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Post by zedfifty on Aug 30, 2019 2:40:32 GMT -6
I am not expert and do not know this topic but I understand fuction of pickets. However these pickets as operating alone are very vulnarable. Why enemy should not deploy tactic destroying pickets which should be easy task and thus main task force will operate without them and weaker as ships used as pickets could not be used to protect main task force. I can easily see that this would not work if time is crucial element however speed of ships is quite low relating to general distances. Hence the SSR radar picket submarines. I wish I were joking.
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Post by ulzgoroth on Aug 30, 2019 21:39:39 GMT -6
Let's remember that even in the late 60's missiles were so unreliable that the F4's lack of a cannon was considered a major disadvantage. Not that I totally agree with that, the F4 wasn't built for a dogfight with a Mig. It's like those 8" guns they make us put on the first carriers, if you're ever in a situation where you use it you're doing it wrong. Missiles in this game should be a costly and unreliable novelty, something to entertain yourself with in late game if you are playing the US and have a huge budget to waste. Air to air missiles are a bit of a different proposition from SAMs though. In fact, the Sparrow missile that was such a failure for the Phantoms proved quite a success as a ship-launched weapon. And North Vietnamese SAMs had substantial successes too.
(Tangentially, a gun attack doesn't imply a dogfight. You can, and in a Phantom probably would, make a single high-speed attack run, preferably blind-siding a target that never even sees you coming. Then win or lose you just keep running. If executed correctly, even if you miss the target doesn't ever get a real chance to retaliate.)
...But the 1955 cutoff does seem to put the presence of missiles in a dubious place. I'm not finding any ship-launched missiles (SAM or SSM) that made it to deployment status in that timeframe. There were a number of prototypes in WWII but none that seem to have gotten beyond testing. And Terrier didn't go operational until 6 months into '56.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 30, 2019 22:24:49 GMT -6
Let's remember that even in the late 60's missiles were so unreliable that the F4's lack of a cannon was considered a major disadvantage. Not that I totally agree with that, the F4 wasn't built for a dogfight with a Mig. It's like those 8" guns they make us put on the first carriers, if you're ever in a situation where you use it you're doing it wrong. Missiles in this game should be a costly and unreliable novelty, something to entertain yourself with in late game if you are playing the US and have a huge budget to waste. Air to air missiles are a bit of a different proposition from SAMs though. In fact, the Sparrow missile that was such a failure for the Phantoms proved quite a success as a ship-launched weapon. And North Vietnamese SAMs had substantial successes too.
(Tangentially, a gun attack doesn't imply a dogfight. You can, and in a Phantom probably would, make a single high-speed attack run, preferably blind-siding a target that never even sees you coming. Then win or lose you just keep running. If executed correctly, even if you miss the target doesn't ever get a real chance to retaliate.)
...But the 1955 cutoff does seem to put the presence of missiles in a dubious place. I'm not finding any ship-launched missiles (SAM or SSM) that made it to deployment status in that timeframe. There were a number of prototypes in WWII but none that seem to have gotten beyond testing. And Terrier didn't go operational until 6 months into '56.
The sparrow was not a failure although from about 1965 to 1970, it did have some things that caused some issues but on the whole it was an effective semi-active homing air to air missile. The issues with it were simply that after you have acquired the target by hitting the half-action switch on the radar controller, the radar stops its three bar scan and now begins its track mode. This is for the F-4B, the F-4J had different radar but it worked the same. Now once in the track mode, after the sparrow was fired, the CW transmitter would fire alternately with a trigger before the radar. This would illuminate the target and the missile would receive the reflected signal and track. Now, obviously, a MIG pilot is not going to fly straight and level but maneuver since he had a radar warning receiver. So, if he maneuvered wildly, you could lose lock and the missile would miss. Initially with the AIM-7 there were incidents where the missile went off in the wrong direction due to malfunction and the motor never engaged. I believe I have explain why those two things occurred. Both missiles were effective when used properly. Many of the explanations in the air to air engagement documentation (I have it) were simply that the pilots had not been trained in air combat maneuvering and this was the reason for TOPGUN and RED FLAG. It wasn't always the weapons failures, but their misuse. Once pilots began to train for air combat maneuvering, all changed.
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Post by ulzgoroth on Aug 31, 2019 1:16:39 GMT -6
Air to air missiles are a bit of a different proposition from SAMs though. In fact, the Sparrow missile that was such a failure for the Phantoms proved quite a success as a ship-launched weapon. And North Vietnamese SAMs had substantial successes too.
(Tangentially, a gun attack doesn't imply a dogfight. You can, and in a Phantom probably would, make a single high-speed attack run, preferably blind-siding a target that never even sees you coming. Then win or lose you just keep running. If executed correctly, even if you miss the target doesn't ever get a real chance to retaliate.)
...But the 1955 cutoff does seem to put the presence of missiles in a dubious place. I'm not finding any ship-launched missiles (SAM or SSM) that made it to deployment status in that timeframe. There were a number of prototypes in WWII but none that seem to have gotten beyond testing. And Terrier didn't go operational until 6 months into '56.
The sparrow was not a failure although from about 1965 to 1970, it did have some things that caused some issues but on the whole it was an effective semi-active homing air to air missile. The issues with it were simply that after you have acquired the target by hitting the half-action switch on the radar controller, the radar stops its three bar scan and now begins its track mode. This is for the F-4B, the F-4J had different radar but it worked the same. Now once in the track mode, after the sparrow was fired, the CW transmitter would fire alternately with a trigger before the radar. This would illuminate the target and the missile would receive the reflected signal and track. Now, obviously, a MIG pilot is not going to fly straight and level but maneuver since he had a radar warning receiver. So, if he maneuvered wildly, you could lose lock and the missile would miss. Initially with the AIM-7 there were incidents where the missile went off in the wrong direction due to malfunction and the motor never engaged. I believe I have explain why those two things occurred. Both missiles were effective when used properly. Many of the explanations in the air to air engagement documentation (I have it) were simply that the pilots had not been trained in air combat maneuvering and this was the reason for TOPGUN and RED FLAG. It wasn't always the weapons failures, but their misuse. Once pilots began to train for air combat maneuvering, all changed. The AIM-7's performance in Vietnam has been called a disappointment at best by every source I've ever seen mention it. Although I must admit that I was partly conflating its faults with criticisms of the AIM-4, which was worse.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 31, 2019 14:37:21 GMT -6
The sparrow was not a failure although from about 1965 to 1970, it did have some things that caused some issues but on the whole it was an effective semi-active homing air to air missile. The issues with it were simply that after you have acquired the target by hitting the half-action switch on the radar controller, the radar stops its three bar scan and now begins its track mode. This is for the F-4B, the F-4J had different radar but it worked the same. Now once in the track mode, after the sparrow was fired, the CW transmitter would fire alternately with a trigger before the radar. This would illuminate the target and the missile would receive the reflected signal and track. Now, obviously, a MIG pilot is not going to fly straight and level but maneuver since he had a radar warning receiver. So, if he maneuvered wildly, you could lose lock and the missile would miss. Initially with the AIM-7 there were incidents where the missile went off in the wrong direction due to malfunction and the motor never engaged. I believe I have explain why those two things occurred. Both missiles were effective when used properly. Many of the explanations in the air to air engagement documentation (I have it) were simply that the pilots had not been trained in air combat maneuvering and this was the reason for TOPGUN and RED FLAG. It wasn't always the weapons failures, but their misuse. Once pilots began to train for air combat maneuvering, all changed. The AIM-7's performance in Vietnam has been called a disappointment at best by every source I've ever seen mention it. Although I must admit that I was partly conflating its faults with criticisms of the AIM-4, which was worse. Air to air missiles are dependent not only on their own performance but on many factors. First there was unrealistic testing in peacetime. They used remote operated drones like the QF^F or QB-17. They would fly straight and level at high altitude. There was no hard turns. The firing was scripted, scheduled and straightforward. The NVAF aircraft were very small aircraft, agile and they generally flew very low. Their normal combat procedure was to take off one of their airfields like Kep, Bien HOi, Hoa Lac and Gia Lam to name a few. They would stay low, fly underneath our attack squadrons, then climb up and roll out behind our squadrons then attack. This meant that our fighters had to have look down - shoot down capability with anti-clutter capability. The F-4B/N APQ-72 did not have that capability but the AWG-10 in the F-4J/S did. The USAF F4C did not have the capability but the F-4E. This meant that the missile seekers could and did choose the wrong target. or could not lock up. Poor training was a big issue. The early AIM-7 Sparrow was a tube-based. Tubes are very sensitive to high G maneuvers. We had to solder the tubes into the boards in the WRA's, then use an epoxy to glue it to the board so it was not lift up during maneuvers. This was the E-version. Missile seekers were sometimes found with tobacco and ash in the seekers and this disabled them. Poor quality control caused all this. This is not a simple story, trust me. Here is what Ed Rasimus with two tours, 250 missions in F-15's and F-4E's stated: “You'll seldom get a tactical aviator to confess that he didn't have a clue, but I'll admit it with regard to the F-4/AIM-7 system… I went to war in the F-4 after a "Cat IV" checkout which was 45 days and just under 30 hours flying time in F-4Cs at Luke. I arrived at Korat to fly E's which had a considerably different weapons system--and within the first month the wing converted to TCTO-556 with yet a different cockpit configuration… My understanding of the AIM-7E was pretty much that the WSO would lockup and I'd shoot when the dot was centered and the circle got big. In most instances I'd be swatting at the plastic tubing extension we all put on the weapons select switch (or after -556 flipping the pinky switch) to go to AIM-9 or guns because we couldn't get a lock, we were inside parameters or the missiles didn't "tune"--whatever that meant. Training never improved much during the five years I spent flying Phantoms. The details of AIM-7E-2 employment were locked in the safes in the Wing Weapons shop and only doled out grudgingly by the "target arms." The secrets of intercept geometry were readily available and with practice even an ol' ground attack puke like me could figure out how to "hot up" an intercept to keep from tail chasing, but the details of even the bit checks were never well understood. (What was the significance of making the dot run around between the two circles anyway??) With the establishment of the Aggressors and wide-spread emphasis on DACT, I got to improve my BFM skills and apply some tactics but the concentration was on WVR maneuver to guns or a lagging Sidewinder shot. We still never got regular, detailed, tactically applied instruction on AIM-7 parameters and employment.” If you haven't figured it out, I worked on the F-4B, F-4J, F-14, F-18 but primarily the E2C, for the government and I can give you some really good stories, but I can't. One last issue that no one understands. Most pilot did not really want a gun, because there would be a tendency to want to dogfight with the enemy and that could be deadly in an F-4 against a MIG. All they wanted was a look down-shoot down radar, reliable missile and air combat maneuvering training with the missiles to understand its limitations and capability. However, the Vietnam War ended before all this could occur. They later developed SEAM for the AIM-9 which was the sidewinder extended acquisition mode. It was two mirrors mounted in the cockpit, one on the upper left and one on the upper right, and the helmet had a special device. I am not allowed to tell you anymore, but it was very effective. Remember that the missile would not function properly if the radar wasn't functioning properly. Sometimes to maintain the necessary squadron launch requirements from both land and sea, the radars might not be fully functioning in the bird, if it wasn't, the missile might not work. The AIM-7 was a very complex and sensitive missile and its performance paid the price. The Vietnam War caught all of us without adequate preparation. The military had trained since the Korean War for combat against bombers and now the aircraft that had been designed for shooting down bombers and supporting tactical requirements in the North German Plain in Europe was out the door. Now we were engaged in a war over jungles, with ROE that were absolutely senseless and with other restraints against bombing their bases or their power plants and the bridges that brought the supplies from China. It's like fighting with one hand behind your back. I am not making excuses for poor training, poor quality control and a lack of understanding of our new enemy. But we must take these into consideration. There is no one reason for the failures of both the AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles. My apologies to all for going on and on about all this. My intent to provide an understanding of just how complex this issue of missiles, radar and aircraft is.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2019 11:49:00 GMT -6
I know I am overdoing this work on air to air missiles but for the game I think it important to understand. The information I am providing is from a report titled the "Ault Report". It is a review specifically dedicated to air to air missile system capability. The date of the review is from July- November 1968.
The abstract for the reports states that during the time from 17 June 1965 and 17 September 1968 there were 360 hostile engagements with 600 air to air missiles fired by both the Navy and the USAF. The kill probability was one kill for every ten firings. The aircaft and weapons used were the F-8, F4B, F4J, Aim-7 and Aim-9. The report does provide the details on versions.
Here are the five basic questions that the inquiry focused on:
1. Is the industry delivering to the Navy a high quality product, design and built to specifications?
2. Are Fleet support organizations delivering a high quality product to the CVA's and the forward area sites ashore?
3. Do shipboard and squadron organizations launch on optimally read combat aircraft-missile systems?
4. Does the combat aircrew fully understand and the exploit the capabilities of the aircraft-missile systems and is the aircraft-missile systems properly designed and configured for the air-to air mission?
5. Is the air-to air missile system repair and rework program returning a quality to the fleet?
The report is very detailed but the conclusion was that the air to air missile systems were design optimized for high altitude engagement against a non-maneuvering large (bomber) target. This meant that the systems were limited in their low-altitude fighter to fighter engagements. In other words, they could not dogfight. The report also states that missile control system performance, aircrew performance and missile motor fire were three areas that had to be improved but that the missile guidance and fuzing functions were problems all due to maintainability and reliability. Essentially, the missile performances would have been better if a better system of quality control and program control at the top had been better.
The report did recommend a very long list of problem areas for both missiles and the fire control systems along with pilot and cockpit management. You can't dogfight with your head in the cockpit. You have to look out of the cockpit but the electronic display systems were never designed for that and that had to be changed.
They also found that built in test functions in the aircraft were not enough to detect faults and isolate the problems. I can confirm that issue, trust me. There is far more problems with the test equipment assigned to test, and provide the necessary data to repair defect or deficient systems. My purpose with this piece to try to show how very complex all this was and still is. This is not WW2. You don't just fire the engine up, test the guns and radios and launch. It is far more complex than that. The Ault Report can be found on DTIC which is the Defense Technical Information Center.
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Post by ulzgoroth on Sept 1, 2019 12:07:19 GMT -6
...And somehow you've translated that rather damning list of flaws in the missile and its immediate supporting hardware into arguing repeatedly that the missile wasn't bad?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2019 13:05:27 GMT -6
...And somehow you've translated that rather damning list of flaws in the missile and its immediate supporting hardware into arguing repeatedly that the missile wasn't bad? The problems for the missiles and weapons systems were the mission for which they were designed did not fit the operational theatre and the operations in that theatre. That is the difference along with poor quality control in the manufacturing, the poor maintenance of the missiles and the radars at all levels. The whole system failed from top to bottom. Once we solved the quality control issue, trained the pilots and RIO's, the kill ratios increased. Unfortunately, the war ended before the improvements could take a large effect. The late 1950's and early 1960's saw a rapid increase in the complexity of air combat and as such, the development periods were greatly increased. They've been increasing ever since. If you discovered a problem, the time frame for a solution and getting it out to the fleet became almost exponential. Another issue that we need to understand is funding. During a war, most of your funding is directed to operations and maintenance, not personnel or research and development. Operations and maintenance increases because of the increased sortie rates which mean more flight time and this means that planes reach their limits quicker. This simply means that you have to ground the plane and perform the hourly checks as specified. Increased flight times and missions will rapidly cause aircraft failures that need to be addressed. The majority of the missions by the USAF and the USN were in support of ground operations or for the USAF support for the limited bombing missions in the north. This was the focus for both services. Fixing problems with the missile systems was important, but not as important as keeping the planes flying and dropping ordnance. There are priorities in war and sometimes the problems during the war cannot be completely addressed until the war ended. This is exactly what happened in Vietnam. I have tried not to use reductionism in this issue about the missiles but to convey in my best way, how complex the development, implementation and use of air to air weapons has become since the middle 1950's. Even in air to ground the issue is the same. News programs can deceive us about this whole issue. My apologies if I did not explain well, I did my best. Thanks for being patient.
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