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Post by rimbecano on Mar 17, 2019 5:42:11 GMT -6
All I can say is, "Thank God Nimitz didn't run the war the way that Yamamoto did." American flexibility and intelligence made up for a lot of other issues. What it really came down to was American logistics. The GDPs of the Allied and Axis powers were about equal before the US got involved. When the US joined the war, allied GDP *doubled*. We could have bungled things quite badly without bribing the end result into doubt, it just would have taken longer.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 17, 2019 10:00:07 GMT -6
oldpop2000 - that accords with what I've thought. I wonder if it was the economic crash that brought out the militarism. If you have not read it I recommend Sledge's 'With the Old Breed' about Marine Corps fighting in the Pacific. It's brutal, honest and unsparing... As much as I want our soldiers to behave in as civilized and humane a fashion as they can, fighting the Japanese in WW2 was one place where the enemy had mostly forfeited the right to civil treatment. My father said the US Army in the Philippines stopped wearing rank insignia - the snipers would kill any NCO or officer they could. One preferred method of killing snipers was a battery of 155s; flamethrowers, napalm and WP (white phosphorus) were also freely used for underground targets. Just finished reading 'Rampage', about the invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese atrocities there simply pass belief. Best estimate is that twice as many Philippine civilians were killed in four weeks than in five years of the Blitz (120k versus 60k). I've read the same information in some of my monographs and books about the Japanese atrocities. Many of their officers paid the price after the war in trials. Almost all were shot at dawn after a trial, something that the Allied soldiers never got. The Philippine Island campaign really brought out the worst in everyone and I wonder if they have ever really been forgiven for their barbarism in Korea, Manchuria, China and the Southwest Pacific. However, I don't think we should blame the whole Japanese nation because it was the training of their soldiers that caused this. Remember that the victor gets to tell the history and it can be a little one sided.
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Post by director on Mar 17, 2019 10:26:23 GMT -6
rimbecano - I agree... somewhat. American logistics and industrial output didn't kick in until maybe 1943. Before that, it was the pre-War Navy fighting hard and gambling to win. If the commanders' personalities had been reversed I don't think we'd have seen the Japanese stalemated and then defeated in 1942, but that is just my opinion.
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Post by dorn on Mar 17, 2019 11:15:50 GMT -6
All I can say is, "Thank God Nimitz didn't run the war the way that Yamamoto did." American flexibility and intelligence made up for a lot of other issues. What it really came down to was American logistics. The GDPs of the Allied and Axis powers were about equal before the US got involved. When the US joined the war, allied GDP *doubled*. We could have bungled things quite badly without bribing the end result into doubt, it just would have taken longer. Even British Empire has economic power almost of Germany (with conquered Europe) itself. With USSR Allied has higher economic potential. USA changed that totally to Allied side. Table of idustrial production from Rise and Fall of Great Power by P. Kennedy.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 17, 2019 12:16:13 GMT -6
The contribution of economics to the outcome of the war is vital. I have a whole book on how economics explains war. But let’s understand some facts. Economics is comprised of national requirements of the war, quantity and quality of resources, availability and mobilization and the how the institutions and policies of the government mobilize them.
Resources include not only natural resources, capital assets and financial stocks but also human resources such as the working population, health, how well educated it is, its skill, and training and education. Another factor is scientific knowledge and technical know-how.
There were two periods in the war; the first when the military factors were important, and the Axis had the advantage. The Second period, which most experts say started in 1942, was where economic fundamentals began to assert themselves.
But when you examine tables of population, territory and GDP at 1990 prices, the Allies were always ahead. One reason Hitler went east was to gain the oil fields of Southern Russia and other minerals plus acreage for food production. Japan went west into China to gain natural resources and south to gain oil, rubber, and other natural resources for her industry. Her industries were limited especially in ship and armament production, her scientific knowledge was very limited.
For Allies, the US had already authorized the two-ocean navy and after Pearl Harbor, we were able to replace all of the aircraft lost within fifteen days. That does not sound like a nation that is not in the process of ramping up. Our problem was to provide the necessary weapons, oil and food to Great Britain and that required convoys which required escorts. It took a little time.
Personally, the only advantage for the Axis was the fact that they struck first, and Allies did not understand where they were going to attack initially. France, Belgium, Holland and Great Britain all knew the German’s were coming their way after Poland. Norway surprised them, but it made sense.
As for Japan, we were fully aware of their intensions, so much so, that Nimitz stated after the war that the War in the Pacific went exactly as the war games at the Naval War College had predicted. The US was never surprised.
All in all, the first period from 1939 to 1942 was just an advantage for the Axis who were preparing for war whereas the Allies, democracies, had to cope with anti-war sentiments and recovery from the depression. But all in all, it did not take much time for the Allies to ramp up; much faster than Germany or Japan had ever expected.
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Post by dorn on Mar 17, 2019 13:21:43 GMT -6
I think that only possibility to "win war" for Axis was knock out UK from war.
European colonial empires were through whole world and easily accesible for Axis without UK resistance, has a lot of natural resources and whole Europe is something as superisland as USA itself.
However Luftwaffe was not able to knock down RAF which was most important as without RAF, Royal Navy was not able to defend Home island. And Hitler has no long plan, he just use all opportunities he had but Germany has no reasonable plan to cross Channel.
As if UK was knocked down, USSR will be completely isolated and even if USA later would be in war without it would be difficult and probably different and much worse bi-polar world exist.
But is lot of speculations.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 17, 2019 17:11:19 GMT -6
I think that only possibility to "win war" for Axis was knock out UK from war.
European colonial empires were through whole world and easily accesible for Axis without UK resistance, has a lot of natural resources and whole Europe is something as superisland as USA itself.
However Luftwaffe was not able to knock down RAF which was most important as without RAF, Royal Navy was not able to defend Home island. And Hitler has no long plan, he just use all opportunities he had but Germany has no reasonable plan to cross Channel.
As if UK was knocked down, USSR will be completely isolated and even if USA later would be in war without it would be difficult and probably different and much worse bi-polar world exist.
But is lot of speculations.
That is one possible alternative historical path but there are others. 1. Hitler builds the 300 U-boats that Doenitz wanted instead of a bunch of useless battleships. He could have strangled Great Britain very quickly. 2. After invading Russia, maintain the objective as Moscow, not head south to get the oil. With the demise of Moscow, the disorganization might have lead to the acquisition of the oil fields in 1942. 3. Don't invade Yugoslavia, an invasion which delayed the offensive against Russia and caused Barbarossa to be struck by a worst winter than any one could imagine. Japan: Don't continue or allow the Kuomintang Army to take control of Chinese operations and expend all the resources of the nation. This action did not allow the Army to assist the Navy in the Southern Operation or in the defensive perimeter that Japan needed to attrite the US forces. This might have given Japan New Guinea, and the Solomon's which might have allowed the Navy to control the Coral Sea and hinder supplies to Australia. It might have allowed the alternative operation to Midway that was proposed and that was invade Burma, Ceylon and possibly take India which actually would have like to have gotten rid of the British. One more is appropriate. Don't divide your forces in Operation MI. Use the carriers assigned to the Aleutians to help provide fighters for the four fleet carriers for protection. Anyway, These are just a few of the "paths not taken". This is an interesting subject but I don't know if this is the thread to continue with it. I will if the thread initiator does not mind.
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AiryW
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Post by AiryW on Mar 18, 2019 11:25:19 GMT -6
1. Hitler builds the 300 U-boats that Doenitz wanted instead of a bunch of useless battleships. He could have strangled Great Britain very quickly. Ugh, Donitz logic again. Okay, four problems here. 1) You are talking about doubling the cost of the naval rearmament program AND consuming several times more oil. They already were in a desperate oil shortage until their invasion of France was unexpectedly successful and they could overthrow the anti-fascist Romanian government. You put another oil burden on and their invasion of France becomes a slow, plodding affair and certainly fails. If the invasion of France hadn't succeeded like it did, the German economic situation in 1941 was dire and they might well have faced a revolt in the winter of 1941 as the populace is asked to suffer through a second cold winter without heating coal. 2) Donitz logic assumes that the British and French would have kept doing the same thing if the circumstances were different. If there are no German battleships, the British and French are much less interested in building their own. Perhaps two fewer French battleships, three fewer British ones compared to four fewer German ones. Since the French and British budgets are tighter then the German one, that helps their position vis-a-vis the Germans. And the British and French are going to see the German build up and start building escorts which is a huge cost multiplier for them, an escort uses cheap machinery compared to a type VII and can be built in older facilities. If Germany builds 250 more type VIIs while the British and French build 400 more escorts, that's greatly reducing the effectiveness of the uboats 3) There is no credible threat to the Royal Navy in the north sea without the battleships. No invasion of Norway and the British can allocate more of the ships they already have to other theaters. 4) Uboats mostly sank older, slower vessels and tramp steamers. You increase the number of boats in the ocean, you scare them into convoys and reduce the number of targets. And given the range difficulties if you dont have the naval bases in Norway and western France, the allies have a fairly small zone they need to protect. It annoys me so much to see these theories endlessly repeated everywhere. It's not just that their wrong, it's that they're so freaking obsolete. Donitz should not be the end all be all of understanding German naval strategy. We know a lot more then he did, he was not a neutral source by the widest stretch of the imagination and we can benefit from decades of analysis and further refinement of doctrine. But Donitz, Rommel, Guderin, they're half-baked ideas are treated like the writings Thucydides where we lack the information to perform any analysis not based on the original text. Manstein I can see making a limited exception for since he figured out the situation in 1940 in a way that a lot of people didn't understand even in hindsight. But for everything else it's really sad that 70 years later we are still basing our thinking on judgements made at the time with political motivations, incomplete information and all sorts of prejudices.
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Post by corsair on Mar 18, 2019 13:05:15 GMT -6
You are talking about doubling the cost of the naval rearmament program AND consuming several times more oil. They already were in a desperate oil shortage until their invasion of France was unexpectedly successful and they could overthrow the anti-fascist Romanian government. You put another oil burden on and their invasion of France becomes a slow, plodding affair and certainly fails. If the invasion of France hadn't succeeded like it did, the German economic situation in 1941 was dire and they might well have faced a revolt in the winter of 1941 as the populace is asked to suffer through a second cold winter without heating coal.
Adam Tooze's book The Wages of Destruction goes into considerable detail on the German economy both before and during the war. According to his research, Germany's economy was already in a perilous state in 1939, and the nation was pretty much faced with the choice of going to war when it did or face an economic collapse. Ironically, going to war cut off the substantial coal imports Germany was getting from Britain, and the subsequent capture of France did not entirely address the shortfall.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 18, 2019 14:09:51 GMT -6
Just a simple reminder. The list of possible "paths not taken" are not necessarily ones that I believe would have succeeded, just possible alternatives from authors and experts. Historians have been arguing for well over seventy years about how the Germans and Japanese could have won the war. I certainly can't add any real facts beyond what they have already gathered and used in their justifications. Keep in mind the old adage of Hindsight is the clearest vision. Enjoy the discussion, it is interesting.
As an aside: Adam Tooze's book "The Wages of Destruction" was mentioned. On Page 398 he states that Doenitz calculated that his crews would have to sink 600,000 tons per month for one year to bring Britain to her knees. He stated that he would need 100 operational U boats in the North Atlantic at any one time, and 300 overall. The problem according to Tooze was the demand by U-boats for raw materials in short supply like rubber and copper. There were many other factors but simply put, it was not possible.
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imryn
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Post by imryn on Mar 20, 2019 8:29:47 GMT -6
In my opinion the most glaring "path not taken" was when the Luftwaffe shifted focus from the airbases to industrial and urban targets in the battle of Britain. The RAF was stretched close to breaking point and a few more weeks might have bought the air superiority needed to launch Sealion. Knocking Britain out of the war before invading Russia eliminates the USA from interfering in the European theater and possibly keeps them out of the European war entirely. That would leave Japan to face the full US industrial might, but I think Germany wouldn't have cared much if it kept the US out of the European war.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 20, 2019 8:47:18 GMT -6
In my opinion the most glaring "path not taken" was when the Luftwaffe shifted focus from the airbases to industrial and urban targets in the battle of Britain. The RAF was stretched close to breaking point and a few more weeks might have bought the air superiority needed to launch Sealion. Knocking Britain out of the war before invading Russia eliminates the USA from interfering in the European theater and possibly keeps them out of the European war entirely. That would leave Japan to face the full US industrial might, but I think Germany wouldn't have cared much if it kept the US out of the European war. I would certainly agree that changing the mission objectives to industrial targets was a critical mistake. They should have focused on the coastal radar network and fighter bases along with command and control centers.
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Post by akosjaccik on Mar 20, 2019 9:00:12 GMT -6
Well, I'm not so sure about that. It was a while when I last read Kershaw's "Never Surrender", but I got the impression that Germany had no real means to invade Britain, moreover I vaguely remember that the "RAF holding on to it's last breath" is not entirely correct either, for example I found some figures, but this isn't the primary source I remember. Still, let's say they do knock out the RAF, the RN is still a very, very serious obstacle, certainly able to win enough time.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 20, 2019 9:50:33 GMT -6
Well, I'm not so sure about that. It was a while when I last read Kershaw's "Never Surrender", but I got the impression that Germany had no real means to invade Britain, moreover I vaguely remember that the "RAF holding on to it's last breath" is not entirely correct either, for example I found some figures, but this isn't the primary source I remember. Still, let's say they do knock out the RAF, the RN is still a very, very serious obstacle, certainly able to win enough time. Historians and diarist have been arguing since 1940 as to whether Hitler was serious about invading England. I am inclined to agree a little, that maybe he was never serious. After the Norway invasion which cost the German navy many destroyers, I don't think Admiral Raeder could guarantee that the British fleet would not be able to intercede even with a fair number of submarines to protect the invasion force. Also, the use of barges in that narrow passage with the sea states would be very dangerous. I am going to review my copy of the Halder Diaries to see what he states and can he shed any light on this.
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Post by corsair on Mar 20, 2019 14:58:14 GMT -6
In my opinion the most glaring "path not taken" was when the Luftwaffe shifted focus from the airbases to industrial and urban targets in the battle of Britain. The RAF was stretched close to breaking point and a few more weeks might have bought the air superiority needed to launch Sealion. That is more myth than reality. Fighter Command was never near a breaking point. It was hard-pressed, perhaps, but it was holding its own. Aircraft supply was never a significant problem, as British factories were in fact outproducing the Germans. There was an issue with a shortage of pilots in the latter part of August, but some of that was due to administrative inefficiencies. Most Fighter Command sector airfields in southern England were never put out of action for more than a short amount of time. The Luftwaffe was bedeviled by poor intelligence throughout the battle, frequently hitting the less important satellite airfields rather than the more critical sector stations, as well as sometimes hitting Coastal Command and training airfields instead of Fighter Command bases. Even in the worse case scenario, the RAF could have pulled its aircraft back from 10 and 11 Group areas, repositioning them in 12 Group, putting them outside of the range at which German bombers could be escorted, and thus beyond effective attack. (This would have the price of increasing the time it took to intercept incoming German raids.) The switch to bombing London in early September was prompted by intelligence reports suggesting the RAF was down to its last few hundred fighters, and by hitting London it would force those remaining fighters into the air where they could be destroyed. (That intelligence was, of course, very mistaken.) The Germans never made any significant effort to curtail British fighter production during the battle, due to poor intelligence, the difficulties of hitting such targets, and lack a good heavy bomber for such strategic work. The Luftwaffe was taking significant losses as well during the Battle. Even if by some miracle it had managed to win air superiority over southern England, it would have wrecked itself in the process — a Pyrrhic victory. (And that's not even getting into the details of how vulnerable a German invasion fleet would have been to naval intercept.) The truth is, the Germans actually stood little chance of winning the Battle of Britain given the tactics, equipment, leadership, and intelligence it had at the time. Winning air superiority over the heart of the enemy's homeland is difficult, costly, and time consuming. For a true picture of just what is required, I suggest examining the USAAF's daylight campaign over Germany during the first half of 1944. And that effort was assisted by outside factors. They should have focused on the coastal radar network and fighter bases along with command and control centers. A substantial effort to first knock out the radar network was one of the few ways the Germans could have achieved victory. But the radar stations were very difficult targets to put out of action for any length of time, and the Luftwaffe did not understand the true importance of the radar network and how it was integrated into the British air defence system.
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