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Post by dorn on Oct 31, 2018 6:18:12 GMT -6
As for the Friedman article, I think that has basic points can be summarised as: 1. Efficiency over time (longevity) is more important than efficiency in the present. 2. Relatively high speed is never very useful, because the sacrifices made to attain it are not worth the small tactical value it offers. 3. Bigger ships are better because they can be more easily adapted to make use of new technology. 1. I think the 'longevity' argument is certainly a valid one, but I think Friedman misses an important point; combat efficiency of a vessel during a World War is far more important than combat efficiency during peacetime, and with hindsight we know that the ships that finished the Second World War in 1945 were not called upon to fight a third. Even though this fact could not have been known at the time, it could certainly be argued that it was far more sensible to build a navy for the task at hand - winning the war - even at the expense of future capability, rather than look too far into the future at the expense of the present. This is especially true because the threat posed by the Soviet Navy to the West was not nearly as great in the immediate post-war years as it was to become by the time the last wartime ships were being retired. 2. It is indisputable that a faster ship can theoretically choose not to fight a superior ship. However, one must ask how often this option to retreat is actually practicable in wartime. Nevertheless, I think that this point deserved some deeper analysis. 3. I think that this is a very good point. As for bias - I also noticed that in each one of Friedman's comparative examples, the navy whose magazine he is writing for is shown to have been cleverer than its critics, but I think that since each of his arguments are justified by good reasoning, which may be debated but can certainly not be dismissed, it is only fair to give him the benefit of the doubt and assume that bias was not a factor. You make o point. 1. I completely agree with you, important is what you have when you need to. Take as example King George V class battleships. They are commonly considered as worst treaty battleships. However their main advantage was that they were available when they were needed. RN could have better battleships a year later however they would have not be available to counter threat of surface riders of Bismarck class (Scharnhorst class could be counter by existing ships with a little more difficulty). 2. I think he has right as one knot more is more and more costly, this is reason why most of treaty battleships were around 28 knots and cruisers had very similar speed. 3. It is point but I think it is more important to ships designed in peace in time you do not expect large war commitment. From 1935 RN designed most of the ships expecting war fighting be very soon. If you do such a rearmament your main point is how much ships that will handle the tasks in future war could be built. In this case you sometimes choose small design that allow to build more ships. And I think this was the way UK built. As USN had much higher limits on resources used on one ship. I am sorry, you are right about bias. And you are right that he has good arguments however the view presented at that article is quite specified so we should not separate good and bad ship on this view only. Again best example is KGV class or RN cruisers. Was they worse than USN so if you replace RN ship to USN ship would it enhance fleet capabilities. Answers is mostly yes, but there are other important factors as availability of ships (RN needs ships in 1939-42 mainly when they were overwhelmed - in 1942 surface Nazis raiders were countered, in the Mediterranean the situation in 1942 began to change, in Indian Ocean and Pacific year 1942 changed situation) number of ships. So for RN ships available before 1943 was much important.
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Post by oaktree on Oct 31, 2018 7:02:05 GMT -6
Quite interesting but it seems me a little bias (using criteria more important for USN than RN and to do not taking into consideration date of design and what was priorities of that design) and some error as stating Essexes has three times aircraft capacity of Illustrious class, in reality it was less than two times for the first three ships. It is more evaluation for the future (after WW2) than for WW2 which ships were primary designed. Relating to comparison of Atlanta class to Dido class, I thought that Dido was quite successful in the Mediterranean even if they were cramped. And that as emergency pre-war program the ships were worth the money. Altantas were superior because of being large, have excellent dual main guns and were built 3 years after Dido class. There is mentioned that RN ships were more seaworthiness but less adaptable for future. I think it is true but if you expect war is coming than you build ships the most efficient way for now not future especially if your resources are limited so I expect the adaptibility was not the issue for RN. On other hand USN ships do not need to operated in worse condition so much as RN ships. At the end is part " How Can You Tell? " from Friedman and I think it is best part of the article really worth reading. Thanks for the article oldpop2000 . D K Brown in _British Cruisers_ had some specific criticisms of number of design decisions regarding mechanical room and compartment layouts. The UK was a late adapter of the "unit layout" where engine and boiler rooms were alternated so that a single hit* would not take out all of one or the other. There was also a design flaw regarding some compartments were if the compartment on one side was damaged and flooded it would destabilize the ship and make capsizing more likely unless the corresponding compartment on the other side was flooded. * - British testing indicated that a torpedo hit would probably breach any bulkhead within a certain distance of the hit. Therefore a hit in the mechanical spaces would probably flood at least two compartments depending on where the hit was in relation to the bulkheads dividing compartments.
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Post by dorn on Oct 31, 2018 7:45:51 GMT -6
Quite interesting but it seems me a little bias (using criteria more important for USN than RN and to do not taking into consideration date of design and what was priorities of that design) and some error as stating Essexes has three times aircraft capacity of Illustrious class, in reality it was less than two times for the first three ships. It is more evaluation for the future (after WW2) than for WW2 which ships were primary designed. Relating to comparison of Atlanta class to Dido class, I thought that Dido was quite successful in the Mediterranean even if they were cramped. And that as emergency pre-war program the ships were worth the money. Altantas were superior because of being large, have excellent dual main guns and were built 3 years after Dido class. There is mentioned that RN ships were more seaworthiness but less adaptable for future. I think it is true but if you expect war is coming than you build ships the most efficient way for now not future especially if your resources are limited so I expect the adaptibility was not the issue for RN. On other hand USN ships do not need to operated in worse condition so much as RN ships. At the end is part " How Can You Tell? " from Friedman and I think it is best part of the article really worth reading. Thanks for the article oldpop2000 . D K Brown in _British Cruisers_ had some specific criticisms of number of design decisions regarding mechanical room and compartment layouts. The UK was a late adapter of the "unit layout" where engine and boiler rooms were alternated so that a single hit* would not take out all of one or the other. There was also a design flaw regarding some compartments were if the compartment on one side was damaged and flooded it would destabilize the ship and make capsizing more likely unless the corresponding compartment on the other side was flooded. * - British testing indicated that a torpedo hit would probably breach any bulkhead within a certain distance of the hit. Therefore a hit in the mechanical spaces would probably flood at least two compartments depending on where the hit was in relation to the bulkheads dividing compartments. Could you be more specific which cruisers have the issue? I would appreciate this information. I know that some of Leander class had that issue including small classes of cruisers but I am not aware that Town class had that issue. For battleships it is more complicated as these ships are larger. US battleships have large compartments from side to side, KGV had bulkheads that split the space to port and starboard. The advantage of US solution is that flooding the compartment has minimal effect on list but the flooding is more extensive, RN solution is just opposite. So answer what solution is better depends on situation.
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Post by oaktree on Oct 31, 2018 8:44:55 GMT -6
First, a mea culpa. _British Cruisers_ is a Norman Friedman book. D K Brown information on the cruisers is drawn from _Nelson to Vanguard_.
p164-165 in my edition.
Quote:
Cruisers The Enterprise of the First World War was the first British cruiser with separated machinery spaces. Post-war ships did not have proper units until the Amphion though it was possible to cross connect. From the Amphion onwards, British cruisers had alternating boiler and engine rooms. The forward boiler room had two boilers side by side, occupying the full width of the ship. The after room had the boilers fore and aft with wing compartments outboard. As discussed in Chapter 4, these contributed to the capsize of several ships, particularly among the smaller Didos. The two 1944 designs are much better subdivided but the amount of longitudinal division in the small (8050-ton) 'N2' is worrying.
The table below indicate some typical cruiser arrangements (Forward compartment on the left) B - Boiler Room E - Engine Room V - Other space eg magazine M - Combined engine/boiler space
Ship Machinery ---- --------- Enterprise BBVEBVE 'County' BBVEVE York BBEE Leander BBBEVE Amphion BEBE
(end quote)
The wing compartments in the Amphion and later war cruisers were an issue since an undamaged wing compartment would provide excess buoyancy on one side if a torpedo hit on the far side flooded the engine room and wing compartment on that side.
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Post by atlanticghost on Oct 31, 2018 9:10:02 GMT -6
OOOOhhh Thank you, sir. I have preached on this forum that each ship is a tool in the toolbox and you need the whole toolbox to conduct naval operations. Good post, mate. Thanks, oldpop2000. One definitely can't have a balanced fleet without the whole pyramid, from the showy capital ships at the top all the way down. Thanks also for the Friedman article. His observations are always interesting. AiryW A good reminder about drifters, and trawlers, and all the warships that were never meant to be warships but put in sterling service. I suppose if you can fulfill a military task with it, it's a warship.
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