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Post by vonfriedman on Mar 14, 2019 2:50:50 GMT -6
Besides the similarities between ships of the same nation (e.g. Prinz Eugen CA - Scharnhorst BC - Bismarck BB and also Garibaldi CL - Giulio Cesare BB in WW2), there were deliberately created similarities with ships of other countries (e.g. Bremse and Brummer German CLs vs Arethusa British CLs in WW1). Not to mention the merchant raiders, one of which managed to sink the CL Sydney.
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sykes
New Member
Posts: 13
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Post by sykes on Mar 14, 2019 19:44:45 GMT -6
Sorry, won't happen. They never knew in reality. Bismarck thought she had been fighting KGV instead of POW at Denmark Straits for example. At least you will get the truth at the end of the battle scenario. IIRC some japanese ships write their name on the side of the ship so you can tell if you can read them clearly. Ofcourse this is pretty minor exception so I don’t have an issue with keeping name hidden. Otherwise(correct me if This is already in rtw 1) but it may make sense for you to be able to distinguish between refitted ships of the same class and their pre refit sisters. You may not be able to tell Bismarck from Titpitz, but you can certainly tell renown from repulse. If the AI will be more actively reforming their ships in rtw2 and the player did some good espionage work, we should have the ability to distinguish ships that underwent significant refits in battle. This will be quite relevant when the refitted variant have a much improved aa suite for example. As far as I'm aware, the prominent painting of ship name and division number on the ship's side appears to be a peace-time only practice. In all the pictures of wartime IJN ships I have seen the names haven't been painted on, or in one particular case, appear to have been over-painted.
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Post by corsair on Mar 14, 2019 20:32:23 GMT -6
Sorry, won't happen. They never knew in reality. Bismarck thought she had been fighting KGV instead of POW at Denmark Straits for example. At least you will get the truth at the end of the battle scenario. That's what I'm asking for, though. If Bismarck thought it was KGV, it should be labelled BB King George V, not BB King George V-class. The misidentification would remain. Literally all I want is the game to assign a specific name, even if it's wrong, so I don't have to look at the almanac and hold all the names in my head for my running narrative of the action. If the post battle screen shows I was actually fighting Prince of Wales, not KGV, great!
Agreed. Makes sense to me, for the reasons already given.
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Post by jeb94 on Mar 15, 2019 13:06:08 GMT -6
I have to mention the confusion the Japanese had when it came to the Yorktown class. They just knew they had sunk Yorktown along with Lexington at Coral Sea so when they damaged Yorktown the first time at Midway they thought for sure they had sunk Enterprise or Hornet. After the second attack on Yorktown the IJN was confident they had killed both Enterprise and Hornet. Knowing the class of your target is fine. Knowing the specific name of the target? That was very difficult in the chaos of battle.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 15, 2019 13:35:08 GMT -6
I have to mention the confusion the Japanese had when it came to the Yorktown class. They just knew they had sunk Yorktown along with Lexington at Coral Sea so when they damaged Yorktown the first time at Midway they thought for sure they had sunk Enterprise or Hornet. After the second attack on Yorktown the IJN was confident they had killed both Enterprise and Hornet. Knowing the class of your target is fine. Knowing the specific name of the target? That was very difficult in the chaos of battle. Just a bit of information to digest. After the attack on the Japanese carrier force, with the sinking of Akagi, Soryu and Kaga, Ens. Wesley Osmus was plucked from the water and divulged that Yorktown was operating separately from the other two flattops. He gave them all the information about the sortie and composition. All this was transmitted to Yamaguchi on the Hiryu by 1300. This basically says that the Japanese now knew they were facing three carriers, not two that they had identified.. This fact does not negate what you have said. Yamamoto had assumed that he would have a three to one majority in carriers but after Coral Sea, the majority was reduced to 2:1 one based on the intelligence reports from his pilots. Unfortunately they were wrong and Yorktown survived and was repaired enough to sail in three days. His majority was now reduced to 1.33 to one. But the other unknown factor was Midway. I don't think his reconnaissance of Midway told him of the aircraft that had been deployed on the island and that it did have a radar for search. So, his offensive majority now was 1:1. It isn't really important to know names, just approximate classes to assess the enemies possible strength. The IJN knew that our Yorktown class carriers could carry up to 100 aircraft which was more than their carriers could carry. Again, Midway added to this mixture. Scouting and signal intelligence is absolutely critical in these situation. Generally, it's what you don't know, that gets you. You must assess not only how many carriers an enemy has deployed but how many aircraft he can deploy and what kind are they. Intelligence is absolutely critical, as the IJN found out. Of course, a little luck doesn't help.
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Post by director on Mar 15, 2019 17:40:13 GMT -6
Author David Weber has his heroine, Honor Harrington, frequently quote the maxim that 'Surprise is an action that takes place in the mind of the enemy'. Surprise is actually pretty easy to create; surprising the enemy is much harder and intentionally giving the enemy the surprise you meant him to have is darned near impossible - it requires not only great luck but accurate information that is correct in real-time. The closest thing I know of to Midway was Schwarzkopf's video-game-type destruction of the Iraqi Army.
Warship recognition is hard - if it wasn't, everyone would have been good at it and they weren't - and damage assessment was simply ludicrous early in the war.
All I can say is, "Thank God Nimitz didn't run the war the way that Yamamoto did." American flexibility and intelligence made up for a lot of other issues.
As for the airman: poor fellow, being captured by the Japanese. Even though he told them the truth it is possible they didn't really believe it.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 15, 2019 18:23:34 GMT -6
Author David Weber has his heroine, Honor Harrington, frequently quote the maxim that 'Surprise is an action that takes place in the mind of the enemy'. Surprise is actually pretty easy to create; surprising the enemy is much harder and intentionally giving the enemy the surprise you meant him to have is darned near impossible - it requires not only great luck but accurate information that is correct in real-time. The closest thing I know of to Midway was Schwarzkopf's video-game-type destruction of the Iraqi Army. Warship recognition is hard - if it wasn't, everyone would have been good at it and they weren't - and damage assessment was simply ludicrous early in the war. All I can say is, "Thank God Nimitz didn't run the war the way that Yamamoto did." American flexibility and intelligence made up for a lot of other issues. As for the airman: poor fellow, being captured by the Japanese. Even though he told them the truth it is possible they didn't really believe it. There are many ways to surprise an enemy, not only where you are going to attack, when, if you are going to attack, but what is your ultimate objective; that can be a surprise. The old adage of surprise, speed and concentration can present surprise to an enemy. The German attack through the Ardennes and crossing of the Seine at Sedan between 10 May 1940 and 14 May was a very big surprise; not only because of the location but of the speed and the concentration of the forces into panzer divisions and brigades. This was a very big and lasting surprise to the French and British. As to warship recognition, even recognition manuals which I have in my collection don't really give you a lot of detailed information about the capability of the ship in question. As to the difference between Nimitz and Yamamoto, there is a lot to be said for Nimitz but also the commanders that worked for him. He and his staff along with the signal intelligence group had done their jobs well. One of the most important differences between the IJN and the US Navy is what is called the "speed of the command process". From the time that a new situation is recognized, and the military staff adjusts it planning to the time its implemented on the battlefield is critical and many battles, operations and wars have been lost. I can't confirm that the this will have an effect in the games, but it is something to consider at all times. Now, as to the Ensign, well he paid the price for his disclosures. His hands and feet were tied up, and he was thrown overboard.
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Post by director on Mar 16, 2019 13:22:16 GMT -6
oldpop2000 - yes, I agree. I was really speaking of the difficulty of recognizing ships from an aircraft at altitude, but I didn't actually say that. I'll add one more quality Nimitz's staff had going for them: a close view of the results of the Pearl Harbor attack providing a thirst for revenge. I agree that a tight command loop (stimulus, assessment, response, assessment is the one I use) is a powerful advantage. The French Army in 1940 was actually pretty good in terms of manpower and equipment, but German speed of command (not just speed of movement) overwhelmed their response time. Rommel's 'Infantry Attacks' illustrates how mission-oriented devolution of command can permit small units to fox and out-fight larger units simply by being at the decisive point first. French units, from what I know, used a more top-down command line with lots of 'this is what I see, what do I do/do this/I can't because they moved, now what do I do' orders without much decisive movement. We can see the same thing in the US/Iraqi handling of the land battle in the 1st Iraq War. I regret the Ensign's death. Americans were mostly unprepared for Japanese barbarity. I think there is a book in the change of - what to call it, ethics? morality? - in the Japanese Army from 1904 to 1939. I'd be interested in hearing if the Japanese Army carried out those sorts of atrocities in 1904 - I know they did against China. I'm also off-topic here. so I'll stop.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Mar 16, 2019 13:32:55 GMT -6
oldpop2000 - yes, I agree. I was really speaking of the difficulty of recognizing ships from an aircraft at altitude, but I didn't actually say that. I'll add one more quality Nimitz's staff had going for them: a close view of the results of the Pearl Harbor attack providing a thirst for revenge. I agree that a tight command loop (stimulus, assessment, response, assessment is the one I use) is a powerful advantage. The French Army in 1940 was actually pretty good in terms of manpower and equipment, but German speed of command (not just speed of movement) overwhelmed their response time. Rommel's 'Infantry Attacks' illustrates how mission-oriented devolution of command can permit small units to fox and out-fight larger units simply by being at the decisive point first. French units, from what I know, used a more top-down command line with lots of 'this is what I see, what do I do/do this/I can't because they moved, now what do I do' orders without much decisive movement. We can see the same thing in the US/Iraqi handling of the land battle in the 1st Iraq War. I regret the Ensign's death. Americans were mostly unprepared for Japanese barbarity. I think there is a book in the change of - what to call it, ethics? morality? - in the Japanese Army from 1904 to 1939. I'd be interested in hearing if the Japanese Army carried out those sorts of atrocities in 1904 - I know they did against China. I'm also off-topic here. so I'll stop. My dad and many pilots have said that many types of ships, at 20,000 feet look like just simple black marks on the water and that is why scouts such as the SBD and patrol planes flew at about 5000 feet to provide the view of the ship for intelligence transmissions. There are many instances in my books for the German Army where the local commander had total control and that is why the missions succeeded. My research over the years says that the Japanese soldier acted courteously to major European powers but were brutal with Koreans and Chinese. I believe that the 1930's was a time when as one author has stated, we saw the emergence of an ideology of the Japanese racial superiority. This was especially applicable to the Anglo-Americans who were deemed immoral and spiritually inferior. The soldiers of the Japanese soldiers were indoctrinated on a corrupted version of the Bushido Code which glorified death over surrender. They were dehumanized by their own leaders and this lead them to treat others with the same brutality. This would seem to make perfect sense; racial superiority, preference of death over surrender and barbaric treatment during training would and did lead to numerous atrocities. US Marines learned very quickly on Guadalcanal, not to trust surrendering Japanese soldiers. They might have grenades ready to pull the pin and kill who ever is near. I suspect that after learning the hard way, not many surrendering Japanese soldiers made it. I suspect the Marines just gunned them down.
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Post by director on Mar 16, 2019 21:50:13 GMT -6
oldpop2000 - that accords with what I've thought. I wonder if it was the economic crash that brought out the militarism. If you have not read it I recommend Sledge's 'With the Old Breed' about Marine Corps fighting in the Pacific. It's brutal, honest and unsparing... As much as I want our soldiers to behave in as civilized and humane a fashion as they can, fighting the Japanese in WW2 was one place where the enemy had mostly forfeited the right to civil treatment. My father said the US Army in the Philippines stopped wearing rank insignia - the snipers would kill any NCO or officer they could. One preferred method of killing snipers was a battery of 155s; flamethrowers, napalm and WP (white phosphorus) were also freely used for underground targets. Just finished reading 'Rampage', about the invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese atrocities there simply pass belief. Best estimate is that twice as many Philippine civilians were killed in four weeks than in five years of the Blitz (120k versus 60k).
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Post by corsair on Mar 16, 2019 22:46:27 GMT -6
Now, as to the Ensign, well he paid the price for his disclosures. His hands and feet were tied up, and he was thrown overboard. He wasn't the only USN aviator to meet that fate during the battle. Two other captured American aircrew were also executed in a similar fashion.
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Post by noshurviverse on Mar 16, 2019 22:52:36 GMT -6
Speaking of captured enemy combatants, will it be possible to pick up downed aviators in a similar manner to sunken/sinking ships? Perhaps this could yield a position report, albeit one of very questionable value.
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Post by bcoopactual on Mar 17, 2019 0:40:09 GMT -6
I wouldn't mind being able to set submarines to air/sea rescue priority to get back some of my downed pilots if pilot experience is ever tracked whether at the squadron or individual level. Same with using search planes post battle if it's not a decisive defeat.
Although I suspect it would be a significant programming task so I would move down on any wish list.
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Post by rimbecano on Mar 17, 2019 3:24:31 GMT -6
I have to mention the confusion the Japanese had when it came to the Yorktown class. They just knew they had sunk Yorktown along with Lexington at Coral Sea so when they damaged Yorktown the first time at Midway they thought for sure they had sunk Enterprise or Hornet. After the second attack on Yorktown the IJN was confident they had killed both Enterprise and Hornet. Knowing the class of your target is fine. Knowing the specific name of the target? That was very difficult in the chaos of battle. Even identifying type wasn't especially reliable let alone class or name. The Japanese at Samar thought they were engaging cruisers and fleet carriers.
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Post by akosjaccik on Mar 17, 2019 5:13:26 GMT -6
Speaking of rescuing crew, while I'd be suprised if it was possible to do so for any effect, still, it would be interesting if carriers could have a plane guard ship escorting them. I could see it being able to be ordered the same way one can kiiiind of arrange the order of battle by clicking the division flags and define relationships between the divisions. (Core to XY, screen YZ etc.) That way, a lone ship would leave said division and strictly "just" escort the/a carrier, but in return maybe the air crew would lose less experience in accidents (or, for simpler implementation: just overall lose less experience in the battle for losses in general), or could do something with a small point change at the end result. This could of course, even be a fleet tactics tech, it would make sense.
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