and if a lighter convoy escort ship were to perform very well in the convoy escort role, shooting down attacking aircraft and sinking submarines, then of course that's worthy of consideration. Different types of ships should be judged differently; how well they performed the roles for which they designed or how well they were adapted for new roles are certainly good criteria. But as for the theoretical basis for certain historical designs being better than others, I deliberately left this open because I think the issue is subjective and defies an exhaustive list of criteria or a formula. I asked for people's 'favourite' designs because I did not expect that we could somehow arrive at the one which is objectively the best. Having said that, one guideline that I like, and which I think others also seem to prefer, is how far ahead of its time a ship was. As was discussed earlier with Bismarck and Hood, it was a given that a ship which was 20 years newer would be considerably better; the real question is not which was the better ship, but which was better for its time. I think that the strongest argument which has been made for the Queen Elizabeth class is that it was both state-of-the-art at the time of its completion and perfectly adequate throughout the Second World War. I think this is the metric by which real life navies, and probably Rule the Waves players, judge a class to be particularly special, but it is by no means the only standard.
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Post by aeson on Oct 30, 2018 0:54:54 GMT -6
I think the point is that, considering how old they were during the Second World War, those of us who advocate for the design believe they performed well in combat, perhaps better than ships of a similar age. Perhaps that is the argument which was meant, but it is not the argument which rockmedic109 made. I'd be very inclined to say that the Queen Elizabeths were too slow to be 'perfectly' adequate throughout the Second World War; they could not keep pace with the fast battleships completed in the 1930s and 1940s or, perhaps more importantly, fast carriers steaming at high speed and conducting flight operations.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 8:44:47 GMT -6
I think the point is that, considering how old they were during the Second World War, those of us who advocate for the design believe they performed well in combat, perhaps better than ships of a similar age. Perhaps that is the argument which was meant, but it is not the argument which rockmedic109 made. I'd be very inclined to say that the Queen Elizabeths were too slow to be 'perfectly' adequate throughout the Second World War; they could not keep pace with the fast battleships completed in the 1930s and 1940s or, perhaps more importantly, fast carriers steaming at high speed and conducting flight operations. I totally agree on the last point and that was the exact problem with the battleships at Pearl Harbor. They were too slow for the fleet and used too much fuel. They were not "perfectly" adequate. Admiral Halsey was aware of the issues and that is why he did not want them with him when he sortied for his mission prior to Pearl Harbor.
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Post by dorn on Oct 30, 2018 11:22:51 GMT -6
I think the point is that, considering how old they were during the Second World War, those of us who advocate for the design believe they performed well in combat, perhaps better than ships of a similar age. Perhaps that is the argument which was meant, but it is not the argument which rockmedic109 made. I'd be very inclined to say that the Queen Elizabeths were too slow to be 'perfectly' adequate throughout the Second World War; they could not keep pace with the fast battleships completed in the 1930s and 1940s or, perhaps more importantly, fast carriers steaming at high speed and conducting flight operations. I think you are right about their speed. And it was the reason why Italians were able to withdraw regurarly. They were lucky (except Barham which was not modernised) not to be hit by torpedoes as they torpedo protection was almost 30 years old and not adequate. The reason they fight well were that RN had no better ships for that role and they were used the best way they can.
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Post by atlanticghost on Oct 30, 2018 11:55:20 GMT -6
Under the "quantity has a quality all its own" principle I offer the Flower-class corvettes and Bogue-class escort carriers. With RtW's focus on the heavies, and especially battlecruisers, we tend to malign and forget the smaller ships that do the day-in, day-out grunt work of winning wars. The heavies, meanwhile, swing around their buoys and from time to time sortie out to burn a lot of fuel and on even rarer occasions engage in some spectacular action. Neither of these classes was very good, but both were good enough for their roles. Every U-boat forced to abandon a convoy attack due to a (slowly) charging Flower or a patrolling Swordfish or Avenger flying off a Bogue was another paving stone on the path to victory. As an honorable mention, I propose the Hawkins-class cruisers. They were nothing special, but through historical accident set the tonnage and armament standard for cruisers for twenty years.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 13:54:23 GMT -6
Under the "quantity has a quality all its own" principle I offer the Flower-class corvettes and Bogue-class escort carriers. With RtW's focus on the heavies, and especially battlecruisers, we tend to malign and forget the smaller ships that do the day-in, day-out grunt work of winning wars. The heavies, meanwhile, swing around their buoys and from time to time sortie out to burn a lot of fuel and on even rarer occasions engage in some spectacular action. Neither of these classes was very good, but both were good enough for their roles. Every U-boat forced to abandon a convoy attack due to a (slowly) charging Flower or a patrolling Swordfish or Avenger flying off a Bogue was another paving stone on the path to victory. As an honorable mention, I propose the Hawkins-class cruisers. They were nothing special, but through historical accident set the tonnage and armament standard for cruisers for twenty years. OOOOhhh Thank you, sir. I have preached on this forum that each ship is a tool in the toolbox and you need the whole toolbox to conduct naval operations. Good post, mate.
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Post by oaktree on Oct 30, 2018 16:14:36 GMT -6
Under the "quantity has a quality all its own" principle I offer the Flower-class corvettes and Bogue-class escort carriers. With RtW's focus on the heavies, and especially battlecruisers, we tend to malign and forget the smaller ships that do the day-in, day-out grunt work of winning wars. The heavies, meanwhile, swing around their buoys and from time to time sortie out to burn a lot of fuel and on even rarer occasions engage in some spectacular action. Neither of these classes was very good, but both were good enough for their roles. Every U-boat forced to abandon a convoy attack due to a (slowly) charging Flower or a patrolling Swordfish or Avenger flying off a Bogue was another paving stone on the path to victory. As an honorable mention, I propose the Hawkins-class cruisers. They were nothing special, but through historical accident set the tonnage and armament standard for cruisers for twenty years. OOOOhhh Thank you, sir. I have preached on this forum that each ship is a tool in the toolbox and you need the whole toolbox to conduct naval operations. Good post, mate. Along those lines a lot of additional credit needs to be given to the LST and the C-47 (DC-3). The staggering air transport capability of the Allies in the Pacific is often underappreciated. Especially since the campaigns were essentially airbase wars. Towards favorite designs I was always fond of the Fletcher-class DDs and Gato-class subs. (Later from playing a board game called "Silent War" I think, as well as a Mac-based computer game called "Gato" in the 1980s. In the latter on the easier settings I was often able to pull "down the throat" shots on Japanese DDs after I attacked a convoy.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 16:55:17 GMT -6
OOOOhhh Thank you, sir. I have preached on this forum that each ship is a tool in the toolbox and you need the whole toolbox to conduct naval operations. Good post, mate. Along those lines a lot of additional credit needs to be given to the LST and the C-47 (DC-3). The staggering air transport capability of the Allies in the Pacific is often underappreciated. Especially since the campaigns were essentially airbase wars. Towards favorite designs I was always fond of the Fletcher-class DDs and Gato-class subs. (Later from playing a board game called "Silent War" I think, as well as a Mac-based computer game called "Gato" in the 1980s. In the latter on the easier settings I was often able to pull "down the throat" shots on Japanese DDs after I attacked a convoy. Another unrecognized ship is the Haskell-class attack transports which were amphibious assault ships. They were very active in the Pacific War. There were over 249 of these APA's as they were designated. Also, the Motor Torpedo Boats did a very good job in the Solomon attacking Japanese barges and doing reconnaissance of islands. The Fletcher's and the Gato's were both workhorses in the Pacific. The Buckley and Evarts class DE's were vital. Another was the Frigates of the Tacoma Class. As I have said, it takes many different tools in the tool box. The old battleships were not that valuable but were used.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 19:22:10 GMT -6
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AiryW
Full Member
Posts: 183
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Post by AiryW on Oct 30, 2018 22:04:18 GMT -6
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Post by oldpop2000 on Oct 30, 2018 22:13:04 GMT -6
Well, that is great, I remember reading about the whalers doing coastal work. God fights on the side of the bigger battalions. I guess this certainly follows that axiom.
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Post by dorn on Oct 31, 2018 1:27:04 GMT -6
Quite interesting but it seems me a little bias (using criteria more important for USN than RN and to do not taking into consideration date of design and what was priorities of that design) and some error as stating Essexes has three times aircraft capacity of Illustrious class, in reality it was less than two times for the first three ships. It is more evaluation for the future (after WW2) than for WW2 which ships were primary designed. Relating to comparison of Atlanta class to Dido class, I thought that Dido was quite successful in the Mediterranean even if they were cramped. And that as emergency pre-war program the ships were worth the money. Altantas were superior because of being large, have excellent dual main guns and were built 3 years after Dido class. There is mentioned that RN ships were more seaworthiness but less adaptable for future. I think it is true but if you expect war is coming than you build ships the most efficient way for now not future especially if your resources are limited so I expect the adaptibility was not the issue for RN. On other hand USN ships do not need to operated in worse condition so much as RN ships. At the end is part " How Can You Tell? " from Friedman and I think it is best part of the article really worth reading. Thanks for the article oldpop2000.
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Post by generalvikus on Oct 31, 2018 1:55:10 GMT -6
For some reason the link won't work for me, can you give me another? EDIT: Cancel that, it's now working.
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Post by dorn on Oct 31, 2018 3:31:43 GMT -6
Some thoughts if QEs never happened. Article
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Post by generalvikus on Oct 31, 2018 4:11:03 GMT -6
As for the Friedman article, I think that has basic points can be summarised as:
1. Efficiency over time (longevity) is more important than efficiency in the present. 2. Relatively high speed is never very useful, because the sacrifices made to attain it are not worth the small tactical value it offers. 3. Bigger ships are better because they can be more easily adapted to make use of new technology.
1. I think the 'longevity' argument is certainly a valid one, but I think Friedman misses an important point; combat efficiency of a vessel during a World War is far more important than combat efficiency during peacetime, and with hindsight we know that the ships that finished the Second World War in 1945 were not called upon to fight a third. Even though this fact could not have been known at the time, it could certainly be argued that it was far more sensible to build a navy for the task at hand - winning the war - even at the expense of future capability, rather than look too far into the future at the expense of the present. This is especially true because the threat posed by the Soviet Navy to the West was not nearly as great in the immediate post-war years as it was to become by the time the last wartime ships were being retired.
2. It is indisputable that a faster ship can theoretically choose not to fight a superior ship. However, one must ask how often this option to retreat is actually practicable in wartime. Nevertheless, I think that this point deserved some deeper analysis.
3. I think that this is a very good point.
As for bias - I also noticed that in each one of Friedman's comparative examples, the navy whose magazine he is writing for is shown to have been cleverer than its critics, but I think that since each of his arguments are justified by good reasoning, which may be debated but can certainly not be dismissed, it is only fair to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that bias was not a factor.
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