tc27
Junior Member
Posts: 68
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Post by tc27 on Aug 28, 2015 7:43:11 GMT -6
Interesting discussion....I spend a lot of tonnage and funds on my legacy armoured cruisers because if you get in a war early being able to win the cruiser battle scenarios is a good path to victory...usually it means I have less Bs in my battleline but due to the woeful accuracy and damage from early game gunfire I can usually get away with ACs acting as battle squadrons (and having 10-11 inch main batteries means then can also hurt pre-dreads).
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Post by dickturpin on Aug 28, 2015 14:12:52 GMT -6
I have only completed 1 campaign (playing as USA).
I fought 4 wars 1900 - 1925 and never had a battleship fire a shot (or appear in a tactical battle for that matter). All actions involved cruisers of various types and a few destroyers.
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Post by dickturpin on Aug 28, 2015 14:13:18 GMT -6
I have only completed 1 campaign (playing as USA).
I fought 4 wars 1900 - 1925 and never had a battleship fire a shot (or appear in a tactical battle for that matter). All actions involved cruisers of various types and a few destroyers.
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Post by namuras on Aug 28, 2015 15:34:29 GMT -6
I have only completed 1 campaign (playing as USA). I fought 4 wars 1900 - 1925 and never had a battleship fire a shot (or appear in a tactical battle for that matter). All actions involved cruisers of various types and a few destroyers. That happens as USA... unless you try to fight the RN or station your fleet in Europe...
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 29, 2015 14:56:02 GMT -6
I would like to offer my thoughts in this interesting subject. The name "cruiser" describes a role for a ship, operating in cruising duties. This is different from the terminology of the Napoleonic Wars where the name described a ship type like a third rate ship of the line. Their mission was scouting for the battle fleet, trade protection and "showing the flag" as one author puts it.
On March 17 1905, the Committee on Designs approved the building of four "large armored cruisers" specifically the Invincible class. Their mission was exactly the same as the mixed gun version previously built. Trade protection, specifically the new class of fast liners converted to commerce raiders, super scouts and flank protection for the fleet. The next round of Large armored cruisers were now give the name, battleship-cruisers. No mission changes, just larger ships, faster and now using 13.5 inch guns. Finally, lord Fisher, I believe, in a document sent to the Admiralty called them battle cruisers. The mission of trade protection is offered by many historians but research indicates that in no Admiralty document was trade protection ever mentioned for these large armored cruisers. Many historians believe this was invented by Sir Reginald Bacon to cover up for his friend Jackie Fisher after Jutland and that the primary mission was to scout and possibly slow down the enemy fleet to allow the battle force to catch up and then the large armored cruisers would attack the flanks. Considering the cost of these "battle cruisers" this makes much more sense than to use them to hunt down ocean liners.
As with any weapons system, technological changes will change missions. The submarine now, after 1917 took over the mission of commerce raiding and hence, the need for fast cruisers to hunt down the surface raiders was no longer a requirement. That responsibility was for the destroyers and smaller ships like the later corvettes and frigates. The scouting mission, after the 1918 was now being taken over by the aircraft and newly developed aircraft carriers. In the US Navy, its infant carrier force was assigned to the scouting force out of Norfolk and performed that mission during the fleet problems centered in the Caribbean. Again, the mission of scouting was now left to the longer ranged and more efficient carrier and patrol aircraft. As to flank protection, the carrier could perform that mission far better than the large armored cruisers or battle cruisers.
I would say that the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty put the coup de grace to the battlecruiser concept. Missions now changed for that class of ships, and so did their title: they were now heavy and light cruisers. They were not going to get involved in battle line actions but would now escort the carriers and provide protection for convoys etc. In the Pacific island campaigns they were the best and most efficient ships that could continue to operate in the narrow and confined waters.
I would have to agree that the large armored cruiser did not and were not intended to replace the battleship. Admiral Fisher thought that the large armored cruisers should be built in lieu of large expensive battleships. The admiralty did not agree and hence both were built, but in different numbers based the financial state of the country.
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Post by dickturpin on Aug 30, 2015 16:20:31 GMT -6
I agree with oldpop2000 that trade protection was not the role of the large armored cruiser. The Powerful class were built for the role of hunting liners and their design shows the attributes that would be allowed for; long range and high speed. These ships are often derided for lack of armament and protection. These attributes are not really required for this role as medium guns are all that is required to sink an unarmored liner and such a vessel would not carry an extensive armament. The pair of 9" guns on the Powerful was not part of the original design but were subsequently added by the Admiralty.
Cruisers in the era of the armored ship are the naval equivalent of dragoons on land; they are versatile and capable of performing multiple roles. By 1905, big guns are indicative of a desire to fight at long range; ships intending to fight at short/medium range will retain a medium battery as their rate of fire will still be useful at such ranges. Blucher is as example of a close range cruiser killer; improved protection, quick fire main guns, strong secondary battery and the speed to close the range.
The role of battleship/battlecruiser was somewhat blurred in the post Washington constructions of the late 1930's and 1940's as lighter machinery and structure enabled battlecruiser speed and battleship protection in the same ship.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 30, 2015 19:34:36 GMT -6
Trade protection was always important to the Admiralty due to England's geographical status as an island nation. It especially became important throughout the 19th century as her self-sufficiency in agriculture and goods began to wane. She imported more cotton from the US and India, wheat and other crops were imported along with raw materials for iron and later steel production. I've discovered in my research that by the mid-19th century, England imported two-thirds of her food supply and did not keep more than six weeks to a month's supply of raw materials and food in stock at any one time. Uninterrupted supplies were a must for England. This was also true of Spain, Italy and France, although France was in a better position due to her location on the European peninsula. Germany and Austria were in a much better position as they were land based powers, the same goes for Russia. In all cases, during war time, this situation for all nations changes radically. It must be considered carefully during war planning.
The Admiralty conference of 1905 decided that there were two methods of conducting commerce protection; patrolling the trade routes or cruiser squadrons at certain points on the trade routes. The latter was chosen. The merchant vessels would be directed to follow pre-determined routes to pass focal points, as they were called, which would be guarded by cruisers. This method of prescribed routes was not adhered to by the CinC channel Fleet who rejected the concept. It was decided to maintain a watch on the enemy forces and disperse the trade to make it difficult for commerce raiders to locate the merchant ships who would be on many different routes.
The Admiralty always believed that the defeat of the enemy fleet was most likely at the beginning of the war and hence, trade defense was not really necessary. It was thought that it might be a temporary inconvenience but not for very long. The 1906 naval maneuvers designed to test guerre de course appeared to prove the idea that an early defeat of the enemy fleet would solve the issue. Fisher and Churchill believed that an enemy fleet might refuse an early action with the British fleet and that the submarine might take a larger role in commerce raiding. Eventually, the Admiralty relied on the old 17th century method of supplying guns to the merchant vessels and to provide the ammunition and training to the personnel. The early years of WW1 seem to have shown the Admiralty easy-going attitude to be a failure.
If we examine a map of the trade routes circa 1900, it is easy to see that there was no possibility of building enough cruisers to create the necessary cruisers squadrons. Their attitude that guerre de course was bound to fail also contributed to the failure to produce adequate cruisers and destroyers but concentrate on battleships and large armored cruisers. The latter were too expensive to waste on trade protection duties especially when it was felt that trade protection was not going to be an issue. To examine other nations such as France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary requires an analysis of their geographical position and economic situation around this same time frame, but as I said, when war starts, all bets are off.
I hope this clarifies why the Admiralty chose to develop all big gun battleships and large armored cruisers. Besides the technological leap, it fit in with their strategic concepts for the next conflict. Who ever that might be with; Russia and France or Germany.
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Post by cwemyss on Aug 30, 2015 19:52:07 GMT -6
Very interesting discussion, and I don't have much to add. But looking at that map... what the heck was going on at the southern tip of Baffin Island?
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 30, 2015 19:54:27 GMT -6
Very interesting discussion, and I don't have much to add. But looking at that map... what the heck was going on at the southern tip of Baffin Island? Whaling specifically Baluga Whales. It is near the gulf stream and that it where good fishing occurs. It is at the entrance to Hudson Bay and that is where the Hudson Bay Company operated. Seal skins and such were a commodity in great demand in England.
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Post by thecarthaginian on Aug 31, 2015 15:54:38 GMT -6
I'm sorry to appear a deserter - after a rough week at work I've spent more time thinking about playing the game, and less about discussing the merits and flaws of ships within it.
Back to the armored cruiser: As Oldpop points out -perhaps not 'in agreement,' but maybe 'in parallel' for lack of a better term? - the armored cruiser was ill-suited for the battleline duties that the developing navies of the US and Japan forced upon it. At Santiago de Cuba, the US armored cruisers survived because 1.) they faced an enemy force of only armored cruisers (one virtually unarmed) 2.) they were covered by a considerable of battleships, 3.) the enemy vessels were in poor material condition and 4.) the Spanish were horribly out of practice and firing shells literally filled with sawdust! This gives the illusion of adequacy to the armored cruiser in the battleline role, but even a cursory examination of the actual conditions of the battle is quick to show that you are not dealing with a fair assessment of either the capabilities of either the attacker or the defender... though the defender would have, if facing only the battleships, met with the same fate due to his slow speed and shell handicap. On to Tsushima, then. At Tsushima, we face the difficulty of discerning if the armored cruisers actually contributed to the fight, or were simply sniping at doomed men. Kasagi, as a protected cruiser, will be left out of the assessment. Nisshin had all but one of her 8" guns put out of action by Russian hits, rendering her materially ineffective for fighting. Admiral Yamamoto would probably also argue against her armor being particularly effective, as he was one of roughly 100 of her crew wounded in the action (five were killed). Iwate faced the Russians in line of battle along with Kasuga and Nisshin, but accomplished little in the way of verifiable contribution. Their only certain success was to prevent the Zhemchug from attempting a torpedo attack to make the battleline deviate away from the Russians. Her great success came after this action, pummeling the poorly-designed and mechanically unreliable - not to mention damaged - Admiral Ushakov. It is unknown whether the latter was actually sunk by the Japanese; the crew may well have scuttled her. Kasuga encountered a demoralized Imperator Nikolai I after a completely inconsequential stent in the battle line; the latter vessel was so terrorized by the Japanese battleships that after a single heavy shell struck her funnel, the ship surrendered along with the rest of the badly outnumbered Russian fleet. Yakumo made little telling contribution save participating in the harrowing of the Admiral Ushakov. So, what did thu Japanese armored cruiser force actually accomplish during Tsushima? 1.) A poorly-organized and fruitless pursuit of the Russian cruisers, 2.) a completely inconsequential contribution to the battleline at the cost of mild damage to themselves and 3.) the terrorizing of a single damaged and obsolete coastal battleship who's poor crew could barely have fought their own ship under the best of circumstances - and which possibly sank their own vessel. All in all, hardly a convincing argument for the armored cruiser in the battleline... especially considering that the Nihon Kaigun was - man for man and ton for ton - possibly the navy on the planet with the most combat experience at this time.
I say as Mahan did about an armored cruiser thta attempts to fight line of battle: "She is armored, and she is a cruiser; and what have you got? A ship to "lie in the line"? as our ancestors used to say. No, and Yes; that is to say, she may at a pinch, and at a risk that exceeds her powers. A cruiser? Yes, and No; for, order to give her armor and armament which do not fit the line, you have given tonnage beyond what is needed for the speed and coal endurance proper for a cruiser. By giving this tonnage to armor and armament you have taken it from other uses; either from increasing her own speed and endurance, or from providing another cruiser. You have in her more cruiser than she ought to have and less armored vessel, or less cruiser and more armored ship. I do not call this a combination, though I do call it a compromise.... I do not say you have a useless ship. I do say that you have not as useful a ship as, for the tonnage, you ought to have." This 'mission creep' is entirely responsible for why armored cruisers because the bloated, bastard children that we see in the Minotaur and Tsukuba classes. Straining for the approval as both cruiser and battleline vessel, they accomplish neither well.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Aug 31, 2015 21:34:37 GMT -6
In the history of warfare, there are always transition time periods. Periods when the tactics and strategies are from the older period but with technological changes coming about, they haven't had time to be re-evaluated and revised. Sometimes its due to the fact that technological changes occur during extended times of peace and war games do not compare with actual combat. This is essentially what happened during the middle to late 1900's and into the early 20th century. Iron and steel ships, steam, wirewound guns, new types of powder for those new guns, new sighting equipment; this list goes on and on. The Sino-Japanese war and the Spanish American War were both fought during that transition period and both were fought in an enclosed sea and littoral zones. In the first war, the IJN used the idea of the small fast warships; cruisers and torpedo boats because she did not have the funds to buy large battleships. The Battle of the Yalu river was a Japanese victory not because her ships were better but because of poor tactics and position.
The situation in the Battle of Santiago Bay was essentially the same issue. Better training for US ships, more ammunition and poor positioning of the Spanish Fleet.
In the Russo-Japanese war, the victories at Port Arthur and Tsu-shima were due more to poor positioning of the Far Eastern Fleet for the Russians, poor training and lack of experience on the part of the Baltic fleet. It wasn't the poor design of the ships, because you design your ships for your geographic situation. For the Russians it was enclosed seas; the Black Sea, the Baltic and the Mediterranean. You fight like you train. In the period prior to WW1, this is exactly the problem, not the battle cruisers or armored cruisers, it was the lack of appropriate training in the use of the new technology. Neither the Germans nor the British had a fought naval war in at least one hundred years; at least for the British. War games just couldn't predict how the tactics and strategy would develop.
You can't predict how your enemy will react once the shooting starts. The enemy always has a say in your plans; and that isn't just a trite saying, its true. The best designed warships can be lost, for just some stupid mistake or because your strategy failed due to your opponent not following your plan for him. There wasn't anything wrong with armored cruisers or large armored cruisers. It was the failure to understand that the strategy and tactics had to adjust to the new technology and that your opponent might not be reading the same naval manuals that you are reading. You design a ship with a combination of good seakeeping capability, speed, armor protection and firepower. It must be a balance of all those qualities. A ship with a balance of those qualities, tailored for its mission or missions, will succeed provided you understand the appropriate strategy and perform adequate training to accomplish those missions.
Thanks for putting up with the ramblings of an old guy;
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Post by dickturpin on Sept 1, 2015 16:00:44 GMT -6
Back to the armored cruiser: As Oldpop points out -perhaps not 'in agreement,' but maybe 'in parallel' for lack of a better term? - the armored cruiser was ill-suited for the battleline duties that the developing navies of the US and Japan forced upon it. At Santiago de Cuba, the US armored cruisers survived because 1.) they faced an enemy force of only armored cruisers (one virtually unarmed) 2.) they were covered by a considerable of battleships, 3.) the enemy vessels were in poor material condition and 4.) the Spanish were horribly out of practice and firing shells literally filled with sawdust! This gives the illusion of adequacy to the armored cruiser in the battleline role, but even a cursory examination of the actual conditions of the battle is quick to show that you are not dealing with a fair assessment of either the capabilities of either the attacker or the defender... though the defender would have, if facing only the battleships, met with the same fate due to his slow speed and shell handicap. On to Tsushima, then. At Tsushima, we face the difficulty of discerning if the armored cruisers actually contributed to the fight, or were simply sniping at doomed men. Kasagi, as a protected cruiser, will be left out of the assessment. Nisshin had all but one of her 8" guns put out of action by Russian hits, rendering her materially ineffective for fighting. Admiral Yamamoto would probably also argue against her armor being particularly effective, as he was one of roughly 100 of her crew wounded in the action (five were killed). Iwate faced the Russians in line of battle along with Kasuga and Nisshin, but accomplished little in the way of verifiable contribution. Their only certain success was to prevent the Zhemchug from attempting a torpedo attack to make the battleline deviate away from the Russians. Her great success came after this action, pummeling the poorly-designed and mechanically unreliable - not to mention damaged - Admiral Ushakov. It is unknown whether the latter was actually sunk by the Japanese; the crew may well have scuttled her. Kasuga encountered a demoralized Imperator Nikolai I after a completely inconsequential stent in the battle line; the latter vessel was so terrorized by the Japanese battleships that after a single heavy shell struck her funnel, the ship surrendered along with the rest of the badly outnumbered Russian fleet. Yakumo made little telling contribution save participating in the harrowing of the Admiral Ushakov. So, what did thu Japanese armored cruiser force actually accomplish during Tsushima? 1.) A poorly-organized and fruitless pursuit of the Russian cruisers, 2.) a completely inconsequential contribution to the battleline at the cost of mild damage to themselves and 3.) the terrorizing of a single damaged and obsolete coastal battleship who's poor crew could barely have fought their own ship under the best of circumstances - and which possibly sank their own vessel. All in all, hardly a convincing argument for the armored cruiser in the battleline... especially considering that the Nihon Kaigun was - man for man and ton for ton - possibly the navy on the planet with the most combat experience at this time. I say as Mahan did about an armored cruiser thta attempts to fight line of battle: "She is armored, and she is a cruiser; and what have you got? A ship to "lie in the line"? as our ancestors used to say. No, and Yes; that is to say, she may at a pinch, and at a risk that exceeds her powers. A cruiser? Yes, and No; for, order to give her armor and armament which do not fit the line, you have given tonnage beyond what is needed for the speed and coal endurance proper for a cruiser. By giving this tonnage to armor and armament you have taken it from other uses; either from increasing her own speed and endurance, or from providing another cruiser. You have in her more cruiser than she ought to have and less armored vessel, or less cruiser and more armored ship. I do not call this a combination, though I do call it a compromise.... I do not say you have a useless ship. I do say that you have not as useful a ship as, for the tonnage, you ought to have." This 'mission creep' is entirely responsible for why armored cruisers because the bloated, bastard children that we see in the Minotaur and Tsukuba classes. Straining for the approval as both cruiser and battleline vessel, they accomplish neither well. This subject will inevitably be controversial as all ships are a compromise and the battleship is designed entirely to fight in the battleline whilst the cruiser can fulfill a range of tasks. All being equal, the battleship should defeat the cruiser 1:1 but is not capable of fulfilling any other tasks. Providing the range was kept long, the Invincible would be an exception as she may be expected to beat contemporary battleships. I have tried this using S&I RJW, matching Invincible and her sisters against the most modern US, German and French battleships in equal numbers; the Invincibles usually win.
Whilst the examples given could be interpreted as above, there are factors in the battles chosen that could be interpreted otherwise.
At Santiago de Cuba, an American force of battleships and a cruiser unsurprisingly defeated a smaller Spanish cruiser force that was in poor condition. D.K Brown in Warrior to Dreadnought gives the following figures for the hits obtained on Spanish ships: 13" (0 hits from 47 rounds) 12" (2 hits from 39 rounds) 8" (10 hits from 219 rounds) 5 & 6" (17 hits from 744 rounds) 4" (13 hits from 251 rounds) 6pdr (76 hits from 6,553 rounds). The Spanish ships were largely destroyed by fire. It could therefore be concluded that most of the damage was caused by medium and intermediate caliber artillery and that penetration of armor was not a significant factor. Furthermore, the Americans lacked quick fire medium guns that were mounted in most European large ships and these may be expected to be even more effective. These are the exact conditions in which armored cruisers may be expected to perform well when incorporated into the battleline.
At Tsushima, a Japanese force combined battleships, cruisers and torpedo craft against a Russian force of predominantly battleships. The Garibaldi class were not armored cruisers in the true sense but were designed as budget substitutes for capital ships in the fleet of second line powers; they were barely greater than 50% of the displacement of a battleship. The remaining armored cruisers were also on the small size when compared to battleships or some contemporary ships of other powers.
According to N.J.M Campbell in Tsushima, Nisshin had her guns cut by a Russian shell (or possibly by prematures) but her turrets remained operational; this kind of hit would equally cut 12" guns also. Campbell's detailed analysis indicates that the Japanese cruiser force absorbed a fair amount of punishment but remained in action. Campbell makes the point that a detailed analysis of the hits on the Russian ships is not possible as many of these were sunk with few casualties. Brown however suggests that Osliabia was sunk mainly as a result of fire from cruisers.
Thus, despite the fact that Tsushima was fought predominantly at fairly long range (due to caution on the part of Togo, who was reluctant to lose any of his significant units) and in conditions not entirely favorable to the cruisers, they absorbed a fair amount of punishment but survived to potentially cause significant damage to the battleships in the Russian fleet. This could possibly be considered more as a vindication of the type.
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Post by thecarthaginian on Sept 1, 2015 16:16:41 GMT -6
Oldpop, In the history of warfare, there are also principles and designs that prove "you already got it right, stop fooling with it." The most reliable weapon in my issue in Iraq in 03 just happened to be designed when my Grandfather was still in diapers (1921 to be exact) and probably built before you went to war in the late 60's. Cruisers excelled at what they were designed to do - catch faster ships, and be in more places at once than an expensive battle line ship. When they handed over these advantages, they lost their purpose. "Battle cruisers" had no purpose after the decline of the armored cruiser; the concept's failure had nothing to do with flaws in training or doctrine. The initial doctrine was sound - make armored cruisers faster, more heavily armed and more able to engage at range than the enemy. The problem came in continuing to produce them after this purpose was obviously not available anymore. They started being used as harassment squadrons against ships with guns they could not defend against. Much like my own war, where a vehicle designed primarily for transporting troops (M1025/1026) became an 'uparmored' 'combat vehicle' version of itself (M1114)... but in doing so, ceased to be as good at moving troops and also remained deficient in being a light armored vehicle.
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Post by oldpop2000 on Sept 1, 2015 17:22:51 GMT -6
First, in war, if you don't adjust to new tactics and weaponry, you will lose. It is an accepted fact and there are more historical examples than I or anyone has time to relate. So I won't try. You never have it right.
Second, the concept of the armored cruiser was a throwback from the Age of Sail but Naval Warfare had changed and was changing so the cruiser had to change. It did change but naval warfare was not finished changing. The mine, torpedo, submarine and the aircraft were changing and would continue to change the way naval strategy was implement and conducted. Guerre de course or commerce warfare would be the province of the torpedo and submarine and those weapons would require a different type of ship; the destroyer. The British had not accepted that and their doctrine suffered. It suffered so badly that in 1917 they were very nearly out of food and raw materials due to the lack of destroyers. They had to take some from the Grand Fleet which did not sit well with David Beatty, new commander.
The armored cruiser and its bigger relative, the large armored cruiser were good designs but were built for a doctrine that was fast fading. As I stated in an earlier post, the Admiralty had decided that the two main missions for the cruisers was to protect the trade lanes and scout for the battle fleet. The third mission; protecting the flanks was not seriously considered by the Admiralty. In the first mission, they had essentially decided that trade protection was not necessary, so they did not train very hard for it. Scouting for the battle fleet prior to the decisive battle as Mahan had explained was the primary mission of those cruisers, and they performed it well except for poor ammunition handling; a training issue and an aggressive fleet commander who possibly did not understand the weaknesses of his battle cruisers; IMHO a doctrinal issue.
As to your example, sometimes we are faced with situations that we have not prepared for, so we have to use whatever systems are available to get the job done. New systems development takes time, so in the interim we adapt. Here is a good example from my war. The early F-4's like the F-4B, J, C and D's did not have a gun. So, they developed the SUU-16 and later versions like the SUU-23. It was a pod with a Gatling gun in it mounted on the belly of the bird. Great adaptation because the vibration from the gun, created a great dispersal pattern for the 20mm rounds. It could hit ground targets and was used in air to air effectively until the F-4E came out for the USAF and it had an internal mounted Gatling. We adapted and we developed a pretty decent weapons system. This is the way militaries work; at least the successful ones.
The armored cruisers which ever version, were good weapons and would evolve into even better weapons after the Washington Naval Treaty. With good speed, armor and firepower they would be effective in enclosed seas, narrow seas and in littoral zones where you would not want to risk your battleships. They would become the escorts for the new technology the carrier and perform that mission well as they still do; they have evolved as all good weapons must.
I will let others move this good discussion in the direction you want it to go. It's very interesting, and disagreements are how we all learn. Keep it going.
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Post by sabratha on Sept 11, 2015 4:34:14 GMT -6
Honestly the designer is kind of wonky with everything. Apparently as long as a ship makes more than 21 knots the game considers it a Battlecruiser. I mean, I built the 1939 refit of the Warspite in the designer - 24 knots, 8 15-inch guns in four double turrets, 8 6-inch guns in casemates, 8 4-inch guns in 4 double turrets, 14-inch belt, all that stuff - and it was calling it a Battlecruiser. Well, the game isn't really suited to post 1925 designs. Having said that, a 24 knot ship for the 1910s is pretty fast. In 1910s this would be blending the grey area between battlecrusiers and battleships - some kind of "fast battleship". Also I disagree that the Battlecrusier was an evolutionary dead end. Far from it. While the Washington naval treaty prevented relaly large new cruiser designs, fast battleships like the refitted Kongo proved to be a very versatile and usefull class in the coming Carrier&airplane era. Thge Dunkerque class was a good design as was a victim of the political situation of France mroe than anything else. At the same time the tendency was to build new battleships to be faster. Take the USS Washington - it farewd well and imho would have been a much less usefull ship if they built her with the same parameters, but with a 23 knot speed with more impressive armor. What I'm saying is that the 1930s and ww2 era designs (especially US and Japanese ones) had a tendency to bring the BC and BB evolutionary lines togeather into the modern 27+ knot fast battleships. Were it not for the naval treaties, I think we would have seen CAs and more BCs, "fast battleships" and "pocket battleship" designs coming from all major nations. The Atago CA class or the Mogami CA would surely not exist in their RL forms had it not been for the naval treaties. Yeah, had a similar thing in my US game. I guess the main reason was base limits - I was unable to bring my BB fleet to Europe, while my opponents were unable to bring theirs to the US coast. Japan had the opportunity to attack me in Asia, but her battlewagons were obsolete in comparison to my own and she never took the risk. Germany was stupid enough to try to send one pre-dreadnaught in the early 1920s to the US coast and it was torpedoed and sank by a force of just USN destroyers.
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